The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform


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Jadidism in Central Asia
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
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for my parents

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Preface
Whether it is in the obsession with multiculturalism in American academe or in
facile visions of an impending, perhaps inevitable "clash of civilizations" in the mainstream public, it is culture that defines the essence of difference in the post-Cold War world. The Muslim world occupies a special place in this cultural geography, more closely identified with culture than any other part of the world. The cultural determinism implicit in such thinking can exist only by leaving unasked the question of the origins of culture. Although a substantial scholarly literature has argued at some length (but perhaps not very successfully, if one were to judge from how little its insights seem to illuminate mainstream debate), cultures are not immutable givens but themselves subject to change and flux. This applies to Muslim culture as much as to any other, although given the place Islam and Muslims occupy in the imagination of the "West," we are left constantly to reaffirm this basic fact. I have tried in this book to argue this basic point: that Islam, and Muslim culture, and the sense of being Muslim are far from immutable characteristics; rather, they change and evolve and do so through debate and the struggles of different groups in Muslim society.

The advent of new means of communication and new forms of sociability from the nineteenth century on introduced new ways in which debates over culture could take place, while the political and military imperatives represented by the rise of European power lent a special intensity to these debates. Modern historians have paid too little attention to what Muslims were debating in these new media. A few studies of major figures and their thought have provided us an overview of the trajectory of intellectual history of the period, but the emphasis in such studies remains either explicitly religious or explicitly political. The sea change that the Muslim intellectuals' view of the world, and of their place in it, underwent in the half-century before the Great War has never been evoked. Yet this change underlay the new directions in intellectual and political history that have appeared in the Muslim world in the twentieth century.

The foregoing applies with even greater force to Central Asia, an area largely forgotten by the outside world. When I began graduate work over a decade ago, I usually had to explain to inquisitive friends where Central Asia was. Then came perestroika, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the "emergence of Central Asia." These events have heightened interest in the region in a way that would have been inconceivable just a decade earlier. But while the amount of publishing on the region has increased manifold, the new literature is dominated by matters of geopolitics and prognostications about the future of the new countries, with remarkably little attention paid to topics of cultural or historical import, even as the literature of prognostication freely makes explanatory use of both culture and history.

This neglect stems from certain fundamental institutional factors: the passing of the old order in Russia in 1917 coincided, broadly, with a massive redefinition of the Muslim world in Western academe. The Muslim world came to be reconfigured in an Arab-centered manner, in which the Turks occupied only a marginal place. No fate was worse than that of Central Asia, which was consigned
to oblivion by scholars of Muslim societies and left to the tender mercies of émigré scholars and experts on Soviet nationalities studies. (Mainstream Soviet studies, notoriously Moscow-centered in any case, saw little more than incomprehensible oriental exotica in Central Asia.) Much of the slim literature that was produced on Central Asia outside the Soviet Union during the Soviet period was marked by a heavy emphasis on politics and what might be called "national martyrology." A sensitivity to the Muslim cultural background of pre-Soviet Central Asia and the consequences of its transformation in the postrevolutionary period was seldom evident, for it was often beyond the competence of nationalities scholars and anathema to émigré nationalists. The result was a general absence of a comparative framework for thinking about Central Asian history.

This book has been a prolonged attempt at righting the balance. It proceeds from a recognition of the fact that the experience of Central Asians under colonialism was hardly unique in the Muslim world. The debates that this book examines were parallel to those capturing the attention of Muslim intellectuals the world over. Indeed, the Muslim elites of Central Asia in the tsarist period were part of a much broader, cosmopolitan community of the world's Muslims. One of my aims in writing this book is to reclaim Central Asia for the study of Muslim societies, for only by understanding this context may we understand the cultural politics in pre-Soviet Central Asia, and only by understanding pre-Soviet Central Asia may we understand Soviet Central Asia. And conversely, only by understanding how Central Asian Muslims debated issues common to their age may we acquire a comprehensive picture of the myriad forms modernity has taken in the Muslim world. This is more than an exercise in "academic" history, for it allows us challenge facile explanations of the contemporary world in terms of an inevitable "clash of civilizations" and to remember that the more intransigent visions of the utter incompatibility of Islam and modernity that capture the headlines today are but one of the many answers Muslim intellectuals have produced to the most crucial questions of the previous century.

Attention to debates within Central Asian society also permits a more nuanced view of Russian imperialism. The demise of the Soviet Union has created considerable interest in the imperial dimension of Russian history, which has already resulted in the publication of a number of works of commendable sensitivity. Yet, much of this work remains in the domain of Russian colonial history, i.e., the history of how imperial officials made sense (or tried to make sense) of the borderland; of empire. As long as scholars look solely (or largely) at imperial debates over policy in the borderlands, natives will remain natives, as mysterious to the historian of today as they were to the administrator of yore.

But for all the attention to these broader dimensions, I have tried throughout to keep Central Asia itself at the focus of my inquiry (a courtesy not usually extended to it), for ultimately this book is an attempt to comprehend the making of modern Central Asia. I have not mentioned Soviet historiography earlier. It had its achievements, but shedding light on the cultural transformations of the
tsarist period was not one of them. As far as the Jadids were concerned, Soviet historiography obfuscated far more than it revealed. Many names (Behbudi, Cholpan, Fitrat) were simply written out of the history books, while others (Hamza, Awlani, Qadiri) were given highly tendentious biographies. Many of the most basic outlines of modern Central Asian history have to be delineated anew.

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This has been a major goal in writing this book, as has been the sense that the tumultuous history of Soviet Central Asia may only be understood against the background of the tsarist period. For Central Asia might have been largely forgotten by the world of scholarship after 1917, but it experienced all the excesses of the twentieth century: revolution, "development," genocide, ecological disaster, social engineering, and virulent nationalism. There are many stories to be told here; this book is perhaps a first step.

I have been with this project longer than I care to remember and in the process have accumulated many debts of gratitude to people and institutions. An earlier version of this book was completed as a dissertation under Kemal Karpat at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. In Madison, Michael Chamberlain introduced me to the works of Pierre Bourdieu, while his own work on medieval Damascus provided an elegant example of how historians appropriate the work of social thinkers. David McDonald kept me honest about the Russian dimension of my work. Many thanks to Uli Schamiloglu for friendship, advice, and those microfilms. Since then, I have benefited greatly from the advice and insights of a number of colleagues. Ed Lazzerini has for years been a font of searching questions; he has also generously shared copies of scarce materials with me. Hisao Komatsu also provided me copies of invaluable and impossible to find works fundamental to my work. Marianne Kamp shared her excellent judgment with me on several parts of the manuscript; she also gave permission to quote from her unpublished work. Dale Eickelman has given encouragement for several years and by inviting me to a National Endowment for the Humanities seminar on "Imagining Societies: The Middle East and Central Asia" at Dartmouth College, provided a captive audience for earlier versions of this book. John Perry invited me to a workshop on "Language, Literature, and Empire" at the University of Chicago in 1994, which produced valuable insights. Colleagues at the history department at Carleton College provided excellent comments on Chapter 2. Elyor Karimov allowed me to make copies of rare materials in his personal collection. Conversations with Vincent Fourniau, Garay Menicucci, Scott Seregny, and Gregg Starrett helped in various ways to clarify the argument. In Tashkent, Abduljabbar Abduvahitov, Akram Habibullaev, Saodat Kholmatova, and Saur Yaqupow provided inestimable friendship and support.

The research for the dissertation on which the book is based was

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funded by various agencies at the University of Wisconsin. Since then, the National Endowment for the Humanities has figured large in my professional life.
A Summer Stipend in 1994 allowed me to return to Tashkent for archival research, and a Fellowship for College Teachers allowed me a precious break from teaching in 1996, during which I wrote the bulk of the manuscript for this book. My leave coincided with some of the darkest hours that the endowment has endured, which heightened my appreciation for the work that it does for the humanities in this country. This book would have taken a lot longer without its support. I also gratefully acknowledge support from Carleton College. A faculty development endowment grant in 1994 contributed to the trip to the archives in 1994, and more recently the college provided generous support for the preparation of illustrations and maps for publication."Little of the research for this study could have been accomplished without the assistance of library and archive personnel on three continents. The staff at Memorial Library of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the (then) Lenin State Library in Moscow, its annex in Khimki, and the Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Tashkent deserve special gratitude. The Central State Archives of Cinematic, Audio, and Photographic Documents of the Republic of Uzbekistan provided the photograph reproduced here. But my greatest debts are of a personal nature. Cheryl Duncan humored me throughout the many years it has taken me to finish this project. In the process, she has read more drafts of this work than seemed humanly possible. Her love and encouragement, as well as her editorial skills and historical insights, were my constant companions. Haroun arrived in this world unduly ahead of the manuscript and thereby delayed it considerably; the joy he brought with him, however, makes it all worthwhile. Finally, my family has been my greatest source of inspiration. My brother Najeeb made it all possible in the beginning. My parents, Nazakat and Khalid Latif, always taught me to expect the utmost of myself. My father's library, especially his own book on the Muslims of the Soviet Union, first got me interested in Central Asia. When that interest led me in the unexpected direction of becoming a historian, my parents supported me in every way possible. It is to them that I dedicate this book.

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Technical Note
Transliteration
There does not exist a universally accepted system for transliterating Central Asian Turkic into the Latin script. During this century, it has been written in five different alphabets in three scripts. I have resisted the temptation to transliterate all Uzbek according to modern Cyrillic-script spelling, given that even modern Uzbek publishers do not follow this practice. Instead, I have transliterated the names of individuals active before 1920 and the titles of their works directly from the Arabic script in which they wrote, using the six-vowel system (a, a, e, i, o, and u) and disregarding vowel harmony. For modern Uzbek written in the Cyrillic script, I have used the system adopted in Uzbekistan in 1995, with the exception of rendering o' as o, k as kh, and g' as gh. The two systems are thus rendered harmonious, except that the vowels transliterated from the Arabic script as a and o appear as o and o,
respectively, when transliterated from the Cyrillic. I have followed the same logic in transliterating Tajik from the Cyrillic script, whereas "Tajik" in the Arabic script has been transliterated as Persian. Ottoman Turkish has been rendered in modern Turkish orthography on the basis of the 1968 Redhouse Türkçe İngilizce Sözlük, and Tatar citations are vocalized using Tatar vowels and vowel harmony.

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Names and Dates

Personal names took many forms in Central Asia in the period discussed here. Some people used Russian-style surnames (e.g., Khojaev), whereas others adopted Tatar-style last names (e.g., Behbudi, Awlani); yet others used pen names (takhallus, e.g., Ayni), although most were simply known by their first name (e.g., Hamza, Munawwar Qari). I have used the form of name most commonly used by the person in question and have alphabetized the bibliography accordingly. When the name of the same person might be transliterated differently in works appearing in different languages, I have grouped all entries by the same author together in the bibliography.

All common-era dates are given according to the Julian calendar, which was twelve days behind the Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century and thirteen days behind in the twentieth. The Julian calendar was in use in the Russian empire until February 1918; dates after February 1918 are in the Gregorian calendar, and the calendar is specified in cases where confusion might arise. Dates for periodicals published in the Ottoman empire are also given in the Julian calendar, which was the basis of the Ottoman fiscal calendar until 1917. I have used double dating only when the common-era year could not be determined with certainty for a publication dated in a hijri calendar.

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Abbreviations

GARFGosudarstvennyi arkhiw Rossiiskoi Federatsii
IOLRIndia Office Library and Records
OSEOzbek sovet entsiklopediyast
SFSada-yi Farghana
STSada-yi Turkistan
TsGARUzTsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi arkhiw Respubliki Uzbekistan
TWGTurkistan wilayatining gazeti
UTULugh Turkistan
ZhMNPZhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia

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At present, we Turkestanis are not sufficiently acquainted with religious and worldly knowledge. Our old maktabs and madrasas are in ruins, reminiscent of the nesting places of owls. Our madrasas, far from teaching worldly sciences, don't even teach tafsir and hadith, [which are] the basis of all religious knowledge. We do not have any teachers' training colleges to train teachers, or any workshops to teach skills. We do not have any merchants with modern business skills. There are no organized schools for the elementary education of our children. . . . If this . . . continues, soon even our present existence will be destroyed.

Haji Muin b. Shukrullah, 1916

In combining intimations of mortal danger faced by Central Asian society with a profound faith in the power of education to provide the solution, this speech from one of the first pieces of modern Central Asian theater neatly exemplifies the reformist project of the first generation of modern Central Asian intellectuals, the "Jadids." The unease about the present lay in a sense that traditions of the past were not only incapable of meeting new needs but were also failing to transmit the values of the past. A thoroughgoing reform of culture and society was needed if Central Asians were to survive the unprecedented challenges of the modern world. Although the Jadids saw themselves as reformers of their society, their enthusiastic embrace of modernity led them to radically new conceptions of society. Their attempts at rescuing tradition redefined it, and their attempts to return to a "pure" Islam brought new understandings of Islam and of what it meant to be a Muslim. The Jadids were successful in garnering considerable support for their project, but their call for reform also evoked vigorous opposition from established elites (the qadimchi ) in their society. It was through the debate over the meaning of Central Asian culture that Central Asians came to imagine the modern world and their place in it. This book tells the story of this debate.
global condition that brings with it new forms of organization of self and society, new forms of intellectual production, and new ways of imagining the world (and one's place within it). Modernity is not reducible to the inculcation of culturally specific norms or traits; nor is it synonymous with economic development. Rather, as an enormous body of interdisciplinary literature has argued in recent years, the modern condition transforms tradition (indeed, it makes it possible to conceive of tradition as tradition); it takes—and produces—numerous cultural forms, and it inheres in (economic) underdevelopment as much as in development. This conception of modernity therefore differs substantially from that of classical modernization theory, which saw modernization as a unilinear process that dissolved all opposition to it in its conquest of traditional forms.

The Jadid formulation of the predicament of Central Asian society was as much a result of the profound transformation of Central Asia in the fifty years of imperial Russian rule as a response to it. When Russian forces abruptly conquered the khanates of Central Asia between the 1860s and the 1880s, there existed no theater, no printing press, and no benevolent societies. All of these means of cultural production arose in the half-century of Russian rule. Between the establishment of the governorate-general of Turkestan in 1867 and the Russian revolutions of 1917, Central Asia became increasingly intertwined with imperial (and hence global) economic networks; its social order was drastically reshaped, with the extinction of old elites and the emergence of new ones. Its political order was, of course, reconstituted. New groups, such as the Jadids, adopted and appropriated new forms of communication and sociability in their attempts to reform, creating, in the process, radically new understandings of tradition, religion, and the world.

The Jadids of Central Asia were far from alone in the Muslim world in this period in (re)evaluating their cultural heritage under the exigencies of modernity. Jadidism, as this movement for cultural reform is usually called, had much in common with similar modernist movements popular among intellectuals throughout the Muslim world. The aim of such movements was nothing less than to reconcile Islam with a modernity they very much admired. But whereas similar modernist movements in India, the Ottoman lands, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria have received extensive scholarly attention,[1] Jadidism, especially in its Central Asian

form, remains virtually unknown. The volume of Western scholarship on tsarist Central Asia is slim, and work on Jadidism in Central Asia forms only a small part of it. Until very recently, specialist treatments of the subject were almost entirely lacking,[2] and one was left to retrieve Jadidism from brief passages widely scattered in broad-ranging synthetic works that subordinated Jadidism to much broader themes.[3] The very few longer pieces available on Jadidism suffered from the lack of access to primary sources that beset all study of Central Asia until the very last years of the Soviet regime.[4] Soviet scholars, while enjoying access to primary sources, were hampered by ideological constraints that often proved insurmountable. The situation has changed in recent years, but far less dramatically than many had hoped during the heady days of perestroika.[5] While the political context of scholarly production has been


[5] Central Asian scholars have brought back into print numerous works of Jadid authors, but larger synthetic studies of the period remain rare; see "Jadidchilik nima?" San"at , 1990, no. 12:4-10; Begali Qosimov, "Jadidchilik," in Milliy uyghonish wa ozbek filologiyasi masalalari (Tashkent, 1993), 12-39; Qosimov, "Sources littéraires et principaux traits distinctifs du djadidisme turkestanais (début du XXe siècle)." Cahiers du monde russe 37 (1996):107-132.
transformed in Central Asia in recent years, the severe economic dislocation of
academic life (combined with new political demands from the newly independent
states) in the post-Soviet period has meant that little new historiography has
emerged on this important topic.[6] Outside the former Soviet Union, interest in
Central Asia has focused on the contemporary period, with Jadidism enjoying the
attention of only a few scholars. Thus, although detailed research on tsarist
Central Asia has begun to appear in recent years, much more remains to be
done.[7] This book is the first effort to comprehend Muslim cultural debates in
Central Asia in a broad, comparative perspective.

Reform, Cultural Production, and Elite Strategies

Much recent social thought has insisted that cultures, rather than being
timeless givens, are products of historical change, their meanings contested and
constantly in flux. New understandings of the world emerge through efforts by
various groups in society to make sense of vastly new conditions they confront.
In the case of Central Asia, the Jadids, in diagnosing the ills of their society
and prescribing the cure (to use the medical metaphors they often favored), were
usurping the moral and cultural authority of the established religious-cultural
elites. Their prescription for reform contained a radical re-visioning of
society and the roles of various groups within it as well as a redefinition of
Central Asian culture and what was valuable within it. Not surprisingly, the
Jadid project provoked considerable opposition.

[6] On the politics of the rewriting of history in contemporary Central Asia,
see the very astute analysis by Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Djadidisme, mirasisme,
[7] Two substantial works appeared while this book was being written: Stéphane
A. Dudoignon, "La question scolaire à Boukhara et au Turkestan russe, du
"premier renouveau" à la soviétisation (fin du XVIIe siècle-1937)," Cahiers du
monde russe 37 (1996): 133-210; and Hisao Komatsu, Kakumei no Chuo Ajia: aru
Jadidó no shojo (Tokyo, 1996). Dudoignon's article covers much of the same
ground as this study, but with a different emphasis and rather different
conclusions. Komatsu's work, an extended biography of Abdurrauf Fitrat in the
context of revolutionary change in Central Asia, remains, unfortunately, beyond
my ken. I am grateful to Katie Sparling for acquainting me with its contents.

Western scholars have generally tended to ignore this opposition. As with
modernist reform in the Muslim world in general, scholars of Jadidism have
tended to focus on the Jadids as the sole voice of reason in their society while
dismissing their opponents as unreasoning obscurantists opposed to all positive
change. Thus, Edward Allworth sees the Jadids as "men . . . who dared reconsider
the predicament of their people," who "for the indigenous population of the
region . . . created or adapted six instruments for their purposes." Their
opponents, however, are dismissed as "those internally governed by fixed habit
and rigid tradition" who "failed to understand" the reforms suggested by the Jadids.[8] Soviet scholarship, on the other hand, acknowledged the contestation but reduced it to a Marxist metanarrative of class competition. The qadimimchi were representatives of the feudal-colonial order, whereas the Jadids were mouthpieces of a rising nationalist bourgeoisie, both groups transparently expressing the ideology of their respective classes.[9] Both these views are misleading. The complete absence in Western scholarship of any analysis of the contested nature of Jadidism leaves us unable to explain the Jadids' modest success except through invoking such orientalist tropes as the obscurantist nature of traditional elites or the fanaticism of Muslim culture. The Soviet view, too, simplified matters even as it confused them. The debate in Central Asian society cannot be reduced to conflicting economic interests for the Jadids often shared common social origins with their opponents and economic issues seldom surfaced in the debate. Rather, much of the debate discussed in this book centered around the competing claims to cultural authority—the authority to create and interpret culture—in which new elites challenged the authority of the old, for in the attempt to reform society lay a claim for leadership that was profoundly subversive to the established order.

I argue that the struggle between the Jadids and their opponents was over the possession and redefinition of what Pierre Bourdieu has called "cultural capital."[10] The Jadids sought to redefine the culture their society should value, bringing to bear on the debate their access to new intellectual technologies and forms of sociability. Their opponents met the challenge by valorizing the cultural values that guaranteed their status.


and prestige. Neither group, however, entered the contest fully formed, and the lines between the two groups always remained porous. Many Jadids were members of the religious elite in their own right, and many others were only a generation removed. More significantly, however, the ideas of both groups were articulated and refined through this contest. I follow Pierre Bourdieu in contending that only by "apprehending the specific logic of the social world, that 'reality' which is the site of a permanent struggle to define 'reality,'"[11] may we begin to understand what was at stake.

Bourdieu's numerous works on the social reproduction of culture provide a valuable point of departure for this study. In his attempt to transcend the opposition between structures and representations, between the objectivist claims of twentieth-century social science (shared also by Soviet Marxism) and the phenomenological alternatives proposed to them, Bourdieu has defined a reflexive sociology that seeks to understand how social agents make sense of their world by plotting strategies of social action given the possibilities and
constraints of the world. What is significant to Bourdieu are not the "rules" of society, but rather the strategies that social agents bring to bear on their social action. These strategies emerge from a "practical sense" represented by a logic of practice that is defined by the agents' experience of the world. This shift of attention from structures to practices, without denying the existence of structural constraints within which individuals and groups act, allows him to see the individual as an agent actively negotiating the social world rather than as a mere actor acting out a script dictated by structures; at the same time, it reminds us that social agents act on a terrain that contains limits as well as possibilities.[12] The social game is played with symbolic or cultural capital, markers of status and prestige, that signify the distinction of social agents. Wealth is certainly one such marker, but others, such as education, comportment, possession of culturally valued knowledge, and claims to august lineage, are also significant in their own right. The definition of what is culturally valuable, as well as the rules of the social game itself, are constantly being contested and negotiated by individuals and groups. Individuals and groups differ in terms of their symbolic capital, but Bourdieu sees them arranged not in a rigid pyramidal hierarchy but in a social "field" in which groups have more properties and interests in common the closer they are to each other. The field becomes the arena for competition and contestation. In terms of cultural production, the competition of elites leads to the definition and elaboration of culture, as different groups seek to transmute "egoistic," private, particular interests . . . into 'disinterested,' collective, publicly avowable, legitimate interests.”[13]

Such an approach has numerous advantages for this study. The notion of symbolic capital enables us to go beyond the vulgar-Marxist formulations of Soviet historiography without losing sight of the contested nature of reform. It also forces us to consider the competition within Central Asian society as a central feature of Jadid reform. The Russian conquest had transformed the nature of the social terrain in which social competition took place in Central Asia (indeed, the Jadids themselves were a result of that transformation); access to new means of communication and sociability allowed the Jadids to challenge the rules of the game, while at the same time contesting the value of the symbolic capital possessed by the older elites. The stakes for which the older elites put up such stubborn resistance to the ideas of the Jadids were nothing less than their social survival as an elite.

This approach also allows us to problematize the very notion of reform itself. As a trope for disinterested rectification of the social order, "reform" is a problematic enough notion when it is invoked by established states to reaffirm their authority (cases as disparate as those of the Ottoman empire during the
Tanzimat era and the Soviet Union during perestroika illustrate this; it is far more so in cases where movement for reform comes from unofficial groups in society. In Central Asia, where the native state ceased to exist (as in Turkestan) or was not a participant in reform (as in Bukhara and Khiva), arguments for reform were nothing short of arguments for a reconstitution of society according to the vision of a new elite. Thus, only a focus on elite competition allows us to understand the politics of the 1917, when revolution redefined the rules of the game and brought competition into the open.


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By focusing on the social life of ideas and connecting it to the social fortunes of their carriers, we can also avoid reifying religious and national identities. This last is a task of considerable importance, for thinking about post-Soviet Central Asia is laden with misleading and facile assumptions about identity. Policy makers debate the potential of "Islamic fundamentalism" in Central Asia, a danger deemed to inhere in the fact of Central Asia being "Islamic." By showing how the meaning of Islam and of being a Muslim changed over time (and the period covered by this book was pivotal in this regard), I hope to bring some sophistication into the debate over the nature of Islam in Central Asia.[14] On the other hand, post-Soviet state elites in Central Asia have staked their legitimacy on fulfilling the historical destinies of nations that are deemed to have existed and to have developed together since time immemorial. This book also questions these claims by highlighting the historical process that underlay the construction of modern group identities in Central Asia. The caveat against reification also applies to viewing Jadidism as a unified movement, as is often done in the existing literature, which tends to see Jadidism as a movement that spread out from its centers in the Crimea and the Tatar lands on the Volga and swept all before it throughout the Muslim borderlands of the Russian empire. Jadidism was a coherent movement to the extent that it was (or came to be) embedded in a set of self-reproducing institutions (e.g., new-method schools that recruited their own graduates to teach in them). Beyond that, it is difficult

Perspective (Cambridge, 1991); Michael Lambek, Knowledge and Practice in Mayotte: Local Discourses of Islam, Sorcery and Spirit Possession (Toronto, 1993); John R. Bowen, Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (Princeton, 1993); Patricia Horvatich, "Ways of Knowing Islam," American Ethnologist 21 (1994): 811-826; Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way (Princeton, 1995). In addition, although not directly related to this literature, but very pertinent to Central Asia, is Devin DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion in Historical and Epic Tradition (University Park, Penn., 1994). This line of inquiry has helped dissolve the notion of a monolithic Islam. Indeed, Abdul Hamid el-Zein ("Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology of Islam," Annual Review of Anthropology 6 [1977]: 227-254) suggested that the notion of a single "Islam" be replaced by many "islams" to account for the multiplicity of Islamic expression. A similar argument has been made recently by Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London, 1993).

to impute any unity to the "movement." To be sure, the Jadids of Central Asia used the same symbols, tropes, and metaphors as the Jadids of European Russia in their discourse, but there is no reason to assume that they necessarily imbued them with the same meaning intended by the original authors. As Roger Chartier forcefully argues, texts are open to multiple readings, since a work "acquires meaning only through the strategies of interpretation that construct its significances. The author's interpretation is one among several and it does not monopolize the supposedly unique and permanent 'truth' of the work."[15] Rather, social agents use, or "appropriate,"[16] texts for their own strategies and social struggles. In the case at hand, Central Asian Jadids used texts from elsewhere—from the Muslim centers of the Russian empire as well as the broader Muslim world—in struggles that were grounded in local realities. The Jadids were not moved by abstract ideas such as "reform" or "pan-Islam" or "nationalism," but rather used these abstractions to navigate the social struggles of Central Asia.

Print and the Re-Imagination of the World

Jadidism would have been inconceivable without print. The Jadids gloried in the powers of print (and printed books and newspapers) to spread knowledge and enlightenment, and publishing remained a significant field of endeavor for them. This marked a sharp contrast to the situation before the Russian conquest, when the production and transmission of knowledge in Central Asia existed in the scribal domain with a strong component of orality. Knowledge was transmitted in a ritualized setting through face-to-face interaction between individuals; the possession of knowledge provided moral and cultural authority in society, which translated into status and prestige, if not always directly into wealth, although that connection was common, too. The advent of the printing press, the railway, the telegraph, and the modern postal system transformed these patterns and allowed the Jadids to redefine the nature of cultural production in their society.

[15] Roger Chartier, "Intellectual History and the History of Mentalités," in
New means of the production of knowledge were crucial to the Jadids in numerous ways. Most immediately, these means enabled an unprecedented flow of information, putting Central Asian intellectuals in contact with the broader world in ways that had hitherto been impossible. By the turn of the twentieth century, Central Asian readers could read books and (increasingly) periodicals published throughout the Russian empire as well as those imported from the Ottoman empire, Iran, and farther afield. This circulation of literature, accompanied by the circulation of people facilitated by modern transport, made Central Asia part of a broader world, or rather, a part of several overlapping translocal communities, in a far more immediate way than had ever been possible before.

Furthermore, modern means of communication were not transparent vessels for the communication of ideas; they helped shape new ways of imagining the world and thus transformed the parameters of debate in Central Asian society. Print helped transform the social uses of literacy as it redefined the framework and, increasingly, the norms of public debate over culture. As a result, by the turn of the century, Central Asians not only debated new ideas, but they debated in a manner that was new. As I argue in Chapter 4, newspapers, magazines, books, and theater created a public space that became the central venue for discussing culture and society. Unlike the decades' worth of learning in the madrasa that provided entree to the cultural elite, access to the new public space required only basic literacy (and not even that for the theater). In the new public, the older cultural elite was increasingly marginalized.

This rapid flow of information combined with new means of communications wrought a fundamental transformation in the way in which Central Asian intellectuals had come to see the world. In different ways,

the discovery of geological time and language families, the idea of Progress, and the modern map of the world all transformed how Central Asians could imagine their world. New conceptions of time and space were reflected in the Jadids' emphasis on history and geography, allowed a far-reaching historicization of the world that produced new, rationalist understandings of Islam and Muslimness. The growing consciousness that the grand narrative of history was not necessarily centered on Islam or the Muslim community, that they themselves were a product of history, and that they coexisted (often in disadvantageous situations) with other faiths and other communities were crucial to the elaboration of modern identities in Central Asia during this period. Their emergence, moreover, was a result of this basic reconfiguring of the world, not its cause.

Dale Eickelman has called this the "objectification" of Islam, the emerging perception of Islam as a coherent, systematic, and self-contained set of beliefs and practices, separate and separable from worldly knowledge, which came to displace previously held understandings of Islam as embedded in everyday social practice and as something irreducible to a textbook exposition.[18] Underlying the discourse of reforming tradition was a new kind of knowledge, produced and transmitted in a radically new context. Unlike the Jadids, their opponents often set forth an uncompromising traditionalism that valorized existing practices as the essence of "true" Islam. Yet, as I argue, this understanding of tradition was itself marked by modernity, since the very valorization of tradition made use of modern means and was an expression of its proponents' modern predicament.

Similarly, the community—its nature and its boundaries—also came to be reimagined, giving rise to the first articulations of modern Central Asian "national" identity. All nations are imagined,[19] but they may be imagined in many different ways. Jadid notions of identity were articulated in the context of new ethnographic knowledge produced by the colonial regime and the influx of romantic discourses of nationhood from the Tatars and the Ottomans; they were firmly rooted in the political realities on the ground in Turkestan. The objectification of Islam led to the emergence of a largely secular Muslim confessional nationalism in which Islam functioned as a marker of political and cultural identity.

for a community initially defined by its adherence to a religion. The relationship between ethnic and confessional definitions of the nation is fluid, rather than fixed;[20] in the Muslim world of the turn of the century, a certain tension between the two forms of community existed, but it could be elided more easily than the existing literature on the subject often realizes. It is well to remember this form of political Muslim identity today, when all "political Islam" has come to be synonymous with the most intransigent visions of the utter incompatibility of Islam and modernity.


 Discipline and Organize: New Forms of Sociability

Haji Muin's call for organized schools reflected a central concern of the Jadids: the creation of a system of well-organized schools that would offer a standardized, disciplined education providing both religious and worldly education to future generations of the community. Indeed, the new-method (usul-i jadid) school gave the movement its name. Understanding the centrality of the faith both in knowledge and in organization provides crucial insights into the nature of Jadidism.

The Jadids' faith in the ability of the human intellect to solve the problems of the world was intertwined with the notion of progress that the desacralization and historicization of their outlook helped promote. I will explore the origins of this conception of the power of knowledge in Jadid thought at some length, for it represents an important aspect of their modernity. In the process, however, the concept of knowledge itself came to be subtly redefined, as it came to encompass new fields of knowledge and new ways of knowing. For the Jadids, of course, these transformations were transparent: They did not contravene tradition but helped bring it to its true fruition. There was no contradiction between the notion of progress and their faith in Islam. Indeed, only knowledge could enable Muslims to understood Islam properly, and Islam itself was the best guarantee of progress. As a closer inspection shows quite clearly, new notions of knowledge (and hence of religion, history, and politics) lay at the bottom of the Jadid critique of society.

But if knowledge was a panacea, it needed organized institutions to be properly produced and disseminated. The Jadids' critique of their society centered on the disorder that they saw prevailing in it. The maktab[20] was disorganized, unhygienic, and run by uncouth teachers with no training in pedagogy; there was no system for inspecting schools; there were no organizations for establishing schools; and the philanthropy of the rich, insufficient as it was, took no organized form. The Jadids' efforts to overcome this disorder are a central feature of their reformist project. Their faith in the efficacy of organization and order marks the Jadids as moderns. Their quest for new forms of organization—new-method schools, publishing houses, benevolent societies, and (eventually) political parties—was significant in itself in transforming the rules of the social game in Central Asia, as organized,
impersonal (and to a certain extent, self-perpetuating) institutions increasingly became arenas for debate and the production and transmission of culture, replacing dialogic interaction in the informal settings where cultural practices had previously been located. The new-method school, for instance, was more than merely a reformed maktab: It was the site of a new cultural practice, that of schooling, which it marked off from everyday practice and objectified. The Jadids' pioneering of incipient institutional forms in the Muslim society of Central Asia gave them a certain advantage over their opponents, who, for various reasons did not organize in similar fashion. A new public space was created for the interpretation of Central Asian culture, and of Islam itself, in which the traditional carriers of Islam were increasingly marginalized. The process of institutionalization was neither easy nor unilinear, since material difficulties combined with opposition from traditional elites and suspicion of the colonial state to ensure that a large gap remained between Jadid ambition and Jadid achievement. Nevertheless, by 1917, new-method schools were widespread, a print-based public space had taken hold, and the traditional elites' monopoly over the definition of culture had been shaken.

Colonial Encounters in the Russian Borderlands

In pointing to the transformative role of Russian rule, it is by no means my intention to claim that imperial benevolence was the linchpin of cultural regeneration in Central Asia. Rather, I hope to distance the analysis from the hackneyed dichotomies of resistance and collusion, of native authenticity and "Westernization" (or, in our case, Russification), by suggesting that the social and institutional terrain on which struggles over culture take place in colonial settings is very much the product of colonial rule. To look for "responses" to colonialism in a domain located entirely outside of it is futile, since the very formulation of the response is inextricably intertwined in patterns of colonial knowledge.[21] Although this obviously applies to modernist re-visions of identity, even visions of the authenticity of native tradition are articulated through means of cultural production often introduced by the colonizer. For if culture is to be located in the struggles of elites, then the colonial presence was a major feature of the social terrain on which they took place. This presence may not have determined the nature of the competition, but it certainly provided a major resource even as it also defined the limits of the permissible.

The interconnections between empire and imperial knowledge have received considerable scholarly attention in recent years,[22] but the politics of native cultural production in the conditions of empire have been less popular. The Jadids, like many colonial intellectuals, occupied a liminal space between the colonial power and native society. From this position they could appropriate colonial ideas for their own uses, invoking the superiority of the colonizer to exhort their society to reform; at the same time, they talked back to the colonizer in the colonizer's own language. This involved them in bitter struggles over turf in their society with groups that had made their own compromises with the colonial regime.
In the Russian case, even the colonial nature of the regime remains a matter of dispute. Although the Russian empire was one of the largest empires in the world during the period under discussion here, sophisticated study of the Russian imperial experience is only now beginning. Scholars centrally concerned with one or more of the "nationalities" of the Russian empire have long been used to viewing the Russian state as a colonial entity (although often more as a matter of reflex than as an analytical preoccupation), but mainstream Russian history has seen imperialism only in Russian foreign policy, being content to study the borderlands as a problem of administration rather than imperialism.[23] And of all the borderlands, Central Asia remains the least known.


To be sure, Russia's geographic contiguity to its empire made for several peculiarities of its colonial experience (the state usually did not recognize the borderlands as separate political entities), but the basic epistemological operations of empires were, nevertheless, present. Moreover, as I argue in Chapter 2, Central Asia, conquered between the 1860s and the 1880s, occupied a position that was in many ways unique in the empire. The distinctly colonial conception that informed Russian rule in the region contrasted markedly to earlier periods of annexation that had brought other Muslim and non-Muslim groups under Russian rule. If in previous periods of expansion, the Russian state had coopted local nobilities and absorbed conquered populations into its system of social classification, in Central Asia the rhetoric of conquest mirrored nineteenth-century notions of colonialism. Russian administrators constantly compared Turkestan to British India (the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva were directly inspired by British treaties with various princely states in India) or French North Africa and sought to benefit from the experience of these powers in ruling "their" Muslims. The local population remained "natives," regardless of social standing.

Although such colonial policies and practices were very important to Central Asian cultural life, their appreciation is also crucial to understanding late imperial Russia as a whole. The fact that Russia was a multinational empire is often glossed over in mainstream Russian (as opposed to "nationalities")
historiography, with a resultant loss of historical perspective. The imperial borderlands, perhaps Central Asia more so than any other, were not incidental to Russia. Their existence—and their subjugation—helped define Russia and Russianness in very tangible ways that are lost to analysis if Russia is seen as a unitary state.

The study of imperial interactions in the Russian borderlands also helps to deconstruct the notion of "the West." Scholarly discourse is so permeated with the dichotomy between Russia and "the West" (which events of the past decade have only entrenched more deeply) that it appears as a paradox that Russia should personify "the West" in its Asian borderlands. Yet, Russians saw themselves as resolutely European in Central Asia, sharing in the European civilizing mission to which all imperial powers pretended. If world history of the last two centuries is to be glossed as "Westernization," then we face the paradox that many of

<table>
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<th>TABLE 1 RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA POPULATIONS</th>
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<td>Populations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>(sq. ml.) 18971911</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syr Darya189,1501,478,3981,816,550</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samargand33,850860,021960,200</td>
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<td>Fergana55,2101,572,2142,041,900</td>
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<td>Total three core oblasts278,2103,910,6334,818,650</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transcaspia231,238382,487472,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semireche147,510997,8631,201,540</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Turkestan656,960,290,9836,492,690</td>
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<td>Bukhara78,650—2,500,000</td>
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<td>Khiva26,070—550,000</td>
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<td>Total Central Asia761,680—ca. 9,550,000</td>
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<td>SOURCES : V. I. Masal'skii, Turkestanskii krai (St. Petersburg, 1913), 348; Aziatskaia Rossiiia (St. Petersburg, 1914), I: 91-92.</td>
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For Turkestan, population figures for 1897 are from the census of 1897; those for 1911 represent official estimates. Figures for the protectorates are estimates and pertain to 1909.

the agents of this process were not generally regarded as those of the West. Russia is scarcely the only exception; the burden of Europe was carried in other places by Spain or Portugal, countries that in the continental context were hardly epitomes of "the West." "Europe" and "the West" are but ideas that take various forms at various times and places. But if "Westernization" is not a useful concept, "Russification"—the dominant paradigm for understanding cultural interaction in the Russian empire—is even less so. The latter concept has been popular with scholars of "the nationalities" of the Russian empire, who see in every Russian (or Soviet) policy an attempt to dominate and transform authentic national cultures. (It is a measure of the alterity of Russian history vis-à-vis Europe that
"Russification," the local variant of "Westernization," carries a completely negative connotation.) By foregrounding themes of national struggle, while ignoring debates within society, such approaches render themselves incapable of exploring the politics of cultural production and identity formation on the Russian borderlands. Going beyond Russification is all the more crucial for the study of Central Asia, where in the tsarist period the state had neither the means nor the will to intervene directly in local cultural life. The impact of imperial power has to be sought in more subtle form than the paradigm of "Russification" allows.

Central Asia

Russian Central Asia comprised the governorate-general of Turkestan as well as the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva (see Table 1). For reasons of both space and clarity, I focus largely on Turkestan in this book, although since the writings of Bukharan Jadids (especially Abdurrauf Fitrat) were highly influential, Bukharan developments cannot be wholly excluded. Nor do I deal with the traditional lands of the Qazaqs incorporated in the Steppe province administered from Omsk. Its nomadic population had a conception of Islam very different from that of the inhabitants of the oasis cities of Transoxiana. Moreover, the Steppe province was under direct Russian rule far longer and subject to different administrative policies than Turkestan. During our period, the foci of Qazaq cultural life lay to the north, in Orenburg and even Kazan, rather than to the south in Tashkent or Samarqand. The administrative entity of Turkestan produced its own logic that was a salient feature of Central Asian life in the tsarist period.

Chapter 1

Knowledge and Society in the Nineteenth Century

The three and a half centuries between the collapse of the Timurid order and the Russian conquest constitute the least understood period of Central Asian history. The literary production of the period still remains largely in manuscript form, and scholarly attention focuses on the more glamorous Timurids or the more accessible Russian period. In the absence of systematic research, we are left to struggle with V.V. Bartol'd's dictum that "in the nineteenth century, in contrast to the Middle Ages, Turkestan was among the most backward countries of the Muslim world."[1] Soviet scholarship tended to focus on the centralization of states in the nineteenth century as a positive sign (and to contrast it to the feudal dissension of the eighteenth); however, its judgment on the culture of this period was no more generous. Yet, if we are to understand the politics of cultural production that obtained on the eve of the Russian conquest, politics that the Jadids set out to reform, we need to rescue the topic from the domain of aesthetic judgment and place it firmly in the realm of
social practice. This is a crucial task in its own right, but it is also of fundamental importance for understanding the politics of culture during the tsarist period.

[1] V.V. Bartol'd, Istoriia kul'turnoi zhizni Turkestana (1927), in his Sochineniia (Moscow, 1963), II/1: 297.

Knowledge, Literacy, and Culture

A sharp critique of traditional Muslim education in nineteenth-century Central Asia is perhaps the only area of scholarship in which all observers, scholars and officials, tsarist and Soviet, agreed with Jadids and émigré nationalists. The maktabs and madrasas of Central Asia were the clearest sign of the stagnation, if not the degeneracy, of Central Asia. Judged by criteria these observers brought with them, the maktab and the madrasa not surprisingly appeared as inefficient, pointless, and even harmful. Yet, if we are to understand the logic of the practices surrounding the transmission of knowledge in pre-Russian Central Asia (many of which continued well into the twentieth century), we have to examine them in their own right, and not by the modernist criteria of observers standing outside the tradition.[2]

The tradition of learning replicated in the maktabs and madrasas of Central Asia was common to many premodern Muslim societies. It was characterized by two overriding concerns: the transmission of knowledge (ilm) and the cultivation of proper modes of behavior and comportment (adab). The primary impulse was conservational, the transmission to future generations of the finite, fixed truths revealed by God.[3] This tradition was marked by rigorous discipline, including severe corporal punishment, and often the insistence on memorization without explicit explanation. As Dale Eickelman has suggested, "'Understanding' (fahm) in the context of such concepts of learning was not measured by any ability explicitly to 'explain' particular verses [of the Qur'an]. . . Instead, the measure of understanding was implicit and consisted of the ability to use particular Quranic verses in appropriate contexts."[4] The finite and fixed nature of knowledge by no means precluded a dynamic tradition of interpretation, for it was only through an act of interpretation that divinely revealed knowledge could become meaningful for human beings. This interpretation required a carefully inculcated scholarly habitus, a set of predispositions and habits of mind that allow "practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence


taken for granted."[5] The habitus reproduced in the maktabs, and especially the madrasas, of nineteenth-century Central Asia cultivated a certain relation to texts and to the world beyond them that provided the framework for life. The distinction between religious and secular knowledge in this world would have been impossible, for all knowledge emanated from God and was consequently imbued with a certain sacral value. Different crafts and sciences were similarly deemed to have been invented by various prophets. Noah, for instance, was the inventor of woodwork and David of metalwork.

If the transmission of knowledge (ta'lim ) was one concern of the maktab, the other was the inculcation of proper modes of behavior and conduct (tarbiya ). Adab as mimetic practice occupied a central place in Muslim societies. Originating in pre-Islamic Middle Eastern traditions of civility and refinement, adab was thoroughly Islamized after the eighth century through the works of such Muslim writers of Iranian origins as Ibn Muqaffa' (d. 756) and Firdawsi (d. 1020). In later centuries the term "adab " came to be understood in a more restricted fashion to denote knowledge necessary for a certain profession or station in life (and so it became possible to speak of adab al-mufti , the adab of one who holds the office of mufti [jurisconsult]).[6] In nineteenth-century Central Asia, proper adab marked the boundaries of civility and status and was a crucial element in cultural capital recognized in urban society. Manuals of civility existed,[7] but the primary arena for its transmission remained the maktab.

We have a number of descriptions of the Central Asian maktab, although most of them are the hostile views of outsiders.[8] Fortunately, in


[7] For example, the Adab us-salihin of Muhammad Salih Kashghari, translated from a lithographed edition by N.S. Lykoshin, "Kodeks prilichii na Vostoke," Sbornik materialov, po musul'manstvu , vyp. 2 (Tashkent, 1900).


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the writings of Sadriddin Ayni (1878-1954), we possess a unique source on the maktab and the madrasa as they existed in this period. Born in a small village outside Ghijduvan, Ayni was among the last generations of Central Asians to receive a traditional education. A prominent Jadid, he had an illustrious career after the revolution in education and publishing in which he helped found modern literatures in both Tajik and Uzbek. One of the few Jadids to survive the 1930s, he was greatly honored as a national hero of Soviet Tajikistan. This stature allowed him to publish in 1949, at the height of Stalinism, his reminiscences of old Bukhara, a text remarkable for its sensibility. Although Ayni wrote of the period when Bukhara was a Russian protectorate, much of what he describes can safely be projected back to much of the nineteenth century, for the impact of the Russian presence on the internal life of Bukharan maktabs and madrasas was minimal in the 1880s and 1890s.

The education of a Central Asian boy began when his father took him to a teacher (maktabdar, damla) and left him behind with the formula, "You can beat him as long as you don't kill him; the meat is yours, but the bones are ours." As Ayni later recalled: "When my father left, the teacher sat me down close to him and ordered one of the older students to work with me. This pupil bade me look at my writing board as he said aloud, 'Alif, be, te, se.' I imitated him and repeated the names of these letters. Having taught me how to pronounce them, the student went over to other kids and started teaching them. The children called him khalfa." The pupil was thus immediately thrust into a set of hierarchical social relationships. In addition to knowledge, the child acquired adab from direct contact with the teacher. The maktab had neither formal division into classes nor any examinations. The student progressed through school at his own pace, his status determined by the number of books he finished. Although the students sat together in a "class," their relation to the teacher was individual and direct.

Having memorized the names of the letters of the alphabet, the student was introduced to vowels, which again he learned through memorization. "The lessons
on 'zer-u zabar' were interesting. ... I was taught to say, 'Alif zabar—a, zer—i, pesh—u.'... Thus I learned the letters from the beginning to the very end of the Arabic alphabet."[12] At the end of the year, Ayni started on the abjad .[13] He was told: "Say: 'Alif ba be zabar—ab; jimm ba dal zabar—jad; abjad' ... Once my father said, 'Now that you can read the abjad, I'll teach you how to count according to it,' and put in front of me a slate with the abjad written on it. Pointing to a letter, he asked, 'What [letter] is this? And this?' I could not answer a single question. I had absolutely no idea; nobody had ever shown me the letters."[14]

After the alphabet, the child started with the Haftyak, a compilation of selected verses from the Qur'an, beginning with the shortest suras usually located at the end. These too were memorized. The child was thus familiarized with the alphabet at the same time as he or she started the process of memorization of key texts. Of course, the Qur'an was taught in the Arabic, with no translation provided and no attempt made at explanation. The rules of the proper recitation of the Qur'an (tajwid, tartil) were taught from this stage, so that the child could recite the Word of God in an acceptable manner. Upon memorization of the Haftyak, the boy received the title kitabkhwan (reader of a book).[15] He then proceeded to the Char Kitab, an anthology providing basic information about Islamic ritual. As the name suggests, the anthology contained four works: Nam-i Haqq, a tract in verse by one Sharifuddin Bukhari (fl. fourteenth century), dealing with rules for the fulfillment of ritual obligations of ritual purity, fasting, and prayer (namaz); Char Fasl, by an anonymous author, providing a statement, in prose, of the bases of belief, the five pillars of Islam, and ritual purity; Muhimmat ul-Muslimin, another anonymous work providing information on four things that are important to all Muslims (the unity of God [tawhid], fasting, prayers, and ritual purity); and selections from the Pandnama of Fariduddin Attar, a

[12] Ibid., 128-129.
[13] The abjad was both a mnemonic device for learning the Arabic alphabet and a system for counting in which each letter of the alphabet was assigned a numerical value (allowing the use of the alphabet in cabals, etc.).

major work in the adab tradition.[16] After finishing the Char Kitab, the student encountered poetry, both in Persian and Turkic, by Hafiz, Sufi Allah Yar, Fuzuli, Bedil, Nawa'i, and Attar. The works of these poets constituted the canon of Central Asian literature, and acquaintance with them (and the ability to recite verses from memory at appropriate times) was de rigueur for an educated person.

The instruction up to this point was entirely oral. Students used written texts, but they were meant to be used as visual mnemonic aids. Having finished the Haftyak, the Char Kitab, and the Qur'an, Ayni "could still not read anything, except for what I had read with the [teacher]. For example, I could always read those verses of Hafiz which I had read at school, no matter whose hand they were
in. But I could not read others that I had not [already] read—I was illiterate! Writing I did not know at all."[17] Although children were introduced to the alphabet, the acquisition of functional literacy was not the goal of their maktab experience. In a society organized around direct, face-to-face interaction between social agents, writing was of limited use and tended to become a specialized skill. The ability to read and write (and the two were different skills, separately acquired) was necessary for only a few spheres of endeavor, whereas vast spheres of life remained untouched by writing. Even in trade, large-scale transactions were carried out purely orally, with the personal guarantee of special intermediaries (qasids) taking the place of written documents as late as the 1870s.[18] At the same time, culture was transmitted largely orally. Central Asia, of course, boasted a vibrant tradition of oral poetry, but oral transmission also extended to texts that could be read aloud in various formal and informal settings. Itinerant reciters and storytellers (maddahs, qissakhwans) were a common phenomenon in Central Asia, as were evenings (mashrab) devoted to reading aloud from manuscript texts.[19] The ability to read was there-


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fore not a necessary precondition for participation in the literary tradition of Central Asia, and indeed, the audience for written texts was always far greater than the number of competent readers. The high rates of illiteracy and the inability to write prevalent in Central Asia in the nineteenth century did not indicate a lack of education, let alone ignorance.[20] Rather, the emphasis on memorization and learning by rote emanated from a different concern: Knowledge was to be embodied by the learner so that his or her body could be marked by sacred knowledge.[21]

Writing was a separate skill altogether, not taught at all by many maktabdars. When taught, it usually took the form of calligraphy. Just as students were left to learn their native language on their own while the maktab concentrated on Arabic and Persian texts, they were left to their own devices to learn the cursive hand, and only calligraphy was taught at the maktab. Calligraphy and the
possession of a fine hand were thus analogous to rhetoric and the ability to quote verses as marks of a civilized individual. As with reading, calligraphy was acquired through imitation. Ayni recalled that he had acquired the rudiments of calligraphy before he could read fluently, having copied letters of the alphabet from a relative who had returned to the village for the summer from his Bukharan madrasa.[22] Many more people could read than could write.[23] At the same time, writing had significant ritual uses. Books were used not merely for reading the text but for divination and as charms and amulets.[24] Writing could be venerated in its own right as embodying the holiness of the message. The Majmu'a-yi nurnama, an anthology of various prayers, promised, "Whoever reads this Nurnama or carries it with him will be saved from the troubles of both the worlds."[25] Members of various craft guilds

Many scholars of Central Asian intellectual life of the period have seen the high rates of illiteracy in Central Asia as a grave indictment of the maktab and a sign of the stagnation of Central Asian life. See, for instance, Nalivkin, "Chto daet," 235. Criticism of the maktab on this account was, of course, a staple of Jaded discourse.


Ayni, Yaddashtha, 90-92.

Iuldash Abdullaev, Ocherki po metodike obucheniiia gramote v uzbekskoi shkole (Tashkent, 1966), 79-86. Reading-only literacy was a common phenomenon throughout the world until the rise of universal schooling in the nineteenth century. In France, as late as 1866, 11.47 percent of the population (9.73 percent of men and 13.21 percent of women) could only read. (32.84 percent of the population could neither read nor write.) See François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry (Cambridge, 1982), 17.

Divination through books (falbini) was a common practice; see N.S. Lykoshin, 'O gadanii u sredneaziatskikh tuzemtsev," Spravochnaia knizhka Samarkandskoi oblasti 9 (1907): 163-242.

Majmu'a-yi nurnama (Tashkent, 1914), 12.

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were similarly exhorted to know the risala of their guild by heart, or else to carry it on their person; failure to do so could bring dire consequences. As the risala of the guild of grooms stated, "If a groom does not know this risala or has not heard it, all livestock is more forbidden than the flesh of the swine; he will be tortured in his grave by snakes and scorpions, and his face will be black on the day of judgment."[26] Writing had many ritual uses, but the ability to read fluently was a skill required only in a few, very specific niches in society.

The maktab was not a school at all in the sense of an institution set apart from other practices but a site for the acquisition by children of basic elements of culture and modes of behavior through interaction with an older, learned man. It existed wherever the teacher could teach, and any literate person with the proper credentials of adab and piety could teach. The maktab seldom had a
building of its own: It could be housed in a mosque, the house of the teacher, or that of a wealthy resident of the neighborhood. A teacher seldom had more than a dozen or so pupils in his charge. He did not receive a regular salary but was supported by gifts from parents, which took the form of weekly donations of food, and occasionally money (payshanbalik), given every Thursday. In addition, the teacher received gifts of clothes on annual holidays or when a child finished a book.[27] The maktab was ubiquitous in the sedentary parts of Central Asia, especially the towns. As a relatively informal institution, without formal admissions or enrollments, the maktab was not reducible to the kind of census-taking that various tsarist statistical committees strove for. Numbers provided by nineteenth-century travelers should also be treated with the greatest caution, since they were invariably based on hearsay or on reports by local "informants," who usually provided mythical numbers. Nevertheless, O. A. Sukhareva's ethnographic data indicate that at the turn of the twentieth century almost every residential neighborhood in the city of Bukhara had its own maktab.[28] Maktabs were also common in rural areas of sedentary population; in 1903, nine of the fourteen villages of Chapkulluk volost in Khujand uezd had a maktab.[29] Among the nomads, the situation was rather different. Instruction for the children of nomads was generally provided by itinerant mullas from either the settled areas of Central Asia or from among the Volga Tatars. For a fixed salary (paid either in cash or kind), the mulla traveled with the family and taught the children; he was free to take on any other students from the aul.[30] Hiring a mulla from Bukhara or Kazan was a status symbol. Once a Turkmen fellow student offered to get Ayni's elder brother a summer job as teacher in a Türkmen village. Ayni's brother hesitated, because he knew no Turkic: "'That doesn't matter,' said the student to reassure my brother. 'The Turkmenian bais don't maintain teachers to teach their children to read and write. The main thing is that people should say: 'Such and such a bai has had a teacher brought from Bukhara.'"'[31] Concerns about civility and markers of respectability were differently defined among the nomads, and the maktab accordingly occupied a different place in nomadic society.

Of course, not every student stayed in the maktab for the duration; in an agrarian society with very low levels of surplus, few families could afford to remove their boys from productive labor for such long periods of time. Those who stayed to the end had only rudimentary literacy skills, but they had acquired basic norms of cultured behavior, of gesture and posture, and an ingrained attitude of deference to older men—in short, cultural capital that was a marker of social distinction in their society. They had also acquired an implicit knowledge of Islam as faith and practice, without which membership in the
community was unimaginable. They had not acquired literacy, or skills such as arithmetic, or general knowledge such as history or geography, because these were transmitted elsewhere in society, in appropriate dialogic contexts. Maktabs for girls existed and in many ways paralleled the boys' maktab. A very similar kind of instruction was provided by the atin, who would teach young girls from the neighborhood in her house in return for presents from the parents or, possibly, help with housework. It was not unknown for some women to teach both boys and girls, since segregation by sex was not mandatory before puberty.[32] Atins were often wives and daughters of imams and other educated men, but they were respected members of the community in their own right. As Marianne Kamp has argued, "Women and girls formed their own chains of knowl-
edge transmission, without formal male instruction. In gatherings involving religious practice, ... women's separation from men allowed the creation of women's religious authority. Separate spaces and separate knowledges reproduced gender-based networks."[33]

Madrasas and the Reproduction of Islam

The transmission of knowledge beyond the maktab was diffused throughout society. Knowledge and skills were acquired in practical contexts of work. Artisans received their training in craft guilds, whose structure, admittedly very loose, incorporated a sacralized hierarchy: the apprentice was subordinate to a master (occasionally this relationship was mediated by a khalifa), who in turn was subordinate to an aqsaqqal, the leader of the craft organization in the whole city; the aqsaqqal was ultimately subject to the symbolic authority of the patron of the guild, usually a pre-Islamic prophet. The master (ustad) would take the apprentice, usually at age twelve, into his house and over the next several years teach him the required skills of the trade. The master was also responsible for teaching the child rules of proper behavior (adab) and, if he was literate, knowledge about Muslim law (ulum-i shariat) and mysticism (ulum-i tariqat). Initiation into a guild revolved around the memorization of the risala, often in verse, that laid out the rules of initiation and proper conduct to be followed by members. An apprentice was, for example, expected "to be well-bred and affect humility before the master, not to be rude to him, not to walk in front of him, not to sit down without his permission, [and] not to address him by his name."[34] In order to complete their education, apprentices were required to know the risala for the guild by heart. Beyond the world of artisans, even chancery practices were similarly endowed with sacred origins and intent, as is clear from a late-eighteenth century manual of accountancy.[35] The connections to the tradition of adab are quite obvious here.

[32] Ayni's father moved him to a girls' maktab (run by the imam's wife) when he realized that the teacher at the regular maktab was incompetent. "Eski maktab," 130.
It is in this context that the place of the madrasa in Central Asian society is best understood. Rather than being an institution of higher learning in the modern sense of the word, the madrasa was the site for the reproduction of one class of professionals, those concerned with various aspects of Islamic law. It was a place where, in dialogic interaction with a recognized scholar, the student acquired mastery over a number of authoritative texts of the Islamic tradition as understood locally. Although this knowledge existed in written form, it was transmitted orally. As numerous scholars have noted, the Islamic tradition of learning was marked with a profound distrust of the ability of the text to convey the author's intention. That could only be learned from the author himself, or through a chain of transmission going back to the author. Knowledge could be authoritative only if acquired through a recognized chain of transmission.[36] Further, the proof of mastery of knowledge lay not in a transcript of courses taken at an institution but in the ijaza (license) issued by the master in his own name, which signified a link in the chain of transmission.

A student entered a madrasa when a mudarris allowed him to listen to his lectures; there was no formal matriculation. A gift, usually but not necessarily of money, called the iftitahana, signified the beginning of a teacher-student relationship.[37] As in the maktab, progress through the madrasa was marked by successful completion of books; each student proceeded along the curriculum at his own pace. Attendance at lectures coincided with more informal peer learning in study circles organized by students. Members of a circle studied the same book, and those with a better command of the material helped others in return for food or clothing, since it was considered "a kind of vileness" to receive money in return for knowledge.[38] Some texts were studied only in such groups, and others were prepared thus before students listened to lectures on them from the mudarris. When a student had satisfied the professor of his command of a book (which often involved memorization), he could

[34] Risala-yi chitgari, ms., cited by R.G. Mukmmova, "Remeslennye korporatsii i uchinichestvo (po sredneaziatskim pis'mennym istochnikam XVI i XIX vv.)," in Materialy po istorii Uzbekistana (Tashkent, 1973), 26; on risalas in general, see M. Gavrilov, Risolia sartovskikh remeslennikov: izsledovanie predanii musul'manskikh tsekhov (Tashkent, 1912).
students could amount to 1,500 rubles, which could buy 2,500 puds [more than 40 tons] of grain; Yaddashtha, 171.) In addition, a teacher received a portion of the endowed income from the waqf, as well as from any other posts (mufti, qazi, etc.) he might hold.

[38] Ayni, Yaddashtha, 537-540; for a discussion of similar "peer learning" in Morocco, see Eickelman, Knowledge and Power, 98.

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pass on to the next book by joining another study circle, possibly with another teacher.

Life in the madrasa began with the private study of several brief tracts: Awwal-i 'ilm, a short tract that covered the essential requirements (zururiyat) of Islam in question-and-answer format; Bidan, an exposition of the basic rules of Arabic grammar in Persian; and Adab-i muta'allimin, which covered the adab of the student. After that, the student read Sharh-i Mulla, a commentary on Ibn Hajib's Kafiya (which the student had already studied) by Abdurrahman Jami, the Timurid poet; written in Arabic, this was the first book studied with a mudarris. At the same time, the student started studying formal logic with an assistant teacher, using the Shamsiya of Najmuddin Qazvini (d. 1276); when he was ready, he moved on to the Hashiya-yi Qutbi, a commentary on Shamsiya; concurrently with the Hashiya, the student was introduced to theology ('ilm-i kalam) through the 'Aqa'id of Abu Hafs Nasafi (d. 1142), which he read with an assistant teacher. Later, the student moved to various glosses on this book. These were followed by the Tahzib ul-Mantiq wa'l kalam, a tract on logic and dogma by Sa'duddin Taftazani (d. 1381); Hikmat ul-'ayn by Qazvini, a tract on natural science and metaphysics; Mulla Jalal, a commentary by Jalaluddin Dawwami (d. 1502) on the 'Aqa'id ul-adudiyat of Abdurrahman b. Ahmad al-Iji (d. 1356), a tract on Muslim beliefs.[39] There was no formal termination of studies in the madrasa, and many students lingered on for decades. The core texts could, however, be mastered in nineteen years.

Formal lessons took place four days a week. The entire study group assembled; a designated reader (qari, elected by the students) read out the passage to be discussed; the mudarris then translated the passage (if necessary) and proceeded to explain and comment on it; a disputation involving the students concluded the lesson.[40] There was no compulsion to take courses at the madrasa of residence; indeed, at many madrasas no lectures were held at all.[41] A student was free to learn from any pro-


[40] The description of madrasa life in Ayni, Yaddashtha, passim, is unique in both its substance and its sensibility; see also Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan, 2 vols. (New York, 1877), 1:162-165; V. Nalivkin and M. Nalivkina, Ocherk byta zbenschchiny osedlogo tuzemnogo naseleniia Fergany (Kazan, 1886), 61-65.

[41] Sukhareva (Bukhara, 72-73n) counted eighty madrasas existing in Bukhara at the turn of the twentieth century; lectures were held at only those twenty-two
whose waqfs provided for hiring a mudarris.

fessor in the city. This was especially the case in Bukhara. During the reign of
the pious Shah Murad (r. 1785-1800), many madrasas in the khanate were in such
bad repair that the amir issued an edict giving property rights to whoever
repaired or rebuilt hujras in a madrasa.[42] As a result, the hujra became
immovable private property and madrasas turned into hostels. Ownership of a
hujra brought with it the right to receive a portion of the madrasa's endowed
(waqf) income. The price of a cell therefore depended on the size of the
madrasa's endowment. In the nineteenth century, many cells in the madrasas of
Bukhara were occupied by men who had little connection with learning. Many
individuals owned cells as a form of investment and leased or donated them to
students in need.[43] Residents of madrasa cells were free from taxation and for
much of the nineteenth century also received scholarships from the amir. During
the reigns of Shah Murad and Mir Haydar, large sums of money were set aside for
the use of madrasa teachers and students.[44] This custom lapsed in mid-century
as Nasrullah diverted funds toward defense, but at the end of the century, the
amir still handed out pensions (dehyak) to students annually.[45] In this
situation, a student's only connection with the mudarris of the madrasa where he
lived was that they both derived income from the same waqf.

The madrasa was the site of the social reproduction of Islamic legal knowledge
and its carriers, the ulama. The method of instruction was connected to this
basic concern. It aimed to explicate the meaning of the text and to convey that
meaning dialogically. At the same time, it inculcated in students a certain
habitus, which allowed them to construct meaningful social action in the world.
Students acquired the basic skills needed to practice their trade—literacy, a
knowledge of canonical texts of Islamic law, and some command of Arabic.
Successful completion of the madrasa opened up various possibilities of
employment in the legal-administrative nexus of power. A madrasa education was
necessary to

[43] Ibid.; see also F.M. Kerenskii, "Medrese Turkestanskogo kraia," ZhMNP 284
(1892): 45-47.
[44] Several travelers of the early nineteenth century state that large portions
of government revenue from zakat and customs were earmarked for support of
madrasas and their students and teachers: Meet Izzut-oollah, Travels m Central
Asia m the Years 1812-13, trans. P. D. Henderson (Calcutta, 1872), 58; Georges
de Meyendorff, Voyage d'Oren-bourg ô Boukha ra fait en 1820 (Paris, 1826), 301;
Alexander Burns, Travels into Bukhara, together with a Narrative of a Voyage on
[45] On the dehyak and its corruptions, see Ayni, Yaddashtha, 774-779.
figures could hold several positions at the same time.
The madrasa was not concerned with other fields of knowledge, or, indeed, with the nonlegal aspects of Islam. We know little about Sufism in nineteenth-century Central Asia, but it is clear that most adult men had a spiritual guide (shaykh, ishan, pit). However, the madrasas were not involved in the initiation and learning of Sufi practices, which took place in the khanqah. This was true even when many mudarisses seem to have been Sufi adepts and many ishans possessed madrasa knowledge. A rough survey commissioned by a Russian administrator at the end of the nineteenth century in Tashkent revealed that a number of ishans in Syr Darya oblast had attended madrasas in Bukhara.[46] Far from being mutually exclusive, shariat and tariqat were often paired as sources of proper conduct and understanding in Central Asian Islam; they remained parallel phenomena entrenched in different social spaces. Similarly, while many mudarisses as well as students wrote poetry, as befitted any cultivated individual, poetry itself was not a subject of study in the madrasa. Instead, poets gathered in literary circles to write and study poetry. Princely courts patronized many such circles, but they also existed autonomously.[47] The madrasas were not concerned with teaching literature or poetry.

Attendance at lectures was open, as Ayni remarked sourly, to "anyone who, having finished the maktab, was seized by the desire to 'become a mulla' ... whether he be literate, semiliterate, or completely illiterate."[48] But opportunities were not equal to all: The initial investment of traveling to the madrasa, setting up house there, and providing the iftitahan for the mudarris was considerable and thwarted many aspiring students. Thereafter, the rate of attrition was high, as many students struggled to make ends meet. Ayni tells of the various jobs he held in order to pay for his keep, from cooking for a circle of his brother's friends, to working as a mirza (clerk) for a merchant, to tutoring wealthy fellow students. The school year, lasting from September to March, was short, allowing students to work productively in the summer. Indeed, many stu-

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ments left Bukhara for their villages in October to gather the harvest.[49] At the same time, sons of ulama began madrasa education with a distinct advantage in cultural capital, and wealthy students could always hire others to tutor them. Ayni came from a poor family but possessed cultural capital, for his father was literate and concerned with poetry and letters. Once in Bukhara, the patronage extended to him by Sharifjan Makhdum, scion of a notable Bukharan family, was crucial in ensuring that Ayni complete his education.

The madrasa did not only reproduce the learned elite, it also reproduced a certain understanding of Islam. The description above of the texts around which
madrasa education centered in Bukhara is revealing. Students did not study the Qur'an and its exegesis, the traditions of the Prophet, or even jurisprudence, although they could do so if they could find a teacher willing to give them private lessons. Rather, instruction revolved around commentaries and supercommentaries, some of post-Timurid provenance. Moreover, students studied a given text (usually itself a commentary) individually or with a khalifa; the mudarris lectured on a commentary. Students aimed at expertise in the interpretation of the texts that connected them to the Islamic tradition as it was understood in Central Asia. "Islam" did not reside in certain scriptures that spoke for themselves; rather it was embedded in the social practices of transmission and interpretation, from which it could not be abstracted. Much the same process was evident even among the ulama, for whom access to the Islamic tradition lay through layers of authoritative interpretation and commentary carried out locally. This Islam was consequently not scripturally "pure."

Motivated by a new vision of the world, latter-day critics such as the Jadids were to take the ulama to task on this account as they set about purifying Islam; but their critique arose from assumptions that were inconceivable in the nineteenth century.

The parallels between the madrasa, the craft guild, and the Sufi order point to the madrasa's place in society. The transmission of knowledge was embedded in everyday social practices and consequently diffused throughout society. The madrasa was one institution among many, transmitting one kind of knowledge among many. It was imbricated in the social reproduction of the learned elite and their social distinction, and it could not have been otherwise in the absence of the disciplinary apparatus of the modern state. The logic of cultural reproduction that underlay the madrasa accorded very well, however, with the vastly decentralized political and social order in which it existed.

State, Society, and Knowledge

The political order of nineteenth-century Central Asia carried the legacy of the decentralization of the preceding centuries. Shaybani Khan's conquest of Transoxiana created a confederation of tribes that shared in the sovereignty of the Chinggisid khan, to whom they paid nominal allegiance. This was formalized in the division of the realm into a number of "appanages," usually centered on a town, which were the loci of real political power. The authority of the khan, for all its aura of Chinggisid descent, remained tenuous, since a number of potential Chinggisid rulers existed at any given time. The resulting decentralization of effective political power meant that even revenue extraction and local administration were the domain of appanage holders, in contrast to the unitary, hierarchical bureaucracies of the Mughal and (especially) the Ottoman empires of the same time.[50] The khan's authority included the customary prerogatives to mint coinage, to have his name recited during the khutba (sermon at the Friday prayer), and to receive tribute from the appanages. Individual khans could attempt to assert their authority more fully, but the tribes
possessed enough power to thwart such attempts. This decentralization led to the secession of Khwarazm from the Shaybanid domains in the middle of the sixteenth century, but elsewhere, too, political authority remained fragile and deeply contested. In the early eighteenth century, decentralization reached such an extreme that the authority of Abulfayz Khan, ruler of Bukhara, came to be limited to his fortified palace. Some of the reasons were, to be sure, external; the expansion of the Jungar empire in Inner Asia set in motion one last wave of nomadic migration across the Eurasian plain, which resulted in the invasion of Transoxiana by Qazaq tribes from the Qipchaq steppe, who united with disaffected Ozbek tribes against the khan in Bukhara. The impact was felt by the entire sedentary population of the area; an Indian Muslim traveler to Central Asia in 1812 heard accounts of how Samarqand "had fallen into such utter ruin and decay, that tigers and wolves had actually taken up abode in the colleges ... which are situated in the centre of the...


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city."[51] Balkh and Ferghana seceded from even nominal allegiance to the Bukharan khan at this time. The unrelated invasion of Nadir Shah Afshar, fresh from his sack of Delhi, sounded the death knell of the Ashtarkhanid dynasty in Bukhara itself, where a power struggle ensued for the right to nominate the ruler, in which the Manghit beat out the Keneges, even though the latter had better Chinggisid credentials.

It took members of the new dynasty much of the rest of the century to assert their authority over other tribes. Beginning with Shah Murad, however, the rulers of Bukhara (who had taken the title amir) began a struggle against the power of the tribes that was to continue until the Russian conquest. Shah Murad's reign was characterized by constant warfare with Ozbek tribes in Transoxiana as well as Tüürkmen tribes who inhabited the desert between his domains and Iran, but it was only under Nasrullah (r. 1816-1860), who gained notoriety in Britain for his execution of two British officers, but who also won from his subjects the epithet amir-i qassab (the Butcher Amir), that the power of the tribal chiefs was broken.[52] Similar developments took place in Ferghana, where over the course of the eighteenth century the Ming khans consolidated their hold as independent rulers. By the turn of the nineteenth century they had captured Tashkent, where urban notables had managed to retain a considerable amount of degree of autonomy under nominal Qazaq rule for much of the eighteenth century. At the same time, the new dynasty made inroads against Qazaq tribes on the steppe in the north. The city of Kokand saw considerable public construction during this period, and the court of Umar Khan (r. 1800-1820) became the center of a minor cultural renascence.[53]

The reasons behind this trend toward the greater assertion of power by rulers remain to be explored fully. It may have been rooted in an attempt to control increasing trade with both India and Russia,[54] but it was also connected with the gradual sedenterization of large parts of the population over the course of the previous century. Nevertheless, centralization had its limits: The struggle
against the tribes was not moti-
[51] Izzut-oollah, Travels, 56. A later Bukharan chronicler recorded that only
two quarters of the city remained inhabited during this period; cf. Yuri Bregel,
[53] Susanna S. Nettleton, "Ruler, Patron, Poet: 'Umar Khan and the Blossoming
of the Khanate of Qoqan, 1800-1820," International Journal of Turkish Studies
[54] A.Z.V. Togan, Bugunku Turkili (Turkistan) ve Yakin Taribi, 2nd ed.

vated by any new notions of sovereignty, and it was not entrenched in new forms
of organization or control. In both Bukhara and Kokand, rulers countered the
influence of the tribal elites not by the creation of centralized institutions
of government but by promoting to high positions persons (usually Iranian or
Qalmuq slaves) personally beholden to them. Shah Murad had begun his career by
having the qushbegi (the highest state functionary, responsible for the
treasury) and the chief qazi of Bukhara murdered on accusations of corruption
and oppression while his father still ruled.[55] The only institutional
development connected with the attempted centralization was the establishment of
standing armies (sarbaz) in both Bukhara and Kokand, although their size
remained small.[56] Indeed, the political situation seemed anything but
centralized to our Indian traveler, who enumerated eight major rulers in the
region.[57] Shahr-i Sabz remained a Keneges stronghold in Bukhara down to the
Russian conquest, its rulers (hakims) inheriting their authority from each
other while maintaining the legal fiction of vassaldom to the amir at
Bukhara,[58] and the ascendance of urban power in Kokand proved short-lived, as
Qipchaq chiefs successfully reasserted their power in the 1840s and all but
overthrew the Ming khan.[59]

Sovereignty was embedded in several levels of obedience and allegiance; it was
exercised not through institutionalized means of dominance but rather through a
series of personal bonds. A centralized bureaucracy existed in only the most
rudimentary form, and then it revolved around the treasury (diwan). Soviet
scholarship was fond of reconstructing stable structures in the khanates of this
period,[60] but it is cru-
Schefer (Paris, 1876 [ms. 1818]), 54-55 (text), 123-125 (trans.); Ahmad Makhdum
Danish, Traktat Akhmada Donisha "Istoriiia Mangytskoi dinastii," ed. and trans.
I.A. Nadzhafova (Dushanbe, 1967 [ms. ca. 1890]) 29-30; Istoriiia Uzbekistana, vol.
3 (Tashkent, 1993), 152.
(London, 1845 long. 1842), 87, reported "500 regular troops of Bokhara." A.
Madzhlisov, Agrarnye otnosheniia v vostochnoi Bukhare v XIX-nachale XX veka
(Dushanbe, 1967), 38, puts the number at 800. The statement in the recent
Istoriiia Uzbekistana, III: 158, that the sarbaz numbered 40,000, is without
foundation.
cial to realize the informality of power in the nineteenth century. Ranks and titles were granted by rulers as markers of status and authority, but they did not correspond to stable offices, which did not exist. The conduct of the state could not be abstracted from the practice of social elites, which in turn did not have access to formal institutions. This pattern of personal, face-to-face relationships was replicated at all levels of society, including the realm of cultural reproduction.

Social bonds and the activities that depended on them (trade, irrigation, cultural reproduction) survived the political instability and nearly constant warfare precisely because the state was not a significant node of social solidarity. Social solidarities were enmeshed in a series of bonds that created numerous localized, often cross-cutting allegiances defined in sedentary society by residential, professional, and genealogical bonds. The urban neighborhood (guzar, mahalla), formed around a mosque and a holy site (ziyarat, usually a tomb [mazar]), was the locus of close ties of mutual assistance. The neighborhood community was territorial and brought together people of various standings; the more notable residents were expected to support and protect their neighbors.[61] The neighborhood community coexisted with craft guilds, each of which involved membership in a series of hierarchical relations headed by an elder.[62] These hierarchies replicated in society the multilayered pattern of political power outlined above and provided a means for the mediation of relations between rulers and the ruled.

These hierarchies rested on differentials of wealth and status and existed because they were widely recognized as "natural." The maintenance and reproduction of this notability was crucial to the social survival of the notables (and of the social order as constituted). Notability could reside in a number of sources, among which wealth was one.

[61] O.A. Sukhareva, Kvartal'naia obshchina pozdnefeodal'nogo goroda Bukhary (Moscow, 1976).
Dzhabbarov, "Ob uchinichestve v remeslennykh tsekhakh Srednei Azii v kontse XIX i nachale XX v.," in Materialy vtorogo soveshchaniia arkeologov i etnografov Srednei Azii (Moscow, 1959), on Khorezm; E.M. Peshchereva, Remeslennye organizatsii Srednei Azii v kontse XIX i nachale XX v. (Moscow, 1960).

Substantial merchants (sawdagar) could enjoy influence in society and entrée at court. Equally important, though, were other less tangible attributes, such as claims to august lineage, the possession of sacred knowledge, or a reputation for piety or civility. For the most part, the various claims to notability were compatible and mutually reinforcing: merchants could acquire a reputation for piety through patronage of the learned or construction of pious sites, and the learned and the pious could (and did) accumulate considerable wealth. More broadly, knowledge and commonly decipherable codes of civilized behavior served as significant markers of status, whose cultivation in succeeding generations was crucial to the social reproduction of distinction that underlay the social order of nineteenth-century Central Asia. The maktab and (especially) the madrasa were significant channels for the production and reproduction of such social distinction.

The mediated nature of political power meant that the domain of law existed in the interpretive practice of legal experts at some remove from the power of the state. While appointments to the various offices of law were often made by the ruler, the prestige and authority of judges and jurisconsults was largely defined by peer groups. The decision of a qazi carried authority not because he was a functionary of the state but because of his reputation for piety and the knowledge he possessed. This was symbolized by the seals used by qazis, which carried the name of the qazi and a ritual phrase in Arabic and nothing else. Madrasa education was an instrument for the reproduction of the social distinction and social position of the ulama as a group.

Social distinction did not automatically translate into political power, however. The relationship between the rulers and the ulama was dynamic. In times of weakness for the state, the ulama could exercise power in their own right. In fifteenth-century Samarqand, Khoja Ahrar played a very significant role in the social and political life of the city,[63] and the Juybari khojas in Bukhara accumulated vast wealth and political influence in Bukhara in the Shaybanid period.[64] In Tashkent, the ulama ruled in their own right for much of the eighteenth century.[65] At other times, rulers honored the ulama and placed them in places of high influence,

[65] O.D. Chekhovich, "Gorodskoe samoupravlenie v Tashkente XVIII vv.," in Istoriia i kul'tura narodov Srednei Azii (drevnost' i srednie veka) (Moscow, 1976), 149-160.
granting them tax exemptions as well as control of substantial endowed (waqf) property and patronizing madrasas and khanqahs. The Manghit amirs Shah Murad and Mir Haydar seem to have formed especially strong alliances with them. Several ranks among the ulama came to be reserved for Sayyid Ata'i and Juybari Khojas. Shah Murad had apparently been under the influence of a shaykh before ascending the throne, and his murders of the qushbegi and the qazi of Bukhara were prompted, it was claimed, by his dismay as much at their moral turpitude in smoking water pipes, then a new habit in Bukhara, as at their propensity for oppression. Mir Haydar, described by a contemporary as having the temperament of a scholar (mulla tabi'at), spent a great deal of his time in learned discussions with the ulama (although that did not prevent him from also being enamored of women [zan dost] and contracting a great many marriages). Both were generous in their support of the ulama, and as a result both acquired excellent reputations with chroniclers. In both Bukhara and Kokand, intermarriage between the ruling dynasties and leading Sufi families was widespread during the first half of the nineteenth century. But such deference or alliance did not come automatically. We are told that Alim Qul, khan of Kokand (r. 1800-1810) "did not believe in Sufis and shaykhs." Abdulkarim Bukhari relates the unpleasant experience at his hands of a shaykh who claimed to possess miracles:

One day, seated by a pond, Alim Qul ordered a rope to be flung across it, and then asked for the said shaykh to be presented to him. The shaykh appeared along with a few disciples. Alim Qul said, "O Shaykh! Tomorrow, on the day of resurrection, you will lead your disciples across the bridge of Sirat over the fires of hell. Today, why don't you cross this rope, so that I may witness one of your miracles." The shaykh began to preach admonitions and to recite hadith and the Qur'an, but the khan was inflexible and ordered him to walk the rope at once. No sooner did the shaykh step on the rope than he slipped and fell into the pond. Blows rained down on him from all sides until he died.


Bukhari, Histoire, 76 (text), 169-170 (trans.); Mir Haydar's reputation for piety was also noted by all contemporary travelers.


After that, wherever [Alim Qul] saw a dervish or a man attired in Sufi robes [khirqa-push], he had him arrested and turned into a camel driver. In such cases, kingship was its own justification. As Devin DeWeese has recently shown us, popular understandings of Islam in post-Mongol Central Asia fully
assimilated myths of conversion to Islam with the very origin of the community itself, which was often defined in terms of ruler-ship.[70] Dynasts also claimed august lineages that tied them, through an Islamizing figure, to both the Prophet (through 'Ali) and Chinggis Khan, and these claims were constantly renewed through intermarriage with saintly families. Thus the prestige of scholars of Muslim law did not mean that the states of Central Asia were theocratic or governed by an immutable Islamic law. The ideal was considerably different. Ruining the demise of the old order, Ahmad Makhdum Danish, a disaffected Bukharan courtier writing in the 1890s, recalled the days when the world was right side up. During the reign of Shah Murad, the son of an akhund killed a shopkeeper who was rude to him. The victim's father petitioned the amir for justice, but the amir was so outraged by the temerity of the victim that he imposed a fine on the father instead, exclaiming that if the victim had not been killed, he would have had him thrown from the Minar-i Kalan. "It is clear from the aforesaid," Danish concluded, "how knowledge and its servants were in ascendance at that time, and how strong were the opinions of the ulama and the rulers."[71] Shariat was honored because its carriers were honored. As long as the old order continued to exist on its own terms, the madrasa made perfect sense and served crucial purposes in reproducing knowledge and the social order. The demise of the old order, however, cast everything in doubt.

The Luxury of Isolation

Madrasas continued to be built and endowed and manuscripts continued to be written in the nineteenth century. If anything, the first half of the nineteenth century was a period of cultural florescence: A majority of the madrasas in existence in Tashkent and Kokand in the first years of Russian rule had been built in the nineteenth century.[72] The khans of both Kokand and Khiva cultivated vast literary circles that produced numerous works of poetry and history.[73] Yet, this florescence was highly traditionalist, the central preoccupation being with writing poetry on the models of Timurid or earlier poets and writing commentaries on existing works. Central Asia's isolation contributed to this conservatism of local cultural practices and tastes. The shift of world trade routes from land to sea after the fifteenth century marginalized the economy of Central Asia; the political dislocation of the eighteenth century added to it.[74] As a result, Central Asia was little affected by the globalization of the world economy taking place in those centuries, which greatly affected other Muslim lands. The low levels of technicalization that obtained in Central Asia until the Russian conquest provide a measure of this isolation from the world economy. The picture of Central Asian isolation can be overdrawn, to be sure. In the nineteenth century, Central Asian merchants conducted a vigorous trade with
Russia, Afghanistan, India, and China. The reach of Indian trade was considerable. As Stephen Dale has recently demonstrated, an Indian world economy encompassed much of Eurasia in the early modern period. Although its heyday was over by the nineteenth century, trade was still sizable. In July 1826, an Indian merchant arrived in Oren-burg with a cargo of gold and silver coin, muslin, and silk brocades. Khanykov reported in 1842 that the volume of trade with Afghanistan and India averaged 3,000-5,000 camel loads annually. A substantial population of Indian merchants resided in the principal cities of Central Asia, where they enjoyed a near monopoly over moneylending. Cen-

tral Asia still served as an entrepôt for trade between Russia and China, and merchants from Ferghana had acquired a dominant commercial position in Eastern Turkestan, where in 1826 Madali Khan obtained the right to levy taxes in Altï Shahr. But the most extensive trade was with Russia, whose goods had come to dominate the Central Asian market well before the Russian conquest. Arminius Vámébëry, who traveled in Central Asia in 1863, wrote, "It is by no means any exaggeration to assert that there is no house, and even no tent, in all Central Asia, where there is not some article of Russian manufacture." This trade was carried on through annual caravans that braved nomad territory on the way to Orenburg and beyond. Orenburg, founded in 1742, had a Bukharan colony, and Bukharan merchants had been allowed to trade at the Makariev fair (which later moved to Nizhnii Novgorod) since 1807. The return trade was in the hands of Tatars, however, and few Russians set foot in Central Asia. There was also considerable circulation of people. The ulama retained contacts with India. In 1842, Kokand's embassy to St. Petersburg was headed by one Sahibzada Mian Fazl Khalil, a Sirhindi Sufi from Peshawar. His cousin headed the Naqshbandi order in Kokand from his arrival there in 1826 until his death in 1869. Those who could also traveled to Arabia for the hajj, although a
Kokand notable found that it took him seven years to make the trip in the 1820. Similarly, the incipient modernization of the armies in the khanates was made possible largely by imported soldiers. Iranian soldiers, many of them slaves captured in war or by Türkmen tribes, provided most of the manpower for [79] Toru Saguchi, "The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate," Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, no. 24 (1965): 82-89; Joseph Fletcher, "The Heydey of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet," in John K. Fairbank, ed., Cambridge History of China, vol. 10 (Cambridge, 1978), 360-395.

[80] Arminius Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia (London, 1864), 475-476; for an earlier expression of the same phenomenon, see Mohan Lal, Travels in the Panjab, Afghanistan, and Turkistan (London, 1846), 142. There is a considerable literature on trade relations between Russia and Central Asia; see M. K. Rozhkova, Ekonomucheskie sviazi Rossii so Srednei Aziei (40-60 gody XIX veka ) (Moscow, 1963); G.A. Mikhailova, Torgovye i diplomaticheskie sviazi Rossii so sredneaziatskimi khanstvami cherez Orenburg (Tashkent, 1982); Kh. Z. Ziaiev, Ekonomicheskie sviazi Srednei Azii s Sibir'iu v XVI-XIX vv. (Tashkent, 1983).


the newly organized standing armies. Similarly, several Indian Muslims with experience in the armies of the East India Company served in Kokand, one of them rising to be governor of Tashkent for several years. The maverick British traveler John Wolff was "most agreeably surprised" when a band of soldiers in Bukhara played "God Save the Queen" for him one evening in Bukhara in 1844. Three decades later, the American diplomat Eugene Schuyler, visiting Kokand on the eve of its final annexation, found local troops being drilled with a mixture of English and Russian commands, many of them seemingly fully nativized into local Turkic.

Nevertheless, this reorganization of armies was directed primarily at regional struggles. The khanates of Central Asia were surrounded by deserts inhabited by nomadic tribes, and the concerns of rulers continued to focus on the shifting calculus of power involving neighboring khanates and the nomads; relations with outside powers, always sporadic because of the distances involved, were seen through the prism of local rivalries. The khans of Kokand had paid tribute to the Qing dynasty since the 1750s, but this relationship remained largely nominal. To the extent that the khans dealt largely with ambans in Kashgar (over the years, only eight Kokand missions were allowed to visit Beijing), this relationship too remained a regional one. Russia was the only external power to have any significant presence in this regional theater of diplomacy, although as long as the steppe remained beyond Russian control, its power to act was limited. Successive embassies traveled to St. Petersburg over the course of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a smaller number of Russian missions paid visits to Central Asia capitals.

The Ottomans maintained sporadic diplomatic contact, although again the vast distances separating the two realms made it impossible for either side to give these relations any substance. The Ottomans initiated relations with Bukhara in the aftermath of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, in the hope of opening a second front against Russia. The pious Shah Murad was distinctly unenthusiastic about the cause, informing the Otto-


[85] Beisembiev, "Farqhana's Contacts with India," 126.


[87] Schuyler, Turkistan, II: 15-16.

[88] Saguchi, "Eastern Trade," 49-52. According to Abdulkarim Bukhari, the Chinese emperor had granted Alim Qul a pension (‘alufa) in return for making sure that the sons of Sarimsaq Khoja, the last ruler of Kashgar, did not cross Kokand territory to attack their father's lost domains; see Bukhari, Histoire, 96 (text), 217-218 (trans.).

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man envoy Alemdar Mehmed Said Aga that it was "impossible to wage war on a power such as Moscow without cannon and armor," but asking instead for help against "our real enemy ... Iran and the Rafizis [Shi'is]."[89] In the ensuing decades, rulers of the three khanates sent a steady succession of envoys to Istanbul, seeking help in religious as well as military matters. Yet it was clear to the Porte that even when Central Asian rulers offered to swear allegiance (bi'at) to the sultan as caliph (as the rulers of both Bukhara and Khiva did in the 1810s), it was in the hope of gaining symbolic supremacy in local struggles rather than with the intent of subordinating their sovereignty to that of the sultan.[90]

The same distances that isolated Central Asia also provided its rulers with a certain comfort and safety from colonial intrusion. Unlike the Muslim states of the Mediterranean, the khanates of Central Asia did not feel directly the military threat of modern powers until the middle of the nineteenth century. Central Asia's neighbors had similar levels of technology and did not therefore mount a significant challenge to its external security. No direct challenge arose from foreign powers until the 1830s, when expanding spheres of British and Russian influence threatened Central Asia. Even when this isolation was broken, the low level of institutionalization in the Central Asian khanates meant that the intensive reform from the top experienced by the Ottoman empire or Egypt could not take place in Central Asia. The result was a measure of freedom in isolation that was available to few other Muslim states in this period. The relative security of obscurity allowed the Islamic tradition unquestioned domination in Central Asian intellectual life. The Russian conquest, so rude in its abruptness, ended this isolation and put Central Asia and its civilization
in a completely different situation.

[90] Ibid., 28-53.

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Chapter 2
The Making of a Colonial Society
The Russian Conquest

The gradual subjugation of the Bashkir and Qazaq steppe by the Russian state over the preceding century and a half had brought Russia into geographical contiguity with the khanates of Central Asia by the middle of the nineteenth century. In the confrontation that followed, the technological and organizational superiority of Russian forces proved to be its own justification for conquest, which was accomplished with great ease and rapidity. Although the motivation behind the Russian expansion has been a matter of much debate, it seems quite clear that the initiatives of willful and ambitious generals played significant and irreversible roles in the conquest of Central Asia.[1]

[1] Soviet historiography long focused on the economic impulse behind Russian expansion, asserting, not entirely convincingly, the necessity of a nascent bourgeoisie in Russia to find new markets. See the classic statement in N.A. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii k Rossii (60-90-e gody XIX v. ) (Moscow, 1965). Much of Western historiography of Russian expansion into Central Asia, in positing a calculated Russian advance against India, is still hostage to the nineteenth-century British understanding of it; for a recent vulgarization of this theme, see Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game (London, 1990). The assumption of a grand strategy behind Russian expansion has been questioned, quite convincingly in my opinion, by David MacKenzie, "Expansion in Central Asia: St. Petersburg vs. the Turkestan Generals (1863-1866)," Canadian Slavic Studies 3 (1969): 286-311; and Peter Morns, "The Russians in Central Asia, 1870-1887," Slavonic and East European Review 53 (1975): 521-538.

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Russia's first territorial acquisition at the expense of a khanate came in 1853, when Russian forces under the command of General V.A. Perovskii took the Kokand fortress of Aq Masjid to complete the Orenburg line of frontier fortifications. Further action was stalled for a decade, when the decision was made to connect the Orenburg and Siberian lines. The resulting advance led to the conquest of the towns, nominally under Kokand rule, of Turkestan (Yasi) and Awliya Ata, and it finally enclosed the Qazaq steppe behind Russian lines. This was, however, only the beginning of bigger things. The following spring, M. G. Cherniaev, promoted to the rank of major general for his recent exploits, marched on Tashkent and conquered it against the express wishes of his superiors in St. Petersburg. Cherniaev's actions in Tashkent set the pattern for Russia's military activity in Central Asia over the next two decades, as military men
repeatedly presented faits accomplis to imperial authorities. Military action
took place in remote, barely known areas, which left imperial authorities with
no ability to monitor the actions of men on the spot, for whom the militarily
weak khanates represented an easy source of military glory.[2]
Cherniaev was decorated and the territories conquered by him retained. War thus
came to Bukhara. Amir Muzaffar showed little enthusiasm for taking on the
Russians, preferring to continue his campaign against Kokand, but he was
surprised by his own population. In early 1866, with the Russians at Jizzakh,
the ulama of Bukhara led a vast throng to the amir's palace demanding the
declaration of war.[3] A similar uprising took place in Samarqand. The amir was
forced to fight, but the hastily assembled army, including many volunteers with
no experience of war, suffered a massive defeat. The next years were a period of
uncertainty. The amir sought help from outside: an embassy led by one Muhammad
Parsa traveled to India and the Ottoman empire, but to no avail.[4] Meanwhile,
his troops suffered a number of defeats, which cost him the
[2] On the Russian conquest of Central Asia, see Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Srednei
Azii; good summaries in English are Richard N. Pierce, Russian Central Asia,
1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, 1960), ch. 2; Seymour Becker,
Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge,
1968), chs. 2-7; and Hélène Carfare d'Encausse, "Systematic Conquest,
1865-1884," in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule
(New York, 1967), 131-150.
[3] 'Abdul 'Azim Sami, Tuhfa-yi shahi (ms., ca. 1899-1900), quoted by L.M.
Epifanova, Rukopis'nye istochniki Instituta Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk UzSSR
po istori Srednei Azii perioda prisoedineniia k Rossii (Tashkent, 1965), 34;
Ahmad Makhdum Danish, Traktat Akhmada Donisha "Istoriia Mangitskoi dinastii,
[4] For a description of the letter to the sultan, see Epifanova, Rukopis'nye
istochniki, 69-70; for some Ottoman documents concerning the embassy, see
Osmanli Devleti ile Kafkasya, Turkistan ve Kirim Hanliklari Arasindaki
Munasebetlere dâir Arsw, Belgeleri (Ankara, 1992), 133-134, 136-138; see also
Muhammad Anwar Khan, England, Russia and Central Asia (A Study in Diplomacy)
(Peshawar, 1963), 107-112; Mehmed Saray, Rus Isgali Devrinde Osmanli Devleti ile
Turkistan Hanliklari Arasindaki Siyasi Munasebetler (Istanbul, 1990), 81-88.

provinces of Khujand and Samarqand. In 1868, Bukhara was forced to pay
reparations and to sign a treaty formalizing the loss of territory and granting
Russian merchants equal rights in the country. Similar terms were imposed by
treaty on the rump khanate of Kokand.
The khanates were allowed to exist for several interconnected reasons.
Authorities in St. Petersburg, especially the Ministry of Finance, showed a
marked reluctance to take on the expenditure of administering new regions. There
was also the need to minimize British concerns about Russian expansion, as well
as an uncertainty about the ability to control a large population little known
or understood by the Russians. The initial conquests were to be
incorporated directly into the Russian empire. Yet, the very logic of military
success undermined this hope. Each round of warfare resulted in the acquisition of extra territory as reparations. In 1873, a major campaign that reduced Khiva to vassal status gained considerable territory for Russia. In Kokand, Khudayar Khan found it difficult to assert his authority over his diminished realm and in 1875 lost his throne in an uprising that rapidly turned into a movement against the Russian presence. Russian troops invaded and occupied Kokand; the protectorate was abolished and the khanate incorporated into the Russian empire. Finally, in the 1880s, the Türkmen steppe, where no khanate had managed to assert control, was conquered, often with the use of exemplary brutality (the most notable being Skobelev's massacre at Gök Tepe in 1881). Thus, at the end of the period of conquest, for all its reluctance to take on additional expense, the Russian state found itself in the possession of a vast new densely populated territory.

The 1868 treaty with Bukhara was eventually replaced in 1873 by a new, more far-reaching version that defined Bukhara's status until 1917. It made the amir "acknowledge himself to be the obedient servant of the Emperor of All the Russias." The amir also "renounce[d] the right to maintain direct and friendly relations with neighboring rulers and khans and to conclude with them any commercial or other treaties [or to] ... undertake any military actions against them without the knowledge and permission of the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia."[5] Once he

[5] For an English translation of the treaty, see Becker, Russia's Protectorates, 316-318 (quote on 316).

had accepted Russian suzerainty, Amir Muzaffar set about making the best of it. Through a series of adroit political maneuvers, Muzaffar and his successors carved out for themselves a position of authority that their ancestors had only dreamed of. Now, despite his military defeat, Muzaffar was installed as a ruler by the Russians, who henceforth had an interest in the security of his throne. (Nor was the defeat complete. In 1873, the Russians made the khan of Khiva cede territory on the right bank of the Amu Darya to the amir of Bukhara, whom the Russians trusted more. The amir also gained territory, with Russian blessings, in Qarategin and Darwaz and in the Pamirs.)(6) On more than one occasion, Russian troops were deployed in Bukhara to quell disorders. Muzaffar and his successors kept on good terms with Russian elites, both in Tashkent and St. Petersburg, and backed these contacts with frequent personal gifts and public donations.[7] Domestically, Muzaffar presented himself as the most powerful surviving Muslim monarch in Central Asia. He even turned defeat into victory by claiming credit for having prevented a complete takeover by Russia.[8] He appealed to religious piety and grounded his legitimacy in his support for the "traditional" Islamic order in Bukhara. He and his successors jealously guarded against the introduction of any new institutions that might compromise their absolute power by casting all change as a bid'at (innovation). The nature of Bukhara's political order was transformed as a result of the protectorate, Russia's professions of non-intervention notwithstanding. With the delineation of its boundaries in the treaty, Bukhara also became, for the first time, a
strictly territorial entity.

Bukhara's autonomy was further reduced in 1885, when it was included in the Russian customs boundary and a Russian "political agency" was created to conduct relations with Bukhara (which until then had been carried on through irregular emissaries). The Transcaspian Railway, built in the 1880s to connect Samarqand and Tashkent with the Caspian Sea, also cut through Bukhara. A new treaty made the railway itself and all stations along it sovereign Russian territory. The political agency, directly inspired by the British experience of dealing with princely states in India, was located nine miles from Bukhara, in Kagan, which in time became an important outpost of Russian Turkestan. The political agent was appointed by the governor-general of Turkestan, who could thus keep a closer eye on the amir and project Russian influence into Bukhara more easily. The Russian government periodically contemplated outright annexation of Bukhara, but for the same reasons that had militated against annexation in 1868, the amir escaped unscathed, his autocratic powers intact, until the revolution of 1920.

The khan of Khiva was less successful. His realm was smaller and poorer, and the peace treaty accordingly more punitive. Over the decades, Muhammad Rahim Khan (1864-1910) and his successor were far less prominent in Russian public life, but since they could not make claims to authority like those of the amirs of Bukhara, they proved more open to reform. Their authority over their realm was less certain, however, and an uprising by nomadic tribes in 1916 led to massive Russian intervention that all but abolished the protectorate.

Yet, only the military could be wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the progress of Russian arms in the region. The Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs took a different view of the matter, the former worrying about the expense of administering vast new territories in a period of fiscal restraint, and the latter fearing "complications" in its relations with Britain, which saw any Russian advance as a direct threat to its occupation of India. The fears of these two ministries were reflected in the final outcome, but the military succeeded in setting the pace of conquest. Russian expansion ended when the southern boundaries of the empire were defined in a series of treaties with Britain, which thus made Russian actions subject to European international law.

By that time, however, the Russian empire had acquired numerous new subjects and huge tracts of land that it ruled directly. This rule proved quite stable, at
least partly because strategic considerations remained paramount in the eyes of local administrators.[10] It was also backed by large numbers of troops, usually numbering around 50,000, who were frequently deployed.[11] There


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were few overt challenges to Russian rule until the uprising of 1916, although a certain unease about the thinness of their authority never left the minds of the new rulers.

Imagining Turkestan
The Turkestan krai (region) was created in 1867 and put in the charge of a governor-general.[12] In view of the unsettled and largely unknown conditions in the area, civilian and military rule down to the uezd (district) level were placed in the same hands (although uezd administrators were relieved of military command in 1884), and the Ministry of War, rather than Internal Affairs, enjoying ultimate jurisdiction over it. The region was to be ruled by a governor-general, appointed by the tsar himself and answerable only to him. K.P. Kaufman, the first governor-general, enjoyed immense plenipotentiary powers over administration and the conduct of Russian relations with neighboring states. Given its peculiar position, Turkestan was to be governed under its own statute. The tsar promulgated a Provisional Statute in 1867, but the drafting of a permanent statute was delayed by differences between the various ministries involved, and a final version was not published until 1886. For the first two decades of Russian rule, therefore, Turkestan was governed provisionally, with everyday policy being set by Kaufman. The earliest Russian policies and practices bore the stamp of his preferences.

Central Asia's otherness was palpable to nineteenth-century Russians. As Monika Greenleaf has ably argued, since the early nineteenth century, Russian elites had sought to buttress their Europeanness through participation in the discourse of orientalism.[13] The same could be said of the discourse of imperialism. In his 1864 memorandum to Russian missions in Europe, Foreign Minister A.M. Gorchakov argued in terms of mid-century imperialism common to all Europeans: "The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized States which are brought

[12] Polnoe sobranie zakonot' Rossiiskoi Imperu , 2nd ser., vol. 42, no. 44831 (St. Petersburg, 1868). The krai initially consisted of two oblasts, viz. Syr Darya and Semirech'e; later the Samarqand and Ferghana oblasts, comprising lands annexed from Bukhara and Kokand, respectively, were added. In 1882, Semirech'e was transferred to the Steppe krai, ruled from Omsk, but returned to Turkestan m 1892, when the Transcaspian oblast, representing the last fruits of Russian expansion, was also transferred to Turkestan from the viceroyalty of
Transcaucasia. Both, however, continued to be ruled under their own statutes.


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into contact with half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization.... In such cases it always happens that the more civilized State is forced... to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make most undesirable neighbours.... It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilization has as yet no hold upon them."[14] Nor was this memorandum simply eyewash for the benefit of foreign governments. Educated Russians saw their presence in Central Asia as part of the greater European imperial expansion of the nineteenth century. The Russian intelligentsia might debate its relation to Europe, but no one doubted that Russia represented Europe in Central Asia.[15] Most Russians in Central Asia saw their goals in terms of the usual nineteenth-century imperial notions of replacing the arbitrary, "Asiatic" despotism of local rulers by good government, the pacification of the countryside, and the increase in trade and prosperity. The earliest administrators took pride in the lower levels of taxation Russian rule had brought (even, for some, at the expense of rendering Turkestan "unprofitable"). Kaufman saw the growth of trade as the key to the future prosperity of the region and spent a considerable amount of energy in organizing a biannual trade fair at Tashkent. (The experiment was less than successful and was soon abandoned.){[16]

Russia as progress stood in contrast to Central Asia as fanaticism and barbarity, much of which was seen to reside in Islam. "Fanaticism" came to be the defining characteristic of Central Asia, although precisely what it entailed could vary a great deal; its semantic range included everything from armed struggle against the Russians, through the refusal to send [14] Great Britain, Parliament, Central Asia, No. 2 (1873): Correspondence Respecting Central Asia , C. 704 (London, 1873), 70-75.

[15] This bears emphasis for two reasons: first, current discussions of post-Soviet Russia take for granted its otherness from "Europe"; and second, the considerable literature that exists on Russian views of Asia tends to privilege those Russian authors who had more ambivalent feelings toward Europe (and consequently, toward Asia), thus overstating the prevalence of such views. See, for example, Milan Hauner, What Is Asia to Us ? (London, 1990). In any case, as Mark Bassin ("Russia between Europe and Asia," Slavic Review 50 [1991]: 13) has shown, even those Russian writers who asserted Russia's difference from Europe tended nevertheless to see "the gulf separating Russia from the Occident as considerably less deep than that separating it from the Orient"; Central Asia remained a "purely Asiatic land," a colony of Russia, no matter how un-European Russia might be.

[16] TWG was full of reports and proclamations about the trade fair in the early 1870s. The fair distinctly failed to amuse Eugene Schuyler, the American minister in St. Petersburg, who visited Central Asia in 1873; see his scathing

children to Russian schools, to abstention from alcohol. As David Edwards has pointed out, establishing the other as fanatical denies him or her moral status, since he or she exists beyond the realm of rationality, and gives those whose moral superiority is thus affirmed a free hand in defending their interests.[17] In locating the fanaticism in Islam, Kaufman and his contemporaries were part of a much broader phenomenon of nineteenth-century European thought. As European armies of conquest encountered armed resistance, often in the name of Islam and many times organized around Sufi brotherhoods, the "fanaticism" of Muslims became a commonplace in the literature of imperialism. The view of Islam as a conspiratorial religion (Sufi brotherhoods, dimly understood, were particularly suitable grist for this mill), implacably hostile to Christianity (or Europe or the West), provided a common framework for colonial administrators in Asia and Africa.[18] Russian administrators in Turkestan (some of whom were prominent orientalists) looked to the experience of the British and the French in ruling "their" Muslims, and they avidly read the works of Western European orientalists. The Russians had encountered the same phenomenon in their prolonged conquest of Daghestan, where resistance, led by Shamil, had been organized in Sufi brotherhoods. Similarly, the role of the ulama in forcing the amir of Bukhara to fight was proof to many of the implacable fanaticism aroused by Islam. This fear of Islam remained a constant component of policies toward Muslim peoples through the colonial world, although its intensity varied with the political situation. By the end of the century, the fear of traditional Islam organized in Sufi brotherhoods began to give way to a fear of Islam, fanatical as ever, but now mixed up with nationalism and modern education. Bureaucrats in Turkestan could never make up their minds as to which kind of Islam was more dangerous. Nevertheless, the fear of the conspiratorial nature of Islam rendered certain religious practices, such as the hajj, the locus of suspicion, and hence targets of control.

At the same time, in common with other Europeans, educated Russians had boundless confidence in the inherent superiority of their civilization, a belief repeated often by administrators in Turkestan. Writing


in the aftermath of the Andijan uprising of 1898, a group of orientalists could blandly state: "Of course, at the present time, no one doubts that Islam has had its day and that each day it nears its final collapse and decomposition. No
evidence is needed to show that a renaissance of the world of Islam is not possible: left to itself, it must either meet its final destruction or it will have to adopt a different culture."[19] Russian policies in Turkestan were therefore the product of a curious combination of hubris and paranoia. The superiority and ultimate victory of the civilization they represented was assured, but the natives were nevertheless prone to a fanatical hatred of it. Yet, astute exercise of power (and the utilization of expert knowledge) could ensure the perpetuation of Russian rule and even the diminution of native fanaticism. For Kaufman, policy choices were obvious: Russian authorities were to tread cautiously and leave all aspects of local life that were not of a political nature untouched, so as not to arouse the fanaticism of the natives, while setting before them the example of the superior civilization of their new rulers. The natural corollary to nonintervention was "ignoring" (ignorirovanie) Muslim institutions. Kaufman was critical of the treatment of religious functionaries by the earliest Russian rulers in Central Asia, who had attempted to organize them into a hierarchy that had, in his opinion, only strengthened their position.[20] His own approach was to be different: "Finding that Islam was accustomed to living in the closest association with the state and to using its power for its own purposes, the local administration realized that the best way to fight it [Islam] would be to ignore it completely. In such a situation, the state, by not allowing Islam to unite under its wing, would condemn it to a process of decay."[21] While the decay took its course, the state was to avoid at all costs inflaming the fanaticism of the local population. This approach laid the foundations for an often paradoxical administrative policy that in its broad outlines was pursued down to the end of the old regime. The policy, with its intended and unintended consequences, was of fundamental importance in the evolution of Central Asian culture during the half-century of tsarist rule.

[21] Quoted in Beliavskii, Materialy po Turkestanu (St. Petersburg, 1884), 59.

No religious dignitaries were to be appointed to positions of authority, as Cherniaev had done in the aftermath of the conquest of Tashkent. Thus the positions of qazi kalan and shaykh ul-Islam in Tashkent were abolished. On his travels around Turkestan, Kaufman often pointedly rebuffed religious dignitaries. He also kept Turkestan out of the jurisdiction of the Muslim Spiritual Administration based in Orenburg (a creation of Catherine II, who had sought to provide a bureaucratic structure for Islam to parallel the Holy

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Synod), since it would have meant providing an organizational structure to local Islam. Isolating Islam in Turkestan was a natural corollary to the policy of disregarding it. Even before Kaufman left St. Petersburg to take up his new appointment, he had written to the Ministry of the Interior asking for an amendment to existing passport regulations that would make it impossible for Turkestanis to obtain foreign passports for hajj without his permission. Over the next three years, his chancellery worked out detailed regulations for the granting of passports to his subjects; finding that "while it is not possible to prevent this movement altogether, there is also no need to make it easy and affordable," it sought to make the practice as difficult as possible by setting high fees for applications for hajj passports. In 1876, Kaufman was writing to the Minister of Education D.A. Tolstoi raising his concern about the active trade in printed Qur'ans and other religious books between Kazan and Turkestan. "Finding the dissemination of Muslim teachings by as powerful a weapon as the printed word harmful for Russian interests in Central Asia," Kaufman asked Tolstoi to take measures to limit the entry and distribution of Muslim books in Central Asia. The request was impossible to implement, but it showed that even the principles of free trade so dear to Kaufman could readily be sacrificed at the altar of stability.

More significant was Kaufman's decision to make a clear distinction between the sedentary and nomadic populations of the area. The distinction had a long tradition in Russian thinking about Islam, although the relative values assigned to nomad and sedentary differed over time. As late as 1864, Gorchakov had presented the nomads as the problem ("half-savage...populations, possessing no fixed social organization") and foreseen stable neighborly relations with the "more civilized" sedentary khanates. Kaufman reversed the valences. For him, sedentary populations were repositories of the fanaticism so harmful to Russian interests; the nomads, whose "way of life [was]... based on natural and still primitive principles," might "officially adhere to Islam [but] in reality shun it and have no specific religious faith." The aim of Russian policy ought to be to protect these noble savages from the influence of the fanatical Islam produced in the cities. Kaufman established distinct patterns of administration for each type of population and even hoped to redraw administrative boundaries to perpetuate the "natural demarcation" of the settled from the nomad. Although this territorial demarcation never came about, sedentary populations were placed under the jurisdiction of Muslim religious law (shariat), while personal law among the nomads was to be based on custom (adat); in both cases, judges (called qazis among the sedentary population and biy among the nomads) were to

[22] Kaufman to A. A. Lobanov-Rostovskii, 22 July 1867, TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 11, d. 1, ll. 1-2.
[23] "O poriadke vydachi zagranichnykh pasportov" (February 1870), TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 11, d. 1, ll. 460b-47; the regulations were published in TWG, 15 March 1871.
[24] Kaufman to Tolstoi, 6 February 1876, TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 11, ll. 2-3.
be elected. The distinction between the two, never as clear as Kaufman had assumed, blurred considerably during this period, largely as a direct result of Russian rule over nomadic territory, which rendered it safe for both Tatar and Uzbek ulama to operate on the steppe. By 1917, a new group of Muslim scholars had appeared among the nomadic population as well. Nevertheless, the dichotomy underlay Russian administrative policies until 1917, leading to distinct patterns of political development among the sedentary and nomadic populations in Central Asia. These initiatives were combined with a number of other precautionary measures. Kaufman forbade all missionary activity by the Orthodox church in his realm, and the ban lasted until 1917. As a result, Turkestan never experienced the politics of conversion and resistance to it that marked the cultural life of the Volga basin and gave Tatar Jadidism its flavor. Kaufman also prohibited Russian settlement outside of towns and postal stations and did not allow Russians to purchase land.[27] This prohibition was short-lived, as the Statute of 1886 allowed Christians and local Muslims the right to buy property in Turkestan, and in time large-

[26] K.P. fon-Kaufman, Proekt vsepoddanneishogo otcheta General-ad" uitanta K. P. fon-Kaufmana po grazhdanskomu upravlemiu i ustroistvu v oblastiakh Turkestanskogo general-gubernatorstva 7 notabria 1867-25 marta 1881 g . (St. Petersburg, 1885), 82. The concern with protecting the nomads from the influence of their sedentary neighbors, both Tatars and "Sarts," is a constant theme in this report (see esp. ibid., 141-149, 440-441).
[27] Ibid., 246.

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scale resettlement of Russian peasants appeared on the government's agenda, but the caution behind it persisted and served to place limits on the scale of Russian immigration. Yet, Islam did not "decay." Kaufman was wrong, of course, in asserting that "Islam was accustomed to living in the closest association with the state." Kaufman's hope that "Islam" would decay if bereft of state support therefore proved to be unfounded. There were other reasons, too, why the disregard of Islam did not produce the expected results. Noninterference in native life was not incompatible with fundamental change. Over the half century of tsarist rule, Central Asia was framed with new kinds of knowledge, bureaucratic practices, and forms of economic and political power that profoundly reshaped local understandings of Islam and ensured that it did not simply decay the way Kaufman and his successors had hoped.

The confidence that knowledge could subjugate difference led to the production of colonial knowledge that began immediately after the conquest. Alongside the new administration came statistical committees and their publications, which set about bringing order to the land. Numerous expeditions, Russian as well as foreign, visited Central Asia in the 1870s and 1880s to gather geographical and
ethnographic information. Central Asia was surveyed and mapped, its natural features and social institutions described, and its inhabitants, their fanaticism notwithstanding, photographed, counted, measured, and classified.[28] Soon this attention extended to archeology and history as well. This research was formalized in a number of learned societies that appeared in Tashkent to further the study of the region's history and archeology, all of which enjoyed official support.[29] The aim was to make the region more comprehensible by rendering it an object of familiar modes of description and classification, thus facilitating the new rulers' ability to rule. This impulse toward rigorous ("scientific") description coexisted with a will to exoticize Central Asia, however. When Kaufman first arrived in Tashkent, he was accompanied by Vasilii Vereshchagin, one of Russia's most prominent painters, who specialized in orientalist themes (he was a disciple of Jean-Léon Gérôme). During two stays in Turkestan, Vereshchagin painted and sketched numerous scenes of local life that illustrated the fanaticism and barbarity of the newly conquered territory: dervishes with irrationally dilated eyes, battle scenes with pyramids of (Russian) skulls, and slave auctions all served to fix the otherness of Central Asia in the mind of a wide audience that extended well beyond Russia.[30] Arjun Appadurai has suggested that enumeration and exoticization were intertwined strands of a single colonial project in nineteenth-century India.[31] Russian rule over Central Asia was based on similar epistemological processes. The knowledge created by the new regime was a force in its own right. Statistical committees even counted what was not really amenable to counting; the maktab, as I have argued, was an unstructured site for the interaction of older men and children; the new regime saw them as "native schools" and insisted on collecting statistical data on them. These data are, to be sure, highly unreliable, but the process of counting itself imparted a new meaning to the phenomenon of the maktab. The regime was even more interested in the ethnic classification of the population and over time reified ethnic categories by using them to classify the population. These classifications were to play an important role in native discourses of identity.

But no amount of knowledge could assuage the fear of the natives' fanaticism, which tended to subvert intentions of introducing citizenship to the area. This was reflected in the new administrative structure created in Turkestan. In order to minimize the chance of provoking the "fanaticism" of the local population, the internal administration of the native population was left in the hands of
local functionaries. In its broad outlines, the administrative structure that emerged in Turkestan was similar to that of European Russia in the aftermath of Emancipation, where the peasantry was also left to administer itself, but the implementation of this structure in Turkestan owed as much to the fear of fanaticism as to a principled stance on the part of officialdom to establish empire-wide structures in the newly acquired territory. Existing systems of land tenure and revenue collection often continued unaltered during the period of conquest, often for several years, before the new administration could mobilize resources to reorganize them. Once that was done, lower-level administration was organized at the village and volost levels. In areas of settled population, property owners met to elect electors (piatidesiatniki, ellikbashi), who in turn elected village elders (aqsaqqal), officials in charge of overseeing irrigation channels (ariq aqsaqqal), and volost chiefs. In the cities, different wards elected their own asaqqals. A parallel system of administration was created among the nomadic population, with electors choosing leaders at the aul and volost levels. These officials performed basic functions and assisted the Russian administration in tax assessment. These functionaries were responsible for all matters not having a "political" character, such as revenue collection and the administration of justice. For the same reasons, the local population was not put under the obligation to serve in the military. Although this measure was no doubt popular with the newly conquered population, it also meant that the bifurcation between the two tiers of administration was complete. A few Tatars and Qazaqs served in the military administration, but Turkestan functionaries remained confined to the "native" tier. The Russian administration, which existed only at the uezd and higher levels, had control over the election and functioning of these officials. Oblast governors retained the right to annul the results of any election (the right was frequently exercised). The 1886 Statute retained these elective officials, and they continued to function until 1917. Larger towns were granted organs of elective public economic administration (khoziaistvennoe obshchestvennoe upravlenie), with the task of overseeing local fiscal affairs and determining taxes, but Kaufman, citing widespread corruption and misuse of power, aborted the experiment in 1877.

[32] Motivated both by a spirit of paternalist protectionism and the fear of rural radicalism, the state sought to retain the peasant commune in the aftermath of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Volost-level administration...
was in the hands of elected peasants and volost courts adjudicated according to customary, rather than case, law. The argument can easily be made that the Russian state's relationship to its peasantry was colonial. But many Russian intellectuals sought to overcome their alienation from the peasantry, and the middle of the nineteenth century was the high point of the romanticization of the peasant as representative of pure Russianness. In Turkestan, on the other hand, the distance from the local population was self-evident to most Russians and tended to affirm their sense of Russianness. In time, many officials came to see in the settlement of the region by Russian peasants the solution to the problem of Turkestan's otherness. Empire could reconcile the state to its peasantry in a way not possible in European Russia itself.

[33] Kaufman, Proekt, 43.

and transferred these functions to the uezd administration.[34] The one exception was Tashkent, where municipal self-government was organized from early on.

Although this policy of "ignoring" Islam was questioned as early as 1882, it remained in force until 1917. Immediately upon Kaufman's death, with an impasse still continuing in the debate over the permanent statute, the imperial government instituted an inspection (reviziia) of the region to assess the needs of imperial policy there. The inspector F.K. Girs argued for radical change in the region's administration. Arguing that the population was peaceful and well inclined to Russian rule, he recommended the abolition of the special features of the Provisional Statute and its replacement by empire-wide structures.[35] These recommendations were not taken into account, and when the permanent statute was enacted in 1886, the two-tier administrative structure remained in place. A second inspection in 1908 recommended replacing the 1886 statute with one granting far greater rights to the local population, including the gradual introduction of zemstvo self-government.[36] The proposals provoked considerable debate, which continued until the outbreak of the Great War pushed such matters to the background.

Similarly, Kaufman's policy of "disregarding" Islam was also debated but not changed in any fundamental way until after the revolution. The strongest attack on it came in the aftermath of the Andijan uprising of 1898, when about 2,000 followers of Madali (Dukchi) Ishan, a minor Sufi shaykh, attacked the Russian barracks in Andijan and killed 22 soldiers while they slept and injured some 16 to 20. The insurgents, who were armed only with knives and cudgels, soon dispersed and were eventually hunted down. Russian retribution was swift: 18 of the insurgents were hanged, 360 were exiled to Siberia, and Mingtepe, Madali's village, was razed to the ground and replaced with a Russian settlement.[37] The attack did not produce any other incidents, but it sent shock waves through Russian society and officialdom since it reaffirmed official fears.

[34] Ibid., 60-66.
[36] K.K. Palen, Otchet po revizn Turkestanskogo kraia, proizvedennoi po
about the thinness of Russian rule in Turkestan. In a memorandum to the tsar, the governor-general, S. M. Dukhovskoi, saw in the uprising the failure of all policies of the Russian state toward its Muslim subjects. He attacked the policies not just of Kaufman but of Catherine II, who had created the Spiritual Administration for Muslim Affairs in Ufa and encouraged the Islamization of the Qazaq steppe. Rather, "Islam,... a teaching extremely inert and undoubtedly inimical to Christian culture, excludes all possibility of a complete moral assimilation of our present Muslim subjects with us. A pure Muslim, strongly believing in the letter of the Qur'an and the shariat, cannot be a sincere and trusted friend of a Christian."[38] With this much Kaufman could have agreed; Dukhovskoi, however, drew other conclusions. A rapprochement between Muslims and the "Russian people" was possible only once the Muslim faith weakened, and that did not appear likely to Dukhovskoi. "Islam is so strong in the imaginations of the dark and passionate Asiatics that it would be useless to expect a rapid decline [in its influence]."[39] It was therefore no longer possible to continue disregarding Islam; rather active measures were necessary to control it, such as the abolition of the Spiritual Administration at Ufa, close supervision over all Muslim institutions, and the creation of a special censor for Muslim publications. In addition, Dukhovskoi suggested using modern medicine as a vanguard for breaking down the fanaticism of the Muslim, especially of women, as well as encouraging mixed marriages between Russians and Muslims (or, since the Church would not recognize such marriages, simplifying procedures for the adoption of children born of such cohabitation).[40] If the dark and passionate Asiatic fanaticism of the local population could be thinned by Russian blood, then it was to be coopted into the service of the state.

On the whole, Dukhovskoi's dark warnings met only a lukewarm reception in St. Petersburg and did not result in any significant change in policy. In the end, "nonintervention" proved durable because it was rooted not so much in the whims of a governor-general but in a very real shortage of resources, both human and financial, which placed strict limits on the Russians' ability to effect substantial change. Turkestan was vastly undergoverned even by Russian standards. Central Asia was...

[39] Ibid., 14.
[40] Ibid., 18.
conquered at a time when the Russian government was deep in debt after the Crimean War and the Great Reforms and every expenditure was closely scrutinized. Once the conquest had been accomplished, the central government continued to be extremely tight-fisted with funds for the new region. Thus, at the time of its creation in 1867, the Syr Darya oblast was staffed with only nineteen career (shtatnye) officials with a budget of only 48,500 rubles. At that time, the Ministry of State Control refused to release funds to provide housing for the new administrators, and even the premises for the governor-general's chancellery were built from local taxes. Simultaneously, down to the end of the old regime, there was a remarkable shortage of capable men to administer the region. As a governor-general pointed out in his report to the tsar in 1897, Turkestan suffered in comparison even with other borderlands administered by the Ministry of War. Samarkand oblast, for example, with a population a little smaller than that of Terek province in the Caucasus, had only half as many permanent staff and no chancellery. The uyezd administration lagged behind even more; Samarkand's was run by a mere seventeen officials, compared with fifty-two in Tiflis and forty-four in Erevan, both of which had far smaller populations. The 1908 senatorial inspection voiced the same complaints. Ferghana oblast, with a population of two million, was administered by only forty-three career bureaucrats, including two translators. Of these, only nine had a higher education, all in technical fields. And with the exception of the few capable orientalists among them, Russian administrators had no acquaintance with local languages. The question of providing courses for administrators in local languages was raised at the official level after the turn of the century, but nothing tangible came of it.

The End of Isolation

Administrative policies might profess to minimize interference, but they could not keep at bay the profound economic transformation of the region as a result of its incorporation into the Russian empire. What little economic history of Central Asia has been written in the West deals with the Soviet period. Much, of course, has been published on the imperial period in Russian, however, with the exception of a few monographs published in the 1920s, this literature suffers from the necessity to reconcile the Central Asian experience with official interpretations of Marxism. An example of the earlier work is P.Y. Galuzo, Turkestan — kolonna (Moscow, 1929). Many of the orthodoxies of the last three decades of the Soviet period may be found in A.M. Aminov, Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Srednei Azii (kolonial'nyi period) (Tashkent, 1959).
Asia's isolation was quickly breached. The telegraph arrived in Tashkent in June 1873, and the first bank opened in May 1875.[47] After a slow beginning, the region was also linked to Russia by railway. Purely strategic reasons (the conquest of the Turkmen steppe) motivated the construction of the Transcaspian Railway, the first railway project in the area. It reached Samarqand from the Caspian only in 1888, and Tashkent and the Ferghana valley were connected only a decade later. The Orenburg-Tashkent line, providing a much more direct link with European Russia, was built between 1900 and 1906. Until then, travel to European Russia from Tashkent entailed a journey through the Türkmen desert to Krasnovodsk on the Caspian, a steamer ride to Baku or Astrakhan, and further train or steamer connections onward. Even so, the new technology represented an immense saving of time and money over previous forms of transport. Not only did it effectively tie Turkestan to Russia, it also altered patterns of overland trade with neighboring countries. The conquest had already subjected the trade with India to Russian tariffs (and the customs boundary was extended to include Bukhara as well in 1885); the introduction of railways and steamships proved to be the last nail in the coffin of the caravan trade, for it became much cheaper and faster to send goods to India via Odessa and Bombay than overland across Afghanistan.

The conquest also led to the triumph of a cash economy in Central Asia. The Statute of 1886 recognized the right to possession of land by those who cultivated it. In sedentary areas, this effectively created private ownership of land in the hands of a class of smallholders. In nomadic areas, the state claimed ownership of the land since it was not cultivated. Long-distance trade was replaced by far more intensive exchange with Russia, which eventually led to the demise of local crafts production and its replacement by industrial goods from European Russia. The key role in this transformation was played by cotton. Cash crop production brought the cash economy to the countryside, created a greater economic surplus than ever before, and caused the emergence of a pros-

[47] TWG, 28 June 1873; 3 June 1875.
perous city-based class of merchants and middlemen that did more to alter the social terrain in Central Asia than any conscious government policy. Cotton had long been grown in Central Asia and exported to Russia, but its production took a quantum leap in the 1880s with the introduction of long-fiber American cotton into the region. A rapidly developing textile industry in Russia and Poland provided an almost insatiable market that had hitherto been completely dependent on imported cotton. Kaufman early on encouraged the adoption of long-fiber cotton by local cultivators. An experimental farm was established on the outskirts of Tashkent in 1878; three years later, it was providing seed and information gratis to interested peasants. In 1884, a certain A. Wilkins planted 300 desiatinas (800 acres) with Sea Island and Upland cotton in the Tashkent area on an experimental basis. The Upland variety succeeded beyond all expectation. Table 2 shows the growth of cotton production in Turkestan in the ensuing three decades. It was accompanied by shifts in patterns of land use, especially in Ferghana oblast, where cotton accounted for 44 percent of cultivated land. The foundations for Soviet Central Asia's economic catastrophe were already in place.

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By the turn of the century, Turkestan had acquired a new significance to the Russian economy. The tsarist government supported cotton production in Turkestan, which it saw as a way of achieving freedom for the textile industry of European Russia from cotton imports from the United States and India. In the oft-quoted words of the minister of agriculture in 1912, "Every extra pud of Turkestani wheat [provides] competition for Russian and Siberian wheat; every extra pud of Turkestani cotton [presents] competition to American cotton. Therefore, it is better to give the region imported, even though expensive, bread, [and thus] to free irrigated land in the region for cotton." But since the government's interests lay primarily in encouraging the textile industry of European Russia, and not the economic development of Turkestan, it limited its encouragement to imposing high tariffs on imported cotton (by 1900, the import duty on cotton was four rubles per pud). Little was done to improve matters locally by funding improvements in irrigation and transportation or credit to small farmers. Yet, cotton reconfigured the social order in Central Asia. It required intensive amounts of labor (which altered work patterns in the countryside) as well as cash (to buy seed, pay for transport, and buy food during the growing season), which was available to few peasants. Cotton-buying firms were only too willing to advance large sums of money against
the harvest, often at exorbitant rates, thus tying the peasantry into a never-ending cycle of debt.\[53\] This dislocation was cause for some concern among local administrators, since it threatened to provide fertile grounds for disaffection that could lead to an explosion of "fanaticism." The state's interest in maintaining the region's stability could act as a damper on Russia's economic exploitation of the region. From the beginning, governors-general had enacted paternalistic legislation to protect Central Asians from outsiders. They had waged a constant struggle with usurers (mostly Indian), placing limits on what they could claim in return for defaulted loans.\[54\] Similarly, a 1902 decree forbade the seizure of plots of under one desiatina for debt.\[55\] In the 1910s, an ambitious project for financing a large-scale irrigation works at the Moscow Stock Exchange came to naught in part because of concerns among [51] A.V. Krivoshein, Zapiska glavnoupravltaiushchego zemledeliem i zemleustroistvom o poezdke v Turkestansku krai v 1912 godu (St. Petersburg, 1912), 7.

[52] Demidov, Ekonomicheskny ocherk, 86.
[53] Ibid., 123ff.
[54] TWG, 19 December 1877.

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the Turkestan authorities about the political consequences of concessions sought by the Moscow financiers.\[56\]

At the same time, with the imperial government beginning to sponsor resettlement of Russian peasants in the borderlands in the 1890s, Turkestan was cautiously opened to peasant settlement, directed mainly to the nomadic areas of Semirech'e and Syr Darya oblasts, where the state claimed ownership of land not cultivated by the nomads. Settlement was seen by many as an instrument of control and economic exploitation of the new territory; perhaps the most vocal proponent of this view was Minister of Agriculture A. V. Krivoshein, who in 1909 offered the simple formula of "cotton + settlement + irrigation = a new Turkestan" as a means of knitting the region more tightly to the empire. His view was not overwhelmingly popular in the bureaucracy, however, as many worried that unbridled resettlement would lead to mounting disaffection and the emergence of a political issue, as was happening in the neighboring Steppe region, where the "land question" had become a major spur to Qazaq nationalism.\[57\] The volume of rural settlement remained small, and as of 1 January 1910, there were 382,688 Russians living in Turkestan, comprising 5.9 percent of the population. (The figure was only 153,651 [3.2 percent] for the three core oblasts.)\[58\]

Almost all of the cotton produced in Central Asia was exported to the textile centers of inner Russia and Poland. Since production was dispersed among numerous smallholders, the task of procuring the harvest, and of advancing loans for the next one, fell to local middlemen, who made hefty profits. This group, which came to be known as the chistach (a corruption of the Russian word chistit', to clean, since most of them were agents for cotton-cleaning firms), arose from among the local mer-chantry or usurers but in time diversified their
operations.[59] From its ranks emerged a fledgling modern merchant class in Turkestan. Also, land alienated from smallholders tended to concentrate in the hands of wealthier landholders, many of whom belonged to the urban merchantry. Central Asia experienced an unprecedented expansion of its economy, especially in the cities, whose populations swelled. The largest growth


[57] In 1909, for instance, the governor-general, P.I. Mishchenko, in a memorandum to the minister of war, warned of the potential of any "artificial growth" of resettlement to lead to antigovernment sentiments; TsGARUz, f. 2, op. 2, d. 369, ll. 110b-12.

[58] The figures are from V. I. Masals'kn, Turkestansku krat (St. Petersburg, 1913), 362.

[59] Iuldashev, Agrarnye otnoshentia, 104.

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was in Tashkent, which grew from around 76,000 in 1870 to 234,289 in 1911. In the same year, Kokand, at the center of the cotton boom, had a population of 113,636 and Samarqand 89,693.[60]

A New Social Map

Local society underwent a major realignment in the first decade of Russian rule. In Bukhara and Khiva, Russian support strengthened the rulers against chiefs and governors, allowing a greater degree of centralization than the rulers had been able to achieve themselves. Yet, since this centralization was not entrenched in any new formal institutions of administration, the protectorates did not see the emergence of functionaries in the manner of Turkestan. The ulama, too, enjoyed less autonomy in their affairs, even though their jurisdiction was wider in the protectorates than in Russian territory. The amir also managed to turn the ulama, who had proved so troublesome in 1866 and 1868, into a state-supported estate, providing numerous sinecures and establishing a hierarchy that had never existed before.[61] But the new wealth also affected the protectorates, which were fully absorbed into the Russian economy after 1885. The amir of Bukhara, one of the world's largest traders in astrakhan, acquired a vast personal fortune; others too, native Bukharans as well as Russian subjects from Turkestan and many Tatars, amassed great wealth from this trade.

Change took a rather different direction in Turkestan. In the sedentary areas, the most profound upheaval was the almost total disappearance of the warrior elites. The colonial nature of the conquest of Turkestan, as well as its suddenness, left little room (or need) for the cooption of native elites, as had been the case in other Muslim areas of the empire, such as the Crimea and the Qazaq steppe. A few scions of ruling families received titles and admission into the Russian armed forces, but their numbers remained small.[62] Warlords who fought against the Russians met varying fates. Many were pensioned off, others were exiled to provincial towns in European Russia, while some escaped to Afghanistan to live out their days. The Statute of 1886, which granted de facto property rights in land to those who cultivated it, struck a direct blow at the eco-
The disappearance of the tribal chiefs was accompanied by a realignment of existing groups and the emergence of new ones. Proximity to the Russians and a knowledge of their language came to be a new source of notability. Anxious to create a group in local society loyal to them, the Russians created a new group of "honorable" (pochetnye) citizens from among those who had welcomed the conquest. Many of the wealthiest merchants of Tashkent, for instance, had favored annexation by the Russians as early as the 1850s, and had even maintained contact with the Russians in Orenburg. When Tashkent was finally taken in 1865, these merchants provided the conquerors with their initial footing in an unknown and hostile environment. On 17 July 1865, Cherniaev decorated thirty-one men for "assiduous service and attachment to the Russian government... [and] for services rendered during the conquest of Tashkent."[63] This laid the foundations for a new elite of notables who served as intermediaries between the colonial regime and local society. Immediately after Tashkent was taken, the conquerors were lionized by two of the wealthiest merchants in the city, Said Azim-bay and Sharafi-bay Zaynulabidin, the latter a Tatar who had lived in Tashkent for a long time.[64] Between them, they owned the two largest caravansaries in the city and maintained extensive trading interests in Russia.[65] Both were well rewarded: Said Azim-bay received the rank of "hereditary honorable citizen" from the emperor himself in St. Petersburg, and Sharafi-bay was appointed chair of the first Public Economic Administration of the old city.[66] Other such appointments followed in Tashkent and in every other city conquered by Russian forces. Said Azim-bay's family remained prominent in local affairs until 1917: Two of his sons, Said Karim-bay and Said Ghani-bay, were elected to the Tashkent City Duma, and a son-in-law won election to the Second Duma in 1906 (although he refused to serve). The family's house acquired a permanent place on official itineraries in the old city, and as late as 1906 the newly appointed governor-general stopped by the house for tea as part of his initial tour of Tashkent.[67] Said Ghani's millions ensured his appointment in 1908 as the...

[63] F. Azadaev, Tashkent vo vtorot polovine XIX v . (Tashkent, 1959), 72-75.
[65] Ibid., 154n.
[67] Taraqqi—Orta Azyaning umr guzarlighi , 3 February 1906.
official guide in charge of supervising the arrangements for the hajj for Muslims of all Russia.[68] With time, the ranks of these honorable citizens swelled to include local merchants as well as some ulama and other functionaries. Honorable citizens received medals and ceremonial robes, were invited to official functions, and acquired numerous formal and informal privileges. The new economy also produced its own heroes. By the turn of the century, a number of wealthy merchants (bays, aghniya) had emerged as prominent social figures. Some of them were decorated by the authorities, while others enjoyed the fruits of the stability provided by Russian rule, the monetized economy, and freedom from competition with military or khanly elites, as had been the case before the conquest.

Kaufman's policies also ensured that the ulama survived the conquest well. The impulse to nonintervention left the madrasas largely intact. The Provisional Statute of 1867 did not alter the status of waqf property, and although the 1886 statute sought to regulate such property more closely, the concept as such was never abolished. Similarly, the state retained Muslim courts, which, although placed under bureaucratic supervision, continued to function as before and to be staffed by the ulama themselves. Kaufman's hope that the removal of state support would lead to a sharp decline in the authority of the ulama proved misguided, partly because the qazis were more closely tied to the state now than before. Indeed, given the decline in the fortunes of the old warrior elites, the relative position of the ulama increased in Turkestan. Similarly, judicial affairs remained largely in Muslim hands. Among the settled population, every volost and city ward elected, indirectly through ellikbashis, a qazi. Anyone over the age of twenty-five without a criminal record could aspire to this office. The jurisdiction of the qazis was strictly defined by law, although Russian administrators had few means of ensuring strict compliance. Qazis could sentence people to arrest for up to eighteen months or a fine of up to 300 rubles.[69] They were not competent to hear cases involving documents written in Russian or cases involving non-Muslims. Their decisions were subject to review by Russian circuit courts. Qazis did not receive a fixed salary but were allowed to charge fees for each case heard or each document signed.[70] Apart from avoiding active interference in the religious life of the local population, these

[68] Odessku listok (Odessa), 19 July 1908.
[69] Polozhenie ob upravlen Turkestanskogo kraia (St. Petersburg, 1886), § 217.

[70] On Muslim courts, see F. Bakirov, Chor Turkistonda sud, shariat wa odat (Tashkent, 1967); N. Lykoshin, Pol zhizm v Turkestane (Petrograd, 1916), 52—96.
to destroy the authority of traditional Islamic elites among the settled population and of tribal and clan structures among the nomads, a task deemed necessary for turning natives into citizens of the empire.[71]
The application of the electoral principle to qazis had been aimed at diminishing the moral authority of the office in the eyes of the population. (The 1886 Statute further eroded the moral authority inherent in the office by turning qazis into "popular justices.") This was only partly successful, for although the qazi's became an elected office, the population in the settled areas of Turkestan continued to recognize the cultural capital of the ulama. Many men who had been qazis in the last years of Muslim rule returned to office through election. Muhiddin Hakimkhojaoghli, for instance, the son of the last qazi kalan of Tashkent, was elected qazi of the Sibzar part of Tashkent and continued to be reelected until 1902.[72] Of the 253 qazis serving in the three core oblasts of Turkestan on 1 June 1883, 225 had the usual madrasa credentials.[73] There was also a marked reluctance on the part of the population, especially in the early years of Russian rule, to have recourse to Russian justice. In the three years 1880-1882, there were only three instances of natives turning to a Russian court when such recourse was not obligatory.[74] After 1886, when qazis became "popular justices" overnight, a struggle ensued about the meaning of their office. The state tried to coopt them as its agents and provided them with new seals, made of steel, and inscribed in Russian with the name of the office. Qazis had traditionally been appointed because of their personal merits, and the silver seals they had used indicated only the name of the individual. Many qazis resisted the new regulation under various pretexts, and some used both seals for a period. According to the reminiscences of a zealous functionary, this practice ended only when he personally broke the old seals with a hatchet.[75]
The story reveals much more than native obstreperousness or Russian bureaucratic zeal: The meaning of the institution was in flux. The struggle was over whether the qazis were to operate as agents of the colonial state or as members of a
traditional Islamic elite. The Russians also sought to bring order to what seemed to them the chaos of traditional Islamic law. As I argued in Chapter 1, shariat is best understood as interpretive practice in which the possession of knowledge of appropriate texts gave the jurist license to issue his opinions. Abstracted from this discursive context, the manuals of fiqh were rendered incomprehensible and chaotic. The Russians brought a different understanding of law, as a code, accessible to all and universally applicable. The shariat itself was often (mis)taken as such a code; Dukhovskoi, for instance, could state simply that the "shariat... a multivolume commentary on the Qur'an [is] considered by Muslims to be a universal codex, in which believers find answers to all questions, without any exceptions, of religious, state, public, and personal life."[76] Dissatisfied therefore with the practice of qazis, who cited no precedents and followed no particular procedure, officialdom set out to refashion the shariat as a civil code. The British invention of "Anglo-Mohammedan" law in India, a formalized code of personal law based on shariat precepts and Anglo-Saxon procedure, provided the inspiration. Already in 1893, B.D. Grodekov had translated the Hidaya (an eleventh-century manual of fiqh by 'Ali b. Abi Bakr al-Marghinani used as the basic code for "Anglo-Mohammedan" jurisprudence) from the English, and other attempts at the creation of what Brinkley Messick has aptly called "colonial shariat" continued down to the end of the old regime.[77] Yet, characteristically, little came of the effort, and the tension between the various conceptions of the status of Muslim law and qazis was never fully resolved. The ulama, however, came to be seen as keepers of the Muslim tradition, the last bastions of Islam. With political power gone and compromises required in navigating the new social and economic order, traditional practices came to be valorized as the sources of Muslim identity. Local notables operated inside a precarious matrix of loyalty and suspicion. Kaufman was fond of majestic displays of his power, for he believed in behaving like an "oriental" monarch in the Orient. On his travels around the region, and especially on his return from military campaigns, he preferred to be welcomed by local notables with suitable imperial pomp. When Kaufman returned from a trip to St. Petersburg in 1873, officials, as well as Russian and Muslim merchants of Tashkent met Kaufman three chaqirim outside the city. They welcomed him with a laden table .... The Governor General stopped and gave those present the Emperor's greetings to the inhabitants of the region. Later, he mounted his carriage and entered the city, where he reviewed the soldiers who stood, row upon row, from the head of the street to his mansion. At his mansion also, he conveyed the greetings of
the Emperor to the officials who had gathered there [to greet him]. Upon hearing this, the men were very pleased and returned home with joy. Later, after nightfall, all streets and houses were illuminated in order to celebrate the return of the esteemed Governor General.[78]
The notables played their part, as they did in presenting addresses and petitions to the new rulers. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877, notables from Aq Masjid presented Kaufman with assurances of loyalty and 10,000 rubles for wounded soldiers collected from the nomadic population of the uezd.[79] Others sent their sons to Russian schools and built European-style houses in the Russian parts of town. Yet, nothing could dislodge suspicion of even the most loyal notables from the minds of Russian officialdom. For all the prominence Said Azim-bay acquired, Kaufman felt it "necessary to deal with Said Azim-bay very cautiously, because he wants to boss everyone and everything."[80] We have seen that the fear that local notables and functionaries would place their interests before those of the state ("corruption," "misuse of power") led to the demise of organs of municipal self-government in the 1870s. In 1906, the veteran administrator V.P. Nalivkin rued the fact that the Russians had from the beginning enclosed themselves in a "living wall" of opportunists and ill-wishers.[81] Other administrators, realizing their dependence on these intermediaries, but helpless to do anything, fretted over their evil designs. Many in Tashkent suspected that Russian policy in Bukhara was hostage to the machinations of a small group of translators who had "taken over" the political agency in Kagan.[82] As fears of pan-Islam gathered strength after the turn of the century, honorable status proved no protection against arbitrary searches. Said Karim's house was searched in 1914 because of numerous suspicions harbored against him by the police (ranging from conspiracy to take over the publishing trade in Tashkent to collecting money on behalf of the Ottoman war effort).[83] Yet, such searches, while a reminder of the precariousness of their position, did not undermine the notables' prominence in Muslim society.
The Russian presence, for all its professions of noninterference, had created new sources of notability and thus redefined the politics of status and prestige in local society. The new rulers' dependence on the decorated notables and the translators gave them a degree of informal influence in local society. Muslim functionaries in the new apparatus similarly appeared as intermediaries between the local population and the Russian state, as well as figures of authority. The ulama retained their source of moral and cultural authority and became the sole bulwarks of moral authority; indeed, the elimination of tribal chiefs, who had often competed with the ulama, gave the latter a stature in society that was in many ways unprecedented. These new elites reached their compromises with the new order, which in turn defined the positions they came to occupy in the new politics of culture in Turkestan.
Russians and Natives
But Muslim society was no longer autonomous; it was set against a new settler society that took root as a direct result of the Russian conquest. The earliest Russians to arrive were members of the conquering armies. They were followed by civilian functionaries and, in time, by traders, workers, and divers adventurers, so that quite soon a settler Russian society, complete with its own schools, churches, newspapers, and markets, appeared in Turkestan. Given the cautious approach to peasant re-
[81] V.P. Nalivkm, Tuzemtsy ran'she t teper ' (Tashkent, 1913), 72-75, passim; see also Togan, Turkili , 274.
[82] See, for instance, the report of a police agent sent from Tashkent to Bukhara on a secret mission m April 1910, in GARF, f. 102, op. 240 (1910), d. 277, l. 23.
[83] "Spravka" (21 May 1915), TsGARUz, f. 461, op. l, d. 2263, I. 160b.

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settlement in Turkestan, the majority of its Russian population was connected with administration and trade. The emergence of Russian society also transformed the urban landscape. The Russians built their own quarters, which were self-consciously designed as advertisements for the superiority of the conquering civilization, adjacent to native cities. In common with urban development in other European colonies, these quarters were laid out according to a regular plan, their straight, wide streets contrasting to the labyrinthine neighborhoods of the traditional cities. Imperial architecture and the presence of churches further defined these quarters as different, and disproportionate expenditure and allocations ensured the maintenance of this order. Such "new cities" arose next to all major cities in Turkestan (in Bukhara, they developed along the Transcaspian Railway), while in nomadic territory, urban life emerged for the first time during this period. Vernyi (present-day Almaty), Pishpek (Bishkek), and Askhabad (Ashgabat) were all established as Russian settlements in this period and remained predominantly Russian. Although common in the colonial world, this pattern of urbanism was unique in the Russian empire. Similarly, in common with other settler societies, there were marked differences in wages between settler and native populations. As an American traveler observed in 1910, "Wages of Europeans are very high. A Russian labourer or servant expects twice or three times as much as he gets at home, but the wages of natives are low, 25 and 30 cents a day being the maximum."[84] This combination of cheap native labor and high salaries for settlers meant that even the poorest sections of the Russian population enjoyed a standard of living considerably higher than the majority of the native population. All this served to underscore Turkestan's uniqueness in the empire. Unlike other Muslim areas of the Russian empire, Turkestan was a relatively densely populated region with practically no Russian settlement in the beginning. It differed dramatically in that respect from the Volga region and the Crimea, which were also inhabited by Muslims but where the demographic balance was quite different and Russian rule much better entrenched. It also meant that the relationship between the rulers and the ruled was different—and more distant—than elsewhere
in the Russian empire. The nomenclature adopted for classifying the local population gives some indication of this difference. Most non-Russian groups inhabiting the Russian empire were designated inorodtsy (a term best translated by the French allogènes). Although the term had a consider-


able semantic range, it connoted inhabitants of the Russian state who were somehow alien.[85] For legal purposes, the population of Central Asia was classified as inorodtsy, but the term was never used in Central Asia itself, where the term tuzemtsy, directly translatable as "native," with all its connotations, held currency. Unlike inorodtsy, the term tuzemtsy asserted the connection of the given population to the land; conversely, the term also affirmed the foreignness of the Russians in the region in a manner that was inconceivable in other parts of the empire.[86] Moreover, in Turkestan, the otherness of the local population acquired a social as well as a political or ethnic connotation, for the native population fit the state's system of classifications only awkwardly. Table 3, which classifies the local population by social categories, shows the ambivalence inherent in the state's classifications of its newest subjects. While entry into various estates was open to the native population of Turkestan, natives remained simply natives unless marked by some forth of social mobility. As the figures for Tatars show, this was not the fate of all inorodtsy in the empire.[87]

Yet the lines between European and native were not entirely rigid. The new Russian cities were never segregated. The vast majority of the European population lived in those quarters, but a substantial proportion of their population was invariably of local origin. "Russian" Tashkent grew rapidly after its establishment in 1866. It had a population of 2,073 in 1870, 4,926 in 1877, 33,276 in 1901, and well over 56,000 in 1911.[88]

[85] The concept behind this term has attracted little attention. Its legal and popular meanings differed considerably, and even the former did not remain constant over the last century of the old regime; see the succinct overview in Henning Bauer et al., Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1991), 1: 416-419; see also L. Shternberg, "Inorodtsy: obshchii obzor," in A.I. Kasteliansk, ed., Formy natsional'nogo dvizhenua v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh (St Petersburg, 1910), 531-534.

[86] In actual bureaucratic practice, tuzemtsy and inorodtsy could be used as mutually exclusive categories. In 1906, the special regulations governing the election of candidates from Turkestan to the State Duma divided the electorate into "native" (tuzemnoe) and "non-native" (netuzemnoe) groups, thus classifying the nonnative morodtsy with the Russstans; see "Polozhenie o vyborakh v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu," Polnoe sobrante zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, 3rd ser., vol. 25 (St. Petersburg, 1907), no. 26662, § 1, prilozenie. The confusion resulting from attempts to implement this distinct, on is recorded in TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 17, d. 616, l. 134.
As a recent statistical analysis of the 1897 census has shown, Kalmyks and the "small peoples" of Siberia were the only other groups in the empire among whom large parts of the population remained simply inorodtsy; see Bauer et al., Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Retches, II: 197.


TABLE 3
SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION BY NATIVE LANGUAGE (THREE CORE OBLASTS, 1897)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Gentry</th>
<th>Personal nobles</th>
<th>Honorary citizens</th>
<th>[Christian] clergy</th>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th>Townsfolk</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Inorodtsy</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Foreign subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3,801</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sart</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>1,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozbek</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Pervaia vseobshchaia, perepis' naselenia Rossuskot Imperu, 1897 g., vols. 83, 86, 89 (St. Petersburg, 1905), table 24.

The figures for Tatar speakers pertain only to Samarqand and Syr Darya oblasts; in Ferghana, Tatar was counted as one of the "Turko-Tatar" (tiurko-tatarskie ) languages, thus rendering both "Tatar" and "Turk" mcomparable across oblasts. On the classifications used by the census, see Chapter 6.

It presented a marked contrast to the old city, and already in 1873 a foreign visitor felt that "one can live for years in Russian Tashkent without even suspecting the existence of the Sart part of town."[89] As early as 1870, members of the local population owned sixty-nine shops in the new city, and they comprised more than one-fifth of its population. By 1901, Muslims (including Tatars) accounted for one-third of the civilian population of the new city,[90] which had sixteen mosques in 1913 (compared with fifteen churches and two synagogues).[91]

Nor could officialdom turn unequivocally to the settler population for support, for it was not immune from the suspicion directed at local notables. Russian autocracy jealously guarded its monopoly over matters of state policy from the interference of any public groups, Russian or not. In colonial borderlands such as Turkestan, this monopoly often

came up against the need to find broader support for Russian rule. Dukhovskoi's suggestion for the genetic Russification of the region was only the most blunt (because desperate) expression of the hope, frequently expressed in bureaucratic correspondence, that the answer to the lack of personnel resources in Turkestan was to entrust the supervision of various aspects of local life to members of the Russian population. Yet, seeking such support from society implied a partnership with society that the autocracy found unacceptable even after the revolution of 1905. In Turkestan, administrators hoped that Russian society would recognize its duty to empire and act in the interests of state, and they expressed astonished dismay when it failed to do so. The political agent in Bukhara wrote in 1906 of the deleterious effects of the revolution on "Russian prestige" in Bukhara, and in 1910, Governor-General Mishchenko turned literary critic in order to remind the editor of the Tashkent journal Sredniaia Azia of his duties to Russian power in the region. Presented with a complimentary copy of the new publication, he found "extremely weak in literary terms" a sketch that presented in a poor light the behavior of army officers. "This story belongs to phenomena," he wrote, "that are altogether undesirable, especially in Central Asia."[92] Russian society did not always agree with officialdom. It was the only segment of Turkestan's population to be involved in the revolution of 1905; in the ensuing elections to the State Duma, local Russians largely voted for radical parties of the left.[93] The files of the political police indicate that the state found itself governing settler society almost as sternly as native society.

Along with the Russians came members of other groups that further complicated the dichotomy between Russian and native. Some, such as Ukrainians, Belorussians, and even Poles and Germans, tended to be lumped together with the Russians both in terms of perception and legal privileges. Others, such as Jews, Armenians, and Tatars, occupied separately delineated spaces in the new colonial society. A sizable Jewish community had existed in Bukhara since at least pre-Mongol times and played a significant role in the area's economic life. In 1833, Bukharan Jews were granted the same rights to trade in Russia as Muslim merchants from Bukhara and Khiva, and this pattern of equal legal treatment for all subjects of the amirs of Bukhara was maintained after the conquest. [92] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 28, d. 1119, l. 112.

Kaufman saw Bukharan Jews are a good influence in Turkestan as well as a channel for Russian influence in Bukhara. Under the terms of the 1873 treaty with Bukhara, Bukharan Jews had the right to own property and to settle anywhere in Turkestan, a right denied Russian Jews. As a result, large communities of
Bukharan Jews appeared in Tashkent, Samarqand, and the cities of the Ferghana valley, where they were very successful in business. This success, as well as general anti-Jewish sentiment of the reign of Alexander III (r. 1881-1894), led to a gradual curtailment of their favored status, culminating in a 1910 law that made it illegal for Bukharan Jews to reside in all but a few towns of Turkestan unless they could prove that their ancestors had lived in the area before the Russian conquest. The needed documents were duly produced, and many Jews remained in Turkestan. Some of them had acquired sizable fortunes, especially three families in Ferghana that had concentrated a great part of the raw cotton export to Russia in their hands. According to one estimate, the Vodiaevs alone managed 60 percent of this trade. In 1914, there was a large enough Jewish community in Kokand to support a newspaper, Rahamin. The wealth of the community, as well as its contacts abroad (extremely sketchy notices in contemporary travelers' accounts refer to the fact that many local Jews had contacts in Western Europe and that many spoke French fluently), allowed it to negotiate increasing legal disabilities. 

An Armenian community similarly developed in the major urban centers of Turkestan, performing similar entrepreneurial functions in the economy, its arrival facilitated by the Transcaspian Railway. But for our purposes, the most important community was the Volga Tatars. Under Russian rule since the middle of the sixteenth century, the Tatars enjoyed affinities of language as well as of religion with Central Asia and had played a central role in Russia's trade with Central Asia during this period. Bukharan madrasas were also a common destination for Tatar ulama. A number of Tatars moved to Turkestan after the Russian conquest, partly because their familiarity with both Central Asia and Russia gave them a considerable competitive advantage in the area. True to form, the administration attempted to stem this unauthorized movement of people, although the repeated prohibitions are evidence of a distinct lack of success. Some Tatar and Bashkir officers served in the Russian army and therefore appeared in administrative roles; many more served as interpreters and guides; but the vast majority of Tatars living in Central Asia were connected with trade and private business. As inorodtsy, they suffered from a number of legal disabilities—they could not legally own immovable property—and were often the objects of suspicion, but they nevertheless occupied a space quite distinct from the local population. They were not tuzemtsy, and as Table 3 again shows, were much better integrated into Russian social classifications. Their position with regard to local society was, however, always ambivalent; their religious and linguistic affinities with it had made them the natural intermediaries in the Russian trade before the conquest, but they nevertheless remained outsiders. "A number of Noghays [the Turkestani term for Tatar] have arrived in these parts lately," a newspaper reader stated in 1876. "Some want to buy property here and
marry locally because life is good here and the climate is better. But local Sarts and Qazaqs don't want to give them their daughters."[97] The disdain was mutual, however, as the Tatars in Turkestan soon formed a close-knit community, which self-consciously delineated itself from the local population and looked to phenomena in the Tatar lands of European Russia for inspiration. Numerous markers separated them from the local population: Most chose to live in Russian quarters, far more Tatars sent their children to Russian schools, and Tatar women followed different codes of dress and comportment than Turkestani women. The Tatar community in Tashkent organized a benevolent society with its own school in 1902, which further served to demarcate it from the rest of Muslim society.[98]

Yet for all the intermediary groups and the differences within Russian society, the Russian-native dichotomy came to provide the parameters within which difference and hierarchy were imagined in Turkestan. The settler population's oppositional proclivities did not render it sympathetic to the native population. The otherness of the native population was too widely shared in Russian discourse for that, and the emergence of a colonial economy tended to reinforce the differences. Even though the entire spectrum of Russian political life appeared in Turkestan, all sections of it were united in taking for granted the exclusion (or disre-

[97] TWG , 28 July 1876.
[98] Tashkand shahrining orus chastida istiqamat etub masjid-t jami 'imizga qawm bulub turghuivchi hamma abl-t mahalla noghay khalqiqa ruski tatariski ishkolaning paptchitilstvasining predsidatilidan daklad (Tashkent, 1902).

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gard) of the natives from mainstream politics. This fact was to be of fundamental importance in 1917. But the dichotomy was also shared by non-Russian groups in Turkestan, who appropriated it for their own uses. The vocabulary of progress and backwardness inherent in the dichotomy was also to figure prominently in the politics of cultural reform in Muslim society itself, which was made necessary by changes in society noted above and the need to make new choices in new circumstances unleashed by the Russian conquest.

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Chapter 3
The Origins of Jadidism
In 1899, a young man of twenty-five boarded the Transcaspian Railway in Samarqand and headed off to Transcaucasia on his way to Istanbul, Cairo, and Mecca. The journey was to be a turning point in the life of Mahmud Khoja ibn Behbud Khoja, who later took the surname, in the Tatar fashion then becoming popular, of Behbud. In his travels Behbud saw current developments in public education in the Ottoman empire and Egypt and met leading figures concerned with cultural reform. Upon his return to Samarqand eight months later, he took out a
subscription to the newspaper Terjüman, published by the Crimean Tatar reformer Is-mail Bey Gasprinskii (1851-1914) in Bahchesaray. Behbudi's public career began with the appearance of his first essays in the official Turkistan wilayatining gazeti (TWG) in 1902 and proved to be the most illustrious of his generation. He also supported a school that taught literacy according to the new method championed by Gasprinskii. Over the years, he wrote a number of general information books as well as primers for new-method schools; he edited and published a newspaper and then a magazine of his own. His publishing activities expanded considerably and in 1913 he opened a bookstore that stocked books from all over the Muslim world. That same year he became Central Asia's first playwright when his Padarkush (The Parricide) opened in Samarqand. Down to the premature end of his life in 1919 he continued to exhort his compatriots to "awake from their sleep of ignorance" and acquire the knowledge that the new age demanded.

Yet for all his enthusiasm for reform, Behbudi (1874-1919) came from the old cultural elite of Turkestan. His father was qazi in the village of Bakhshi Tepe on the outskirts of Samarqand, and Behbudi was taught the standard madrasa texts of the time at home by his father and uncles. But his father died when Behbudi was twenty, and he was forced to find work. He worked as mirza (scribe) to an uncle who served as qazi, before becoming a qazi himself.[1] The family was prosperous enough for Behbudi to travel abroad, and he was astute enough not to squander his wealth. In 1913, he owned houses in both the Russian and native parts of Samarqand (he himself lived in the Russian part) as well as ten desiatinas of agricultural land. He also traded in grain in addition to keeping his position as a mufti in Samarqand.[2]

Behbudi's experience was exceptional only in that he was the most prominent figure in the Jadid movement that arose in Central Asia around the turn of the twentieth century. He was very much a figure of his time, experiencing the world in a manner that would have been impossible for his compatriots a generation earlier and making use of forms of communication and organization that had not existed before. Behbudi's career embodied all the seeming paradoxes of Muslim cultural reform in Central Asia: Its most vocal proponent was rooted in the tradition of Muslim learning, yet advocated the adoption of new cultural forms; although Jadidism generally raised the hackles of Russian officialdom, its earliest expressions emerged in the organ of officialdom; and although it was a response to Russian rule, its most constant feature was a ruthless critique of Muslim society. These are paradoxes, however, only if we insist on seeing Jadidism merely as a "response" to colonization or "the challenge of the West," an expression of nationalism, directed solely at the colonizer. The "challenge" was not inherently obvious to all. Rather, Jadidism is to be located at the intersection of Russian cultural policies and processes of social and economic change set in motion by the Russian conquest which put older patterns of cultural production under

[1] Typically also for the Jadids, details of Behbudi's biography are not well known. Apart from Behbudi's own copious writings, our best source for
biographical information is an article by his disciple, Haji Muin [Shukrullah], "Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (1874-1919)," Zarafshan (Samarqand), 25 March 1923; see also Sherali Turdiev, "Mahmudkhoja Behbudiy," Muloqot , 1994, no. 3-4, 44-48; and Ahmad Aliev, Mahmudkhoja Behbudiy (Tashkent, 1994).


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strain and allowed new voices to emerge. Jadidism was both a social and a cultural phenomenon.
The First Generation
The advocacy of comprehensive modernizing cultural reform was not the "natural" outcome of Russian conquest. Indeed, the dichotomy of Russian and native served to reinforce existing cultural practices as essential markers of difference. The authority of the decorated notables rested on their status as intermediaries between Russians and natives; the clear demarcation of boundaries between the two as separate entities came to be of crucial importance to them. Cultural practices—texts, dress, food, posture, gesture—and the manner of their reproduction became the bedrock of a traditional way of life that differentiated natives from Russians, Muslims from Christians. The ultimate authority for this newly objectified tradition rested in "Islam," which was inextricable, as I have argued, from the practices surrounding its transmission. The Russians had seen in Islam the essence of Central Asia's otherness. For rather different reasons, an appeal to Islam became the source of the new elites' authority.
The notables, as intermediaries between society and the colonial regime, kept a foot in both worlds. Wealthy merchants such as Said Azimbay built houses in the new Russian cities; many ulama accepted decorations from the state, learned Russian and sometimes sent their sons to Russian educational institutions. Sattar Khan Abdulghaffar oghli (1843-1901), a qazi in Chimkent at the time of the Russian conquest of the city, exemplifies the trajectory of many such individuals. In the dislocation following the Russian conquest of the town, Sattar Khan lost his position. He made the acquaintance, however, of a Muslim officer in the Russian army, a certain Yenikeev, from whom he learned Russian. Sattar Khan became convinced of the need for Central Asians to learn Russian; for three years, between 1871 and 1874, he taught Russian in a school that he established in Chimkent. Later, in 1881, he moved to Tashkent, where he worked as a translator for various government departments, including the offices of the TWG . In Tashkent, he lived in the Russian part of town in a house furnished in the European manner and sent his sons to the gimnaziia .[3] Muhiddin Khoja, son of the last qazi kalan of Tashkent, was decorated with the orders of St. Stanislav and St. Anna. He

remained a qazi all his life, but he learned Russian and consorted with Russian officials. Although initially opposed to it, he taught Russian to his sons, one of whom attended the gimnaziia. But Muhiddin also taught that son the usual madrasa texts at home and married him off at the age of sixteen.[4]

The colonial regime had left the practice of Muslim law intact; it also allowed for the survival of the maktab and the madrasa. Kaufman’s cultural policies stemmed from his general outlook on Islam. Properly ignored and deprived of state support, maktabs and madrasas would automatically lose their attraction for the population. The state was to be concerned with attracting the local population to Russian schools, where they would study together with Russian students. Kaufman saw as the aim of the educational system the creation of "useful citizens of Russia" regardless of religion.[5] Since the basic aim of public education in the region "must be its development in the direction of Russian interests ... the religious convictions of the natives must remain without any encroachment and schools for natives must not have a confessional character."[6] The state was to support only Russian schools, where Russians and natives would study together, for only such education could produce the useful citizens Kaufman foresaw. Kaufman concentrated his efforts on the Qazaqs, where education would allow "[us] to fulfill the humanitarian responsibility of drawing them into the family of civilized peoples ... [as well as] to distance them from Muslim influence that have already begun to appear among the nomads."[7]

The local population in its turn steadfastly ignored the new institutions (see Table 4). The numbers of Muslims in Russian institutions remained minuscule, and most of this small number belonged to Tatar or Qazaq families, or were sons of the decorated notables. On the other hand, the maktab and the practices associated with it continued. Traditional Muslim education retained its prestige and its value after the conquest. To be sure, the period of conquest did prove disastrous for many madrasas, as in the confusion many waqfs were embezzled and turned into private property.[8] Upon the conquest of Samarqand, waqfs benefit-

[7] Quoted by K. E. Bendrikov, Ocherki po tstrom narodnogo obrazovaniia v Turkestane (1865-1925 gody ) (Moscow, 1960), 64.

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TABLE 4
MUSLIMS IN RUSSIAN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (SELECTED YEARS)
Institution1885189719091916
Gimnaziia and progimnaziia1414106170
Realschule—7426
Higher primary schools145160341272
ing properties located in Bukhara were confiscated while the amir of Bukhara refused to allow muitawallis ("trustees") from madrasas in the conquered territories to collect revenues in his domains.

According to the 1886 legislation, endowed populated lands passed into the possession of those who worked them, while the status of other kinds of waqf property had to be verified and confirmed by the local uezd administration. New waqfs could be established only with the permission of the governor-general himself, and waqf property was subject to local taxes.

This process proceeded with the usual glacial speed, and many claims were rejected on technicalities. Despite such difficulties, though, the cultural authority of madrasas and the knowledge to be acquired in them remained intact and young men continued to consider spending several years in residence a worthwhile experience. According to some reports, the numbers of madrasas actually increased after the conquest, especially when the introduction of cotton through the 1890s increased the income of their waqfs manifold.

During this period, the madrasas of


Polozenie obupravlenii Turkestanskogo kraia (St. Petersburg, 1886), §§ 265, 267.


This prosperity was, however, relative. According to Ostroumov, the combined waqf income of the thirty-seven madrasas in the city of Kokand was "not more than 50,000 rubles" on the eve of the First World War (N. P. Ostroumov, Vvedenie v kur's is-lamovedeniia [Tashkent, 1914], 183). Similarly, the waqf income of madrasas in Andijan city totaled 34,955 rubles in 1908 (A. Sharafiddinov, "XIX asr okhiri-XX asr boshlarida Farghona oblastida madaniy hayot tarikhidan," Obschestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane, 1978, no. 2, 27). In contrast, in 1908, the Tashkent men's gimnazna alone had an annual budget of 73,913 rubles (although tuition fees accounted for 21,512 rubles): K.K. Palen, Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia, proizvedennot po Vysochaishemu poveleniu Senatorom Gofmeistorom grafom K. K. Palenom, 19 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1910), VI: 153.
Bukhara. New madrasas were founded after the conquest: Of the fifty-eight madrasas in existence in Samarqand oblast in the years 1892-1893, no fewer than ten had been founded since the conquest, and thirty-six in the nineteenth century.[14]

The earliest commentaries on the changed fortunes of Central Asia came in traditional genres. The feeling of a world turned upside down expressed in these lines by Zakirjan Furqat 1858-1909), the popular Kokand poet, was widely shared in the literary milieu of the first generation after the conquest:

Ah! The commonfolk are honored, the learned wretched
The unwise hold their heads high, and the wise are trampled underfoot And the exalted have become lowly, and the lowly exalted.[15]

Chronicles by disaffected court officials such as Ahmad Makhdum Danish and Abdulaziz Sami in Bukhara continued to cast the narrative of the decline of Muslim fortunes in Central Asia in the same framework well after the turn of the century.[16] Many poets, however, went beyond such laments and used verse to describe, with praise or satire, many of the new phenomena they witnessed. Much of this poetry appeared in the TWG, which, along with its longtime editor N. P. Ostroumov, played a central (if seemingly paradoxical) role in the articulation of new voices.

Historians have tended to dismiss the TWG all too hastily. In the influential opinion of Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Despite the considerably important role of Muslims in its publication, it [TWG ] was conservative, [and] very hostile to all manifestations of Jadidism.... Edited by Russians, [it] cannot be considered a true 'Muslim' newspaper."[17] A closer look shows that the newspaper's

[14] V.P. Nalivkin, "Svedeniia o sostoianii medrese Samarkandskoi oblasti v 1892/93 uchebnom godu" (ms., ca. 1894), TsGARUz, f. 455, d. 1, l. 20b.
[17] Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920 (Paris, 1964), 25-27. Similarly, writers such as Baymirza Hayit (Turkistan Rusya ile Çin Arasinda , trans. Abdulkadir Sadak [Ankara, 1975], 168-170) and H. B. Paksoy (Alpamysh: Central Asian Identity under Russian Rule [Hartford, 1989], 19) see the newspaper only in the context of Ostrou-moves efforts to create a Sart language, and hence dismiss it as pernicious. For a recent defense of its place in Central Asian cultural history, see A. Jalolov and H. Ozganboev, Ozbek ma "rifatparwarlik adabiyotining taraqqiyotida waqth matbuotining orni (Tashkent, 1993), 17-59.
role was far more ambivalent. It began life in 1870 as a weekly supplement (with "Sart" and Qazaq editions alternating every week) to the Turkestanskie vedomosti printed at the newly established printing press at the military headquarters in Tashkent. In 1883, the Qazaq edition was abandoned altogether and the Sart version turned into a weekly newspaper in its own right; it became biweekly in 1908. The TWG was one of the first Turkic-language periodicals in the Russian empire, and except for two brief periods in 1906-1908 and 1913-1915, when a vernacular commercial press existed in Turkestan, it remained the only local newspaper in Central Asia in the tsarist period.

The newspaper was established by Kaufman's decree in order to "inform the populace of all manner of decrees issued by the governor-general." The first issue of the newspaper promised that "it will also include all kinds of news about trade and happenings in Tashkent and other cities."[18] Its first editor was Shahimardan Ibrahimov, a Tatar from Oren-burg who worked as translator in the governor-general's chancellery. In its first years, the newspaper was aimed at native functionaries, whom it sought to keep abreast of the latest regulations and decrees; it also served to provide a record of Kaufman's comings and goings, and his conquests. The effect of these dreary reports (often written in convoluted prose that gave every indication of its origins in Russian bureaucratese) was lightened by the publication of tales from the Thousand and One Nights and random news bits from the Russian press. By the mid-1870s, however, the newspaper began publishing pieces by its readers, as well as "useful information" about the modern world. Useful information ranged from an account of the world's geography and the names of important states, through descriptions of hot-air balloons, railways, and telephones (as early as 1881), to instructions about the cultivation of cotton and silkworms. In 1879, when Ibrahimov went to Europe on vacation, he sent back descriptions of his travels for readers of the newspaper, thus providing the first description of Berlin in Central Asian Turkic. Readers' contributions usually recounted local affairs and scandals, but they also began to air opinions about the shortcomings of Central Asian society.

[18] TWG, 28 April 1870.

The arrival at its helm of Nikolai Petrovich Ostroumov in 1883 changed the newspaper. A student of Nikolai Il'minskii at the Kazan Spiritual Seminary, where he specialized in Arabic, Turkic languages, and Islam, Ostroumov (1846-1930) arrived in Tashkent in 1877 in the capacity of inspector of schools for Turkestan.[19] Over time, he was to serve as director of the newly founded Turkestan Teachers' College, and then the director of the Tashkent men's gimnazia. His education was solidly missionary, but in Turkestan, where Kaufman had prohibited proselytization by the Church, Ostroumov saw himself as an upholder of "Orthodox monarchism," using his orientalist learning to ensure the state's best interests in the region. His orientalist credentials attracted the attention of the authorities, and he soon had easy access to Kaufman and Cherniaev, who, during his brief tenure as governor-general between 1882 and
1884, appointed him editor of TWG, in which position he served until 1917. Over the years, Ostroumov became the resident expert on everything connected with local life, and the authorities routinely solicited his opinions on subjects ranging from Islamic dogma to policy concerning new-method schools; he also served as censor for books published locally. In addition, he maintained a copious correspondence with missionaries and orientalists, in Russia as well as abroad, and produced an astonishing amount of writing in a number of registers. His missionary interests are reflected in his translation of the Bible into "Chaghatay," as well as in the publication of a series of textbooks of Islamic studies. But such work was pushed to the background by his copious output on the archeology, ethnography, and history of Central Asia, which appeared in a steady succession of articles and monographs. As the epigraph to one of his books asserted, "It is necessary to study the moral constitution, the beliefs and the way of life of the Sarts in order to beneficially influence their lives."[20]

Once understood, however, Sarts had to be enlightened, and that task Ostroumov made his own. Ostroumov's appointment as editor was part of a broader shift away from Kaufman's policies, as his successors became concerned with the local population's continued disinclination to learn Russian. The TWG was to be an instrument of the new policy of cautious enlightenment, and it was to be used much more effectively than

[19] Ostroumov's life and work have largely escaped scholarly notice; the most detailed treatment is in B.V. Lunin, Istoriografiia obshchestvennykh nauk v Uzbekistane: biobibliograficheskie ocherki (Tashkent, 1974), 259-271.

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had been the case in Ibrahimov's tenure as editor. Orientalism could enlighten orientals and do so in such a way that their interests coincided with those of autocracy. The TWG published useful information, enlightening but politically harmless, in its columns with redoubled effort. In 1891, Ostroumov made the acquaintance of the poet Furqat. At Ostroumov's invitation, Furqat visited the gymnasia and the theater in the Russian part of Tashkent and wrote poems describing them that Ostroumov published in TWG. Ostroumov ensured that Furqat received a modest honor for his efforts.[21] In 1891, when Furqat left Tashkent to travel through Istanbul, Greece, Bulgaria, Egypt, Arabia, and India (he eventually settled in Yarkand in Chinese Turkestan), he maintained his correspondence with Ostroumov, who continued to publish his poetry and correspondence in TWG.[22] At the same time, Ostroumov encouraged contributions from the local population, and the TWG often hosted lively debate among its contributors. For Ostroumov, it was much better to have the natives debate matters under his watchful eye than on their own. Hence his suspicion of those—Tatars, Jadids, even other Russian officials—who encroached on his turf. Many poets and writers developed lasting personal friendships with Ostroumov, for apart from any personal charms, Ostroumov offered patronage and protection from the caprices of the bureaucracy. Others, such as the numerous Jadid writers who wrote for the TWG, although not personally beholden to him, maintained proper relations with him, for the paper he edited offered them a unique forum.
The bitterest criticism of Ostroumov invariably came from Tatar writers, who were more likely to focus on his missionary background and his official position. When TWG ran a polemic against an article in the very first issue of Taraqqi in 1906, Ismail Abidi (Gabitov), its Tatar editor, bitterly denounced "this newspaper whose publisher and editor is the famous missionary Nikolai Ostroumov, while Mulla Alim [its "native" subeditor and contributor] is a writer who for several years has been selling his honor for thirty or thirty-five rubles a month."[23] For Ostroumov, the reason for this attitude was simple: "Not having great success among the natives, progressive Tatars do not hide their dislike of the Editor of the native newspaper [TWG ], calling him a missionary in the civil sense, i.e., a Russifier, since he defended and de-


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fends the autonomy of the nationality and language of the natives of Turkestan from Tatar attempts to involve the Sarts in the progressive Tatar movement. The native newspaper more than once expressed distrust of such attempts and printed direct indications that the constitutions of Turkey and especially Iran will bring no good. Recent events justify this conviction of the Editor."[24] Yet, for all this, Ostroumov maintained a long, if sporadic correspondence with Gasprinskii, who started publishing his Terjüman in the same year that Ostroumov became editor of TWG . The two editors exchanged subscriptions and invariably maintained a high level of civility both in print and in correspondence.[25]

Jadidisms
Although it is impossible to date the beginning of Jadidism in Central Asia with any precision, by the end of the century poetry in praise of the theater and gymnaziia gave way to expressions of profound dissatisfaction with the current state of Central Asian society and passionate appeals for change. In its broad outline and its emphasis on elementary education, this new critique was inspired by similar currents of opinion among emergent cultural elites in other Muslim regions of the Russian empire. The term "Jadidism" came from the new (i.e., phonetic) method (usul-i jadid ) of teaching the Arabic alphabet pioneered by Gasprinskii in the Crimea in the 1880s. Gasprinskii traveled widely among the Muslim communities of European Russia (he visited Central Asia twice) spreading his message. In addition to the reform of the maktab, he advocated the acquisition of modern knowledge, the creation of new civic institutions, and the improvement in the position of women in Muslim society.[26] From 1883 on, he single-handedly published the newspaper Terjü-

[25] A small portion of this correspondence IS conserved in Ostroumov's personal archive (TsGARUz, f. 1009). When Gasprinskii died in 1914, TWG joined the Muslim press in mourning him; the obituary (TWG , 25 September 1914) was written by Mir Muhsin Shermuhammadov, and Ostroumov added an appreciation of his own.
With work in the relevant archives not possible until very recently, the basic source on Gasprinskii's life remains the biography written by a disciple: Cafer Seydahmet, Gaspı-rail Ismail Bey (İstanbul, 1934); for a study of Gasprinskii's reform program, see Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1973); and Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii. (Gaspirali): The Discourse of Modernism and the Russians," in Edward Allworth, ed., Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival (Durham, N.C., 1988).

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man to propagate his ideas.[27] After an indifferent beginning, the new method became widespread among the Tatar populations of the Crimea and the Volga-Urals region. This success was linked to the emergence, after the middle of the nineteenth century, of an urban mercantile middle class among the Volga Tatars, who, living in the heartland of the empire, were directly affected by the escalating economic change in European Russia. The last half-century of the old regime saw an explosion of publishing activity among the Volga Tatars; modern schooling also became widespread and new genres of literary production emerged. Similar phenomena also developed in Muslim Transcaucasia.[28]

The Russian conquest put Central Asia at the margins of the debates that accompanied the rise of Jadidism among those groups. As early as 1885, Terjüman had zoo readers in Turkestan,[29] and it figures prominently in the intellectual biographies of every prominent Central Asian Jadid. Gasprinskii himself was held in the highest esteem by Central Asian Jadids, many of whom were acquainted with him personally. Similarly, Jadid schools used Tatar textbooks until (and sometimes even after) local editions became available, and after 1905, the Tatar press served as the model for its Central Asian counterpart. In addition, some Muslims from other parts of the Russian empire came to Central Asia to teach in new-method schools. However, to assert that Jadidism in Central Asia arose simply as a result of Tatar influence or that it remained a pale reflection of a better organized movement in European Russia is inaccurate.

pernicious by definition, over their new wards. Kaufman had early attempted to minimize such influence by attempting to ban Tatar printed books from his domain; lack of success in such attempts only strengthened the suspicions. Ostroumov complained to Gasprinskii in 1900: "I cannot, of course, determine the course of history, but I always regret that in three and a half centuries Tatars have remained aloof from the Russians and ... pass along their aloofness to other inorodtsy of the Muslim faith."[30] Similar sentiments are legion in official correspondence from the period. Scholars, both Soviet and Western, have tended to accept this official view as an accurate reflection of a reality that was far more complex.[31] This picture of Tatar influence also fit well with the self-image of many Tatars, who saw themselves as the natural leaders of the Muslim community in the Russian empire. It was their mission to awaken Central Asia to the cause of reform, and many took for granted that they would be able to dictate the terms of this awakening. Ultimately, however, Tatars wrote for a Tatar audience, in which Central Asians occupied a marginal place, and as their responses indicate, Central Asian Jadids were fully aware of this fact.[32]

Professions by later émigré historians of a common bond against the Russians need not hide from view the ambivalence of Tatar opinion about Central Asia. On the one hand, the region exercised a fascination for many Tatar intellectuals, who saw it as the cradle of Turkic civilization, and in the years before the revolution, Nurshirvan Yavushev and Zeki Velidi (Togan) traveled to Central Asia for scholarly purposes.[33] [30] Ostroumov to Gasprinskii, n.d. [1900], TsGARUz, f. 1009, d. 90, l. 540b. [31] Hélène Carrère d'Encausse ("The Stirring of National Feeling," m Edward All-worth, ed., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule [New York, 1967], 178), for example, in speaking of the leading role of the Tatars in Turkestan, cites A.V. Piaskovskii (Revoliutsia 1905-1907 godov, v Turkestane [Moscow, 1958], 102), who in turn cites a memorandum from the military governor of Syr Darya oblast to the Department of Police expressing disapproval of the spread of pan-Turkic ideas in Turkestan through Terjüman.

[32] Perhaps the most striking evidence of this is the long essay, "Turkistands bugunke hayat" (Contemporary Life in Turkestan), serialized in the Orenburg magazine Shura in 1916 and 1917. It was written by Abdurrauf Muzaffer, a Tatar functionary who served for many years in Turkestan. During his stay in Tashkent, he was involved in local cultural life, primarily as a regular contributor to ST (1914-1915). The tone of the essay is purely ethnographic, explaining an exotic land and its people to a home audience; the concern with the Turkestan, lack of progress is firmly pushed to the background.

[33] Yavushev, who spent several years in Turkestan and Chinese Turkestan, wrote copiously in both the Tatar and the Central Asian Jadid press about his travels as well as the history of the areas he visited. He died in 1917; his obituary is in Hurriyat, 17 November 1917. Ahmed Zeki Velidi (1890-1970) went on to become
the leader of the Bash-kit national movement during the revolution and civil war, and later, in emigration, under the surname Togan, found renown as one of the foremost Turkologists of the century.

Containing half the empire's Muslim population, Central Asia also became important to Tatar politicians who founded the All-Russian Muslim movement in 1904. For others, the desire to spread the message neatly coincided with the necessity of getting a job. Tatars (and Transcaucasian Muslims) held a competitive advantage in the field of new-method education in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Tatars formed distinct communities in Central Asia cities, with their own schools and organizations, and those visiting from European Russia found Central Asia quite alien. Traveling in 1893, Mehmed Zahir Bigiev found himself surrounded by backwardness. The students in the famed madrasas of Bukhara and Samarqand surprised him by "their complete ignorance of the world"; his guides could not answer his questions; numerous customary practices, "holdovers from paganism," contravened explicit commands of the shariat; and the position of women was "extremely pitiable." All of this Bigiev contrasted to the situation in "our Russia [bizim Rusya ]."[34] According to a Tatar employee of the police department who traveled incognito in Ferghana in 1909 to gauge the "mood of the population" (a common exercise), Tatars had stopped interacting with the local population, which they referred to as iilek khäliq (dead people) for reasons of their political inertia.[35] This impatience with Central Asia also led to constant criticism in the Tatar press. The Muslim press in Transcaucasia was no kinder to Central Asia. The illustrated satirical magazine Mulla Nasreddin of course spared nobody, but the Baku newspaper Iqbal also ran numerous articles harshly critical of Central Asia. A certain Muhammad Said from Transcaucasia visited new-method schools in Turkestan in 1913 and 1914 and was not impressed by what he saw. First he lectured the schoolteachers of Turkestan in the local press on the shortcomings of their schools and their methods of teaching, and then he went home and declared in Iqbal that "there is not a single genuine and selfless teacher in Turkestan."[36] All through 1914 and 1915, Iqbal kept up a barrage of criticism of Central Asia that was harsh even by prevailing standards. If the Jadids could come in for such treatment, the rest of society could expect little mercy.

In the end, different elite strategies defined the various styles of Jadidism in the Russian empire. These various Jadidisms shared several fea-

[34] Muhammed Zahir Bigiev, Maveraiinnabrdä styahat (Kazan, 1908).
[35] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 540, l. 1780b.
tures (the new-method school, an emphasis on education, readership of common newspapers), but their proponents faced markedly different struggles in society. Volga Tatar Jadidism was defined by the concerns of a nascent mercantile middle class facing the consequences of economic change in the center of the empire along with intense pressure from the Church, which threatened to obliterate the very existence of the Tatar community, which had already been turned into a demographic minority. Among the Crimean Tatars and the Qazaqs, reform was first championed by aristocratic elites who had been coopted into the Russian social hierarchy, many of whom had Russian educations. In Transcaucasia, Jadidism arose in a situation of conflict with neighboring non-Muslim communities that threatened to marginalize the Muslim population in an oil-based industrial economy. In Central Asia, in the new social terrain that emerged in the first generation of Russian rule, reform was articulated by a group occupying a different position in society. Although Central Asian reformers appropriated the rhetoric and methods of the Jadids of European Russia, their use of them was defined by imperatives, constraints, and possibilities peculiar to Central Asia.

Once it is located in society, Jadidism does not appear as an undifferentiated intellectual movement emanating from a well-defined center to the periphery. Instead, there were many Jadidisms in the Russian empire, each with its own concerns rooted in local social struggles. This accounts for the fruitlessness of repeated attempts at cooperation at the all-Russian level, as illustrated by the lack of success of attempts to create a common Turkic literary language (a favorite project of Gasprinskii's) or to create a fully representative political movement.

The Jadids of Central Asia
In calling for society to reform itself, the Jadids of Turkestan set themselves up against the social order that had emerged in the generation after the Russian conquest. The Jadids most commonly called themselves ziyalilar (intellectuals) or taraqqiparwarlar (progressives). The term most often used by others in society was yashlar (the youth). The label usul-i jadidchilar or jadidchilar (proponents of the new method) was actually less frequently used, although it has acquired standard usage in scholarship. The emergence of the Jadids also created, largely as a residual category, their opponents, who came to be called usul-i qadimchilar, or qadimchilar (the proponents of the old method). The debate over reform had turned quotidian cultural practices into objectified traditions. But

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the emphasis on the conflict of ideas implicit in these labels does not help us in locating the Jadids on the new social map, even though their place in society was to be of fundamental importance to their project.

The task of locating the Jadids in their society is not easy. Although the lives of the Jadids are chronologically not very distant, they can be extremely difficult to reconstruct. They were born in a society in which written documents did not mark a person's progress through life (although some of them developed a mania for documenting their lives), and few accumulated private papers. Even the
concrete remains of their lives perished against the twin assaults of Stalinist repression and urban development. No plaques mark places where the Jadids lived and worked, for most have not survived; the few "house-museums" that exist have undergone so many changes that they fail to evoke the lives of their former occupants. Often the most basic details of their biographies are difficult to establish with any certainty. Nevertheless, as the following survey shows, it is possible to trace the basic outlines of a collective biography.

Behbudi remained the most respected Jadid in Central Asia down to the revolution. In Samarkand he found support from a number of active colleagues and disciples. His circles included Abdulqadir Shakuri, Ajzi, and Haji Muin. Shakuri's (1875-1943) father was an imam, and his mother ran a maktab for girls. He studied at the Arifjan-bay madrasa in Samarkand and taught children according to the old method in his village of Rajabamin on the outskirts of the city. Then he came in contact with Gasprinskii's Terjüman at a Tatar friend's shop and became a devotee of the new method. He opened one of the first new-method schools in his village and in time published three textbooks for use in such schools. He traveled to Kazan in 1909 and to Istanbul in 1912 to observe at first hand the workings of modern Muslim educational institutions. Sayyid Ahmad Siddiqi (1864-1927), who wrote under the pen name "Ajzi," was born in a family of modest means. Orphaned early, he was apprenticed to a watchmaker and worked for several years in this craft before going to Bukhara to attend a madrasa. He dropped out after two or three years and worked at various jobs, including a stint as a

scribe for the qazi of Khatirchi. Like all Jadids from Samarkand, Ajzi was perfectly bilingual in Persian and Turkic, and at about this time, he learned Russian from personal friends (two Russians and a Qazaq). Ajzi had inherited a parcel of land from his father, which he sold in 1901 to go on the hajj. He traveled in Turkey, Egypt, and Arabia (where he worked as a translator at the Russian consulate in Jeddah) for two years. On the way back, he visited Moscow and St. Petersburg before returning to Turkestan through the Caucasus. In Baku, he made the personal acquaintance of leading Transcaucasian Jadids. As for Behbudi, this trip acquainted Ajzi with contemporary intellectual life in other Muslim countries, and upon his return he opened a new-method school in his village. Ajzi was also active in publishing and started the Zarafshan Bookstore in Samarkand in 1914. He was an accomplished poet who contributed frequently to TWG as well as Behbudi's Ayina, but his biggest contribution to Jadid reform was two long poems in Persian (both later translated into Turkic), Anjuman-i arwah (The Gathering of Souls) and Mir'at-i ibrat (The Mirror of Admonition), which came to be the standard Jadid indictment of Turkestani
society. Haji Muin ibn Shukrullah (1883-1942) was born in the family of a shopkeeper but orphaned at the age of twelve and brought up by his grandfather, whom he accompanied on hajj in his youth. He established a maktab in Samarqand, which he switched to the new method in 1903. Over the next decade, he published a primer and poetry, in addition to being a regular contributor to both the Central Asian and Tatar press and translating between Turkic and Persian. After the success of Behbudi's first play in 1914, Haji Muin diverted his energies to writing plays for the stage and produced several pieces, of which three were published.

Tashkent was the largest center of Jadid activities. Its publishing trade was the largest, and its new-method schools most numerous in Turkestan. Munawwar Qari Abdurrashid Khan oghli (1878-1931) was in many ways Behbudi's counterpart there. Also born in a family of cultural accomplishment (his father and two elder brothers were mudarrises), Munawwar Qari attended the Yunus Khan madrasa in Tashkent before spending some time at a madrasa in Bukhara. He returned to Tashkent in 1901 and opened a new-method school. We know little about his personal motivation, although one author has recently hinted at the significance of his friendship with a Crimean Tatar. This school eventually became the largest and the most organized new-method school in all of Turkestan. Munawwar Qari also wrote numerous textbooks, ran a bookselling and publishing business, was instrumental in publishing at least two newspapers, and also became involved with theater after 1914. He was at the center of a gap, or a discussion circle, in Tashkent that provided the focus for Jadid activity in the city. Munawwar Qari's friends, disciples, and acquaintances included practically everybody involved in reform in Central Asia.

One of his closest comrades was Abdullah Awlani (1878-1934), whose father was allegedly a weaver but whose family was prosperous enough for Awlani to own a house in Tashkent, which he converted into a new-method school. In his youth, Awlani had attended both the maktab and madrasa. In his own words, around the age of fourteen, "I began reading Terjüman and became aware of the world." In 1908, he published the short-lived newspapers Shuhrat and Azya, subsequently authored several textbooks and collections of poetry (often for classroom use), and organized a reading room in Tashkent. He, too, was involved in publishing and was partner, along with ten other Tashkent Jadids, in the Maktab publishing company floated in 1914. After 1914, Awlani also wrote a number of plays for the theater, with which he was involved also as actor, director, and manager, founding Turkestan's first regular theater troupe in 1916.

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categories of reform in the region was Ishaq Khan Tora Junaydullah oghi (1862-1937), who began writing in TWG in the 1890s. Like Behbudi, he came from a well-to-do family and likewise possessed madrasa knowledge (he had attended madrasa in Kokand and was qazi in his native village of Tora Qurghan). He had traveled in Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and Chinese Turkestan for five years between 1887 and 1892. Upon his return home, he went into the publishing trade, which he used to publish his own work, including such useful books as a six-language lexicon and a compendium of scripts used all over the world. In 1908, he purchased a printing press, which he devoted largely to propagating the message of reform.[49] By that time, new-method schools were widespread in Ferghana, and their teachers provided a substantial core for Jadidism. Again, many came from the older cultural elite. Ashurali Zahiri (1885-1942?), a prominent contributor to the press and author of the first guide to the orthography of Central Asian Turkic, had attended madrasas in Kokand and Bukhara.[50] But perhaps the most active proponent of reform in Ferghana was Hamza Hakimzada Niyazi (1889-1929), whose background and activities encapsulated many characteristics of Central Asian Jadidism.

Hamza's father had studied in Bukhara and was one of the most renowned apothecaries of Kokand. He also wrote poetry and mingled with the literary elite of Kokand. He had traveled extensively in Chinese Turkestan and India, which is evidence of a certain prosperity.[51] Hamza's education was traditional: After the maktab, he spent seven years in a madrasa in Kokand. Hamza wrote poetry in Persian and corresponded with his father only in Arabic. But by 1907, he began reading Vaqit and Terjüman , and, as he later recalled, "I began to think about old superstitions, about [reform] of the madrasas, changes in the people's life, civilization, and society."[52] He had started working as a scribe in the office of Abidjan Mahmudov,[53] but in 1910 he went to Bukhara to perfect his Arabic. He arrived, however, just as riots broke out in the city, and in-
40; Aziz Bobokhonov, Ozbek matbaasi tarikhidan (Tashkent, 1979), 112-113; Ulughbek Dolimov, Ishoqkhon Ibrat (Tashkent, 1994).
[50] Il'dash Abdullaev, Ocherki po metodike obucheniiia gramare v uzbekskoi shkole (Tashkent, 1966), 147.

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stead he worked in a printing press in Kagan and returned by way of Tashkent.[54] It was during this visit that he first saw a new-method school. He also made the acquaintance of a number of Jadids in that city. Upon his return to Kokand, Hamza opened his own school and began teaching. At some point during this period, Hamza had learned Russian (perhaps at a Russo-native school).[55] In 1912, he married a Russian woman who converted to Islam. Almost immediately afterward, Hamza left, via Afghanistan and India, for hajj. He also visited Syria and Istanbul before returning through Odessa and Transcaspia to Kokand.[56] Over the next five years, Hamza opened a number of schools in various cities of Ferghana, although some of them do not seem to have lasted very long. He also wrote a number of textbooks and primers for his use, although none was published. Other works did get published: articles in the Jadid press, several volumes of "national" poetry, a piece of fiction that may be considered the first attempt to write a novel in Central Asia, and several plays. Hamza was also involved in publishing and bookselling, a benevolent society (it does not seem to have had a very successful career), and a theater troupe. We have practically no information about Hamza's private life and only the sketchiest knowledge of his financial situation. Teaching seems to have been an economic necessity as much as a passion for Hamza, but he could also look for support from wealthy friends. He had worked for Abidjan Mahmudov in 1908, and when Mahmudov brought out the newspaper Sada-yi Farghana in 1914, Hamza wrote for it. His friends also included merchants such as Mir Zahid Mir Aqil oghli of Kokand and Said Nasir Mir Jalilov of Turkestan, both of whom helped him out with loans in times of need.[57] Hamza's roots were firmly in the tradition of Muslim knowledge reproduced in the madrasa, and he could utilize all the resources available to a well-connected man in cultivated society.[58] Indeed, the number of Jadids who emerged from the cultural elite of the pre-Russian period is striking. A number of the most prominent Jadids were ulama in their own

[56] Hamza Hakimzoda Niyoziyning arkbwining katalogi, 2 vols. (Tashkent, 1990-91), I, 305. The fact that Hamza was a haji was never brought up in his Soviet biographies.
[57] Cf. several unpublished private documents in Hamza, Tola asarlar toplami , V: 189-192; see also Ghaffor Mominov, "Hamza biografiyasining bit sahfasi,"
This needs to be reiterated given the misrepresentation of Hamza's life in Soviet biographies. See, e.g., Laziz Qayumov, Hamza: esse (Tashkent, 1989), 17-18.

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right. Behbudi and Munawwar Qari both possessed the cultural capital that came from the possession of madrasa knowledge and maintained personal relationships with noted ulama. It is important to remember, too, that the ulama were not as benighted a group as they are often portrayed. Edward Allworth, for instance, in describing the qadiimcbilar as "internally governed by fixed habit and rigid tradition.... ultraconservative officials and clerics [who] could not imagine that they might benefit from the notions of these cultural-social thinkers [the Jadids],”[59] unreflexively adopts the rhetoric of the Jadids. In practice, the lines separating the Jadids from their opponents were considerably more porous. Others active in the Jadid cause were even more closely tied to the madrasa milieu. Sayyid Ahmad Wasli (1870-1920) of Samarqand wrote copious poetry in praise of the new method but accepted an appointment as mudarris at the Hazrat-i Shah madrasa in 1915.[60] His support for reform was more circumscribed, stopping short, as we shall see, of the embrace of theater and changes in the place of women in society. The Beglarbegi and Kokaldash madrasas in Tashkent were the center of considerable literary activity; such poets as Tawalla, Kami, Khislat, and Sidqi (all of whom appeared as champions of reform in the Jadid press) lived and wrote there.[61] Abdullah Qadiri's early biography also reminds us of the impossibility of drawing strict boundaries between the ulama and the Jadids. Qadiri (1894-1938), who was to become the first Uzbek novelist after the revolution, came from a learned family. His maternal grandfather was a muezzin, and the poet Miskin (1880-1937) was a maternal cousin.[62] His father was in his seventies when Abdullah was born, and the family was in dire financial straits. After the maktab, Abdullah held a number of menial jobs in succession before being hired by a merchant as a scribe. His employer put him in a Russo-native school so he could learn Russian.[63] He spent four years in this school, after which he went to work for another merchant. He became interested in writing and published his first play in 1915. Yet, after all this involvement in Jadid reform, he went back to a madrasa in the years 1916-1917.[64]

[60] Ayina , 1 June 1915, 430.
[64] Ibid., 206.
Other ulama, in Tashkent as well as elsewhere, were involved with different versions of reform. Abdulqadir Sayyah, for instance, fits the profile of many Jadids: He traveled extensively, he was a copious author and was involved in publishing, and in 1915 he began publishing the magazine al-Islah (Reform). But he was no enthusiast of the new method of education. The reform he advocated in his magazine concerned questions of religious purity and exactitude. Although it too sought to rectify what it saw as the current perversion of Islam, it derived its authority not from the discourse of progress and knowledge but from a strengthening of the tradition itself. We know rather little about such intellectual currents in Central Asia, but it seems likely that the contributors to al-Islah formed a revivalist movement akin to that of the modernized madrasa at Deoband in India. Contacts with ulama in India had survived the Russian conquest, and by the turn of the century older patterns of travel had been reversed and many ulama now went to India to study. The modernized madrasa at Deoband received students from as far away in the Russian empire as Kazan. In 1914, there were enough students at Deoband from Bukhara and Kazan to form an association.[65] Although al-Islah remained inimical to the main thrust of Jadidism, its pages did see some discussion of proposals to reform madrasas. One set of proposals, submitted by a mudarris from Bukhara, suggested a fifteen-year curriculum, with two subjects being taught every year. These proposals would have gone some way in turning madrasas into colleges, with the introduction of a fixed curriculum, grades, and examinations.[66]

The distinction between such revivalist ulama and the Jadids is a crucial one, for it points to a significant characteristic of Jadidism; as such, it is well worth a short digression. A number of scholars in the West have sought to ground Jadidism in an indigenous Muslim tradition of re-

[65] "Dar ul-ulum Deoband'dagi Rusyali Islam talabalaridan tashakkur," Ayina , 16 October 1914, 1225. During the first century of its existence (1867-1967), Deoband graduated 70 students from "Russia (including Siberia)" (Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 [Princeton, 1982], 110-111). Although the figure of 70 students is an aggregate for the entire century, the great majority, if not all, of these students must have matriculated before 1917. To put the number of Russian Muslim students in context, it must be remembered that the total for all students from outside South Asia was only 431 for this period. The college at Deoband was founded by reformist ulama in the late 1860s; it offered instruction only in religious subjects, but it was organized along modern lines, with annual examinations, grades, and division into classes (ibid., ch. 3).


Jadidism was the outcome, according to this view, of a long struggle
in Bukharan madrasas to break the bonds of taqlid (obedience to canonical opinion) and for a return to the scriptural sources of Islam. This view was a corrective to Soviet-era conceptualizations of intellectual history as a battle between "enlighteners," secular, antireligious, and progressive by definitions, and upholders of various reactionary ideologies, of which Jadidism was one.[68] By pointing to the origins in Islamic theology of the reformism of such Tatar figures as Abdunnsir Kursavi (1776-1812) and Shihabiddin Märjani (1818-1889), scholars situated Tatar intellectual history in its Muslim context.

But such a view is much more difficult to maintain with respect to Central Asian Jadidism. To be sure, much of the reformism of Kursavi and Märjani owed a great deal to their educations in the madrasas of Bukhara, but we have very little evidence to date of debates about taqlid among Bukharan ulama, and Jadidism's connection to such debates is even more problematic. The problem is usually solved by seeing the Bukharan savant Ahmad Makhdum Danish (1826-1897) as the "theoretical precursor" of the Jadids, indeed a figure so important that "few men have shaken ... traditional attitudes as deeply as he."[69] Unfortunately, Danish's own work scarcely bears this heavy burden. Much of his work is marked by a sensibility that belongs very much to the world whose passing he mourns, rather than the brave new world that the Jadids celebrated, and his literary style aims to reproduce the golden age of Persian prose of yore. Furthermore, Danish wrote while in disgrace, and his work remained in manuscript until well after his death. Danish's influence was no doubt substantial in the literary circles of Bukhara, but his name never once appeared in a Jadid publication before the revolution. His reputation as the first of the moderns was created almost single-handedly in the 1920s by Sadriddin Ayni, whose view has been accepted much too readily by scholars.

But there is a further, more fundamental problem with a continuity between debates over taqlid and Jadidism, for it places Jadidism in the realm of "religion" (or, to be more precise, theology) rather than in that of cultural
transformation. As I will argue, theological argumentation was conspicuous by its absence in Jadid writing, even though the Jadids made use of modernist theology being produced elsewhere. The trajectory of Jadidism that I have outlined in this chapter places it in the transformations of Central Asian society wrought by the Russian conquest, as a modern "response" to modernity, which sought to reconfigure the entire world, including Islam. If there was widespread debate in Bukhara in the nineteenth century on the questions of taqlid and a return to scripturalist Islam, its inheritors were not the Jadids but the revivalist ulama who published al-Islah.

The relationship between the Jadids and the moneyed elite of Turkestan was also ambivalent. Said Karim-bay, Said Azim's son, published the newspaper Tojjar in 1907 and occasionally wrote for it, too. He was a founding member in 1909 of the first Muslim benevolent society in Tashkent, in which the prime movers were Munawwar Qari and Awlani. Said Ahmad, Said Karim-bay's son, was a partner in the Maktab Publishing Company, launched in 1914. Mirza Hakim Sarimsaqov, a textile merchant, was a collaborator of Munawwar Qari and Ubaydullah Khojaev in publishing Sada-yi Turkistan (to which he contributed) and a partner in the Turkestan Bookstore.[70] But the most prominent merchant in Jadid ranks was Abidjan Mahmudov of Kokand, merchant of the second guild, who, in addition to his substantial business, was active in the publishing trade. In 1914, he established his own printing press and published the newspaper Sada-yi Farghana.[71] The Jadids and the new moneyed elite were part of the same phenomenon, i.e., the transformation of the Central Asian economy under Russian rule, but the two elites had different stakes in the future. As a new cultural elite, the Jadids proceeded from the assumption that it was necessary to transform the cultural tradition they inherited in order to cope with the new conditions. The moneyed elite, on the other hand, had fared well under the new regime, and most, content to make money from the new opportunities without changing the old ways, saw no pressing need for reform.

[70] TsGARUz, f. 461, op. 1, d. 1311, l. 2420b, 255.
[71] TsGARUz, f. 19, d. 19074, ll. 14, 30-300b.

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They flaunted their newly acquired status in ostentatious displays of wealth at various feasts (toys). For the Jadids, the wealth possessed by the merchanty represented a great resource that could free the Jadids from economic constraints if used according to their priorities. But the merchants (bays) only occasionally spent their wealth in the service of reform, especially since that reform was articulated by a marginal group of youth. As we shall see, in their literature and drama, the Jadids presented their ideal of the bay as a philanthropist patron of reform. In pressing the wealthy of their own community for help, Turkestani Jadids pointed to the example of the Tatar and Transcaucasian Muslim middle classes, who provided considerable financial assistance to their compatriots. The results were indifferent; Turkestan saw nothing comparable to the large-scale philanthropy of the Taghievs of Baku or the Hüseyinovs of Orenburg.

The Jadids came from various backgrounds. What they had in common was a
commitment to change and a possession of cultural capital. This disposed them to conceive of reform in cultural terms, and the modicum of comfort that most enjoyed in their lives allowed them to devote their energies to it. In the end, the Jadids were constituted as a group by their own critical discourse. Their sense of cohesion came from their shared vision of the future as well as their participation in common activities and enterprises. The basic institution of Jadid reform was the new-method school itself. These schools were the site of the struggle for the hearts and minds of the next generation. Through them the Jadids disseminated a cognitive style quite different from that of the maktab and thus created a group in society that was receptive to their ideas. These schools were also crucial to the social reproduction of the movement. If the first new-method schools were founded single-handedly by a few dedicated individuals, by 1917 new-method schools were often staffed by their own graduates.[72] The Jadids also enthusiastically adopted such new forms of sociability as benevolent societies. Ultimately, though, the structure of the movement was quite diffuse, with a correspondingly wide range of sensibilities and attitudes toward other groups in society as well as the state.

Munawwar Qari represented perhaps the conservative end of the Jadid spectrum. Police documents indicate that many of his closest associates[72] See, for example, A.F. Ardashirov, "K voprosu o roli novometodnykh maktabov (po materialam Andizhanskoi oblasti)," Uchenye zapiski Andizhanskogo gospedinstituta , no. 6 (1957): 132-172.

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were ulama not otherwise associated with the Jadid cause, and his writings remained, in terms of genre and content, the most traditionalist. Other Jadids were far more outspoken in their criticism of the old order and the role of the ulama in it. Indeed, it is possible to discern a second "generation" of Jadids in Turkestan by 1910. Younger, and with a less thorough grounding in the madrasa tradition, they were more impatient with the current state of their society and harsher in their tone. Abdulhamid Sulayman oghi, who wrote under the name Cholpan, began publishing in the last years before 1917. He was the scion of a wealthy family and had attended a Russo-native school after the maktab.[73] Mirmuhsin Shermuhammadov (1895-1929) attended a new-method school in Tashkent and started writing in TWG in 1914. A prolific writer (he also contributed to other periodicals), he fearlessly took on every topic and every person, including Behbudi himself.[74] Even Hamza, whose madrasa credentials were impeccable, was fond of harsh criticism, as in this ashula (poem set to a folk tune):

Cry, cry o Turkestan
May soulless bodies swing, cry o Turkestan
Is there a nation like ours, sunk in infamy?
Deceived into foolishness, devoid of chastity?[75]

This powerful language contrasted to the more cautious tone of Behbudi or Munawwar Qari. When Hamza sent Munawwar Qari a manuscript for publication, he was told to tone down the language and to avoid using impolite (adabdan kharij ) words.[76]
The first Jadids in Central Asia were, by and large, men of the old order whose personal experiences had convinced them of the need to change. Yet, they were also products of their time. Many of them had traveled extensively. They possessed the cultural capital of the past, but almost none had experienced a purely Russian education. Many of them knew Russian, but it was usually self-taught in adult life; they had not been through the formative experience of Russian education. This con-

trasts markedly with the Jadids of European Russia and Transcaucasia, many of whom had a Russian (and, in some cases, even a European) education. Gasprinskii, who had attended a military academy in Moscow and worked for two years in Paris as Turgenev's secretary,[77] is hardly unusual in that respect. Central Asian Jadids, on the other hand, remained much closer to the Islamic cultural tradition than Jadids in other parts of the Russian empire.

Yet, for all this, their youth was a striking characteristic. Ishaq Khan and Ajzi, born in the 1860s, were by far the oldest members of the cohort. Behbudi was twenty-eight when he launched his public career and Munawwar Qari only twenty-three; Awlani began writing poetry at the age of sixteen. Those who became active in the last few years before the revolution were even younger. Hamza was twenty-one when he opened his first school in 1910, the same age at which Abdullah Qadiri wrote his first play. When Cholpan sent in his first poem to the newspaper Shuhrat in 1908, he signed the accompanying letter "a maktab pupil." He was probably only ten years old then.[78] The youth of the Jadids was testimony to their prodigious talent and a source of their seemingly inexhaustible energy but, in a society where age was cultural capital in itself, also their greatest handicap.

They also differed from the small number of Central Asians with a modern, secular Russian education. Ubaydullah Khojaev, the Tashkent lawyer and publisher, and the Samarqand doctor Abdurrahman Farhadi, who was appointed Russian consul in Najaf in 1914,[79] were perhaps the only representatives of this group prominent in public life before 1917. (Several others, such as Tashpolat Narbutabekov and Nazir Toraqul oghli, became active in that year.) The vast majority of Muslims in Central Asia with a Russian secular education were Qazaq or Tatar. Whereas the Jadids originated in the old cultural elite of the
region, these intellectuals often came from aristocratic elites. The Tatars came from among the ranks of the more prosperous sections of the community that had arrived in Turkestan after the Russian conquest. The Qazaqs, on the other hand, often came from aristocratic families and were southern analogues to a secular Qazaq elite that had formed in the Steppe province by the middle of the nineteenth century. The Qazaq elites of the steppe

[77] Seydahmet, Gaspirali Ismail Bey, 12-19.
[78] The newspaper was closed down by the authorities and its papers seized before it could be published. The poem is to be found in TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 489a, l. 31.

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had been sending their children to Russian schools since the first quarter of the nineteenth century.[80] The absence among the Qazaqs of a tradition of book learning entrenched in madrasas made the transition to secular education easy, since the survival of a cultural elite was not at stake, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, this interaction had produced the genius of Choqan Valikhanov, equally at home in Qazaq and Russian society.[81] A number of these secular intellectuals received a university education in Russia. Mustafa Choqay (1890-1941), who was descended from the Khivan royal family, attended the Tashkent gymnazia on a substantial scholarship and went on to study law at St. Petersburg University.[82] While in Petersburg, he worked at the offices of the Muslim Faction in the State Duma, drafting speeches for Muslim deputies.[83] In choosing to wage his struggles in the sphere of politics rather than cultural reform, Choqay was typical of the secular intellectuals, whose activities went on in parallel with that of the Jadids. We find little evidence of interaction between the two groups before 1917. The Jadids represented the modernization of the Muslim cultural tradition of Central Asia; the secular intellectuals were fluent in the idiom of European thought. The Jadids spoke to Muslim society in order to achieve cultural change; the secular intellectuals spoke to the Russian state and Russian society in order to achieve political change. With Islam Shahiahmedov, a Tatar born in Tashkent and Choqay's contemporary in St. Petersburg who was arrested in 1907 for spreading revolutionary agitation in the Tashkent garrison,[84] we have come a long way from Wasli and Munawwar Qari. Although a police report described him as "belonging to the

[80] An "Asiatic school" to teach Russian to Qazaq children with the aim of producing translators was opened at Omsk as early as 1786. A school directed at the children of the Qazaq aristocracy started at Khanskaia Stavka in 1841, followed by another one at Orenburg in 1850 (T. T. Tazhibaev, Prosveshchenie i shkoly Kazakhstana vo vtoroi polo-vine XIX veka [Alma Ata, 1962], 17, 22-23). Many Qazaqs also attended Russian civilian and military schools at Omsk and Orenburg.
[81] The Russian conquest of Turkestan brought the Qazaq steppe under greater influence of the Islam reproduced in madrasas, as madrasa students found it safer to travel to the steppe in the summer. Writing in 1910, Ahmet Bukeykhanov
saw two competing new elites emerging in the Qazaq lands, one formed like him in Russian institutions, the other increasingly Muslim and formed in the madrasas of Central Asia and the Volga; see A. Bukeikhanov, "Kirgizy," in A.I. Kastelianskii, ed., Formy natsional'nogo dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh (St. Petersburg, 1910), 597-598.

[82] TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 787, l. 192.


[84] "Spravka" (12 May 1916), TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 1113, l. 28-280b.

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so-called Bolshevist-Leninist current of the RSDWP,"[85] Shahiahmedov contributed to both liberal and radical periodicals in St. Petersburg, and upon his return to Turkestan in 1915, he edited the "progressive, non-party" newspaper, Turkestanskii krai .[86] In the heady days of 1917, when organized politics became a possibility, Jadids and Russian-educated intellectuals coalesced in a single political movement in which the latter tended to assume positions of leadership. The leading role of the modern educated intellectuals in 1917 was out of all proportion to their numerical strength or to their influence in local society before the revolution. Active politics required a command of the Russian language and of the Russian political idiom, and in this regard the Russian-educated intellectuals held a clear advantage over the Jadids.

Colonial Sensibilities in the Age of Empire

The Jadid project was predicated on a new sense of the world and of Central Asia's position within it. The cornerstone of this worldview was an assimilation of the idea of progress. The Jadids explicitly understood that their age was different from any other: "]In the past], one science or craft [used to] develop [at a time]," a Jadid textbook read. "In this century, [however,] all sciences and crafts develop [together].... This is the century of science and progress. The sciences seen in this century have never been seen before."[87] Science developed its own authority, as new discourses of hygiene and public health brought more and more aspects of life into the realm of human agency. The term used for "progress" was taraqqi , with a semantic range that covered "development," "growth," and "rise" (those who had achieved progress were mutaraqqi ).[88] The centrality of progress to the Jadid project was underscored by the fact that perhaps the most common term used to describe them as a group, both by themselves and by others (albeit with more derision than pride), was

[85] Ibid., l. 280b.

[86] Turkestanskii krai , 5 April 1916. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay (La presse et le mouvement national , 168) count Turkestanskii krai as a "Muslim" newspaper. This assertion is not borne out by the evidence of the newspaper itself. The newspaper spoke in the idiom of Russian liberalism; its readership was overwhelmingly Russian, and it had no choice but to cater to their interests. As such, it scarcely differed from any other liberal Russian-language
newspaper published in Turkestan.


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taraqqiparwar, "proponents of progress." This progress was a universal phenomenon accessible to all who cultivated knowledge. Europe and Russia had achieved a higher level of progress because of superior knowledge; they were models to be followed. This attitude was subversive of the dichotomy of Russian and native (colonizer and colonized) on which the colonial order was based, but it served a crucial rhetorical purpose for the Jadids.

The idea of progress was predicated upon the growth of a historical conception of time among the Jadids. The Islamic tradition, it is probably fair to say, had never seen history as a road to progress; rather, the past was a sacralized record of divine intervention in the affairs of men. Just how new the idea of constant progress and change over historical time was becomes clear from the pains Abdurrauf Fitrat took to explain the notion from first principles in an article devoted to outlining the goals of life. Humanity was weak and bereft of knowledge and skills at the beginning of Creation, but slowly it conquered the elements:

It is impossible to deny the changes wrought by humans in the world. Are these changes ... progress or decline? That is, have humans [insanha] been moving forward or backward from Creation to the present day? Of course forward, i.e., they have been progressing, and they have not stopped at a point to our day. For example, a few years ago, we considered the railway the ultimate means of transport. [But] after a while, the power of human knowledge invented the aeroplane and proved us wrong. Thus, it becomes obvious that humanity [bani Adam] has progressed from Creation to our days, and after our time too, it will progress, that is, move forward."

Fitrat then relates his theme to that of religion, but even there the notion of progress is prominent. God has provided guidance to humanity through the ages, but earlier prophets conveyed God's message to specific groups. Only after humanity had progressed to a certain level was it ready for God's final message. Fitrat thus grafts Islam on to an evolutionary vision of history. From our point of view, however, the article is important in that it unequivocally treats history as a record of human progress.

Geography similarly provided the Jadids a completely different conception of their place in the universe. Modern geography brought with it new conceptions of space, as something that could be envisioned in the form of a map or a globe but that also was finite. It provided a sense

of the interconnectedness of peoples and countries.[90] The study of geography occupied a very important place in Jadid thinking because it provided a graphic appreciation of the modern world. The Europeans had conquered the world by knowing it, Behbudi had implied; conquered nations likewise had to know the world. Munawwar Qari's geography textbook, for instance, provides detailed factual information (population, type of government, and capital city) about every country in the world; Munawwar Qari paid special attention to Muslim populations in each country.[91] The Jadids' fascination with maps, globes, and atlases went beyond the classroom. Behbudi published a four-color wall map of Central Asia inscribed in Turkic,[92] and his bookstore carried numerous atlases and maps, mostly of Ottoman provenance.[93]

The significance of the new writing then appearing in Tatar, Ottoman, and Arabic in shaping the worldviews of educated Central Asians was central. The new bookstores operated by the Jadids in the major cities of Central Asia stocked books published in India, Iran, Istanbul, Cairo, and Beirut, as well as the various Muslim publishing centers of the Russian empire. In Samarqand, at Mahmud Khoja Behbudi's bookstore opened in 1914, the interested reader could find a large number of books in Tatar, Ottoman, Arabic, and Persian on topics such as history, geography, general science, medicine, and religion, in addition to dictionaries, atlases, charts, maps, and globes.[94] Among these imported books were many translations or adaptations of European works. In the absence of any significant local translations, these Ottoman and Tatar translations became Central Asia's window on Europe, a fact quite obvious to Behbudi: "Ottoman, Caucasian, and Kazan Turks daily increase the number of translations of works of contemporary scholars, which means that the person who knows Turkic knows the world."[95] But it is easy to overlook the continuing importance of Persian and Arabic. Persian printed books continued to be imported from India (and some booksellers even had their books printed in India).[96] and Persian-language [90] Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation (Honolulu, 1994).

[91] Munawwar Qari, Yer yuzi (Tashkent, 1913).
[92] Ayina , 1 March 1914.
[93] Cf. price list in Ayina , 6 September 1914, 1095.
[94] Much of the information in the following section is derived from a number of detailed price lists of books published by Behbudi in Ayina in 1914.

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newspapers such as Chihra-numa (Cairo), Habl ul-matin (Calcutta), and the Siraj ul-akhbar (Kabul) were widely read in Jadid circles. The Jadids' madrasa educations also gave them access to Arabic. Hamza corresponded in it; Shakuri worked as a translator in the Russian consulate in Jeddah; and Abdullah Qadiri read the works of the modernist Arab historian Jurji Zaydan in the original.[97] Jurji Zaydan was only one example of modern scholarship influencing Jadid
thinking. It intruded in other ways as well. Fitrat, in his Tales of an Indian Traveler, quotes a long passage from "the great French professor" Charles Seignobos about the glories of medieval Islamic civilization. European scholarship on history, linguistics, and anthropology was often held up as validating arguments made by the Jadids. References to Gustav Le Bon, John William Draper, and Reinhart Dozy show up frequently in Jadid writings. Such writing also influenced the style of Jadid argumentation. Fitrat imported Seignobos's anticlericalism whole cloth into his argument against the influence of the ulama in contemporary Bukhara, which he compares to the influence of the Church in the Dark Ages. Almost all Jadids knew Russian, but it was not a significant channel for the transmission of modern knowledge to Central Asia. In addition to the printed word, travel provided important links with Muslim movements and intellectuals overseas. When Jadids traveled, they invariably went to other Muslim countries. One of the transformative moments of Behbudi's life was his 1900 visit to Egypt, where he visited al-Azhar and, most likely, met with reformers such as Muhammad 'Abduh. Behbudi visited Istanbul and Cairo again in 1914. In the meantime, he maintained his contacts in those places, so that when, a decade after his first trip abroad, a disciple of his left Samarkand to attend al-Azhar, Behbudi was able to provide him with letters of introduction to a benevolent society in Istanbul. The Ottoman empire occupied a special place in the imagination of the Central Asian Jadids, who followed closely the debates of the Second Constitutional Period inaugurated by the Young Turk revolution of 1908, finding them much livelier than anything possible in the Russian empire at the time. They sympa-

[97] Qodiriy, Otam haqida, 59.
[99] Ibid., 27-28.
[100] Haji Mum, "Mahmud Khoja Behbudi."
[101] Abdusalam Azimi, "Behbudi haqida khatira wa taasuratim," Zarafshan, 25 March 1923. Abdussalam Azimi also carried a letter of introduction to Gasprinskii, with whom Behbudi was on close terms.

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thized primarily with the Islamists rather than the Turkists, but. they also picked and chose among other ideas. There existed a considerable community of Central Asian students in Istanbul in the years preceding the outbreak of World War I. Muhammad Sharif Sufizada (1869-1937), who was born in Chust in Ferghana, spent his life traveling. He went to Istanbul in 1902 and after three years of serving as imam in various Sufi lodges, he entered the Imperial Teachers' College (Darülmüallimin-i Sahane) in 1905. He did not finish the course but returned to Turkestan in 1906, in order, he claimed, "to serve his own coreligionists and compatriots." Over the next eight years, he taught according to the new method in various cities of Turkestan as well as in Qonghirat in Khiva. In 1913, he opened a new-method school in Chust, but opposition from neighbors forced him to close it and leave town. He went to Afghanistan where he contributed to the Siraj ul-akhbar. In 1919, when the
government of Soviet Turkestan sent a diplomatic mission to Afghanistan (Awlani was one of its members), Sufizada served as its translator and returned home with it.[105]

The most famous Central Asian to study in Istanbul, however, was Fitrat (1886-1938), who spent the tumultuous period between 1909 and the summer of 1914 in Istanbul.[106] The son of a merchant who had traveled extensively in the Ottoman empire, Iran, and Chinese Turkestan, Fitrat attended the Mir-i Arab madrasa in Bukhara, but in 1909 the Tarbiya-ı Atfal (Education of Children) society gave him a scholarship to study in Istanbul. Fitrat's years in Istanbul were formative, although the precise details of his activities remain frustratingly elusive. During this time, he published his first three books, at least two of which (Debate between a Bukharan Mudarris and a European and Tales of an Indian Traveler) achieved great popularity back in Central Asia. He first appeared in print the Islamist newspaper Hikmet, published by Sehbenderzade Filibieli All Hilmi, a prominent Islamist whose difficulties with the C.U.P. government led to the closure of the newspaper on several occasions; Fitrat also contributed to Sirat-ı Müstakim, the flagship Islamist journal edited by Mehmet Âkif (Ersoy).[107] But in 1914 Fitrat was enrolled in the Medreset ül-Vâizin,[108] a reformed madrasa created earlier that year to prepare a new kind of religious functionary. Its wide-ranging curriculum included Turkic history, taught by Yusuf Akçura, the chief ideologue of pan-Turkism.[109] Behbudi's intellectual range was similarly broad. The reading room he organized in Samarqand received Sirat-ı Müstakim, and Behbudi sent its editors copies of his publications (along with a recent copy of TWG) as a gift.[110] But he also maintained commercial relations with the main Turkist organ Türk Yurdu (whose offices in Istanbul stocked Behbudi's map of Turkestan inscribed in Turkic),[111] and in his own Ayina, he reprinted articles from the entire spectrum of the Ottoman press until the war cut relations.

[102] The Ottoman Islamists were modernists very critical of traditional practices of Islam; few of them came from traditional Ilmiye backgrounds. Rather, they shared the theological views of the Egyptian modernist Muhammad 'Abduh (whose writing appeared frequently in the leading Islamist Journal, Sirat-ı Müstakim [later Sebilurresad]). Their rhetoric of awakening and strength through knowledge was very similar to that of the Jadids of Central Asia, but their most fundamental problem was to ensure the survival of the Ottoman empire on the basis of Muslim solidarity. See Tarîk Zafer Tunaya, İslâmîlik Cereyani (Istanbul, 1962); Ismail Kara, Türkiye'de İslâmîlik Diisâncısı: Metinler, Kisiler, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1986-1987), I: xv-lxvii. [103] Khurshid, 19 October 1906. [104] On this incident, see TWG, 3 February 1914. [105] OSE, X: 478-479, s.v. "Sofizada." [106] The only full-length biography of Fitrat is in Japanese: Hisao Komatsu, Kakumei no Chuo Ajia: aru Jadudo no shozo (Tokyo, 1996); otherwise, see Begali, Qosimov, "Fitrat (chizgilar)," Sharq yulduzi, 1992, no. 10, 170-180.
Istanbul at the time was probably the most cosmopolitan city in the world, and a cauldron of Muslim opinion, as émigrés and exiles from all over the Muslim world gravitated to it. The role of Muslim émigrés from the Russian empire, such as Yusuf Akçura and Ahmed Agaoglu (Agaev), in laying the foundations of pan-Turkism is generally recognized, but the substantial presence of Iranian exiles in the city has provoked less interest.[112] Fırat, who at that time wrote exclusively in Persian, was clearly influenced by the Travels of Ibrahim Bek by the Iranian exile Zayn ul-‘Abidin Maragha’i, published in Istanbul, for the parallels between the novel and Fırat’s own Tales of an Indian Traveler are striking.[113] Simi-

[107] Abdurrauf, "Hasbihal bahamwatanan-i bukharayi," Hikmet, 18 November 1910; Buharali, Abdurrauf, "Buhara Veziri, Nasrullah-bi, Pervaneçi Efendi Hazretlerine Açık Mektub," Tearüf-i Muslimin, 25 November 1910, 10 (only the title and the byline are in Ottoman; the text is in Persian). On Hikmet and its publisher, see Kara, Türkiyede İslâmçılık, I: 3-4.

The Jadids were part of a cosmopolitan community of Muslims knit together by readership of common texts and by travel. They lived in the last generation when Muslim intellectuals in different countries could communicate with each other without the use of European languages. Central Asian Jadidism was located squarely in the realm of Muslim modernism. It was Muslim because its rhetorical structures were rooted in the Muslim tradition of Central Asia and because the Jadids derived ultimate authority for their arguments in Islam. The Jadids never disowned Islam in the way that many Young Turks had done well before the end of the nineteenth century.[114] Rather, modernity was fully congruent with the "true" essence of Islam, and only an Islam purified of all accretions of the ages could ensure the well-being of Muslims. Informed by a new vision of the world, the Jadids arrived at a new understanding of Islam and what it meant to be a Muslim.
[114] For an excellent exposition, see M. Sukru Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York, 1995), ch. 2.
Chapter 4
The Politics of Admonition
Publics and Public Spheres

Jürgen Habermas's notion of the public sphere has attracted much attention in recent years. Since Habermas very consciously defines his public sphere as a specific moment in the history of bourgeois Europe, its utility as a model for comparative research is limited (although it has been attempted). We are unlikely to find private individuals (each both "owner of goods and persons and one human being among others, i.e., bourgeois and homme ") "coming together as a public [and] soon claiming the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves" in settings other than the ones Habermas investigates, and least of all in the colonial world. Indeed, as a number of scholars have argued, Habermas's description of the public sphere remains highly idealized even for eighteenth-century Europe. Nevertheless, the emergence of the press, a substantial publishing trade, intensive sociability in discussion groups and benevolent societies all reconfigured the nature of cultural production in Central Asia. There may not have been any bourgeois, but the transformation of the context in which culture was produced and reproduced was significant. In our disappointment at not finding an exact match with Habermas's description, it is easy to overlook the similarities. Jadidism as a critical discourse arose in a realm of public debate that had come into existence as a result of the transformations wrought by the Russian conquest. The advent of print had begun to redefine the parameters of debate in Muslim society, in which the authority of older elites could be challenged in public. The Jadids' enthusiastic advocacy of print and new forms of sociability was not incidental, for Jadidism's strength as a cultural or political force was directly related to the strength and extent of the new public sphere constituted by these new forms. This proved to be a formidable problem, for neither the economic nor the political situation was particularly salubrious for the public sphere, and Jadidism had constantly to maneuver between the twin perils of a weak market and a hostile colonial state in order to propagate its reform. The colonial context marked the new public sphere in two fundamental ways. First, the state had a significant presence in it, both as protagonist and antagonist. From the earliest period, the authorities attempted to inculcate "useful knowledge" among the local population to counter what they considered its inherent fanaticism and to render it more amenable to Russian rule. They
also kept a stern watch on the public, using their wide-ranging powers of censorship and oversight with abandon. Second, the "native" public sphere existed alongside, and anterior to, a local Russian public sphere. The existence of a public sphere in Russia, where autocracy jealously retained control over all matters of state import, is problematic in itself, although recent scholarship has seen plentiful evidence of it in the flourishing of a popular press and voluntary organizations in the postreform period. This form of public life also appeared in Turkestan, where a nonofficial Russian-language press emerged early. Although its relationship with officialdom remained tense, it could engage the state in political dialogue, especially after 1905. By contrast, the native public sphere was subject to different rules and the object of much greater official suspicion. Permission to publish newspapers was granted by the governor-general himself. Once in business, editors had constantly to worry about the censors, for the slightest misstep could result in the closure of a newspaper. The administration could go to extremes of bureaucratic obscurantism to deny permission or to revoke it once it was granted. Writing in emigration, Mustafa Choqay recalled how an application he submitted was rejected because it was "too simply worded." With few qualified personnel to monitor vernacular newspapers, local authorities erred on the side of caution and suspended publication of newspapers at the slightest excuse.

As Munawwar Qari wrote of the forced closure of Taraqqi in 1906: "When a Russian newspaper is arraigned before a court or prohibited from publication for some reason, it is allowed to publish under a new title so that subscribers keep receiving something. But this system apparently does not apply to Muslims." Officialdom also attempted surveillance over native society through a network of police agents whose presence, judging by the volume of the reports they filed, must have been quite pervasive. Given this suspicion, and Turkestan's disenfranchisement from imperial politics after 1907, the native public sphere became largely depoliticized. Eschewing a discourse of political rights aimed at the state, it focused largely on debates about culture and society. This accounts for the fact that the reformist project was articulated in terms of a harsh critique of Central Asian society itself, in which all problems were the result of shortcomings of Central Asians themselves, and where the solution lay in self-improvement.

The difference between the Russian and native spheres was, however, primarily a matter of language, for there were no legal restrictions on the entry of "natives" into the Russian press. Rather, the exclusion was primarily based on cultural capital—the knowledge of Russian and professional or academic
accomplishment in "Russian" domains, although attempts by natives to enter the sphere never failed to provoke official suspicion. Until 1917 the spheres remained distinct. The Russian-language


[6] Immediately after Sada-yi Turkistan began publication in April 1914, the governor of Syr Darya oblast asked the governor-general to delegate the task of monitoring it to a competent orientalist such as Ostroumov or Semenov because no person higher in rank than a translator could be found in the Syr Darya chancellery with the necessary linguistic skills. The chancellery of the governor-general, however, could not spare the services of the men requested and the task remained with the translator. The correspondence is in TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 957, ll. 1-5.


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press in Turkestan had little in common in theme, tone, or content, with its vernacular counterpart. Few people were active in both spheres. Ubaydullah Khojaev, a trained lawyer who also published the newspaper Sada-yi Turkistan, was perhaps the only such figure. The Jadids were not hostile to the Russian sphere, however, for as I shall argue, the central goal of Jadid reform was to enter this sphere while retaining the bifurcation between Russian and native. Beyond this dichotomy of Russian and native publics, as we have seen, Central Asia was also located on the fringes of two other publics: one composed of the Muslims of the Russian empire and centered around Terjüman and other Tatar newspapers; and the other an international, cosmopolitan public of readers of newspapers from all over the Muslim world. Debates in these other publics influenced the tenor of Central Asian Jadidism, but the fortunes of the Jadids were determined on the ground.

Print and the Public
Printing arrived in Central Asia with the Russian armies. The new authorities' faith in the power of the printed word equaled that of the Jadids a generation later. One of Kaufman's first acts was the establishment of a printing press, complete with Arabic characters, which were used also to print TWG from 1870. The state also published a small number of booklets and brochures (some of them reprints from the TWG) containing useful information (such as books about the history of Russia and the Romanov dynasty, a history of Egypt, a life of Columbus, but also pieces from Pushkin and Tolstoy in translation) or official reports and proclamations in Turkic. Commercial publishing took off only after the appearance of lithography in 1883, but then developed rapidly. In 1898, two British orientalists visiting the book market in Bukhara found "the counters of its shops ... piled high with standard works in lithograph editions, and here and there a manuscript. Great finds may sometimes be obtained by connoisseurs, though there are still enough native bibliophils in Bokhara to render good finds by Europeans exceptional."[8] Manuscripts might have become a rarity, but it is impossible to speak of a printing revolution in Central Asia in the manner that many scholars

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claim for early modern Europe.[9] The new trade was coopted by the existing network of manuscript trade, and dealers in manuscripts (sahhaf, warraq) were the first Turkestani publishers. The local publishing trade remained in the hands of the nashir (publisher), the individual who bore the cost and the risk of putting a new book on the market. The role of the publisher could range from that of a sponsor, responsible only for the financial outlay, to that of calligrapher, printer, and bookseller as well. The output of the printing trade was dominated by traditional genres. Lithographed books did not look any different from manuscripts, although they were far more ubiquitous. New genres appeared in local publishing only after the turn of the century and were largely the work of the Jadids.[10]

Print was central to the strategies of the Jadids, many of whom were deeply involved in publishing. The bulk of publishing remained in the hands of individuals and hence subject to limited resources and the frailties of individual initiative. The Jadids sought to put the business on sounder footing and pioneered bookstores (kutubkhana), larger corporate entities that served also as publishing houses. In 1910, seven men, including such well-known Jadids as Munawwar Qari, Abdussami Qari, and Abdullah Awlani, applied for permission to open a bookstore called Umid (Hope). The request was categorically denied,[11] no doubt because Munawwar Qari and Awlani had earlier incurred the ire of the authorities with their involvement with independent newspapers between 1906 and 1908. Awlani was more successful in 1914, when he opened the Zaman (Time) Bookstore in the Russian part of Tashkent.[12] In 1916, he joined with a number of Tashkent professional booksellers and philanthropists to form the Maktab Nashr-i Maarif Shirkati (Maktab Education Company).[13] Behbudi's diverse activities included operating a bookstore, located in his house in Samarqand,[14] where Abdulqadir Shakuri also started the Zarafshan Bookstore in 1915.[15] The largest growth of bookstores, however, took place in the towns of the Ferghana valley.

[11] GARF, f. 102, op. 244 (1914), d. 74, ch. 74B, 1. 442.
[12] TsGARUz, f. 17, d. 17273, ll. 94, 95.
where several such companies were launched between 1913 and 1915. Such bookstores had larger financial resources and, as corporate entities, were less vulnerable to the fickleness of individual fortunes. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that these bookstores were able to function like modern publishing concerns. Maktab, which began operation with a capital of 5,500 rubles, paled in comparison with such Tatar publishers as the Karimov Brothers of Orenburg, not to mention established Russian publishers.[16] Ghayrat (Energy) was a larger operation. It had hoped to raise 50,000 rubles through the sale of shares, although success was limited. Primarily concerned with supplying textbooks and stationery to new-method schools and selling books and newspapers when it first received permission to operate on 27 February 1915, its executives were, by late 1916, aiming to acquire a printing press with the eventual goal of publishing a newspaper.[17]

For all the moral urgency with which the Jadids invested it, publishing was a commercial enterprise in which the decision to put a certain text in print was largely, but not solely, determined by the need to sell. This was a fact of crucial importance for the fate of Jadid reform, since the Jadids constantly came up against the stark realities of a market in which they occupied only a small niche. Benedict Anderson has argued that "print capitalism" went a long way toward creating standardized languages and fostering a new sense of community in many parts of the world.[18] For the Jadids, however, the market proved to be the most formidable obstacle. The market imposed harsh limits on what the Jadids could accomplish. They sought, instead, to bypass the market through recourse to philanthropy, patronage, and charity, but they were not entirely successful in institutionalizing philanthropy in Turkestan, and Jadid reform remained subject to significant economic pressures. (Indeed, it was only after the revolution, when the market was abolished, that print produced the kind of change that Anderson ascribes to "print capitalism" in early modern times.) Although books and newspapers were the stock in trade of Jadid reform, Jadid publications occupied only a small part of local production. According to the only accurate and reliable bibliographical information we possess, of the seventy printed editions of sixty-nine different works that appeared in Central Asia between October 1910 and August 1911 only eleven could be classified as Jadid publications. The balance of the publishing output comprised new editions of classical works or

[16] The Karimov brothers received permission to start a company to publish and sell books in 1898. They began with an operating capital of 20,000 rubles; Abrar Karimullin, Tatarskaia kniga nachala XX veka (Kazan, 1974), 22; The Moscow firm of I.D. Sytin & Co. began with a capital of 75,000 rubles in 1884; by 1914, when it was the largest publishing concern in Russia, the company was worth 3.4 million rubles; Charles A. Ruud, Russian Entrepreneur: Publisher Ivan Sytin of Moscow, 1851-1934 (Montreal, 1990), 27, 141
new works of poetry in the traditional idiom.[19] Publishing remained a precarious business, and many Jadid publications continued to be financed by their authors. The publishing career of Hamza Hakimzada's Milli ashulalar (National Songs), a collection of poetry for use in new-method schools, provides an example of publishing practices from the period. Hamza apparently completed the manuscript in February 1913, when he wrote to the printing press of the newspaper Vaqït in Orenburg for quotes on the price of printing the collection of verse. The Vaqït press was well known for the quality of its work, but apparently the quality work came at a price. The press asked 80 rubles for printing 1,000 copies, although an order of 1,500 copies would have cost only 105 rubles. This was apparently beyond Hamza's means (he had just returned from a long trip abroad), and he dropped the matter. In 1915, he approached Munawwar Qari at Turkistan Bookstore in Tashkent for publishing the work piecemeal. He was offered royalties of 300 copies for each printing if Turkistan were to publish the book of its own accord. Hamza chose a different option, whereby Turkistan supplied the paper and covered other expenses, but Hamza still had to pay the cost of printing, which, for 1,000 copies, came to 28 rubles. For its services, Turkistan retained 285 copies (another 15 went for "censor, etc."), leaving Hamza 700 copies to sell for himself. For publishing later parts of the series, however, Hamza turned to two friends, Iskandar Baratbaev and Said Nasir Mirjalil oghli, who published seven parts during 1916 and 1917, receipts from the sale of one part apparently financing the publication of the next.[20] Hamza could, moreover, count on the support of friends in his search for ready cash needed to publish his work.

[19] L. Zimin, "Bibliografita," Sredniaia Azua , 1911, nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 8. It should be noted that as low as these figures might be, they are significantly higher than those generally quoted in the literature. Soviet sources usually cited a figure of thirty-three titles in "Uzbek" for the year 1913 (Istoriia knigi v SSSR 1917-1921 [Moscow, 1986], III: 168); these figures were also used by Edward Allworth, Central Asian Publishing and the Rise of Nationalism (New York, 1965), 36.


In July 1914, for instance, sixteen friends raised a total of 139.50 rubles among them for printing and publishing Yangi Saadat .[21] But the onus for mustering resources remained on the authors themselves in the publishing world of Turkestan before 1917.

Economic constraints similarly haunted attempts to establish an independent vernacular press in Turkestan, although officialdom was responsible for the demise of many newspapers. The newspaper held a particular fascination for the Jadids, who celebrated the mere existence of newspapers as a sign of progress and a source of enlightenment. A writer in one of the earliest Turkic-language
newspapers in Tashkent likened newspapers to true sages and skilled physicians (hukama-yi sadiq wa atibba-yi haziq) who cure the ills of the community, and several years later, Behbudi saw newspapers as leaders of society through their constant criticism of its shortcomings.\[22\] Newspapers also provided information about the rest of the world, making their readers aware of world affairs and of progress achieved by other peoples. Articles extolling the virtues of newspapers became a staple in the Jadid press, and protagonists in Jadid literature spent a lot of time reading newspapers.\[23\]

We do not know whether the TWG owed its monopoly solely to officialdom, which denied permission for publication of other vernacular periodicals, but we do know that Turkic and Persian newspapers published in the Ottoman empire, Iran, and Europe, as well as Terjüman, were widely read in Central Asia. The postal system, which reached Central Asia with the conquest, made this possible, and although officialdom saw censorship as an immutable right, it did not extend to a complete ban on imported publications. The political liberalization in the wake of the revolution of 1905, along with the political enthusiasm it aroused, led to the appearance of the unofficial press in March 1906. The first independent vernacular newspaper was also the most unusual. It was published by I.I. Geier, a local Russian of moderate socialist persuasion, with the aim of acquainting the local population with the new political ideas. Much of the copy was translated from Russian newspapers by Mu-

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hammadjan Aydarov, an interpreter retired from official service. This made for ponderous prose, which showed up even in the title of the newspaper, Taraqqi—Orta Aziyaning umr guzarligi (Progress—Central Asian Life). There were already several new-method schools in Tashkent, and the Jadids, then still a small group, took the opportunity to appear in print. Munawwar Qari, who never contributed to TWG because of personal and political differences with Ostroumov, published his first articles here. Nevertheless, the brief career of this newspaper (it folded for financial reasons after seventeen issues spread over three months) is important mostly because it represented one of the very few attempts by local Russians to include the native population in political dialogue. The newspaper's failure did not deter Ismail Abidi (Gabitov), a Tatar Social Revolutionary, from trying again. Abidi brought out Taraqqi (Progress), which managed to appear nineteen times before being shut down by the Tashkent high court. Taraqqi had much in common with its predecessor, except that its political views were more radical and it avoided the infelicities of language that had plagued Taraqqi-Orta Azyaning umr guzarligi. Again, local reformers flocked to the newspaper to take advantage of the forum and to air their criticisms of society. Such criticisms created their own scandals, but the
undoing of the newspaper was its radical tone, directed in the fashion of those
days against bureaucracy as the enemy of the newfound liberties of the land,
which proved too much for local officialdom to bear. Problems began early as
police raided its offices after the publication of its third issue and
confiscated several hundred unsold copies because inaccurate translations of two
editorial articles had led them to believe that the newspaper favored killing
members of educated nationalities. Abidi was called to the police station and
released only on bail.[24] The newspaper was shut down after nineteen issues by
court order for publishing an editorial containing unacceptable material.[25]
Within three weeks of Taraqqi's closure, Munawwar Qari brought out his own
newspaper, Khurshid (The Sun). It had Taraqqi's feisty tone and did not shun
explicitly political topics (it published several articles about Russia's still
volatile political situation, as well as covering political events in Iran,
Egypt, and India with overt anticolonial sympathies).
[24] See his account of the incident m "Baylar, buyraqaratiya wa ghazita,"
>Taraqqi , 27 July 1906.
[25] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 4, d. 1003, ll. 117, 119, 188.

All of this invited official wrath, and after only ten issues the newspaper was
ordered closed for its "extremely harmful direction."[26] The same fate befell
Shubrat (Fame), published in December 1907 by Abdullah Awlani with the
cooperation of Ahmetjan Bektimirov and Munawwar Qari, which also lasted ten
issues, as well as its successor Aziya (Asia), which could manage only five
issues. The much more moderate Tojjar (Merchants), published by Said Karim-bay,
the decorated notable, shunned politics ("Our purpose is not opposition to the
government [unlike Taraqqi and Khurshid ] but rather to be the friends and
supporters of the Russian state in a way that does not harm religion"),[27] but
could not attract enough readers to pay its way, and Said Karim-bay apparently
being unwilling to foot the bill himself, folded after thirty-seven issues. By
March 1908, the independent vernacular press had ceased to exist in Central
Asia.
The first attempt to revive it came in Bukhara in 1912 and took a more
institutionalized form. In 1912, a group of Bukharan Jadids managed to secure
permission for the publication of a Persian-language newspaper called Bukhara-yi
sharif (Bukhara the Noble) in Kagan. The newspaper was financed by a joint-stock
company for which 9,000 rubles were raised almost immediately.[28] Mir Jalil
Mirbadalov, the chief translator at the Russian Political Agency, was apparently
instrumental in securing permission, although the agency reserved the right to
censor the newspaper. Edited by an Azerbijani, Bukhara-yi sharif published
daily (although in July, when it launched a biweekly Turkic supplement titled
Turan , its frequency declined). The two newspapers survived on their own for
several months but were closed down in January 1913 by Russian authorities at
the request of the amir.[29] In April of that year, Behbudi, who by this time
was deeply involved in writing and publishing, launched Samarqand as a biweekly
newspaper. The venture was not successful financially, and in September he
abandoned the newspaper and channeled its finances into Central Asia's first
magazine, Ayina (The Mirror), which he managed to put out almost weekly for the next twenty months. Again, sales were poor and the onset of war did not help matters. At the end of the first year, the number of paid subscribers was 234, and

[26] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 536, l. 16.
[27] "Matbuat alami," Tojjar, 21 August 1907.

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the situation does not seem to have improved.[30] When Behbudi was told by his doctors in the summer of 1915 to take the waters, he closed the magazine down.[31] It was never published again.

But 1914 had been the banner year for journalism in Central Asia. In March, Munawwar Qari, Abdullah Awlani, Ubaydullah Khojaev, and four others launched Sada-yi Turkistan (Voice of Turkestan) as a joint-stock venture in Tashkent.[32] Almost simultaneously, Abidjan Mahmudov, Jadid activist and merchant of the second guild in Kokand, began Sada-yi Farghana (Voice of Ferghana). The two newspapers, alike in many ways, shunned politics and focused on educational and cultural goals, ceaselessly exhorting their compatriots to wake up (a favorite metaphor) to the necessity of reform. In early 1915, when reformist ulama in Tashkent launched their own magazine, al-Islah (Reform), five periodicals (including TWG) were being published in Turkestan. But this situation did not last; although political caution saved them from the censor's axe, all but al-Islah fell victim to the market, the small readership being unable to sustain them. Sada-yi Turkistan folded in May 1915 for financial reasons, Sada-yi Farghana followed soon afterward, and Ayina's last issue came out in June 1915. There were two attempts to publish news sheets containing only agency reports in translation and an unsuccessful bid to revive Sada-yi Turkistan in Andijan in 1916.[33] When the old order was cast asunder by revolution in March 1917, the only unofficial vernacular periodical being published in Central Asia was al-Islah.[34]

The Jadid press had a marked didactic flavor. For the Jadids, the newspaper was a platform from which to broadcast their exhortations to reform. The model for the Central Asian press was provided, of course, by Gasprinskii's Terjüman, which for a generation had stood as the only unofficial Muslim newspaper in the Russian empire of any consequence, but Turkestan newspapers shared the general attitudes and style common to much Muslim journalism of the turn of the century, in both the

[32] GARF, f. 102, op. 244 (1914), d. 74, ch. 84B, l. 125.
[34] On the press in Central Asia, see Said, Ozbek waqtli matbuoti; the sections on Central Asia in Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, La
Russian and Ottoman empires, as well as in the Ottoman and Iranian diasporas. Newspapers ran to four pages and appeared usually twice a week (the exception being Bukhara-yi sharif, which appeared daily). They carried news, mostly from other newspapers or from telegraph agencies, since none could afford to post correspondents, but the bulk of the space was occupied by essays, editorial and opinion pieces dealing with the usual themes of education, progress, and admonition. Poetry, usually critical or exhortatory, was a prominent feature. Readers from all over Central Asia wrote to comment on shortcomings or problems in their localities or in Central Asia in general. The central feature of all newspapers remained the filyatun (feuilleton via the Russian), a long essay which often took up as much as a quarter of each newspaper. The filyatun was either critical or informative, usually both, as authors managed to inform readers about the achievements of other societies while using the invidious comparison to Turkestan to exhort their readers to reform, to act as the "society's physicians." Sometimes the filyatun was written as fiction; Cholpan's Doctor Muhammadyar, perhaps the first modern short story in Central Asian Turkic, appeared as a series of filyatus in Sada-yi Turkistan in the summer of 1914. Behbudi's Ayina had a similar tenor of exhortation and admonition, although he also published a great deal of informational material, such as a series of articles on the antiquities of Samarqand, a long essay on "Why Did the Turkish State Decline?" reprinted from Terjüman, and Behbudi's own observations on a two-month trip to the Ottoman empire in 1914.

It was this content that distinguished the Jadid press from the TWG on one side and al-Islah on the other. The earliest voices of reform appeared in TWG, which also featured the filyatun. The tone, however, was never so single-mindedly exhortatory as it was in the Jadid press. Filyats in TWG were generally "informational," such as numerous articles on the tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty in 1913, the centenary of the Napoleonic invasion, or the history of the conquest of Turkestan. Indeed, the appearance of an independent Muslim press after 1905 brought about a change in the character of the newspaper, which seems to have become more circumspect in giving voice to reform. Much of the copy in the last decade of its existence was written by its native editor, one Mulla Alim, a protégé of Ostroumov, who frequently sparred with editors of other periodicals, both Central Asian and Tatar. Al-Islah, on the other hand, did not write about seeking admonition from Europeans; the reform to which it was committed emanated from different sources. Its prose, heavily larded with Arabic and Persian expressions, was also broken up with lengthy quotations in Arabic (without translation) which served,
among other things, to demarcate its readership. With the exception of al-Islah, the ulama did not attempt to join the fray by launching their own publications. Because they did not leave a published record, it is difficult to surmise their reasons. Significant no doubt was the traditionalist ulama's distaste for engaging in debate with those outside their own circles, those who had not dedicated themselves for years to the acquisition of knowledge and adab. However, a second, more fundamental reason for the ulama's absence from the world of journalism was that the bulk of their constituency continued to exist in a largely oral world in which literacy remained a sacralized skill. For the traditionalist ulama, written knowledge was still transmitted through face-to-face interaction, and the impersonal use of the written word inherent in the newspaper was not widely accepted by them. Reading, even for those who were literate, was primarily a devotional activity. Attention to such different uses of the written word and different (culturally valued) reading habits might also help explain the lack of financial success the Jadids met in their publishing efforts. The obvious reasons for the low demand for newspapers and magazines, and for the printed word in general, were the low purchasing power of consumers in a poor agrarian economy and the low levels of literacy among the population. But as I argued in Chapter 1, low levels of literacy did not in themselves mean a lack of education or of interest in the literate tradition. Texts could always be read aloud and shared by those who could not read themselves. Therefore, we have to look further than low levels of literacy for possible explanations of low demand for the printed word. Historians of Europe have remarked on the transition from "intensive" to "extensive" reading practices in the eighteenth century. "Intensive" reading involved the communal reading and rereading, often aloud (and accompanied by memorization) of a small number of texts belonging to only a few genres; such reading was embedded in reverential attitudes toward both the act of reading itself and the book being read. "Extensive" reading, which developed in the age of print, is marked by the reading, silently and individually, of a large number of texts devoid of any reverential or sacral meaning. Such a line of inquiry yields fruit-


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ful insights into the Jadid experience with disseminating reform through the printed word. In the tradition reproduced by the maktab, texts were sacralized objects accessible only through the mediation of a recognized master. The newspaper represented a completely new use of the written word. Its impersonal text, usually in quotidian language rather than rhymed prose or verse, was a desacralized commodity that did not fit existing patterns of usage for the written word. And while the newspaper itself was the best source for the dissemination of new reading habits, the continued existence of older reading habits proved to be the major obstacle in its growth. The new-method schools inculcated different reading practices, and a new generation of their graduates
might have formed a reading public to support Jadid publishing efforts, but in the period under review, such was not the case. Newspapers published by the Jadids therefore failed to attract a wide readership and consequently faced severe financial hardships. Shuhrat had a print run of only 300 when it was closed down by the administration,[36] and as noted above, the number of paid subscriptions to Behbudi’s Ayina hovered around 100 for most of its existence.

A New Literature
The Jadids’ first attempts to write prose fiction also date from this period. Ostroumov had published pieces by Tolstoy in the TWG, and prose fiction in Tatar and Ottoman had made its appearance in Central Asia. A translation from Azerbaijani of Robinson Crusoe published in 1912 by Fazilbek Atabek oghli introduced the term roman to Central Asia. Hamza Hakimzada Niyazi called his 1915 story of the happiness brought by knowledge a "national novel" (milli roman). The Jadids hoped for nothing less than to create a new canon more in keeping with the needs of the moment than the existing literature, which they harshly criticized for its obsolescence and decadence. Hamza wrote his New Happiness for the following reasons: "This book is not for use in the maktab; rather it was written with the aim of providing a book for reading [qiraat risalasi] for use in place of the books currently read by the common people, such as Jamshed, Zarqum, Aldarkusha, [various] bayazes, Dalla Mukhtar, Gul andam, Afandi, etc., which are all full of superstition and nonsense, injurious to morals, and [entirely] baseless."[37] Much like the press, Jadid literature remained firmly subordinated to an overriding didactic concern. This was especially true of the plays which usually culminated in lengthy speeches in which a mouthpiece of the Jadids would rouse the audience by pointing to the moral of the story. There is no character or plot development and no concern with the internal struggles of human beings. The interiorized self of bourgeois modernity is nowhere to be found in the Jadid literature of this period. For all their denigration of the oral romance tradition, the Jadids could not escape its conventions. Many characters did not even have individual names but rather represented social types. The plot served to highlight social ills and to present Jadid remedies for them, but assertion took the place of demonstration through plot development. The effect was rather lugubrious, and most theater evenings were leavened with the inclusion of light comedy (although the didactic intent was never far beneath the surface even in comedy: a skit called Tim Fool puts the difficulties encountered by a country bumpkin in the city to generic ignorance, whereas in Is It Easy to Be a Lawyer?, the lawyer frequently rises above the antics of his humbling clients to lecture the audience about the need to reform).[38] Nevertheless, many of the writers who began writing in the last years before 1917 went on to become accomplished men of letters in the following decade, and the history of modern Central Asian literature can scarcely be imagined without the names of Fitrat, Cholpan, Qadiri, and Hamza (although generations of Soviet scholarship attempted to do precisely that).

[36] TsGARUz, f. 461, op. 1, d. 57, l. 6070b.
Poetry, however, retained its central place in Central Asian literary life, and much of the Jadid exhortation took this form. Sadriddin Ayni’s characterization of "Tajik" literature of this period as "old in form but with new topics" applies also to literary output in Turkic.[39] The Jadid press regularly published poetry (odes to the press were a standard feature), and poetry had an important place in the curriculum of new-method schools. Sayyid Ahmad Ajzi wrote two long poems in the masnawi tradition ruing the fallen state of the Muslim community and exhorting it to reform. But there were new uses for poetry, too. The advent of the gramophone had made folk tunes respectable, and both Aw-

[39] Sadriddin Ayni, Namuna-yi adabiyat-i Tajik (Moscow, 1926), 529.

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lani and Hamza wrote lyrics with "national" (i.e., reformist) themes for folk melodies.

Modern Theater
Theater exercised a deep fascination for Jadids throughout the Russian empire. Looking back on a quarter century of reform, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii could write in 1901 on the emergence of theater as a major achievement.[40] As with newspapers, the mere existence of theater was deemed a sign of progress and civilization. Modern theater came to Central Asia with the Russian conquest, but until the turn of the century, theatrical activity was confined to the Russian community in the larger cities. A dramatic literature and professional troupes had developed among the Muslims of Transcaucasia and the Tatar lands by the end of the nineteenth century. Transcaucasian and Tatar troupes toured Turkestan in 1911, after which such tours became common.[41] In addition, dramatic activity was sustained locally by expatriate Tatars who began staging plays for their community at least as early as 1905, and by 1913, this activity was strong enough to support a standing Tatar theater group in Tashkent led by Zeki Bayazidskii.[42]

The repertoire of these troupes came whole cloth from European Russia or Transcaucasia, and it was performed in the languages of those areas. Local Jadids realized the advantages of the medium and sought to use it for their own goals. Mahmud Khoja Behbudi wrote The Parricide, the first play to be set in Central Asia, as early as 1911, but difficulties with the censor delayed its publication until 1913 and its performance until 1914. When it did first play, in Samarqand on 15 January 1914, it was an instant success.[43] The group that performed it, composed of seven Central Asians, a Tatar, and an Azerbaijani, traveled to Kokand,

Tashkent, and Katta Qorghhan in the next few weeks.[44] By early September, The Parricide had been performed fifteen times by different groups in Turkestan, often without the permission of the author.[45] The next three years saw intense activity in local theater.[46] Central Asian Jadids favored plays that dealt specifically with local issues over those translated from Tatar or Azerbaijani, and therefore many of them turned playwright and produced a number of plays addressing questions of purely Central Asian interest.[47] Samarqand was the greatest center of this activity where Behbudi's disciples Haji Muin b. Shukrullah and Nusratullah b. Qudratullah produced a number of scripts. In addition, Hamza in Kokand, Awlani in Tashkent, and Abdullah Badri in Bukhara wrote numerous plays in this period, several of which were never published.[48] Theatrical performances, often in the form of artistic soirees, became commonplace even in smaller towns like Osh, Namangan, and Katta Qorghhan. This activity was paralleled by visits from Azerbaijani and Tatar troupes, who also began to perform local plays. Moreover, a number of Tatar and Transcaucasian plays were translated into local Turkic and sometimes adapted to a Central Asian setting.[49] Local amateur theater groups began to form immediately after the first performance of The Parricide. The original cast of the play, which rehearsed at Behbudi's house in Samarqand, coalesced into a troupe and began touring Turkestan. Behbudi had apparently directed the troupe in the beginning, but later the position passed to the Azerbaijani director Ali Asghar Askarov.[50] Other amateur groups formed in Tashkent and Kokand as well as in smaller towns. Hamza was at the center of one such group in Kokand, which performed plays written or translated by Hamza himself. The first [44] Mamadzhan Rakhmanov, Uzbekskii teatr s drevneishikh vremen do 1917 goda (Tashkent, 1968), 280. [45] Mahmud Khoja [Behbudi], "Padarkush wajhidan," Ayina, 13 September 1914, 1130. [46] For an overview, see A. Samoilovich, "Dramaticheskaia literatura sartov," Vestnik Imparatorskogo Obshchestva Vostokovedemia, 1916, no. 5, 72-84; Edward Allworth, "The Beginnings of the Modern Turkestanian Theater," Slavic Review 23 (1964): 676-687; Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks (Stanford, 1990), 147-152. [47] See, for instance, Khalmuhammad Akhundi, "Namangandan maktub," Ayina, 16 May 1915, 399. Local reviews and reports of theatrical performances in Ayina also expressed disapproval of Tatar actors for various reasons: "Samarqanda tiyatir," Ayina, 1 February 1914, 263; "Katta Qorghanda tiyatir," Ayina, 29 March 1914, 349.
Buzruk Salihov (Ozbek teatr, 82-84) lists seventeen locally written plays that were staged before February 1917. In addition, another twenty-four plays of Tatar, Transcaucasian, and Ottoman origin had been staged by that time.

Samoilovich, "Dramaticheskaia literatura," 73.

Rakhmanov, Uzbekskii teatr, 280.

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engagement of the group was Hamza's Zaharli hayat (A Poisoned Life), performed in October 1915. In Tashkent, a group formed around Awlani, who had been involved in local Tatar theater since at least 1909. In 1916, the group was formalized as the Turan Amateur Dramatic Society, with the mission to "develop the love of serious drama among the population . . . [and] to stage spectacles for the people, [in order to] provide healthy diversions to them." In Bukhara, dramatic activity remained in the hands of local Tatars, who were, however, allowed to stage their plays in old Bukhara.

In founding a modern theater in Central Asia, the Jadids sought to distance it from the long tradition of folk theater known as maskharabazlik. Satire was the stock in trade of this theater, and maskharas could poke brutal fun at various aspects of society, including the khans and Islam itself. Yet, in preconquest Central Asia, the whole enterprise was located beyond the pale of adab (adabdan kharîj) and hence denied any moral authority. Moreover, the maskharas' use of music was always susceptible to attack by the ulama on Islamic grounds, and their bodily movements contravened the rules of proper deportment conveyed by the maktab. To be a maskhara was the opposite of being a cultured individual; for cultured individuals to take on the activities of the maskharas was scandalous. The Jadids sought to make theater respectable through an appeal to the nation and the needs of the age. For Behbudi, for instance, "theater is a place for preaching and exhortation [majlis-i wa'z-u nasihat]" for society and in its lofty purpose had nothing in common with the crude craft of the maskharas. The Jadids drew inspiration from the modern, print-based theater of Europe, which had also been adopted by other Muslim communities of the Russian empire. Indeed, the print antecedents of Jadid theater need to be emphasized. Unlike the maskharas, the Jadids transmitted their theatrical work in print. The Jadids published the transcripts of many of their plays, partly in the hope that all productions of the same play would convey a uniform message. In conveying its message orally, Jadid theater still aspired to the uniformity made possible by print.

Theater was immediately put to philanthropic use. The play itself spread the message while the performance was used to raise money for

[51] Ibid., 290.
[53] See Rakhmanov, Uzbekskii teatr, 195-198, for examples.
[54] Behbudi, "Tiyatir, musiqi, she'r," Ayina, 18 December 1914, 111-114.
other Jadid causes. Since all the actors were amateurs, usually Jadid activists, there were no performance fees and a large percentage of the revenue could be used for other purposes. In the three years of its existence, Jadid theater was staged to benefit reading rooms, new-method schools, a Muslim field hospital on the war front, and wounded Muslim soldiers. Thus, the first ever performance of The Parricide in Samarqand raised 329.69 rubles for the city's Muslim Reading Room. This figure represented the entire net income from the evening after expenses of 170 rubles had been paid.[55] A performance of the same play in Khujand raised 590 rubles for the Red Crescent in January 1915,[56] and a performance of The Feast in Samarqand the previous December raised 245 rubles, a quarter of which was donated to the war wounded and the rest to new-method schools in the area.[57] The popularity of theater led to the emergence of cultural soirees that combined cultural, economic, and political functions in one event. A soiree typically included at least one play in addition to music and a program of songs. The Tatar singer and Jadid activist Kamil ul-Mutigi Tuhfatullin toured Central Asia at least twice between 1913 and 1915, giving concerts of Tatar music, including poems by such prominent Tatar Jadids as Abdullah Tuqay set to music.

New Forms of Sociability

The activity surrounding the theater was crucial in forming a public that came together under new rules to discuss issues concerning society. It eschewed overtly political matters, but it redraw the boundaries of debate about cultural and social issues. Similarly, informal discussion circles remained the primary institutional form of Jadidism in Turkestan. (The situation was different in Bukhara, where official hostility drove the Jadids into secret societies.) The Central Asian tradition of gap, circles that brought together men of various crafts or neighborhoods for weekly or monthly gatherings of mutual hospitality, was appropriated for new aims by the Jadids. Munawwar Qari was reported by the tsarist police to be leader of one of the largest gaps in Tashkent.[58] But for many Jadids such "modern" gaps were merely the beginning. For the Jadids, the key to progress and development lay in organized effort. Hamza saw all associational endeavors, even commercial ones, as an expression of unity. When he wrote to prospective investors in 1914, he expressed this hope: "Maybe in this way our unity will develop, and the rule of joint organization [shirkat qanuni] will take root among the Muslims of Ferghana and Turkestan, and soon all our affairs, currently decaying, will again turn to progress and development."[59] The bookstores and publishing ventures described above were the most successful in this regard, and they do show a process of greater institutionalization throughout the decade preceding 1917. These ventures were commercial, to be sure, but by their nature they also served as an institutional basis for

[57] Ayina, 30 December 1914, 135-137.
[58] GARF, f. 102, op. 244 (1914), d. 74, ch. 84B, l. 71.
cultural reform. The Jadids, though, invested their highest hopes in benevolent societies, such as those which had flourished among the Tatars since the 1890s. As forms of institutionalized philanthropy geared to social (rather than individual) goals, such societies neatly tied together the various strands of Jadid reform in an institutional framework. The issue of establishing a benevolent society in Turkestan was raised in 1906 in the general atmosphere of enthusiasm,[60] but nothing came of it until 1909, when the Imdadiya (Aid) society was formally established with Munawwar Qari and Abdullah Awlani, who had collaborated on the newspaper Shuhrat the previous year, among its founders. The society defined its aim as "the improvement of the moral and material position of needy persons of the Mohammedan faith in the Syr Darya oblast," through opening shelters for the poor, supporting hospitals, and helping students.[61] The educational goals were broadened in 1913 to include the opening of schools and reading rooms and the establishment of scholarships.[62] The society secured the financial help of Said Karim-bay (who also served as chair for a year), and it lasted until the revolution. It acquired a niche for itself in the public life of Muslim Tashkent without ever making the kind of difference its founders had hoped for. Membership dues (a modest six rubles) were the main source of revenue, although the advent of theater provided another. Still, the total expenditure for 1914 stood at only 1,975.20 rubles, roughly one-third of which went to students in various kinds of schools.[63]

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Imdadiya remained the only benevolent society to operate among the native population of Turkestan, although numerous such societies existed among the European and Tatar communities in various cities. Other attempts at organized philanthropy also had limited success. Thirteen activists led by Behbudi founded a "Muslim reading room" (qiraatkhana wa mutaliakhana islamiyasi [sic]) in Samarqand in 1908. It began with 125 subscriptions, but by 1912, only seven members remained and daily attendance averaged barely ten persons a day.[64] In 1912, Abdullah Awlani opened the Turan reading room in Tashkent, which received periodicals from all over the Muslim world, most of them obtained gratis from their publishers. Nevertheless, financial worries never left it, and it seems to have folded in early 1917.[65]

A Public Sphere
Numerous stalled initiatives to publish newspapers and a small share of the publishing market do not seem to indicate huge success for Jadid reform. However, two points should be kept in mind. The Jadid presence in the publishing field increased rapidly in the years after 1912, both in terms of titles published and publishing ventures launched, and modern theater, perhaps the most successful medium of Jadid reform, began in 1914 and was hugely successful in
the following years. This in spite of an economic slump that hit Turkestan about that time and worsened at the onset of the world war, with its inflation and often crippling paper shortages. The collapse of the periodicals launched in 1913 and 1914 was at least partly due to this slump, since even the officially bankrolled TWG was feeling the pinch; its frequency had been reduced in 1916, and there was talk in early 1917 of cutting it back even further.[66] Second, the lack of success of local publishing (especially of the periodical press) was to some extent compensated for by the appearance of Turkic-language newspapers from other parts of the Russian empire. Terjüman had always been popular; after 1905, it was joined by the very vibrant periodical press that emerged among the Volga Tatars. Indeed, the success

[64] Behbudi, "Hisabi-atchut," TWG, 4 March 1910; Behbudi, "Qiraatkhana wa mutaliakhana islamiyasi babinda mukhtasir bayannama," Samarqand, 11 June 1913; Ayina, 7 December 1913, 144.


[66] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 8, d. 528, l. 5.

of Tatar newspapers, much better produced and often cheaper than their local counterparts, worked to the disadvantage of Central Asian press by encroaching upon an already small market.[67]

Yet, for all these difficulties, print had subtly transformed the manner in which culture was produced and reproduced in Central Asia. As in early modern Europe, print helped sever the link between intellectual production and courtly patronage.[68] It also redefined the boundaries of debate. Beginning with the informational pieces in the TWG, it had led to the creation of a public in which entree was gained by the ability to read (or hear) the printed word. Moreover, the new ubiquity of the written word carried in it seeds of a profound change in cultural attitudes toward knowledge and its place in society. The scarcity of the written word in the scribal age endowed it with a sacral aura. Writing itself was the object of reverence and the mnemonic, ritual, and devotional uses of the written word overshadowed its more mundane documentary functions. Further, in the tradition of Islamic learning entrenched in the madrasas of Central Asia, access to the written word was mediated by authoritative, face-to-face interaction with a recognized master. The ubiquity of print undermined these relations by making the written word more accessible and tended to render the mediation of the learned unnecessary, thereby producing two interrelated results.

On the one hand, print allowed the Jadids to challenge the monopoly of the traditionally learned over authoritative discourse. In their writings, the Jadids tended to address a public composed of all those who could read. The use of print allowed the Jadids to go beyond the concerns of intellectual pedigree and patronage that provided the framework for literary production in the manuscript age. The Jadid project involved nothing less than the redefinition of the social order, for when Behbudi claimed that newspapers were spiritual
leaders of society, or that the theater was a "house of admonition" (ibratkhana) where society could take stock of its ills,[69] he was directly challenging the authority of the traditional cultural elite. The knowledge of the ulama was now neither necessary, nor sufficient to cure society's ills. Similarly, the new prose literature, with its critical posture, independent of the constraints of adab, was crucial to the Jadids' attempt to carve out a discursive space


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for themselves in their society. The printed word redefined the boundaries of the public space within which debate was carried out. The creation of a print-based public space led to a new cultural politics in Central Asia. The ubiquity of print also contributed to a certain desacralization of writing itself. Combined with the spread of functional literacy, the ubiquity of print tended to shift the focus of learning from the master to the text, the secrets of which were now available to all who could read. Newspapers and printed forms further tended to encourage quotidian uses of writing. The Jadids' denigration of the medieval commentaries and glosses used in the madrasa, and their call for a "return" to the textual sources of Islam were rooted in this new attitude toward writing. The market-oriented print trade also led to the commodification of the written word: unlike manuscripts, printed books had to be sold, much like any other commodity. Publishers were not patrons, and although sometimes putting a godly book in print was seen as a pious act, few publishers could afford to do so regularly. This commodification further contributed to the desacralization of writing in the age of print. Both these phenomena were highly subversive of the authority of the ulama. Access to printing allowed the Jadids to reconfigure cultural debate in their society and to lay the foundations for a broad-based movement of cultural reform beyond the control of the older cultural elite.

The Mirror of Admonition

The following assessment by Munawwar Qari, published in Khurshid, perhaps the most outspoken of the newspapers of 1906-1908, is fairly typical of Jadid thought:

[A]ll our acts and actions, our ways, our words, our maktabs and madrasas and methods of teaching, and our morals are in decay.... If we continue in this way for another five or ten years, we are in danger of being dispersed and effaced under the oppression of developed nations [mutaraqqi millatlar].... O coreligionists, o compatriots! Let's be just and compare our situation with that of other, advanced nations; ... let's secure the future of our coming generations [awladimiz uchun ham fa'idalik yollar achib] and save them from becoming slaves and servants of others. The Europeans, taking advantage of our negligence and ignorance, took our government from our hands and are gradually taking over our crafts and trades. If we do not quickly make an effort to reform our affairs in order to safeguard ourselves, our nation, and our
children, our future will be extremely difficult.
Reform begins with a rapid start in cultivating sciences conforming to our times [zamanagha muivafiq ulum-u funun ]. Becoming acquainted with the

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sciences of the [present] time depends upon the reform of our schools and our methods of teaching.[70] Much about Central Asia and its culture had to be reformed and recast if the challenge were to be met properly; continuation in the old ways could lead to the extinction of the community. The Jadids saw as their mission the awakening of their nation (millat ) from the sleep of ignorance through combining exhortation and self-criticism with warnings of dire consequences if the call were not heard. Faith in the power of knowledge (and education) to ameliorate the situation was central to the Jadid project, and I will examine it in greater detail in the Chapter 5. Suffice it to note here the connection between the decay in morals and ignorance as well as the intimation of mortal danger if society does nor change its ways. The reverse of progress was decay. The Jadids espied not just stagnation but decline in their society. If knowledge needed proper social organization in order to flourish, the Jadids saw only disorder and chaos around them. Earlier Muslims had cultivated knowledge, but succeeding generations, through their heedlessness, had forgotten even the names of their forebears. Jadid writers often evoked the names of Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Farabi, al-Bukhari, and Ulugh Bek as exemplars of a previous age of learning that had been forgotten. The Bukharan writer Mirza Siraj, surveying the decline around him, asked, "If the Minar-i Kalan [the thirteenth-century tower that is Bukhara's most imposing structure] were to fall down today, would we be able to rebuild it?"[71]

Knowledge for the Jadids was universal, not culturally specific. Comparisons with "developed" nations were therefore not just permissible but mandatory, and the Jadids constantly made them. The central rhetorical tool for the Jadids was ibrat , seeking admonition or heeding laudable example. The Jadids saw themselves as showing their society the mirror of admonition so that society could reform itself. Much of what the Jadids wrote about other societies (or their own) stemmed from this rhetorical purpose. Their accounts of "developed" countries were entirely positive. Behbudi in particular was fond of publishing statistics showing numbers of newspapers, theaters, schools, or expenditures

[70] "Islah ne demakdadur," Khurshid , 28 September 1906. This message, in its broad outline as well as in its details, was repeated time and time again in the following decade; see, e.g., Jalal, "Che bayad Kard?" Bukhara-yi Sharif , 14 March 1912; Behbudi, "Ihtiyaj-i Millat," Samarqand , 12 July 1913; Haji Muin b. Shukrullah, Eski maktab, yangi maktab (Samarqand, 1916), 27-28.
on education in various countries of the world. Newspapers wrote of technological progress, philanthropy, and collective effort in other countries, all the while exhorting their readers to heed the call and follow the example. Even when dealing with questions of morality, Europe presented a positive image. This is worth noting, since all too often scholarly literature on Muslim perceptions of Europe focuses on criticism of the loose morality of Europeans. There is virtually no condemnation of European morals in the writings of the Jadids of Central Asia. An article on "Alcoholism among the French," for instance, described not the moral decrepitude of Christian (or capitalist) society but efforts at countering alcoholism that the Muslims of Central Asia might emulate.[72] And when they described travels abroad, they painted a uniformly positive picture.

In 1902, Mirza Siraj Rahim, the son of a wealthy Bukharan merchant, embarked on a six-month visit that took him through Russia to Istanbul and then to all the major capitals of Europe. Almost immediately upon his return, he left again for India, Afghanistan, and Iran, where he ended up staying for many years. Returning to Bukhara in 1909, he became prominent in local reform circles, editing Bukhara's first Turkic newspaper in 1912, and contributing to periodicals in Turkestan, Iran, and Istanbul until his premature death in 1914.[73] In 1911, he published an account of his travels of the previous decade that provided the first extensive Central Asian portrayal of the outside world to the local audience. Mirza Siraj takes great pleasure in describing the wonders of Europe to his readers, with the focus squarely on progress, order, and material achievement. He traveled first class across Europe. There is no mention of any difficulties he experienced or any sense of alienation in being in a foreign land. In his bourgeois cosmopolitanism there is not a trace of the native fanaticism that frightened Russian administrators. Upon arriving in a city, he would hire a cab to be driven around the sites before settling down to a round of visits that included museums, schools, universities, and theaters. (Only in London did he visit a factory.) In Vienna, he provides a detailed description of the etiquette involved in a visit to the theater. In Berlin we get copious detail about his hotel, which was "as good as, or rather, better than the palaces of the monarchs of Asia." He was especially fond of Paris ("Whoever comes into this world and does not [72] Basit Khan Zahid Khan oghli, "Firansuzlarda ichkulik," Khurshid , 12 November 1906.
[73] See his obituary in Ayina , 11 January 1914, 291-292.

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see Paris might as well not be born"), with whose boulevards and cafes he fell in love.[74] The descriptions are repetitive and perhaps superficial, but they always serve to remind the reader of the achievements of developed states. The source of this progress was not far to seek. "The instruments of progress and improvement [taraqqi wa tarbiyat ] that I saw in the cities of Germany are also present in villages and towns in proportion to their size. Every village has a complete elementary school, an organized secondary school, a hospital, a
theater, a hotel, and a recreational park.... The expenses of these are the responsibility of the constitutional state of Germany."[75] In Vienna, "every person, big or small, man or woman, reads the newspaper. Every day, several newspapers are printed in the presses of this city. An idle, illiterate person is never to be found."[76] The comparison, invariably invidious, with Central Asia, is always implicit, and occasionally bursts out in impassioned prose.

I did not see in Europe a single person whose clothes were old or torn, not one building in ruins, nor a street that was unpaved.... But in our country, our poor merchants and shopkeepers, in their cells and shops dark with dust and [surrounded by] crowds of beggars, cannot find a minute to breathe properly.... Pity on us, pity on us. All the time I toured Paris, [my] beloved homeland was constantly in my mind, and all the time tears flowed from my eyes.[77]

Leaving Paris for the last time, he felt very sad until he reminded himself, "No matter what, I am going to my country and the lands of Islam."

Even if it is bad, it is our homeland.... One should not despair of one's homeland, and one should not exile its love from the heart. The fault is not with our country, it is with its children for they are ignoble and do not know the rights of their mother. Whatever there is comes from the homeland, and its love has been decreed by the Pride of the Universe to be a pillar of the faith: "hubb ulwatan min al-iman " [love of the homeland is part of faith]. We do not know the worth of our land, and do not attempt to work for its prosperity and improvement. The fault does not lie in our country, but in ourselves.[78]

For Behbudi, who provides us the other Jadid view of the world beyond, this didactic purpose is firmly foregrounded. Behbudi traveled in the Ottoman empire in 1914 and described his impressions in detail in Ayina . Again we get detailed descriptions of the order and cleanliness of

[74] Mirza Sirajiddin Haji Mirza 'Abdurrauf, Safarnama-yi Tuhaf-I Bukhara , ed. M. Asadiyan (Tehran, 1992), 107-109, 113, 121. This book was originally published as Tuhaf-I ahl-I Bukara (Kagan, 1911), but I have been unable to locate a copy of the original.
[75] Ibid., 115.
[76] Ibid., 106-107.
[77] Ibid., 133-135.
[78] Ibid., 149.

Russian cities (in Transcaucasia) and the industry and effort of Europeans, but every such description is turned around to a criticism of the present state of the Muslim world. The reader is constantly reminded of the backwardness and ignorance of Muslims and of the price they are paying for it. In Rostov, the 5,000 Muslims do not have their own school. In Edirne, all the trade is in the hands of non-Muslims while the Turks only govern; he finds the same situation in Palestine, where all the shops were owned by Jews. All grocery stores sell wine, which is gladly imbibed by the local Arabs who do not go to the rusdiye schools opened by the state because they consider them haram (forbidden).[79] Similarly,
he is appalled to find a brothel overlooking a cemetery in Jaffa but disagrees with his interlocutors, who place the blame on foreign consuls and their Jewish or Christian protégés; the blame must rest squarely with the Muslims and their ignorance.[80] Pilgrims and tourists come from afar to visit the Holy Land, all equipped with guide books describing the sights in detail. Muslim pilgrims are the exception. No guide books exist in any Muslim language, and Behbudi notes that he was one of only three Muslims visiting the sights. Even when Behbudi is delighted at the number of wealthy Muslims in Baku, he rues the fact that they do not support the city's newspapers sufficiently. Behbudi rhapsodizes over the glory of the Selimiye mosque in Edirne and the Umayyad mosque in Damascus as examples of the effort and zeal of early Muslims and their support for Islam. The contrast with his contemporaries could not be more starkly drawn. Standing amidst the ruins of the recent war in Edirne, he declares them to be "part of the ruins of ignorance and disorder [ilmsizlik wa idarasizlik ]."[81] Travelogues and foreign Muslims had other rhetorical uses, too. Fit-rat used a fictional Indian Muslim traveler to present his desiderata of reform in Bukhara. The Tales of an Indian Traveler was published in Persian in Istanbul but was freely available in Turkestan (although the amir of Bukhara attempted to ban it from his domain). While some of the criticism in it pertains specifically to Bukhara, the tract became a favorite of the Jadids of all Central Asia and Behbudi published a Russian translation in Turkestan.[82]


The Traveler arrives at the city gates to find them closed for the night. While he is arguing with the gatekeeper, carriages containing Armenians and Jews are allowed into the city without any questions being asked. Then the doors open again, an Armenian emerges and calls out to someone. His dog, accidentally left behind, appears and is admitted to the city while Muslim travelers wait outside for dawn. The next morning, the Traveler finally enters the city and takes a carriage to an inn in the city but immediately runs into a traffic jam in the narrow streets, as oncoming carriages refuse to yield out of honor ('ar ). As fighting erupts, the Traveler asks his driver, "Brother, aren't there the ruler's men around to settle this?"
"What do the ruler's men have to do with this?" comes the reply. The affair is settled only after a physical confrontation, but the theme of chaos and disorder is firmly established in the narrative, as is its connection with the state's incompetence and dereliction of duty. Both are repeated continuously throughout the narrative. Later, when the Traveler visits the town of Qarshi, he has the following exchange with a master weaver:

"Really, the people of Qarshi are very skilled in weaving alacha [the Traveler said]. Thanks to this noble skill they reap a great deal of profit these days. But what is your opinion of the future of this craft?"

The owner of the workshop did not understand my question and looked at me in surprise. I explained my question further. "Will the affairs of the craftsmen of Qarshi be in the same healthy state ten or twelve years from now or not?"

The master understood me this time, but since such a question had not even occurred to him until now, was surprised again, and said nothing. I added, "Esteemed master, Europeans, when they set their hands on something, keep their eyes on how it will develop over ten, twenty, even a hundred or two hundred years. You people of Qarshi are highly skilled, but do you not think of the future of this trade?"

Master: "Our trade was good a few years ago. Now too it's not bad. But only God knows its future."

I: "True, but have you done anything [to ensure] the development of your trade over the next ten years?"

Planning and foresight were essential to progress and modernity, and they were lacking in Central Asia. For Fitrat, they constituted an essential duty of the state, for the Traveler then proceeds to outline an economic policy that Bukhara should follow in order to secure its prosperity.

The theme of sanitation and public health also figures prominently in the Indian Traveler's account. He finds Bukhara unhygienic and employs the discourse of public health to criticize it. In the middle of the trip, he falls ill and finding that none of the practitioners of Bukharan medicine can explain his illness to him, refuses to be treated by them and insists of calling a Russian doctor. Modern medicine cures him, of course, and he recounts in detail his conversation with the Russian doctor on sanitation, public health, and medical education.

The superiority of modern medicine over its traditional Central Asian counterpart, demonstrated by experience, had become an arena of contestation early on. We will remember Governor-General Dukhovskoi's suggestion of harnessing medical science to the task of overcoming native fanaticism. But while individual patients cured by modern medicine were doubtless impressed, public health, a major concern of officialdom, encountered many difficulties as the local population resented the extension of state power into newer domains that such initiatives represented. The most extreme case were the so-called cholera riots in Tashkent in 1892, when attempts by the authorities to regulate
burials during an epidemic led to the most serious outbreak of violence in Tashkent of the tsarist period.[84] The Jadids also embraced this discourse of public health, while criticizing traditional medicine. As a contributor to Ayina wrote, "Our tabibs are ignorant of the science of medicine and have no skills other than that of worsening the disease and sending off the patient to the other world speedily."[85]

Ignorance led to corruption of Islam itself. The Indian Traveler also visits the tomb of Baha'uddin Naqshband on the outskirts of Bukhara and is dismayed at what he sees there. Pilgrims kissed sacred relics such as rams' horns and a flagpole bearing the mazar's banner and prayed to


[84] This episode remains little studied. The last full-length treatment of the subject was V. Zykin, Vosstanie v Tashkente v 1892 g. (Tashkent, 1934).


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the buried saint. The Traveler considers this idolatry, and asks, "Is it possible that you consider others 'infidels' for idolatry and worshipping the cross, and but worship flagpoles in mazar, ask Baha'uddin about your needs, and yet consider yourself Muslims?"[86] Criticism of customary practices for being not "truly Islamic" and hence connected to ignorance was a common feature of Jadid discourse.

Matters of Survival

The sense of impending doom evoked by Munawwar Qari was widely shared by the Jadids, who had to do no more than read their newspapers, which they all did diligently, to be reminded of this Darwinian fact. The middle of the first decade of this century, when the first Jadid newspapers appeared, was a time of great optimism in the wake of revolution in Russia (as well as in Iran), and the hope of a liberal constitutional regime in Russia was very much alive. But the situation changed rapidly. Political life in Russia chilled after 1907, while the news from the Muslim world was uniformly bad. Morocco's rapid subjugation to France and Spain coincided with the virtual disintegration of Iran, but it was the numerous wars faced by the Ottoman empire in the period after the Young Turk revolution of 1908 that shaped a sense of crisis among the Jadids of Central Asia (as indeed among Muslim intellectuals the world over). The wars were covered extensively in the Muslim press of Russia, including the TWG, and brought to the Jadids a certain sense of urgency. Haji Muin cited the example of recent territorial losses suffered by the Ottoman empire and Morocco to bring home the same point: "With the help of the development of science and technology [ilm-u fan], Europeans can keep an eye on the affairs of all kinds of people in the world. The world has become a struggle for life in which every powerful thing destroys the powerless."[87] To stay in the game, every nation had to acquire the means necessary for survival, of which knowledge was the most basic. "No nation can survive in the battleground of life without knowledge," wrote a contributor to Ayina. "Any such nation, whether master [hakim] or subject [mahkum], will succumb to other nations who possess industry and skills .... If
subject nations wish to survive without losing their religion and nationhood [din wa milliyat], they must  

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acquire wealth."[88] Fitrat once wrote that a nation lacking resolve and determination had no right to exist.[89] The responsibility for survival therefore lay with the nation itself.  
Progress and enlightenment were sources of both power and danger. Jadid authors constantly pointed to Jews and Armenians as both sources of danger and models for emulation. On the steamer from Odessa to Istanbul, Behbudi had a long conversation with a Jew bound for Palestine. "How are the new cities around Jerusalem?" I asked. 'Praise the Lord, they progress by the day,' he said. 'Doctor Herzl founded these cities with money collected from people with great effort .... Now there is a Jewish bank there, teachers' colleges, gymnasiias, etc. Now at the invitation of the Doctor we are learning the old Jewish tongue (Hebrew). I did not know anything other than Russian. But I studied Hebrew two hours a week for a year and now I can speak, read, and write it.'... And we study Arabic for twenty years and still cannot speak or write it!'"[90] Jews and Armenians, small stateless communities, even more than the powerful imperial nations of Europe, proved to the Jadids the truth of their general assertion that knowledge was the key to progress.[91] At the same time, they were the perfect example of a Darwinian world in which survival was assured only by disciplined effort.  
Ignorance could be fatal. Death constantly stalks Jadid literature. In Behbudi's The Parricide, a rich merchant refuses to send his son to school; the latter, unable to tell right from wrong, falls in with bad company. One night, in need of money to pay for a prostitute, the group attempts to break into the merchant's house and ends up killing the merchant.[92] In Abdullah Qadiri's The Unfortunate Groom, an impecunious young man forced to conform to custom and celebrate his wedding with an expensive feast (toy), goes bankrupt and commits suicide along with his wife.[93] In Hamza's A Poisoned Life, a young woman married off by  
[91] This is worth noting, for the Jadids' views on this question have usually been cited in the Soviet literature (and occasionally m non-Soviet works as well) as examples of their national chauvinism and even anti-Semitism; see, e.g., Buzruk Salihof, Özbek adabijatida mrllätcilik korunislari (Tashkent, 1935), 11-12; Z. Radzhabov, Iz istorn obshchestvenno-politicheskot mysli Tadzhikskogo naroda vo vtoroi polovine XIX i v nachale XX vv . (Stalinabad, 1957), 401-402.  
[92] Behbudi, Padarkush (Samarqand, 1913).

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her ignorant parents to a wicked old ishan, takes her life and is followed to
the other world by her erstwhile suitor, a young man of modern learning and good
intentions.[94] In Cholpon's Doctor Muhammadyar, murder takes place almost at
random, the result of the ignorance that reigns in Central Asian society.[95]
(Occasionally the wages of ignorance are other than death. In Qadiri's The
Pederast, the protagonist murders several rivals and is sent off to Siberia as
a result.[96] ) And Ajzi painted a portrait of his city in the future, when
splendid prosperity reigns over it but all its madrasas have been turned into
restaurants and its mosques replaced by churches; there are no Muslims left.[97]

Public Morality
The road to death and destruction passed through immorality, and the Jadids saw
plenty of evidence of that in their society. Russian rule had brought with it
legal prostitution and the sale of alcohol, both of which were quite popular in
Turkestan. We read of a brothel in Samarqand with "nearly 400 Turkestani,
Bukharan, Tatar, and Russian prostitutes," without any indication that it was in
at all unusual.[98] Even more troubling to the Jadids, however, was the
widespread practice of dancing boys (bachcha, jawan, besaqqal) who, dressed as
women, figured in evenings of entertainment (bazm, ma'raka) and who were often
also prostituted. This form of pederasty was a widespread practice (and perhaps
had become more widespread under Russian rule).
For the Jadids, the practice was a sign of the worst depths of degradation to
which Central Asia had sunk. Fitrat's Indian traveler is appalled when he
witnesses pederasty at the tomb of Baha'uddin Naqshband:

Woe to me! Next to this noble paradise were open the doors to hell. Next to
these sacred tombs had arisen the vileness of the tribe of Lot! Among the tea
stalls people sat in circles of five or ten; in the center of each circle was
a young boy who with innocence and modesty read several verses from memory.
All those around him pressed up against him, staring at the poor child with
eyes full of lust, just like the devil!!! This terrible and impious spectacle
made my whole being shiver .... I said to myself, "O Muhammad! ... Rise! O
educator, take a look at the actions of these savages! O reformer of people!

[94] Hamza Hakimzada, Zaharh hayot (1916), in Tola asarlar toplami, ed. N.
[95] The story was serialized in ST in 1914; cf. Cholpon, "Dokhtur Muhammadyor",
[97] Sayyid Ahmad Siddiqi [Ajzi], Tarjima-yi mir'at-i ibrat (Samarqand, 1914),

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Either find a way of reforming them, or else show them a place under the earth, like the people of Lot! Don't let the filthy existence of these shameless people harm the glory of the Qur'an.[99]

For Munawwar Qari, "Forbidden acts such as drinking, gambling, pederasty, feasting, turning men into women and women into men' [erkekni khatun qilmaq wa khatunni erkek qilmaq ], adultery, backbiting" were the reason why "our lands were captured and we were reviled and demeaned [khwar-u zalil bolduk ]."[100]

Many of these practices came together in the often extravagant feasts (toys) celebrating circumcisions, weddings, and deaths that were an integral part of Central Asian life. They were defended, even by ulama, as worthy ancestral traditions. By the turn of the century, they had become a means for the newly rich to celebrate their wealth and to assert their social status. The more extravagant feasts lasted several days, with guests (often numbering in the hundreds) arriving from all over Central Asia; the central feature was a party featuring alcohol and dancing boys. The Andijan millionaire Mir Kamil-bay hosted a toy in 1911 that lasted twenty-five days; guests came from all over Turkestan, and charity and food were provided for "widows and travelers" throughout this period. The awestruck report in TWG ("a royal feast neither heard, nor seen, nor known to people of previous generations") estimated the total expenditure to have been 25,000 rubles.[101] The Jadids took a dim view of such practices, which they saw as a waste (israf) of resources that should better be spent for the public good, and especially after a wave of bankruptcies during the economic slump of 1913, as a sign of ignorance leading to destruction. Jadid authors expressed opposition to toys in newspapers and school textbooks, much of which was encapsulated in the 1914 play The Feast by Behbudi's disciples Haji Muin and Nusratullah b. Qudratullah.

The play depicts the dire consequences of ignorance and wastefulness. A rich merchant plans to celebrate his son's circumcision with a toy, brushing aside exhortations against wastefulness and other acts "forbidden by the shariat." Vanity and selfishness govern his actions ("If you give a huge feast, your wealth will be known and you will be fa-

[100] Munawwar Qari, ibn Abdurrashid Khan, untitled article, Taraqqi —Orta Azyaning umr guzarlighi . 7 March 1906.
[101] TWG , 28 April 1911.
The cause of moral corruption was ignorance, and knowledge was the only true guarantee of good morals and piety. "Schools are blessed places built for our good," a textbook informed pupils. "Mosques are also extremely sacred places built for Muslims to worship in. If there were no schools in the world, who would enter a mosque and worship there?"

It was a crisis not because the morals of individuals were at stake or because sin was widespread but because immoral acts led to dereliction of duty to the community, which had come to be the locus of Jadid reform. A correspondent for Shuhrat calculated that at a recent Feast of the Sacrifice (Id-i qurban), Muslims of Tashkent spent 100,000 rubles on alcohol and prostitutes. "If this is not progress, what is?" the writer asked. "But what kind of money was this? This was money enough to educate millions of children, to bring them from bestiality to humanity, to produce thousands of servants of the nation [millat khadimi]."

Narcotic addicts, lampooned in a play by Haji Muin, were similarly immoral not so much because Islamic law forbade the use of narcotics but because they wasted time, money, and human resources.

The Politics of Admonition

Locating morality in the public realm provided a new vision of the rights and responsibilities of different groups in society. In showing the mirror of admonition to society, the Jadids asserted a claim to cultural and moral leadership in it. Their knowledge of the path to a better future qualified them to lead the society. This was, of course, profoundly subversive to the authority of the established elites in society, who derived their authority from their mastery of the past and their role in the compromises with Russian authorities. What ensued as a result of the emergence of a Jadid voice in society was a struggle for leadership in which the fundamental stakes were cultural. The struggle was over the definition of Central Asian Muslim culture: How was it to be defined and by whom? It was not simply a struggle for cultural capital; the Jadids' challenge put the very definition of this capital in question. This politics was every bit as real, and more important, than the politics entrenched in formal institutions of state.
The Jadids commonly asserted that their society rested on the twin pillars of the wealthy (aghniya) and the learned (ulama), for whom they professed great respect if they did their duty to society. But they also bore the blame when problems arose. "The number of those imprisoned in the mire of pederasty, alcohol, and gambling has increased recently," wrote a concerned Ayina reader from Awliya Ata, "because our leaders [ulugh wa kattalarimiz] and our qazis have done nothing to counter these ills."[106] As we saw, the wealthy were open to criticism for wasting their wealth on extravagant feasts rather than using it to benefit the nation. The ulama fared no better. None of the portraits of ulama in Jadid literature is particularly flattering. In The Feast, the neighborhood imam makes an attempt to dissuade the merchant from wasting his money on the feast by arguing that such acts are forbidden by the shariat, but quickly backs down when someone makes a pointed reference to his livelihood depending on the goodwill of the bay.[107] Haji Muin's protagonist in his play, The Oppressed Woman, a new-method teacher, makes the following speech:

In the old days, the common people were subservient [tabi'] to the ulama, but unfortunately now the ulama are subservient to the people and have become flatterers. For this reason, a number of forbidden things such as pederasty, drinking, and ill treatment of [multiple] wives are growing daily. ....

[Aside:] In this respect, the fault lies with our ulama, not the people. It is because of this that they say, "fasad ul-alim fasad ul-alam [The corruption of the learned is the corruption of the world]."... Ah! O God, grant our ulama justice and discernment! [108]

Ulama hostile to reform were, for the Jadids, ignorant of Islam, venal, weak-willed, and concerned only with their own material well being. This was especially the case with criticisms of Bukhara. Fitrat's Indian Traveler found it offensive that the ulama in Bukhara charged high fees for affixing their seals and signatures on documents. Shariat was for sale in Bukhara. The Traveler puts the matter in historical perspective for a Bukharan interlocutor:

The activities of your self-proclaimed ulama are the reason for the extinction of your nation. But there's no need m grieve, brother, since your ulama aren't the only ones like this. The fact is, ulama all over the Muslim world in the last three centuries have committed similar crimes. Until yesterday, the majority of ulama among Turks and Tatars, and in Iran and India, like yours, all drank the blood of oppressed people. But these nations scrutinized matters before you have done, and they overthrew the ulama from their pedestal. Quickly they distinguished real scholars from mullas who only worshipped their own bellies; they placed crowns on the heads of the former and trampled the latter underfoot.[109]

Ishans, connected with the world of Sufism and its related "superstitions," received even shorter shrift. Every ishan in Hamza's writing is a mean-looking glutton who takes a new wife every year, while the Tashkent poet Shawkat Khandayliqi let them have it thus:
Why are there so many dogs in Bukhara in the winter, but so few in the summer? In the summer, they all become ishans and go to the country, that's why.[110]

It was in this context that the rest of society responded to Jadid criticism. The opponents of the Jadids were motivated by very real concerns: They were defending nothing less than a social order that privileged them. The Jadids put to question not just the credentials of the ulama but also the compromises the latter had worked out with the colonial regime,


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which ensured them a status as intermediaries between the local population and Russian officialdom. Much of the social landscape within which the qadimchi operated was the product of Russian rule and the compromises forced by it. Many simply ignored the Jadids, although this was increasingly difficult to do at least in the urban centers. Others responded in kind. The main arguments against the Jadids are encapsulated in the following attack by a Tashkent Tatar on other Tatars that doubtless was read as applying equally to local Jadids:

How have they awakened [the nation]? To wearing narrow trousers, patent-leather shoes, and short jackets... to wasting money on all sorts of music and useless things, money that could be used to benefit the nation .... Our esteemed writers say, "The new method has arrived, the western sun has arisen, everyone has received the light, has arisen and become human." Why don't you show us a teacher who is a perfect Muslim, who works for the rejuvenation of religion [ahya-yi din ] and who explains it to common people? But you cannot .... This method of Yazid [usul-i Yaazid ] of yours will cause poor Muslims to be left without faith; [it] will cause women to discard their veils.[111]

The anonymous author went on to berate the Jadids for their duplicity and insincerity (their concern for the nation exists only on their tongues, not in their hearts, and is motivated by the need to sell their newspapers). Other arguments were more pointed. Sayyid Ahmad Wasli, the Samarqand mudarris who had considerable sympathies for the Jadid cause, wrote that one of the major shortcomings of the Jadid project was its constant criticism of the ulama.

"New-method teachers are merely teachers of reading and writing; for them to criticize the teaching of the ulama was a great impropriety [buyuk adabsizlik ], especially when most of them had never even attended such lessons. If they had only stuck to teaching," Wasli added, "all of Turkestan would have phonetic-method schools by now."[112] , The point was made more forcefully by an author in al-Islah as few months later. Praising the Sada-yi Turkistan and the Sada-yi Farghana for their intentions, the author found it unfortunate that in every single issue, these esteemed newspapers accuse the ulama, the pillars of the faith of Islam, of every kind of ignorance, indeed of foolishness, and insult them by attacking the path shown by the noble shariat as ignorance or error. Rather, [these newspapers] are published in the
of our Europeanized youth who, without regard to divine commandments [amr-i haqq] or the requirements of the shariat [hukm-i shar'], claim to be the renewers of the epoch ....

All of them are ignorant, [men] of unopened eyes and unsound intellects, who have wasted their lives in maktabs and madrasas for none of their lessons seems to have done them any good.[113]

Generational conflict was never far below the surface. After all, the most common appellation for the Jadids was yashlar, "the youth." Hamza's A Poisoned Life was as much about the relations between the generations as about ignorance. It is a tale of eighteen-year-old Mahmudkhan, "most open-minded . . . [and] nation-minded [millatparast]," and seventeen-year-old Maryam khanim, the daughter of a craftsman who "although educated in the old maktabs had read novels, newspapers, and magazines under the influence of her love for Mahmudkhan,... a slave of the nation [millat jariyasi]." They are in love and plan to open a school, but their wishes are quashed by their parents.

Mahmudkhan's father refuses outright to marry his only son to the daughter of a poor craftsman. Maryam's "ignorant and money-worshipping" parents, on the other hand, have promised her hand to a sixty-year-old ishan who already has six wives. The result is disastrous, and both young people take their own lives rather than acquiesce to the dictates of their parents. Hamza attempts to portray them as victims of ignorance and martyrs to the nation, but the most memorable lines in the play involve the two protagonists cursing their ignorant (jahil) and loveless (shafqatsiz) parents for riding roughshod over their wishes.[114] The generational aspect of conflict was prominent also when the qadimchi turned tables on the Jadids and, after Behbudi's Patricide began touring, began calling the Jadids "parricides."

All the major sites of Jadid reform—the new-method school, the periodical press, the theater—were criticized by the ulama, and the Jadids spent considerable energy trying to justify their enthusiasm for new cultural practices. The newspaper aroused deep suspicion. Early in its career, the TWG found it prudent to remind its readers that "reading or listening to a newspaper does not harm religion, but rather it informs [the reader] of all manner of things."[115] But the suspicions lingered. In 1906, an article by Munawwar Qari (who himself had proper creden-


[115] "Ma'lumnama," TWG, 8 January 1874.
tials as an alim) criticizing the old-method maktabs in the first issue of Taraqqi so irked the ulama of Tashkent that they sent a delegation to the city administrator requesting him to suspend publication of the newspaper. [116] Although the delegation did not achieve its aim, the newspaper was soon shut down for other reasons.

Similarly, the Jadids’ use of music and theater provoked heated debate, with many traditionalist ulama, and even some of the more conservative Jadids, criticizing it on Islamic grounds. Music and theater had, of course, long existed in Central Asia, but they both occupied an ambiguous place in the cultural tradition. The Jadids’ insistence that their theater was different only compounded their problems, since they could never shake off the ambiguities of maskharabazlik and had to deal with suspicions over what they insisted was new. The two issues that came to the fore involved women and music.

Women acted on the stage in Tatar plays staged in Tashkent. This was cause for scandal, especially among the local population. In 1910, a Tashkent Tatar who happened upon a benefit performance was dismayed by what he saw (“What benefit will come from girls dancing shamelessly with unrelated men?”). [117] When Central Asian Jadids began staging their own plays, they avoided the problem by having men play all roles on stage. A dual-track system developed in which outside plays could have women on stage, but not locally produced ones. For instance, when The Parricide first played in Tashkent in February 1914, the merchant's wife was played by Abdussami Qari Ziyabaev, but a woman played a female role later in the evening during the Transcaucasian comedy Khor khor. [118] Apparently, even local troupes could include women when putting on performances of imported plays.

The questions over music were less easily dodged. Music was widely used by the Jadids: not only were theatrical performances accompanied by music, but most fundraising cultural evenings also featured performances of folk and traditional music. As we have seen, Hamza and Awlani also wrote poetry specifically for music. The Jadids' open use of music in nonreligious contexts rendered them vulnerable to the charge of introducing illegitimate innovations into Islam. Because of these associations, the theater aroused the opposition of many who were generally supportive of Jadid reform. Nor was such criticism restricted to the

[116] For later comment on the incident in Taraqqi’s columns, see Mulla Zulfiqar, "Madrasalargha aid," Taraqqi, 5 July 1906.

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printed page. Before the first Tashkent performance of The Parricide, a number of ulama and merchants attempted to have the city authorities ban the play, failing which they sought to buy out the troupe by offering to pay an amount larger than what the performance would have raised. According to a contemporary
observer, these men sought to prevent the performance because they feared that
the actors, including many new-method teachers, would henceforth be counted as
maskharas and excluded from polite company. [119]
This debate is most clearly documented in a polemic between Wasli and Behbudi,
perhaps the most enthusiastic proponent of theater among the Jadids of
Turkestan, over the permissibility of theater from the Islamic point of view.
Wasli saw theater as completely contrary to the shariat:
Now, among the things forbidden by the shariat are games and amusements.
Basically, they destroy [personal] dignity and credit, waste one's time and
life, and keep [one] from one's duties as a human being. They also bring [with
them] calamities such as spendthriftiness .... If other forbidden [things] such
as musical instruments, singers, gambling, and women are added to these games,
you become doubly forbidden and bring heavenly retribution upon the head of
the community .... Obscenities (fuhushiyat ) are not entirely without some
profit, and I am afraid that if the custom of considering permissible every
forbidden thing which has some good in it takes hold, obscenities too will
gradually flourish. [120]
By thus condemning music, Wasli was also condemning the new phenomenon of
musical soirées and benefit concerts, which had become increasingly important to
the Jadid cause.
In his response, Behbudi cited hadith and instances from the life of the Prophet
to argue that music and games were permissible provided they did not contain
obscenity. He acknowledged that theater was an innovation (bid'at ), but, he
argued:
Innovation is that which did not exist in the time of the Prophet. Innovations
that have arisen since then are of two kinds: If an innovation brings benefits
to the faith and the community [din wa millat ], it is called a good
innovation [yakhshi bid'at ]; if it brings harm..., it is called a sinful
innovation [gunah bid'at ]. The Parricide is also an innovation, but we
consider it a good innovation because it admonishes the audience. It enjoins
good and forbids evil by showing the audience a warning the murder and
abasement that come from being caught in drunkenness and obscenity. Indeed,
the theater is a place for preaching and exhortation [majlis-i wa'z-u nasihat
]. [121]
[121] Behbudi, "Tiyatir, musiqi, she'r," Ayina, 18 December 1914, 111-114.

Behbudi also pointed out that Wasli himself wrote poetry incorporating rather
racy themes of love and drink, which, although they followed received patterns,
were not permitted by the shariat.
Wasli denounced theater as a wasteful pastime because it threatened to bring
into public use behavior that had hitherto lain on the fringes of the
acceptable. By putting women on the stage and having men act as people they were
not, by openly acknowledging, indeed exhibiting, practices that were immoral,
and by using music to appeal to the audience, Jadid theater threatened to upset
the rules of proper deportment according to which the traditional elites had negotiated their life struggles. Wasli's support of the new method did not extend to this radical redefinition of acceptable behavior.

The debate over the permissibility of music continued after the polemic between Wasli and Behbudi came to an end. It was given a new lease of life by Russian officialdom. The Tatar singer Kamil ul-Mutigi Tuhfatullin sought permission to tour Turkestan in 1915 for a series of concerts to benefit various war-related causes. In a fit of zeal, acting Governor-General F.V. Martson referred the matter to the Muslim Spiritual Administration in Orenburg, whose opinion about the permissibility of the concert he sought, even though Turkestan lay beyond the board's jurisdiction. The matter leaked to the press and debate began anew, this time in the pages of al-Islah. In response to a reader's question, a certain Fazlulwahhab Qari of Marghinan declared all use of music and song as haram. Ashurali Zahiri, a teacher in a Russinative school in Kokand who had studied in Bukhara, joined the fray. He took on the author on his own turf, citing evidence from the requisite texts and discussing quotations from the hadith in the Arabic to show that none of the hadiths used by Fazlulwahhab were trustworthy. Music and song were not haram, but mubah (permissible), and their use in the time of the Prophet was attested to in historical accounts. [122]

Zahiri's intervention did not end the matter, of course, but it was a sign that many Jadids could take on their critics on their own terms. At the same time, the ulama found themselves debating issues in print, in a public forum where the rules of entry were not of their making.


Chapter 5
Knowledge as Salvation

The merchant Ghazi-bay was an ignorant person who neglected to educate his son Abdulqahhar. Instead of sending him to school, he married him off at the age of sixteen to Maryam. Out of ignorance, Abdulqahhar fell into bad habits and soon managed to waste away his fortune on drinking and gambling. When all was lost, he pawned his house and disappeared, leaving Maryam to care for herself and their two children. But Maryam was intelligent and knew the value of knowledge, and despite all the hardship—she had to go from door to door, doing menial labor for neighbors—gave her son Alimjan the beginnings of education. Alimjan was a kind, studious child who went to the mosque regularly instead of playing in the street. Then one day Ahmadjan, a friend, took Alimjan to the new-method school he attended. The teacher was very kind to Alimjan and admitted him to the school, waiving tuition and providing him with the necessary school supplies. Given his mother's good training, Alimjan flourished, finishing two grades in one year. At the examination, he outshone his peers and, by answering all the questions posed by visiting dignitaries, brought credit to himself, the school, and the new method. In time, he graduated and was given a job as secretary by a
merchant who had attended the final examination. Alimjan's knowledge and
diligence won him the trust of the merchant, who gave him his daughter in
marriage. In the meantime, Alimjan got word that his father was alive, eking out
an existence in a hovel in Tashkent. Alimjan went to Tashkent to rescue his
father (spending the sixteen hours on the train journey from Ko-

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kand reading) and thus reunited the family. Alimjan's father-in-law conveniently
died soon afterward, leaving his fortune to Alimjan, who, along with his family,
lived happily ever after, thanks entirely to knowledge.[1]
Such was the new happiness of which Hamza Hakimzada wrote in his "national
novel" in 1915. This view of knowledge as the panacea for all ills, individual
and social, as a font of happiness, wealth, and progress, was the point of
departure for all Jadid thinking. But it was also clear to the Jadids that
existing maktabs and madrasas were not producing such knowledge. Reform had to
begin with the schools, the most crucial aspect of which was the adoption of the
phonetic (or new) method (usul-i jadid) of teaching the alphabet. The creation
of schools that would teach by the new method became the centerpiece of Jadid
reform and, indeed, provided the movement its name.
The reform of the maktab (and the attempted reform of the madrasa) aroused
extreme passions in Muslim society. Opposition to the Jadids is usually
dismissed as the fanatical reaction of obscurantists opposed to all change, but
taking the opposition—and the ensuing debate over the meaning of
culture—seriously allows us to appreciate the extent and mechanism of change
advocated by the Jadids. The knowledge that the Jadids celebrated came off the
printed page and was predicated on the acquisition of functional literacy. This
view of knowledge threatened to undermine existing practices surrounding the
transmission of knowledge and the patterns of cultural and moral authority they
engendered. Knowledge, and its place in society, was being redefined in the
debate over the new method.
The Jadids' cult of knowledge also placed them firmly in the mainstream of the
enlightenment project. The faith in the power of knowledge to transform
societies was shared by the rulers of Russia and those sent to administer
Turkestan, as well as Russian society in general, which also sought answers to
its problems in knowledge and education. "Only knowledge can conquer this region
spiritually," Kaufman once told Ostroumov. "Neither weapons, nor legislation can
do this, but the school,

[1] Hamza Hakimzada Niyazi, Yangi saadat (milli roman) (Kokand, 1915). This
basic plot is to be found in numerous Jadid works of verse and prose; see also
Sadriddin Ayni's epistolary novel, Khanadan-i khushbakht, in his Tahzib
us-sibyan (Samarqand, 1911); Abdulhamid Sulaymani, [Cholpan], "Dokhtor
Muhammadyar," serialized in ST, 1914. The ultimate source of this vision was a
novel by Gasprinskii, The Muslims of the Abode of Happiness (Darurrahah
Musulmanlar'i [Bahchesaray, 1906]), which was translated into Persian by Fitrat
in 1916 (Musulmanan-i Dar ul-rahat [Bukhara, 1916]).
This faith in the power of knowledge and education remained with Kaufman's successors, even when they abandoned policies he had initiated. The same faith in the power of knowledge, however, also produced a fear of the wrong kind of knowledge, which could exacerbate the "fanaticism' of the natives. Kaufman's worries about the malign influence of sedentary Muslims over the nomads and his successors' concerns about the influx of "pan-Islamic" ideas from the Ottoman empire shared this fear. As a promoter of an enlightenment suitable for Russian state interests and a jealous watchdog over rival forms of it, the state saw itself as a significant actor in the realm of education. Indeed, the earliest efforts to transform Central Asian society through education came from the state, and it is here that we begin our examination.

Educating the Natives

The dismal record of Russian educational institutions in attracting students from the local population led to a reappraisal of Kaufman's policy upon his death. In 1884, the new governor-general, N.O. Rozenbakh, seeking a different ploy to get Muslims to send their children to Russian schools, came up with the idea of "Russo-native schools" (russko-tuzemnye shkoly ), in which Russian and traditional Muslim education would coexist. In the morning, a Russian teacher would teach Russian and arithmetic, while a damla would give lessons identical to those in the maktab in the afternoon.[3] The course of study was four years, by the end of which students were expected to be able to write and speak Russian. Reading lessons in the fourth year introduced students to Russian geography and history.[4] Local notables were pressed into service in this novel intervention in local cultural life, and the first Russo-native school opened in Tashkent in the house of Said Karim-bay, Said Azim's son, in December 1884.[5] Notables were asked to provide funding and students. Most of the students of the first school in Tashkent were children of local notables, who also served as patrons of these schools, charged with promoting the school.
in society. Annual examinations were public occasions to which local dignitaries were invited to see for themselves the benefits of the new school. High-ranking officials acted as chief examiners, and graduates received prizes for completing the course of studies. (Abdullah Qadiri received a gold watch from the governor-general himself upon his graduation in 1912.) Yet the treasury remained reluctant to release any funds for these schools, leaving many of the first schools dependent on local revenues. The first school in Tashkent received 700 rubles from the treasury and 1,300 rubles from the city, while the rooms were donated by Said Karim-bay.

The schools had a shaky beginning, as parents refused to send their children to them. In the first few years of their existence, it was even common for notables to pay children of the poor to attend, the police bearing the responsibility for finding the children. In many locations, schools were supported by special levies (maktab puli), which served to heighten their unpopularity. The situation changed by the turn of the century. With the growth in the economy, many more people encountered Russian and came to see it as an important skill. Table 5 shows the significant increase in the number of such schools in the first decade of the twentieth century. The growth was greatest in Syr Darya oblast, where the number of such schools almost doubled in the last six years of the old regime.

The primary goal of the schools was to impart functional skills in spoken and written Russian, and over the years the Russian sections of these schools became their real focus. Although many observers remained skeptical, a graduate of the four-year course was supposed to have acquired a facility in reading and speaking Russian and to be able to write basic bureaucratic or business documents. The "native" part, on the other hand, was meant to gain the trust of the local population by assuring it that the school would transmit the knowledge that parents...

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TABLE 5
RUSSO-NATIVE SCHOOLS IN TURKESTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Schools</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>4—116—</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>229—525</td>
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<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>286—505</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>145—902</td>
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[6] V. Nalivkin, Tuzemy ran'she i teper' (Tashkent, 1913), 104
[7] A.E. Izmailov, Prosveshchennie v respubhkah sovetskogo Vostoka (Moscow, 1973), 44. In Semirech'e, this tax was the only source of revenue for Russo-native schools: D. Aitmambetov, Dorevoliutsionnye shkoly v Kirgizii (Frunze, 1961), 50-51.
[8] A copy of the academic program as revamped in 1907 is in TsGARUz, f. 47, op. 1, d. 903, l. 2-40b; see also TWG, 5 November 1915; 8 November 1915.
expected from a maktab, a point Russian officials took care to emphasize repeatedly. "Remember," Governor-General Teviashew told the audience while inaugurating a new school in 1905, "that the education administration by no means hinders your religious customs and allows your children to study religion in this school in exactly the same manner that you studied it in your schools."[9] Native teachers were, therefore, left free to teach as they pleased. Sporadic attempts to establish a standardized curriculum produced no tangible results. By the turn of the century, many native teachers had begun to use the phonetic method to teach the alphabet and to use textbooks. In 1902, at Ostroumov's initiative, the local educational administration commissioned Said Aziz Khoja, a "native" teacher in one of the Tashkent schools, to write a textbook especially for the first year to replace the Tatar manuals that had hitherto been used.[10] The resulting text, Ustad-i awwal (The First Teacher), was the first new-method textbook to be published in Central Asia. A reader for the second year followed two years later.[11] The native section imparted basic literacy in Turkic (or Persian in a few schools in Samarqand) and the ability to recite the Qur'an and to answer questions

[11] On the creation of these textbooks, see Abdullaev, O metodike, 107-126.

about religious obligations and rituals.[12] While many schools had two or three Russian teachers, all made do with only one "native" teacher, so that often by the fourth year "native" instruction amounted to no more than a half-hour a day.[13]

Over time, local administrators came to attach high hopes to these schools. Writing in 1909, Governor-General P. I. Mishchenko saw them as "the best means for promoting Russian citizenship [grazhdansvennost'] and language" among the natives. His suggestion of increasing their budgetary allocations in view of the political benefits they were likely to accrue fell victim to the paucity of resources, however, and was never realized.[14] To the end of the old regime, numbers of Russo-native schools remained small, and only one offered more than the basic four years of instruction. Yet, they were the most likely channel for the local population to learn Russian.[15] At the same time, there remained
considerable dissatisfaction about their efficacy. N. S. Lykoshin, a longtime administrator, felt that "the Sart merchant considers it sufficient if his son, after graduating from [a Russo-native] school, can write the address in Russian or a letter or a simple business telegram; but the development of the child does not go beyond this in a direction desirable to us."[16] Even so, the numbers of students graduating remained small; only forty-seven students finished the four-year course in 1910, and sixty-three in 1913, when Tashkent's schools were the most successful in the whole province.[17] The situation was far worse in Ferghana, where as many as seventeen of the twenty schools did not graduate a single student in 1907, and three schools in the oblast continued to exist without producing a single graduate among them after 1903.[18]

The New Method

The growth in the numbers of Russo-native schools after the turn of the century was part of a broader phenomenon that included the emergence of new-method schools beyond the purview of officialdom. Indeed, Mishchenko's enthusiasm for Russo-native schools was provoked at least in part by his concerns about the growth of new-method schools in Turkestan. Pioneered in the Crimea by Gasprinskii, who opened the first such school in 1884, new-method schools were the staple of Muslim reform in the European parts of the Russian empire. By the turn of the century, these schools dominated elementary education among the Tatars, and new-method madrasas were being founded in Ufa and Kazan. In Turkestan, the first new-method schools appeared in the early 1890s, usually among the Tatar communities in Turkestani cities, but they had spread among the local population as well by the turn of the century. By the time Mishchenko wrote, these schools had become the object of concern for officialdom as well as the focus of the biggest debate in Muslim society.

Scholars have been too content to see the new-method school as the creation of Gasprinskii's genius alone. In fact, the new-method school was part of a secular trend toward functional literacy and the organization of general schooling in which new domains of cultural practice were elaborated. Such practices had first appeared in Western Europe, and they came to Central Asia from two sources. The first was Russia, where concern with elementary schooling had emerged by the middle of the nineteenth century. This experience was reflected in the
Russo-native schools, with which new-method schools shared many characteristics. Many "native" teachers (Haji Muin in Katta Qorghan, Sayyid Ahmad Ajzi in Samarkand, Ashur Ali Zahiri in Kokand, Said Rasul Rasuli in Tashkent) were prominent in Jadid circles; and many of the younger Jadids attended Russo-native schools. The second, more relevant, source was the Ottoman empire, where, for reasons very similar to those in Russia, low rates of literacy among the empire's Muslim population had come to be a pressing concern in Ottoman circles by the early 1860s. In the ensuing debate, non-Ottoman Muslims, such as the Iranian statesman Mirza Malkum Khan and the Azerbaijani Mirza Fathali Akhundov (Akhundzadeh), both of whom were in Istanbul at this time, took an active role.

The diagnosis varied. For Malkum Khan and Akhundov, the cause was the difficulty of the Arabic script, and the remedy a reform of the script. Others, such as the poet Namik Kemal, felt that poor methods of teaching the alphabet were to blame for low rates of literacy and that more efficient methods of instruction would solve the problem.[19]


Gradually the phonetic, or new, method (usūl-i cedid) for teaching the alphabet won official favor when the authorities passed a law making elementary education compulsory.[20] This debate was known among Muslim elites in the Russian empire and had even made it to the pages of TWG, which in 1876 published an article (unfortunately anonymous) propounding the need for a more efficient method of teaching the alphabet.[21] Said Rasul Khoja, a teacher in Tashkent's first Russo-native school and author of Ustad-i awwal (The First Teacher), the first new-method primer in Central Asia, wrote in its preface: "After this [kind of] First Teacher became popular in Istanbul, and the advantages of imparting instruction with it in the maktab became known..., the scholars of Kazan translated it into their own language [and started using it in their maktabs].... The advantages of this way of teaching were also realized at some Russian schools in Tashkent."[22] Gasprinskii himself was understandably reluctant to draw attention to the Ottoman antecedents of the school he pioneered, since that would have laid him open to official suspicion, but the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming. But while there can be no doubt about the Ottoman pedigree of the new-method school, it was more than simply a transplant. In the Ottoman empire, the new method was introduced in a network of state-sponsored and state-funded schools (although financial constraints kept funding levels low);[23] in the Russian empire, on the other hand, such schools existed in the often tenuous space provided by the state to the "confessional" schools of its religious minorities. The organization and support of such schools remained the concern of society, rather than the state, with all the attendant problems.

Disowning the Maktab

The new-method school acquired such a central position in Jadid reform across the Russian empire because political realities allowed it. As "confessional" schools, maktabs had existed in the semi-public niche allowed by the state to religious communities. A reform of these schools could be carried out through...
factions with the state of the maktab. Judged by the needs of the age, the maktab was found wanting. Haji Muin's 1916 play Old School, New School opens in a maktab, "dark as a dungeon with a stove in the middle; a bastinado hangs on the wall; on one side lies a filthy container of water, on the other side, on a torn carpet, sits the teacher, wearing several layers of dirty clothes, short-tempered and with the looks of an opium addict."[24] The teacher is more concerned with food (he sends a pupil off to get tea) and gifts (he insistently asks for his weekly gift of food from the parents of another pupil) than with the welfare of the children in his charge, who learn absolutely nothing. Chaos reigns in the school, as fights break out between children frequently and provoke intertemperate physical punishment from the teacher.

New conditions demanded schools where children could acquire literacy, a basic knowledge of "arithmetic, geography, history, especially the history of Islam," as well as "religious obligations [wajibat-i diniya ], i.e., proper recitation of the Qur'an, questions of faith... prayers, fasting, hajj, and almsgiving."[25] This valorization of functional literacy as a transposable skill was connected with the new ubiquity of the written word made possible by print. As I argued in Chapter I, the juncture of orality and literacy at which the maktab existed rendered functional literacy less than a necessity. Now that literacy came to be a highly valued skill, the absence of literacy instruction became the maktab's biggest liability. Similarly, the complaint, repeatedly made, that poor children wasted several years of their lives in the maktab without even acquiring the rudiments of literacy bespoke a newfound sense of efficiency. The maktab was fully imbricated in the rhythm of everyday life, in which the teacher's qualifications in the maktab lay in his knowledge and piety acquired through interaction with a recognized master. "Teaching" as such was not a separate domain of practice, nor was "learning" to be measured by such means as examinations and grades. Now this became lack of method and organization, and hence a major shortcoming of the maktab.

The new method involved teaching the alphabet using the phonetic method instead of the syllabic method used in the maktab. Instead of memorizing the names of the letters, the emphasis here was on teaching children the sounds that the letters represented; the aim was to impart

the ability to read and write rather than an "implicit" knowledge of certain canonical texts. The texts used in new-method schools were specially devised primers that introduced pupils to the alphabet, with the most commonly used letters coming first and letters representing the specifically Semitic phonemes of Arabic being left to the last. Beyond literacy, new-method schools also sought to teach such "contemporary" (zamancha) subjects as arithmetic, geography, science, and history.

The new method made both the Russo-native and Jadid schools qualitatively different from the maktab. This fact was underscored by the insistence of new-method teachers on calling themselves muallim, after Tatar and Ottoman fashion, rather than damla or maktabdar, the terms traditionally used in Central Asia for teachers in maktabs. The physical appearance of new-method schools was also different. The new school in Haji Muin's play "accords with the rules of public health. Maps hang on the walls. On one side, the teacher sits on a chair behind a table and next to a blackboard. Across from him, behind two desks, sit four students .... As the curtain rises, the children rise to their feet and greet the teacher." [26] Desks, chairs, maps, and globes became fetishes of the new-method schools. The very act of sitting on chairs in orderly rows, with the teacher standing facing the class, rather than sitting on the floor in a circle around the damla, meant, for the Jadids, a leap from the disorder and backwardness of the maktab to the scientific order of the school. A pedagogical manual written by Gasprinskii (and apparently well known in Central Asia) came complete with a diagram of the ideal classroom, with windows, maps, globes, blackboard, and desks neatly laid out in rows.

The Schools

If so far this description of new-method schools seems like a Foucauldian delight, we need to remember the many ways in which such ideals did not become reality. It is impossible to determine the exact number of new-method schools in Turkestan, for although the new-method school was a more tangible entity than the maktab, with records of admissions and enrollments, the discrepancies between archival figures and unofficial information are substantial. Many schools quickly folded for lack of interest on the part of parents, active opposition from them, hostility of the state, or financial problems. Others existed unofficially, beyond

[26] aji Muin, Eski maktab, 40.
1903 the city was reported to have more than twenty such schools.[29] Abdulqadir Shakuri started the first school in the Samarqand area in 1903,[30] while the first schools in Kokand also opened in the first years of the century.[31] The actual numbers of these schools are difficult to determine, though. Mandatory registration began only in 1912, and even then many schools escaped the state's notice. The wide range of figures to be found in bureaucratic correspondence of the day indicates that officialdom had little idea of the precise number of schools in existence. According to official figures, there were thirteen schools with 1,1000 students in the old city of Tashkent and thirteen in Kokand.[32] Yet, the inspector of schools in Ferghana oblast reported twenty-three new-method schools in his jurisdiction in February 1910, but only "about twenty" three years later.[33] However, according to a correspondent to Ayina, Kokand then had thirty-one schools with 3,000 students, making it the leading city in Turkestan.[34] In 1914, the Samarqand area had at least a half-dozen substantial schools.[35] These figures, in all likelihood, understate the number of schools in existence for the contemporary press gives the impression that new schools were being opened frequently. We might also consider the evidence of the textbooks. The last decade of tsarist rule saw the

[29] Turkestanskie vedomosti, 2 November 1903, 552.
[31] A report from the Ferghana oblast educational establishment to the governor-general from 1913 provides details on four of the most important schools in Kokand, the first of which opened "ten to twelve years ago" (TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 943, ll. 57ob-58).
[33] TsGARUz, f. 19, d. 35019, ll. 18-180b (for 1910); f. 1, op. 31, d. 943, 1. 65 (for 1913, reported by the governor of Ferghana to the governor-general).
[34] Mulla Ishaq Jan, "Jawab," Ayina, 4 January 1914, 257.

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publication of scores of textbooks locally, many of which went into several editions. Since publishing was largely a commercial enterprise, we can safely assume that enough demand existed for publishers to put these textbooks on the market. The usual print run for local publications was 1,000 copies. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that new-method schools numbered in the hundreds in Central Asia during the last decade of the old regime. At the very least, it is quite clear that by the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century new-method schools had become a constant feature of urban life in Turkestan.

New-method schools varied a great deal in size, organization, and stability. Some, such as Munawwar Qari's in Tashkent and Abdulqadir Shakuri's in Samarqand,
had over a hundred students, but many—perhaps the majority—had far smaller enrollments and existed in spare rooms in teachers' or patrons' houses. The novelty of some schools did not extend beyond the use of the phonetic method to teach the alphabet, whereas others offered four years of general elementary education.[36] The scarcity of financial and material resources remained the most formidable obstacle. They may have come from reasonably prosperous backgrounds, but few Jadids possessed the resources required for establishing schools. Several Jadids opened schools in their own houses, but others depended on the cooperation of those who had the means and the public authority to support their efforts. Many schools were founded by merchants and other notables, either in their own houses or in rooms especially constructed for the school. In Tashkent, the Imdadiya benevolent society provided a subsidy of fifty rubles per month to some schools.[37]

The practice of charging tuition brought its own ambiguities, for such frank exchange of knowledge for money went against the adab of knowledge (in the maktab, we will recall, the teacher received gifts of food or clothing from the parents, but almost never money) and was distasteful to many parents, but it also laid teachers open to the charge of being interested only in the money. This caused deep anxieties among the Jadids, who claimed to be "servants of the nation" first and foremost. The ambiguity was never resolved, since teaching was the main source of livelihood for many new-method teachers. Jadid publications carried many cautionary tales about the corrupt teachers for whom even new-method teaching was a source of private enrichment rather than a way of serving the nation. Hopes of creating an organized system of schools remained unfulfilled. A shortage of teachers similarly bedeviled new-method schools. Until 1912, Tatars taught in many schools, but this practice became hazardous after new regulations went into effect that year. One solution was to send students to Tatar schools in European Russia for a higher education and to start summer teacher training courses locally,[38] but available resources again fell woefully short. Many new-method schools in Turkestan remained one-man shows in which the only teacher was an autodidact whose commitment to reform often outweighed his ability to teach. Ironically, although the Jadids insisted that maktab teachers were ignorant of the science of education, few if any in their own ranks had a higher education, let alone pedagogic training. Jadid textbooks, too, were the work of amateurs, very committed and dedicated, but amateurs nevertheless. For the same reasons, several attempts to impose a uniform curriculum came to naught because there existed no institution that could enforce uniform standards. An attempt in Kokand to teach according to a common program failed because few teachers could
teach all the subjects included in the syllabus.[39] The Jadids of Central Asia could not bring any uniformity or system to their schools down to 1917. The Advent of Schooling

The program in Table 6 accompanied twelve identical applications for permission to open new-method schools in Tashkent submitted in June 1910. Unfortunately, it does not provide any information about the allocation of time in the classroom (and even if did, it could not be taken as a true indication of what went on in the classroom, since dodging the Russian school inspector was not very difficult). In the more established new-method schools, instruction took place four or five hours a day, six days a week.[40] The first year was largely devoted to learning the alphabet. By 1917, teachers in Central Asia had a choice of at least a dozen locally

[40] See, for instance, the teaching plans of several Andijan schools in Ardashirov, "K voprosu," 157-159.

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TABLE 6

ACADEMIC PROGRAM FOR NEW-METHOD SCHOOLS, 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Texts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year I</td>
<td>reading and writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Munawwar Qari, Adib-i awwal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year II</td>
<td>reading and writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Munawwar Qari, Adib-i sani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>religious instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Munawwar Qari, Hawa'il-I diniya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year III</td>
<td>reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mominjan Muhammedjanov, Nasa'i'h ul-atfal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[moral instruction]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sufi Allah Yar, Sabat ul ajizin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>recitation of the Qur'anMunawwar Qari, Tajwid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>religious instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Munawwar Qari, Hawa'ij-i diniya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sacred history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanafi, Tarikh-I anbiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fatih Kerimi, Mukhtasar jughafiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hadi Maksudi, Dunya ma'lumati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arithmetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inayatullah Mirzajan oghli, Hisab mas'alasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year IV</td>
<td>reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adabiyat (poetry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>recitation of the Qur'anMunawwar Qari, Tajwid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fakhriddinov, Nasihat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sacred history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanafi, Tarikh-i anbiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arithmetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inayatullah Mirzajan oghli, Hisab mas'alasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maksudi, Durus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdulqadir Shakuri, Jami' ul-hikayat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 1148, ll. 3-25.

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produced primers to use in the classroom. Said Rasul Khoja's Ustad-i awwal (The First Teacher) was used in Jadid schools, but it was eventually displaced by Munawwar Qari's Adib-i awwal (The First Writer, 1910).[41] The next few years saw the appearance of several other primers, including several in Persian. These books had much in common: They introduced the Arabic alphabet in stages, giving each letter its phonetic value, and providing exercises in joining the various letters. These led to exercises in forming words and, toward the end of the year, whole sentences. Certain primers contained passages for reading. In the second year, students read longer passages in readers specially designed for children. The passages were largely in prose, but textbooks were also liberally sprinkled with verse. These texts differed from those used in the maktab in that they were specially written for children in their native language using a simple vocabulary. Although the readings remained didactic in intent, they now included fairy tales or stories about animals. Munawwar Qari's Adib-i sani, for instance, contains forty-five passages of literary, scientific (fanni), and moral content. The "scientific" passages provide basic information such as the months of the year in the lunar calendar, as well as the Arabic, Russian, and Ottoman solar calendars,[42] or word lists of animals, items of clothing, geographical terms, and so forth. The ethics lessons deal with common Jadid themes such as the superiority of knowledge over wealth, the status of teachers, the sad fate of a habitual liar, and notions of generosity, miserliness, and wastefulness. Thus, the story of a rich man who refuses to give a circumcision feast for his son because it would become wastefulness (israf) if he invited only his rich friends, and donates the money instead to schools and madrasas was recounted with approval.[43] In another story, a rich man who would not send his son to school because tuition cost one ruble per month deprives his son of the ability to tell right from wrong. As a result, the son becomes a wastrel and spends his entire fortune. The moral: "Such is the fate of the wastrel and of the wealth of the miser."[44] The genealogy of these textbooks remains to be examined. The most immediate model was provided by Tatar textbooks, but these were themselves deeply influenced by Russian pedagogical tools. Said Rasul Khoja also indicates an Ottoman connection, with its roots in French models. In style and format, the new primers of Central Asia replicated developments in European pedagogy. In subsequent years, primers were supplemented by collections of poetry written by various Jadid authors specifically for use in schools. Unlike the mystical

[43] Ibid, 44.
[44] Ibid., 40-42.
poetry of the maktab, these poems propagated the basic message of Jadid reform, such as the fallen state of Turkestan, the need for knowledge, the excellence of schools, and a passion for the nation. Often these poems were written to the tune of newly respectable folk tunes and meant for recitation or singing. By 1913, weekly poetry lessons were common in many schools.[45] This was a major change from the maktab, where singing and profane poetry (let alone the singing of profane poetry) had no place. Munawwar Qari also introduced physical exercise at his school, but the experiment did not last long. Physical exercise of this kind contravened the conventions of adab, and many parents, even those convinced of the superiority of the new method, could not countenance it. Many parents also feared that physical training would inevitably lead to conscription of their children into the army and therefore began to withdraw them from the school.[46]

Elementary Arabic was taught in some schools, but the teaching of Russian was still the exception rather than the rule in new-method schools, the result of a combination of parental suspicion and a lack of capable teachers. Munawwar Qari started teaching Russian in his school in 1911,[47] and four years later it was being taught twelve hours a week by a Russian teacher.[48] The curriculum of new-method schools often included lessons in hygiene and elementary science, for which Tatar textbooks were used. Arithmetic was commonly taught, and some schools even taught geometry in higher grades. Locally published textbooks for elementary arithmetic became available in 1913, but Tatar manuals, themselves translations of Russian textbooks, continued to be used for higher classes. Jadid criticism of the maktab went beyond its inefficiency and disorder and questioned the very suitability of its texts for young children.


[47] Application dated 11 February 1911, in TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 1149, l. 4.


Abdullah Awlani echoed Munawwar Qari when he wrote: "Everyone knows that the books used in the Muslim schools of Turkestan, such as Char kitab, Sabat ul-Ajizin, Fuzuli, Nawa'i, Khoja Hafiz, Bedil, and Maslak ul-Muttaqin, are, one and all, books of poetry. Some of them are concerned with difficult problems of dogma and practice [e'tiqadat wa amaliyat],... [and] as most of them are in Persian, it is impossible for young children to benefit from them, or even to understand them. Teaching these books is like reaching for the stark while sitting on the ground ... Even if [the children] understand the meaning of these apparently romantic poems, what good do they do?[49] Others went further and claimed that romantic poetry memorized in the maktab actually spoiled the morals of little children and was the cause of widespread pederasty in Central Asia.[50]
Children needed books specially designed for them that paid attention to their levels of comprehension and provided material they would find interesting. "It would be more beneficial to pupils just embarking on the study of literature," Munawwar Qari once suggested to Hamza, "if you included short, interesting tales, such as those about the actions of people and animals, in short tales accessible to the faculties of children, rather than [dealing with] difficult topics such as ... honor, courage, nation, and nationalism, or other such dry admonitions.... Experience shows that pupils are troubled not by the size of our present books of literature but by the difficulty of their vocabulary and subject matter."[51]

A Russian orientalist visiting Munawwar Qari's school in 1915 noted that punishments meted out to children were very mild and that teachers used the polite form of speech in addressing the children.[52] The Jadids' horror of physical punishment, repeated on numerous occasions by other writers, stemmed from the same sources as their new-found disgust with mystical poetry. This was the Jadids' discovery of childhood.[53] The maktab treated young boys essentially as men on a small scale: For


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the Jadids, childhood was a special period of life, marked off from the rest of life, a period in which the obligations and gravity of adulthood did not apply. However, such a period also provided the opportunity for molding and training the intellect, morals, and even the body of the child, all the subject of the new, "scientific" discipline of pedagogy.

Desacralization
Concerns with morality were ubiquitous in new-method schools. Moral and ethical messages were never concealed below the surface in these readings, nor did moral education stop with such reading passages. Several textbooks published in Central Asia during this period were directly concerned with imparting purely ethical and moral advice. With names such as Adablik oglan (The Boy Who Has Adab ) and Nasa'i'ih ul-atfal (Advice to Children),[54] these textbooks harked back directly to the adab tradition of the maktab. Reading passages in these books described ideal modes of behavior and deportment. A well-mannered child "listens carefully, with all his soul, without looking to either side, to the teacher or the assistant [khalifa ] when they teach."[55] The same text offers,
as an example to be followed, the story of a little boy who is woken up by his father in the middle of the night, when the latter wakes up of thirst. The father sends the child to fetch water but falls back to sleep before his return. The child stands quietly at his father's bedside with the water until he wakes up again.[56]

Religious instruction took up a substantial part of school time. The topics covered by the syllabus were quite traditional. The most commonly used textbook on Islam was the Hawa'ij-i diniya (Religious Requirements) by Munawwar Qari. Its three parts treated belief, ritual, and Islamic injunctions on social and commercial practices in the form of questions and answers. Children also learned to read the Qur'an according to the principles of tajwid (for which new textbooks also appeared), and they memorized passages from it, as well as learning to recite the five daily prayers. The use of mystical poetry continued and prayer was mandatory in new-method schools. School events began with the recitation of the Qur'an and the evocation of blessings on the Prophet.[57]

[54] Muhammadjan Qari ibn Rahimjan, Adablik oghlan (Tashkent, 1912); Mominjan Muhammadjanov, Nasa'ih ul-atfal (Tashkent, 1912).
[56] Ibid., 3-4.
[57] For example, the final examination for the 1912-13 school year at Abdulqadir Shakuri's school in Samarqand began with worship (salat), invocation of blessings on the Prophet (mawlid), recitation from the Qur'an (qiraat) as well as of national poetry (milli she'r), and recited supplication to God (munajat). The religious ambiance of these schools could not be doubted, but the recitation of modern poetry was indicative of a growing concern with the community. Samarqand, 24 May 1913.

The numerous continuities with the maktab can be deceptive, though. Concerns with morality might seem little different from the kind of moral training and obedience to older men that was imparted in the maktab, but morality was now taught through specially created texts, not under threat of physical punishment. Similarly, religious tenets were conveyed to pupils not through mimetic practice but from especially designed textbooks in the vernacular; pupils were also expected to understand the meaning of the religious acts they were learning. In setting lessons aside for religion, the new-method schools began the process of marking off Islam from the rest of knowledge. In the maktab, all knowledge was sacral and tenets of Islam pervaded everything taught. In new-method schools, Islam became an object of study, knowledge of which could be acquired in the same way as all other knowledge. The Jadids thus constituted the domain of "religion," as a result of which certain practices and spaces now became exclusively "religious." Other domains of practice, by the same token, were desacralized and firmly placed in the realm of the "nonreligious."

This approach is clearly seen in the construction of "sacred history" as a field of study in new-method schools. The "tales of the Prophets" (qisas ul-anbiya) were a respected genre in Muslim tradition, and Rabghuzi's thirteenth-century text was widely circulated throughout the Turkic world. However, the immediate
inspiration for including sacred history in the curriculum came from Russian schools, which had always included sacred history in their syllabus. The Jadids sought to create a Muslim equivalent of this modern phenomenon.

All nations, whether Christians or Jews, teach the history of their religion and the lives of the prophets in their schools. Every Christian and Jewish student learns the guidance and formation of his religion and becomes acquainted with historical events. This is the cause of the growth of religious and national zeal and sentiment [ghayrat-u hammiyat-i diniya wa milliya ].

... The Europeans and [students] in the organized schools of Russia also study other religions [including] the history of Islam. A Christian student knows more about the history of Islam than a Muslim student.[58] Muslims students must know more about the origins of their religion, and [58] Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, Mukhtasar tarikh-i Islam (Samarqand, 1909), 2.

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disciplines developed by Europeans. Behbudi and Fitrat published textbooks on the history of Islam, and Awlani wrote a history of the prophets, little different from the qisas genre in its content, but written in a vernacular style comprehensible to school-age children. In the process, Islam itself began to be historicized, with far-reaching consequences. Similar assumptions underlay the Jadids’ critique of the madrasa. The madrasas of Bukhara and their professors became the butt of criticism and ridicule in the press all over the Turkic world. Again, the most influential critique came from Abdurrauf Fitrat in the form of a debate between a Bukharan mudarris, in India on his way to hajj, and a European sympathetic to Islam and extremely learned in it. The European asks the Bukharan about the curriculum of Bukharan madrasas and is appalled at the list of commentaries and supercommentaries that he hears: "I didn't think I'd ever hear such nonsense [khurafat ] even in my dreams. What a waste of time the people of Bukhara are engaged in! After spending twenty-seven years of their lives in a futile place, they start teaching the same empty and meaningless subjects. But when do they study the most important subjects such as tafsir, hadith, and fiqh?"[59] As we saw in Chapter 1, the madrasa was the site of the reproduction of a knowledge of Islam mediated through several layers of glosses and commentaries, in which the practice of commentary and interpretation was Islam. That set of practices had become a bundle of nonsense and sophistry now, since real knowledge lay in the scriptural sources of Islam. This new textual view of Islam subverted the interpretive practice that was the foundation of Bukharan madrasas and thus opened the way for a new understanding of Islam itself. The point was to acquire a "true" knowledge of the pristine textual sources of Islam, bypassing the glosses and commentaries, which now came to be seen as nothing more than centuries' worth of corruption and a source of moral and social decline.

There were other problems with the madrasa, too. For all his years spent studying Arabic grammar, Fitrat's mudarris cannot speak Arabic properly. (By using phonetic transcription of standard Bukharan [mis]-pronunciation of Arabic,
Fitrat makes a point of highlighting the mudarris's poor Arabic.) The European, who has studied it through the new method, can speak Arabic fluently and corrects his interlocutor in several places. Elsewhere, madrasa teachers and students were criticized for


their lack of interest in the affairs of the nation and their selfish opposition to those who had the interest of the nation at heart.[60] Fitrat's Indian traveler finds professors having affairs with their students.[61]

The Jadids' disdain for traditional ways of knowing Islam was rooted in this fundamental transformation of their worldview. In their desacralized universe, where all phenomena were liable to rationalist explanation, correct understanding of Islam required not insertion in a chain of authoritative masters but mastery of the textual sources of Islam in the original, now available in print. Hence the emphasis on fluency in Arabic and the acquisition of hadith, tafsir, and fiqh. In 1916, Fitrat published The Guide to Salvation, an ethico-didactic tract in which he sought the justification for all Jadid exhortations in the Qur'an itself. The text is peppered with quotations from the Qur'an in Arabic, which alone for Fitrat provide the true measure of the merit of social and individual endeavor.[62] These new emphases denigrated the cultural possessions of the traditionally learned and were thus profoundly subversive of their authority. They also opened up access to the practice of interpretation to those outside the ranks of the madrasa-educated elites. As the seventeen-year-old Maryam tells the sextogenarian ishan who has married her, "I am educated and know religion better than you."[63]

The Jadids may not have been "secularists," for they constantly sought justification for their arguments from Islam, but their understanding of Islam was situated squarely in a desacralized world defined by progress through history. The shariat and true Islam were entirely compatible with the needs of the age, as we saw, and could only be brought about through modern knowledge. The implementation of Islamic law was never an issue in the politics of the Muslim nation; that attitude toward the Islamization of law belongs to a later generation. At the same time, theological debate was conspicuously absent from Central Asian Jadidism. The Jadids doubtless followed the debates of other modernist Muslims, such as Rizaeddin Fakhreddin, the Islamists in the Ottoman empire, and Muhammad 'Abduh and his followers in Egypt, but we have no evidence of any local debates that went beyond the permissibility or other-


wise of the new method or the theater. The Jadids' priorities tended to be the concerns of the community rather than of the faith.

Struggles Over Schooling

The debate surrounding the new method is not easy to chronicle. Unlike the copious critique of the maktab produced by the Jadids, critics of the new method did not appear in print very often, and we are left to glean the nature of those criticisms from the Jadids' criticism of their critics in newspaper debates.

Opponents of the new method also appear, in heavily caricatured form, in Jadid literature and drama.

The fundamental criticism of the new method was that it contravened customary practices surrounding the transmission of knowledge. If the possession of those practices made one a member of the Muslim community, then their contravention was construed by many as an act of secession from that community. As Fitrat's mudarris put it simply, "These schools turn our children into infidels [kafir]."[64] Nor was this merely a literary topos: in December 1913, the imam at the Ulugh Bek mosque in Samarqand declared in a Friday sermon that the new method of education and learning Russian were against the shariat and that those who sent their children to a new-method school were infidels.[65] In 1914, a new-method school in the Maddahi quarter of Samarqand was prevented from opening by residents who would not allow a "Russian school" in their midst,[66] while in late 1916, posters bearing a similar condemnation appeared in Bukhara.[67] These schools also did away with the texts traditionally used in the maktab, which popular opinion held to have been established as part of the canon by Imam Abu Hanifa (the founder of the Hanafi school of fiqh) himself.[68] New-method schools were considered unacceptable also because they used a simplified alphabet and because children sat on benches, "like Russians."[69] The new body language inculcated in new-method schools provoked, not surprisingly, a great deal of debate and hostility toward the Jadids. The Jadids' denigration of the standard texts of the maktab as nonsense and sophistry, and their re-

[64] Fitrat, Munazara, 37.

[68] Munawwar Qari, "Bizni jahalat."
[69] Haji Mum, Eski maktab, 42.

placement of these texts by primers and textbooks, also provoked suspicion. In the tradition of the maktab, the written word possessed a sacred aura; the use of lighthearted stories about animals and of songs in the new-method curriculum offended many sensibilities.[70] Customary practices had been valorized into immutable tradition partly as a result of the Russian conquest and now served as
markers of the local Muslim community and of the status of elites within it. The maintenance of such markers was especially important to the notables created by Russian rule itself if they were to act as intermediaries between two distinct communities. Jadid reform, and most specifically the new-method school, threatened to undermine the status quo.

The Jadids argued for the legitimacy, and indeed the superiority, of their method through recourse to the nation, Islam, and science. Fitrat's response to the charge that new-method schools turn children into infidels was to claim that, on the contrary, these make children "perfect Muslims and well-trained patriots [mu'addib watanparwaran]."[71] At the same time, the Jadids argued that it was the maktab that failed to transmit "proper" Islamic knowledge to children. Fitrat was more caustic in 1917 in his response to the anonymous posters in Bukhara; pointing to the poor grammar and spelling of the posters' text, he wrote: "Even if the backwardness of Bukharans in commerce, morals, science, and industry ... is not obvious to the writers of the posters, it is obvious to others.... Even when we see the scientific wonders of the world, such as the telephone, the telegraph, or the railway, we do not have anybody who can learn their secrets. We do not even have people who, having graduated from a madrasa, could write posters ... correctly.[72] Munawwar Qari argued that it was simple ignorance (jahl) to think that the canon used in the maktab had been created by Abu Hanifa because poets like Fuzuli, Sufi Allah Yar, and Bedil had not been born in Abu Hanifa's time.[73] The Jadids also pointed to the example of other Muslim countries where the phonetic method had long been in use.[74] As for sitting on benches, Haji Muin invoked the authority of modern science to argue that it was far more sanitary and hygienic than sitting on the ground because children were thus protected from the harmful moisture of the ground.[75]

In the end, though, the best argument for the new method was its efficacy in imparting functional literacy, which had increasingly become more valued. Consequently, the Jadids borrowed from Russo-native schools the custom of making the annual examinations a public occasion to which local notables were invited to see for themselves the achievements of the new system. Visitors could ask children questions, and the children recited prayers and read from the Qur'an to impress skeptics. Such occasions, complete with printed invitations and elaborate notices in the press (including the TWG), became important public events in the consolidation of Jadidism as a social phenomenon.

[71] Fitrat, Munazara, 23.
[73] Munawwar Qari, "Bizni jahalat."
[74] Fitrat, Munazara, 23; Munawwar Qari, "Bizm jahalat."

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argue that it was far more sanitary and hygienic than sitting on the ground because children were thus protected from the harmful moisture of the ground.[75]

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Official Suspicions
The state, once it had decided to intervene in local cultural life, proved to be very jealous of its turf and wary of initiatives from other sources. As early as 1871, Said Azim-bay had petitioned Kaufman for funds to enable the teaching of Russian script in certain madrasas. The suggestion aroused some interest in Kaufman but died a natural death in the labyrinths of bureaucracy.[76]

Similarly, in 1892, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii "took the liberty" of sending Governor-General Vrevskii a brief printed memorandum he had prepared the previous year for a functionary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, identified only as Vashkevich, who had been sent to the Crimea to report on the possibility of reorganizing the religious and educational administration of the region's Muslims. The only reason Gasprinskii gave for this approach was that he knew that Vrevskii was "interested in everything that pertain[ed] to the Muslim school,"[77] but he obviously hoped that his views would at some level influence official policy. In the memorandum, Gasprinskii suggested that the "weak urge among Muslims to learn Russian, explained usually by their fanaticism or their isolation," stems from rather different reasons. The traditional maktab was so time consuming that it left children no time to devote to Russian; the solution was to make the teaching in the maktab more efficient, which would free up time necessary for learning Russian.

For Gasprinskii, the solution lay in the creation of "higher madrasas," reformed madrasas, funded where possible from waqf funds, where Russian language and principles of law and pedagogy would be taught; such madrasas would serve as channels for obtaining religious and pedagogical positions.

Much of this did not apply directly to Turkestan, where no spiritual administration existed, but it was still a very modest proposal, couched in terms that officialdom would understand. It sought justification for the new-method maktab not in the backwardness of Muslim society and the need for self-improvement, as was to become the norm in Central Asian Jadid rhetoric in the following decades, but in the need for Muslims to learn Russian. This was where Gasprinskii hoped his proposal might strike a chord with Turkestan.
authorities, exercised by the lack of interest among the local population in learning Russian. Nevertheless, the memorandum encountered much hostility in Tashkent. The governor-general's chancellery passed the memorandum on to two local orientalist-administrators, Ostroumov and V.P. Nalivkin, for comment. Nalivkin found Gasprinskii's main point, the need for Muslims to learn Russian, to be "incontestable," but felt that very similar actions had already been undertaken by the administration itself; Gasprinskii's attention was not welcome because he did not know local conditions and his primer, written in Crimean Tatar, was of little use in Turkestan. "It would be lamentable," Nalivkin concluded, "if in the matter of the enlightenment of the natives of Turkestan Russian authorities turned for help to Tatars in general, and to a Tatar such as Mr. Gasprinskii in particular. As editor of the Crimean Tatar newspaper Terjüman, Mr. Gasprinskii has, over
[78] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 11, d. 806, ll. 2-3.

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the course of many years, distinguished himself by a direction so anti-Russian that there remains no possibility of believing his readiness to serve Russian affairs. In the note presented by him, I see nothing more than an attempt to secure ... some influence in the affairs of the Muslims of Turkestan."[79] Ostroumov, too, was appalled at the temerity of an inorodets to meddle in a question of state: "In the matter of the education of inorodtsy in Russia, we need the direction of a Russian member of the Ministry of Education, not that of a Tatar inorodets, vehemently defending the inviolability of inorodets way of life with all its peculiarities... It would be absurd!"[80] Not only was Gasprinskii meddling in affairs of the state, but he was a Tatar. The memorandum was therefore put to rest in the files of the bureaucracy. Gasprinskii traveled to Central Asia himself the following year and met officials in Tashkent, as well as Amir Abdulahad of Bukhara, but with little result.[81] He opened Samarqand's first new-method school in the house of a Tatar merchant, but the school soon ran into trouble; a year later, when Gasprinskii wrote to Ostroumov, asking him to intercede, the school had still not received official sanction.[82]

Official Russian reaction to Jadid schools stemmed from a long tradition of thinking about Muslim affairs in the empire. State officials and policy makers since Il'minskii and Pobedonostsev had been wary of a Muslim community (and inorodtsy in general) that, led by a modern-educated intelligentsia instead of the traditional religious elite, would demand its rights on a political plane. The Jadids represented political awakening and separatism. For conservatives such as Ostroumov, who set himself as the enlightener of the local population, any unsanctioned attempt to spread enlightenment was by definition a political act contrary to Russia's state interests. At bottom was a tension, never resolved, in official thinking between the universality of the enlightenment and the strategies dictated by empire. Knowledge was the antidote to fanaticism, to be sure, but it had to be the right kind of knowledge, officially sanctioned and monitored, for otherwise knowledge and modern education could become dangerous political phenomena, leading to political or even "separatist" claims. In this

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sense, the Jadids were the true believers
[79] Ibid., ll. 6-70b.
[80] Quoted in Bendrikov, Ocherki, 254.
[82] Gasprinskii to Ostroumov, 19 November 1893, TsGARUz, f. 1009, d. 50, l. 19.

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in the universality of enlightenment; Gasprinskii's denial of Muslim fanaticism subverted the colonial order and therefore rendered him suspect for pursuing the enlightenment project too far. In another memorandum of 1901 on "the progressive movement among Tatars," Ostroumov had taken to task all Tatar publicists for harboring anti-Russian sentiments.[83] The solution was to foster organic change in the madrasa while fostering officially supervised education "in the spirit of Russian state interests," using administrative regulations, inspections, and censorship to ensure compliance.

All these fears seemed to be vindicated in 1905, when maktabs and madrasas remained immune from the political activity that seized all other educational establishments of the empire. The revolution produced a honeymoon between officialdom and traditional maktabs and madrasas. In an article in the Journal of the Ministry of Education, Ostroumov waxed lyrical about the particular attention to strong discipline and obedience paid in the madrasas of Central Asia, which he compared to Orthodox seminaries of old Russia.[84] After 1965, therefore, the state came to favor the old-style maktab more and more. As the minister of internal affairs wrote in a 1913 circular to governors of all provinces of the empire with a Muslim population, the traditionalist ulama, "being motivated purely by religious conviction, are, without realizing it themselves, ... allies of [the state] Power in the struggle with the undesirable (from the state's point of view) nationalization of the Muslim school."[85]

In Turkestan, however, real concern with Jadid activity emerged only in 1908, when the education administration received an application for permission to open a new-method school. The school opened by Gasprinskii had left little trace in the files of the bureaucracy, and others had long existed without any permission being requested or granted. In the best traditions of Russian bureaucracy, the request was denied because no clear guidelines existed for schools that, unlike confessional schools, would also provide instruction in nonreligious subjects. An interdepartmental correspondence regarding the status of these schools ensued, which resulted in Governor-General A.V. Samsonov writing to the min-
[85] Circular from Minister for Internal Affairs, 22 September 1913, TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 943, l. 3.
ister of education for guidance on the question in September 1911.\[86\] Once word
was received from St. Peters burg, Samsonov issued a circular on 25 January 1912,
outlining the new regulations that were to govern new-method schools in
Turkestan down to 1917. The new regulations allowed new-method schools to be
opened with due permission from the Inspectorate of Education in Tashkent.\[87\]
Applications were to be accompanied by a lesson plan and a list of textbooks to
be used.\[88\] It was to be strongly recommended to each applicant that Russian be
taught in the school. Most important of all, these schools were brought under
imperial legislation of 27 October 1907, which required teachers in elementary
schools for the inorodtsy to be either Russian or else belong to the same
nationality (plemia , literally "tribe") as the students.\[89\] The law further
required that teachers be properly certified according to legislation dating
from 1892, which restricted certification to those who had completed their
education in the Russian empire.
The new legislation was directed especially against the Tatars who were
prominent among teachers in new-method schools. Jadid teachers were in short
supply in Turkestan, and founders of new-method schools in the region often
found it more convenient to hire Tatars, even though they did not speak the
vernacular, than to find potential teachers locally. The law was meant to
cripple the fledgling new-method schools of Turkestan by depriving them of their
surest supply of teachers. Henceforth, each community was to produce teachers
from among its own numbers, or else be dependent on Russo-native or Russian
schools. These regulations created grave difficulties for Jadid schools by
providing the state any number of pretexts for closing them, although the
enforcement of these regulations remained, as ever, subject to individual zeal.
As a matter of fact, the law forbidding teachers to teach children of other
nationalities had already been enforced by city authorities in Kokand in
December 1910. Seven schools were closed down in Kokand despite the
\[86\] TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 1148, l. 54.
\[87\] TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 1149, ll. 10-100b. These regulations have also been
published in, inter alia , A. Mukhammadzhanov, Shkola i pedagogicheskata mysly
\[88\] In practice, it seems, an application for a new school also required
information about the place where the teacher received his education (or the
books he used for self-study) as well as his domicile. The application was to be
submitted to the local pristav (prefect), who would then investigate the
admissibility of the schools as well as the political reliability of the teacher
before granting permission (Mahmud Khoja [Behbudi], "Maktablargha rukhsat almaq
\[89\] "Vysochaishe utverzhday Pravila o nachal'nykh uchilishchakh dlia
inorodtsev," enacted by P. fort-Kaufman, Minister of Education, in TsGARUz, f.
19, d. 35019, l. 51.
intercession of Russian and German members of the Kokand chamber of commerce (birzhevyi komitet) on behalf of local notables.[90] On 23 January 1911, when parents of the affected children petitioned the governor of Ferghana to allow the Tatars to continue to teach, the governor disallowed the petition because "the same, and even better, results may be obtained in Russo-native schools, about the opening of which the petitioners may present an application with an undertaking to take the expenses upon themselves."[91] Even greater problems arose in Semirech'e, which had a small, mixed urban population of Tatars, Ozbeks, and Qazaqs, and where practically every school was ethnically mixed. The inspector in Przheval'sk was indulgent (he was highly impressed by the academic achievements of students he had inspected in such schools), but the one in Vernyi closed down six schools.[92]

The fear of the new-method schools also took the form of constant suspicion about the textbooks used in them. In September 1911, the education administration in Tashkent sent out a circular asking local officials to investigate reports that certain Jadid textbooks contained passages from the "oppositional" newspapers of 1906-1908.[93] Although no such passages were found, S.M. Gramenitskii, director of schools in Syr Darya oblast, suggested tightening censorship over textbooks used in new-method schools.[94] This would, of course, have been an impossible undertaking considering that the local administration had only a few bureaucrats trained in local languages. There were numerous expressions of the sentiment that these schools could not be outlawed because of the "fanatical" nature of the local population, or, more realistically, because such an action would serve only to push them underground, and hence render them more difficult to control.[95] Wary of phenomena it did not understand, and yet unwilling to ban them outright, the state chose instead to keep them on a short leash.

[90] TsGARUz, f. 19, d. 35019, l. 630b; Bobrovnikov, "Russko-tuzemnye uchilishcha," 71-73.
[91] The petition with 351 signatures and the governor's reply is in TsGARUz, f. 19, d. 35019, ll. 63-630b.
[92] TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 1149, ll. 38, 48-51, 69-75.
[93] TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 1148, ll. 59, 62.
[94] Ibid., l. 161.
[95] See, e.g., the opinion of the Inspector of Schools of Ferghana oblast, 1 February 1910, in TsGARUz, f. 19, d. 35019, l. 90b; also S.M. Gramemtskii, Polozheme morod-cheskogo obrazovanna v Syr-Dar'mskoi oblasti (Tashkent, 1916), 71-72.
The nation (millat) was the locus of Jadid reform, and sentiments such as these by Tolagan Khojamyarov Tawalla suffuse the work of practically every Jadid writer. For the Jadids, their concern for the nation set them apart from others in their society who recognized only particular, selfish interests. However, such concern was something new: Traditional Central Asian visions of history had revolved around dynasties or tribes. Now new understandings of the world engendered new notions of identity. But if the nation was central to Jadid thought, its boundaries and the manner in which it was to be delineated remained in a state of flux, for the nation was imagined in complex ways that at first sight appear mutually contradictory. Nonetheless, all of them were modern, and all of them helped define how the Jadids acted in the world both before and after 1917.

Despite the overriding importance attached to questions of identity in current writing on Central Asia, pre-Soviet identities remain poorly understood. Most writers writing outside the Soviet paradigm hold one of two views about pre-Soviet identity of Central Asians. One asserts that Central Asians before 1927 lacked all forms of identity except the religious. As late as 1926 the renowned Russian orientalist V.V. Bartol'd could write, "The settled peoples of Central Asia are in the first place Muslims and think of themselves only secondarily as living in a particular town or district, to them the idea of belonging to a particular stock is of no significance."[1] Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-

Quelquejay, whose work has been enormously influential, extended this to the Jadids as well: "In Turkestan and the two protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva, ... the national movement ... assumed, after the defeat of Russia by Japan, a fundamentally pan-Islamic character.... Educated for the most part in the conservative medresehs, the young reformist intellectuals moved rapidly towards the left. Their nationalism, inspired by the teaching of Jamaleddin al-Afghani, was fundamentally hostile to Russia and the Russians."[2] In a more blunt formulation, this becomes a situation where as late as 1917, "Muslims were victimised by their own backwardness [and] ethnic or tribal rivalries.... Their political development hardly embraced the idea of class or of nation, being centred round Islam and the tribe or clan."[3] One hesitates to attach a label to a view so characterized by absences, but one might call it the "Muslim" view.

The second view, particularly popular in Turkey but also widely held in European and North American academe, might be labeled "Turkist." It holds that Central Asians were part of a single "Turkish" nation that extended from "the shores of the Bosporus to the sands of Kashgar," that all Turkic languages were essentially one mutually intelligible language, and that relations between
various Turkic-speaking groups were characterized solely by respect, solicitude, and a will to unity.[4] Rooted in the hopes of Crimean and Volga Tatar intellectuals (the most prominent of whom was Gasprinskii), this notion of Turkic solidarity was popularized by Turkic émigrés in republican Turkey, whose claims have too often been taken at face value. Both these views see the emergence of distinct nations in the 1920s as the result of imperial fiat, a classic case of divide and rule, imposed by an omnipotent regime on a helpless victimized population. They both also share the view that Central Asian identities were focused elsewhere and that Central Asians were only passive participants in larger dramas being played out elsewhere.

[2] Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union, trans. Geoffrey E. Wheeler and Hubert Evans (London, 1967), 47. The authors present no evidence for their categorical assertion of the overriding influence of Afghani in Central Asia; they also exaggerate the "leftist" or revolutionary stance of the Jadids.


[4] This position has never been explicitly formulated, but is often taken for granted; see, e.g., Nadir Devlet, Rusya Turklerinin Millî Mücadele Tarihi (1905-1917) (Ankara, 1985). Its popularity (and the passion that it arouses) is evident to anyone who has attended a gathering of Central Asian studies or seen the question debated on the Internet.

For its part, Soviet scholarship offered a different narrative of Central Asian identities. It asserted the "objective" existence of nations since time immemorial. History was the process of the elaboration and refinement of these national identities through processes such as ethnogenesis. This obviously romantic idea had, from the beginning, formed the basis of Bolshevik (and hence Soviet) understanding of the "national question."[5] This view of things, "naturalized" by the existence of statistical data on each nation, is also often adopted by many writers abroad without much curiosity about the origins of either the nations or the data.[6] Despite the often bitter polemics between the holders of the "national" and "Turkis," views, the two share certain fundamental assumptions. They both take for granted the ontological existence of nations, the assumption that nations are "sociohistorical organisms," sharing common origins ("ethnogenesis") and united by common "historical destinies." The difference is simply that whereas the Turkis, view insists on the existence of a single "Turkish" nation, the "national" view holds that there are several Turkic nations. The collapse of the Soviet Union has done little to challenge the belief in the reality of the nation among intellectual and political elites in formerly Soviet lands.[7]

All three views, for different reasons, largely ignore how Central Asians imagined their community and how those views evolved over time. This is especially true of the debates of the tsaris, period. Yet, those debates are crucial to understanding the transformations of the 1920s. Attention to them
allows us to question primordial discourses of identity by examining how such
tonitudes evolved over time in concrete historical circumstances. The aim in this
chapter is to rescue history from
[5] For an excellent examination of this fundamental trait of the Soviet polity,
see Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State
[6] For a critique of this literature, see John Schoeberlem-Engel, "Identity in
Central Asia: Construction and Contention in the Conceptions of "Özbek,'
'Tâjik,' 'Muslim,' 'Samarqandi,' and Other Groups" (Ph.D. diss, Harvard
University, 1994), 44-72.
[7] The use made of such "organismic" views of the nation (and national destiny)
by political elites in the newly independent countries of the former Soviet
Union is not simply a matter of political calculation. Rather, it represents a
dominant paradigm widely shared in the (formerly) Soviet world that remains
strong in academic circles as well. A lengthy debate on questions of nationality
and national identity in the Moscow journal Etnograficheskoe obozrenie
(Anthropological Survey) between 1994 and 1996 produced views that ranged from
asserting the "objective reality" of ethnicity (S. A. Arutiunov,
"Ethnichnost'—ob'ektivnaia real'nost',' Etnograficheskoe obozrenie , 1995, no.
5, 7-10) to an attempt to replace "ethnos" or "nation" with "socio-historical
organism" as "the most important category of historical science" (Iu. I.
Semenov, "Sotsiosial'no-istoricheskie organizmy, etnosy, natsii,"
Etnograficheskoe obozrenie , 1996, no. 3, 3-13).

the hegemony of the nation by showing how the nation itself is the product of
history.
All nations are imagined, but they may be imagined in a number of ways. Benedict
Anderson has drawn our attention to the ways in which new means of
communications and new regimes of power make possible new ways of imagining
community.[8] However, his insistence that nationalism emerges only with the
demise of broader notions of community diverts attention from the many different
ways in which the nation may be imagined. Print, the census, and the globe made
it possible for the Jadids to see themselves as citizens of a modern,
interconnected world, of a community of Muslims within it, and of a community of
Turks that overlapped with the community of the world's Muslims. As I show
below, these various visions of the world coexisted, sometimes in a state of
tension, until well after 1917.

Premodern Identities
"There is no Persian except in the company of a Turk, [just as] there is no cap
unless there is a head to put it on" (Tatsiz Türk bolmas, bashsiz börk bolmas ),
went a Turkic proverb recorded by the eleventh-century lexicographer, Mahmud
al-Kashghari.[9] Maria Eva Subtelny has rightly used this to investigate the
symbiosis of Turkic and Iranian (or Tajik) elements in Central Asia.[10] I wish
to go further and suggest that the mutual dependence to which the proverb refers
may be seen at a more fundamental level. Only the existence of a Persian made a
Turk a Turk, and vice versa. The symbiosis of Turkic and Iranian in Central Asia
was not the coagulation of two preexisting wholes; rather, it was the very
encounter that shaped the two components of the symbiosis. Without the
opposition, each side of the symbiosis remained a variegated expanse.
Iranian speech varied greatly, although the emergence of a high literary
tradition had ensured a great degree of standardization of the written language,
which tended to mask the differences in regional usages. The language was always
referred to as Farsi, Persian, and never as Tajik. The differentiation of
speech was much greater on the Turkic side, which
[9] Mahmud al-Kasyari, Compendium of the Turkic Dialects (Diwan Luyat at-Turk),
Manz, ed., Central Asia in Historical Perspective (Boulder, Colo., 1994),
45-61-1 owe the reference to the proverb to Subtelny.

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extended far beyond Central Asia to Anatolia and the Balkans in the west, the
Volga and the Urals in the north, and the Gobi desert in the east. This vast
array of dialects, gradually merging one into another, was united only in
opposition to Iranian. In the period after the fifteenth century, two literary
standards (Ottoman and Chaghatay) emerged, but their impact on spoken dialects
was minimal, for skill in the literary form of either Turkic or Persian was a
sign of culture and virtuosity, not a source of national pride. Indeed, a saying
current in the late nineteenth century even asserted that "Arabic is honor,
Persian baseness, [and] Turkic dirt" (lisan-i arabi sharafat, lisan-i farsi
qabahat, lisan-i turki najasat).[11] Each language had its appropriate range of
use. Arabic was entrenched in the madrasa, whereas Persian remained the language
of the chancery in Kokand and Bukhara until their respective ends (only in Khiva
was Turkic used extensively in the chancery). Thus, there was no paradox
involved in the fact, embarrassing to both Iranian and Turkic nationalists
today, that Firdawsi composed his immortal Shahnama under the patronage of
Mahmud of Ghazna, a Turk. At the everyday level, Iranian speech in Transoxiana
acquired Turkic lexical and grammatical elements, while Persian models imbued
all literary Turkic. Bilingualism was widespread even in the countryside, and
the cultural capital of any cultivated individual included a knowledge of the
high traditions in both idioms.

As labels for population groups, too, "Turk" and "Tajik" operated only on the
most general level. Contrasted to "Iranian," "Turk" denoted all groups of Turkic
speech in Central Asia, but it also had more specific uses. After the last wave
of Turkic migration into Transoxiana during the Shaybanid conquest, "Turk" came
to be used exclusively for the older Turkic population of the region; the
newcomers were called "Ozbek." This narrower sense of "Turk" survived down to
1917.[12] Other tribal conglomerates, such as the Qazaq, the Qïrghïz, and the
Türkmen, retained their distinctive identities, rooted in myths of origin that
defined them against other groups in Transoxiana. There were also smaller, more
localized groups (such as the Moghuls of eastern Bukhara and the Qurama of the
Chirchik valley) that did not fit the various tribal federations neatly and
therefore remained distinctive. Moreover, the "ethnic" sense of "Turk" and "Tajik" did not coincide with language use. It was quite

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possible for groups to identify themselves as Ozbek while speaking only Persian, as was the case with many Ozbeks in Bukhara.[13] In 1949, the anthropologist Belqis Karmysheva found groups in Baljuwan who claimed descent from "Turk" tribes but spoke only Persian and considered themselves "Tajiks of Turkic descent [Tadzhiki roda tiurk ]."[14]
Urban dwellers, many of whom did not use tribal designations, were referred to variously as "Tajik," "Sart," or "Chaghatay," regardless of speech. The usage of these terms was neither constant nor universal (as nineteenth-century scholars were to find out to their chagrin), but varied over time and place. The term "Sart" was not used in Bukhara, for example, where the term "Chaghatay" had currency. Although Russian scholars were to distinguish between the two on the basis of language, the relation between Sart and Tajik, often mentioned as synonymous in Timurid sources, was far more complex. As late as 1880, Sulayman Efendi, the shaykh of the Bukharan Naqshbandi lodge in Istanbul, described "Sart" to his Ottoman audience as "tribes of Tajik and Persian origins living in Turkestan; also called Tat."[15] In practice, Sarts and Tajiks were marked as different by their urban status, not by common origin or language. A nineteenth-century history from Kokand used Sart (sartiya ) to oppose the sedentary population of the khanate to the nomadic (ilatiyya ).[16] To paraphrase John Schoeberlein-Engel, seeing the Sarts as an ethnic group or a nationality is analogous to seeing all town-dwellers of southern Europe as a nationality.[17] Nor did these label exhaust the diversity of the urban population, where groups such as Sayyids and Khojas asserted their distinctiveness on the basis of their sacred descent, even though they spoke the same language as their neighbors. The same held true, at the other end of the social spectrum, of the Loli, the "gypsies" of Central Asia, whose identity was defined by their profession.
[17] Schoeberlem-Engel, "Identity in Central Asia," 141 (who makes this observation in examining a definition of Tajiks as the settled population of Central Asia). On Sarts as a social, rather than an ethnic, entity, see also
Individuals felt themselves to be Ozbek or Turk or Tajik not through some abstract sense of belonging to a national group but through the concrete fact of being born in a family that was located socially in a ramified structure of relationships conceived in kinship terms. Tribal designations were far more significant to individual identity than broader categories such as "Turk" or "Tajik." There is no reason to assume that individuals classified by court chroniclers as "Turk" would have felt any affinity for each other, or that divisions between Turk and Tajik or Ozbek and Sart mentioned in the literary sources implied anything but divisions among the court elites. Among the sedentary population without tribal divisions, geographical designations played a similar role. Thus, the sedentary Turkic-speaking population of Khwarazm, called "Sart" in Khwarazm, were called "Urganji" (after the town of Urgench) in Bukhara.

Group identities in pre-Russian Central Asia presented a complex mosaic of fragmented identities intimately intertwined with the social and economic fabric of the land. Community was not conceived of as an organism. Nor were the various identities mutually exclusive: One could be a Sart, a Khoja, and a Turk at the same time. Genealogical explanations were used to assert the origins of groups or social practices; but there is little reason to take these explanations at face value (as indeed they have been by numerous scholars, who all too easily assimilate them into theories of "ethnogenesis"). Arguments based on the organic unity of populations with common genetic descent are hazardous enough at the best of times; they have even less applicability in Central Asia, with its centuries of migration, warfare, and social dislocation.

Islam and the Nation
The Jadids defined the nation in a number of ways. Take, for instance, this appeal addressed by the editor of Tojjar to his "compatriots" (watandashlar):

In our time there is not a single nation that doesn't have tens or hundreds of newspapers and magazines in its own language, for the twentieth century deems any nation not having publications in its own language savage and uncivilized by time itself.... O compatriots! ... By virtue of the manifesto granted by our emperor on 17 October 1905, we too acquired ten or fifteen newspapers and magazines and thus became aware of the world.... But because these newspapers and magazines were in Turkish or Tatar [turkcha tatarcha], and not in the pure language of Turkestan, it was generally not possible for the Muslims of Turkestan to benefit from them.... Now it is ob-
publish a newspaper in the language of Turkestan, that is, in Chaghatay.[18] The "we" refers in the beginning to the Muslims of the Russian empire, but then is quite explicitly narrowed to refer only to the "Muslims of Turkestan." At other times, Jadid authors referred only to "Muslims," but again the context made it clear that the intended audience did not comprise Muslims generally but only the Muslims of Central Asia. Similarly, when the protagonist in Haji Muin's play Old School, New School declaims, "At present, we Turkestanis are not sufficiently acquainted with religious and worldly knowledge,"[19] he clearly has in mind the Muslim population of Turkestan, local Jews and all recent settlers being implicitly excluded from the intended audience. Reference to the Muslims of Turkestan abound in Jadid writing of the period. If the Jadids were nationalists, they were so on behalf of a nation defined in both territorial and confessional terms.

The nation was rooted historically. It is significant that the history taught in new-method schools of Turkestan was that of Islam, not Turkestan or the Turks. The prior golden age of the nation with which the Jadids identified was that of Islam, or more precisely, of the glorious empires built by Muslim dynasties. Jadid writings are replete with references to this earlier age, which served both to highlight the degradation of the present as well as to justify the reforms they advocated. Thus, Nushirvan Yavushev claimed that madrasas in the glory days of Islam offered a full curriculum of worldly as well as religious sciences.[20] Usually, however, the historical legacy was delineated more precisely. The names of Bukhari, Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ulugh Bek were invoked to highlight the past of a Central Asian Muslim nation.

This community had all the characteristics of a nation. We find the expression "Muslim language" (musul'manskü iazyk, musulman tili) in both Jadid and official Russian discourse. Ingeborg Baldauf, the only scholar to have remarked upon this phenomenon, confuses the issue needlessly when she writes: "I do not dare to answer the question whether the introduction of a 'Muslim language' along with the existence of a 'Muslim nation' is to be regarded as a homage to the romantic identification of a nation with its tongue, and vice versa. We might, however, regard the musulmon tili as a 'pseudo-language.'"[21] There was nothing pseudo about the Muslim language. The expression again was a product of Russian usage. For Russian bureaucrats, anything written in the Arabic script or incomprehensible to all but the few trained orientalists among them was "Muslim." Thus, the administration granted separate licenses to booksellers for the sale of books po-rnusul'manski ("in Muslim"), regardless of the language. This usage was adopted by the local population, although it clearly meant the

[18] "Matbuat alami, yaki sabab-i ta'sis-i ghazita-yi 'Tojjar',' Tojjar , 21 August 1907.
language of the Muslims of Turkestan. The newspaper Tojjar proclaimed on its masthead that it was published in "the Muslim language" (musulmancha ). But this usage was obviously understood in a strictly local context, as a language of the Muslims of Central Asia, for the same newspaper claimed in its first issue to be filling a gap created by the fact that the ten or fifteen newspapers that appeared in the wake of the October Manifesto of 1905 were all "in Turkish or Tatar [turkcha tatarcha ] and not in the pure language of Turkestan."[22] The Muslims of Turkestan were a nation, but that nation was not defined by its language in the romantic mold.

And the uses of the nation were entirely secular. As with any other nation, the Muslim nation of Turkestan existed alongside many others, and its essence was political rather than religious. The "others" could be conceived as religious or national entities, although given the realities of the time, the two tended to coincide. Jadid authors constantly pointed to the Jewish and Armenian communities as both sources of danger and models for emulation.

We Muslims have been left behind in everything. In matters of trade we are the prisoners of Jews. There's no place more important than unskilled labor or salaried work left for us local Muslims. Drivers, carriers, diggers, watch-men, in short, those performing menial labor are all Muslims, but their employers, the owners of large buildings, the masters of the stores are all Jews. The small Jewish nation [millat ], without any protectors, has taken all trade in its own hands.

We do not complain of the Jews, to whom we have no enmity. They have achieved this status through their own energy and expertise. Bravo! The fault is our own. We did not take the path taken by the Jews in trade and we did not learn the things learned by the Jews.[23]

For Hamza, the "most basic reason for their [Jews' and Armenians'] being able to command so much wealth so quickly ... is their knowledge of commerce in organized schools and universities."[24] These communities proved to the Jadids the truth of their general assertion that knowledge was the key to progress. At the same time, they were the perfect example of a Darwinian world in which survival was assured only by disciplined effort.

In many Jadid writings, the distinction between Islam as a faith and Muslims as a community disappears completely. Behbudi once urged his compatriots to educate their children to become "judges, lawyers, engineers, teachers, the supporters and servants of the nation, ... who would work for the true faith of Islam."[25] This was the new language of group survival, of progress and modernity.

Similarly, Tawalla had in mind the progress and prosperity of the nation of Muslims when he titled a collection of his poetry The Splendour of Islam . Russian bureaucratic practices, which emphasized religious affiliation as a
significant marker of classification, contributed to self-identification in this form. Although the nation of "the Muslims of Turkestan" was connected to other Muslim communities in the Russian empire and beyond, it remained a delineated, territorial entity in which ethnic identities were clearly subordinate to a more general, patriotic identity. The desacralization of Islam and the absence of theological debate, both noted above, meant that the Jadids' priorities tended to be the concerns of the community rather than of the faith. Such secular confessional nationalism was hardly unusual at the turn of the century, as the rise of Zionism attests. In the Muslim world it arose in a variety of contexts, the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, in which the nationalisms of its subjects in Europe were all fueled by fervent anti-Muslim feelings, being the most significant. Ottomanist intellectuals, such as the Lebanese Druze Amir Shakib Arsalan, looked to Islam to provide a rallying point in their struggle against imperialism. In a different political context, the highly secularized Muslim elites of India found in Muslim "communalism" a node of politically significant loyalty. After 1917, the Tatar Mirsaid Sultangaliev was to advocate class war in defense of a proletarian Muslim nation.[26]

[25] [Behbudi], "Amalimiz ya inki muradimiz," Ayina , 7 December 1913, 155.

The line separating the Muslims of Turkestan from those of other areas could be porous. In 1904, Tatar public figures began organizing a political movement that sought to represent all the Muslims of the empire in one organization. Although Turkestan and Bukhara remained largely marginal in this movement, the idea that the Muslims of the Russian empire belonged to one community was often invoked. Behbudi could claim, for instance, that "we Muslims constitute the second largest nation [millat ] in the Russian empire."[27] The affinity the Jadids felt with Muslims elsewhere in the world is obvious from the intellectual milieu in which they lived and worked. But this was a very different matter than the "pan-Islam" whose dread filled the hearts of colonial officials all over the Muslim world. Russian officialdom spent a great deal of time worrying about pan-Islam and the dangers it posed to the stability of the empire. It located its sources in the "fanaticism" of Muslims, which needed only a spark to ignite. That spark could come, many in Russia feared, from agents of the Ottoman sultan, and the Okhrana, the tsarist secret police, assembled a vast archive on the subject. Its agents saw Turkish emissaries everywhere they looked, although none were ever apprehended. The kernel of truth on which these fears were based was provided by Ottoman attempts under Abdülhamid II to forge links with Muslim populations in the colonies of European powers primarily to provide his empire some diplomatic leverage. But
the success of that enterprise was vastly circumscribed, and Ottoman intrigue
does not explain the phenomena that worried the Okhrana.
Pan-Islamic sentiment was undoubtedly significant in Central Asia before 1917,
but its sources lay not in the fanaticism (inherent, yet malleable by malign
forces such as Turkish emissaries) of the Muslim masses, as colonial officials
feared, but in Muslim elites' encounter with modernity. Pan-Islam was not (and
could not have been) the result of manipulation from outside. During the last
two decades of the tsarist regime, Russian officialdom was seized with the fear
of "Turkish emissaries" roaming the empire and sowing seeds of fanaticism and
separatism among its Muslim population. Yet, in those years the Ottoman empire
faced immense problems externally and political instability domestically. It did
not have the resources necessary to mount such an operation, and Ottoman
archives

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have yielded no evidence of it ever having been mounted.[28] Nor was it a
throwback to some primordial sentiment traceable to the teachings of the Qur'an.
Rather, pan-Islamic sentiment was rooted in modernity, which made it possible
for the first time to imagine a community encompassing all the Muslims of the
world. We have already seen the wide circulation of the printed word among
Muslim elites throughout the world, which allowed new links to be forged. The
Jadids belonged to perhaps the last generation of Muslim intellectuals who could
communicate with each other without the use of European languages. Muslim
newspapers of the period frequently quoted each other. The Jadid press
(especially in the freer period of 1906-1908) gives evidence of a fascination
with Muslims all over the world. There are numerous stories about the spread of
Islam in Europe and extensive, optimistic coverage of an imminent explosion of
interest in Islam in Japan, the one non-European power to have asserted its
presence in the world.
This sense of unity was given a very visible form by modern geography and
cartography. The novelty of this sense of the world is often not appreciated.
Bernard Lewis, among others, writes that in the "Muslim world view the basic
division of mankind is into the House of Islam ... and the House of War.... The
one consists of all those countries where the law of Islam prevails, that is to
say, broadly, the Muslim Empire; the latter is the rest of the world."[29] But
the fact remains that the "House of Islam" was never imagined in a geographical
sense, and the legal theory did not by itself bring about a consciousness of
unity. (In any case, there is little evidence that legal theories influenced
political and diplomatic practice as directly as Lewis asserts.) Rather it was
globes, atlases, and postcards bearing maps of the Ottoman empire or the route
of the Hijaz railway that allowed the Muslim ummah to be imagined as a
geopolitical entity for the first time in history. Munawwar Qari's geography
textbook, which provided a country-by-country account of all the major countries
of the world, also included statistics on the number of Muslims in each
country.[30]
Yet, this was very different from the pan-Islam that Abdülhamid II sought to use
as a diplomatic tool against European powers, since it did not automatically serve Ottoman state interests, nor was it instigated by


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Ottoman agents. Nevertheless, as the last Muslim state left in the high age of European imperialism, the Ottoman empire took on a great symbolic value to Muslims living under colonial rule, and its travails, especially during the second constitutional period, provoked sympathy among Muslims worldwide. The wars in North Africa and the Balkans were assiduously followed by the Muslim press of Russia (including the TWG) and provoked much angst. We have not had the means to enter the private world of the Jadids during this period, but a personal letter from Sadriddin Ayni I found serendipitously provides a first glance. Writing to a friend in March 1913, while Balkan armies laid siege to Edirne, Ayni has this to say: "The news from the war is very bad.... [But] the second war is altogether more cheerful than the first. Even women are present in the service of the wars and the soldiers. The unbelievers are united in their attempts to destroy the Muslim world, whether through war or through peace. The difference is that if they destroy it through peace, the Muslim world will be destroyed disgracefully [razilana]; if they destroy it by war, we will be martyred with honor [namus]."[31] Ayni sent along pictures from the press of Sukru Pasa, the defender of Edirne, and a group of Tatar women doctors who had volunteered to serve in Ottoman field hospitals. He also wrote an ode to Sukru Pasa in Turkish. The same sense of impending doom was evoked three years earlier by Fitrat, who concluded his Debate with an impassioned appeal to the amir to act before "the enemies of our faith of Islam conquer all Muslims... and demand that we renounce our religion... and replace our imams with priests, our call to prayer with bells, and our mosques with churches."[32] Before we rush to declare these statements expressions of age-old Islamic fanaticism, we might do well to remember that the language of honor used here would not have been alien to anyone in Europe at that time. Nor should we forget that the anti-Muslim sentiment that had fueled every Balkan nationalism was commonplace in contemporary Europe. The plea to do something before all mosques are turned into churches evokes this experience, which was very current to people in Istanbul. Moreover, pan-Slavic sentiment was widespread in Russia during the Balkan wars, as numerous societies emerged to aid the struggle.

[31] Private letter dated 10 Rabi’ II 1331/7 March 1913, in the possession of Dr. Elyor Karimov, Tashkent, to whom goes my gratitude for allowing me to quote from it.

[32] Fitrat Bukharayi, Munazara-yi mudarris-i bukharayi ba yak nafar-i farangi dar Hindustan dar bara-yi makatib-i jadida (Istanbul, 1911), 65. This plea was excised from the Turkic translation published legally m Tashkent in 1912.

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of fellow Slavs against Muslim oppression, and anti-Muslim sentiment remained an integral part of official Russia's self-perception. Nor was the role of print incidental in understanding how a Bukharan mudarris came to write poetry in honor of a foreign general defending a city the author had never seen. Pan-Islam was located squarely in the twentieth century.

For the mass of the population, Islam continued to be embedded in everyday practices mediated by men or women of learning. Pan-Islam as a phenomenon of the reading or hearing public remained a matter of elite concern. Different elites in different Muslim countries looked at Muslim unity through the prism of their own struggles (within their own society as well as with colonial authorities). No organizational structure for pan-Islamic unity ever existed. In Central Asia, it was rooted in the anxieties of the Jadids themselves, which alone shaped their activities. More importantly, even for the intellectual elites, pan-Islam was never the sole identity or course of political action.

**Romantic Nationalism**

The idea that humanity is divided into discrete nations united by a language and common descent through history arrived in Central Asia in full force from two different directions. In the eighteenth century, the Russian state had become interested in knowing more about its subjects. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the major axis of classification had come to be the nexus of race, nationality, and language. From the beginning, Russian officialdom had looked to anthropology to render Central Asia comprehensible by classifying its inhabitants. These new classifications, created to understand and control the local population, became integral to bureaucratic practice in Central Asia, and from there entered local understandings of identity.

[33] On the eve of world war in 1914, an official publication claimed: "The majority of the people of the East were Muslims or inclined to this faith (Tatars, Kirgiz, Bashkirs). Sometimes among them appeared emissaries of the Turkish sultan. Already in the seventeenth century, Russia's role as the main and most dangerous enemy of the Mahomedan world had been defined, and therefore the Mahomedan world attempted to unite for a more successful struggle with Russia." S.M. Seredonin, "Istoricheskii ocherk zavoevaniia AziatskoiRossii," in Azatskaia Rossaia, 2 vols. (St Petersburg, 1914), I: 26.

[34] The several international Muslim congresses did, after all, not amount to much; see Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (New York, 1986). The first such congress, held in Cairo in 1907, at the initiative of Gasprinskii, failed to excite even the Okhrana; the disappointingly slim dossier is in GARF, f. 102, op. 238, d. 289.

The same understanding of community underlay the vision of the various nationalist movements in the Russian and Ottoman empires, even though the political aims of these movements were often diametrically opposed to those of officialdom. Romantic ideas appealed to Turkic intellectuals in the two empires, who began to reimagine their histories toward the end of the nineteenth century.
Given the nature of the romantic nation, and the fact that they tapped into common sources (new findings in history, Turkology, and anthropology) and common sensibilities (enthusiasm for romantic nationalism under the influence of pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism), these groups soon discovered mutual affinities, and the idea of a broader pan-Turkic nation emerged. The study of these various Turkisms (Tatar and Crimean nationalisms in Russia and Turk-ism in the Ottoman empire) has been long been overshadowed by an emphasis on the purely political side of pan-Turkism, with the result that the complex connections and contestations between them are poorly understood.

The writings of Turkic émigrés from Russia in the Ottoman empire, such as Yusuf Akçura, Agaoglu Ahmed and Huseyinzade Ali, brought the most extreme versions of the two currents together in pan-Turkism, which professed the goal of the political unity of those who belonged to the Turkic race/nation. Such pan-Turkism, however, was not synonymous with the variegated discourse of Turkism. Pan-Turkism may have had limited success as an intellectual movement, but the more basic idea of the affinity of various Turkic groups, and the knowledge of their Turkness, rapidly suffused all notions of identity in the Turkic world.

Central Asia was of great importance to Turkists, both as the original homeland of the race/nation (the Turan celebrated most famously by Ziya Gokalp as "the homeland of the Turks, neither Turkey, nor Turkestan / but a great and eternal land: Turan"), and also as the home of a large Turkic population. Turkist intellectuals in both empires (although in vastly different conditions) produced a vast corpus of literature that depicted Central Asia as part of a much larger community marked by race and language. This literature was widely read in Central Asia, and although no Central Asians contributed to it, its fundamental premises seeped into Jadid thinking about community and shaped the manner in which they imagined the world and their place in it.

Sart and Tajik

The romantic idea of the nation wreaked havoc on older notions of community and identity. Armed with an understanding of the world that saw it divided into discrete groups, amenable to rigorous, "scientific" classification if only...
sufficient "objective" data could be obtained, Russian officials and scholars proceeded to find the objective reality behind every label they encountered in their new domains. The enumeration and classification of the population that ensued created new understandings of old labels. The complexities of Central Asian identity were nowhere better demonstrated than in the case of the "Sarts." The career of this label in the half-century of Russian rule demonstrates the forces at work in shaping identities in Central Asia.

For reasons that remain unclear, "Sart" became the term most commonly used by the Russians to denote the sedentary population of Central Asia after the conquest. It was used in several different ways. "In common parlance and every day life," a German geographer wrote in 1914, "the Russians use 'Sart' in much the same way as British colonists would speak of 'niggers.' It is applied to all and sundry 'natives' whose dress does not single them out at once (Jews, Turkmen, Kirghiz) or who are not evidently foreigners (Europeans, Afghans, Chinese, Hindu, etc.)."[38] Officials and scholars sought to use the term in a more precise manner, to apply it only to the "real" Sarts. The precise demarcation of the community united behind the label remained in question, but officials and scholars never doubted that the acquisition of sufficient objective information would provide the answer. The Sarts existed as an organic entity; the problem was to define them precisely. The answers could be sought in the realms of science or history, but not social practice, for how the people defined themselves was of very little importance to the concerns of "science."

For physical anthropologists, craniological measurements provided a key to the Truth that was often clouded by social conventions of naming. Similarly, although orientalists exhaustively examined the etymology of the term and its occurrences in historical texts, they did not deign to look at how the term was used in actual practice (but then that has never been the concern of orientalism).

The earliest Russian observers often saw no difference between the terms "Sart" and "Tajik." Iu. D. Iuzhakov, arriving in Central Asia with the armies of conquest, reported that the two terms were synonymous and both referred to the sedentary population of the region. His informants, most likely Tatar or Qazaq interpreters, had apparently told him that this population had descended from Jews and Iranians, an explanation he found convincing. Iuzhakov felt he knew the natives well enough to report, "In their terrible greed for money and their thievery, they exceed even the Jews. In their manners, the tone of their conversations, their cowardice, in the pettiness of their interests, and in the complete absence of political tact, they are, precisely, Jews." The fact that some Sarts spoke "their own language ... a mixture of Turkic and Persian in which the Turkic element strongly predominates," whereas others spoke a variety of Persian, was not of sufficient importance for him to override the common genetic origins as a marker of identity.[39] The stereotypes Iuzhakov used continued to be invoked down to the end of the old regime, but the linguistic
distinction, so unimportant to him, soon emerged as all-important, and "Sart" came to be applied in Russian bureaucratic practice exclusively to the Turkic-speaking parts of the sedentary population of Central Asia, while "Tajik" was reserved for those of Iranian speech, the widespread bilingualism ignored for being too cumbersome.

Such a definition of "Sart," which distinguished Sarts from Tajiks on the one hand and other Turkic-speaking Central Asians on the other, proved difficult to establish in practice. Science came to the rescue. A. Bogdanov used craniological data to argue that Sarts and Ozbeks were distinct peoples.[40] The anthropologist N.A. Aristov suggested a narrower definition of "Sart" to rescue the term from popular misuse. Real Sarts were, for Aristov, "sedentary Turks and Turkicized natives who have already lost their tribal way of life and the tribal divisions connected with it," and the term should only be applied to them.[41] The notion of


"Turkicization" also evoked racial admixture (already foreshadowed in Iuzhakov), which proved compelling to the romantic imagination and soon became a characteristic trait of the Sarts.[42] Orientalists, on the other hand, sought the answer in philology. Perhaps the most influential view was formulated by Bartol'd. For Bartol'd, "Sart" was an old Turkic term, of Sanskrit origin, meaning "merchant," which in the post-Mongol period came to be used as a synonym for "Tajik" in referring to bearers of the Persian Muslim culture of the towns, in opposition to the nomadic Turkic culture of the steppe. The distinction between Turk and Tajik was of little interest to the Ozbek conquerors of Central Asia, and after the sixteenth century, "Sart" distinguished the sedentary population of the conquered territory from the conquerors and their allies. Gradually, "under the influence of the conquerors," the town-dwellers began to call themselves Sart, "but the tribal differences between Turks and Tajiks were so great that the representatives of both peoples could not call themselves by the same name. Since the majority of the settled population now spoke Turkic, urban Turks began to be called 'Sarts,' in contradistinction to not just the nomads, but also the Tajiks."[43]

This approach was in many ways typical of the orientalist enterprise. The etymology of the term "Sart" was the key to the business of understanding who the Sarts were. Similarly, if the term appeared in historical sources, then Sarts must exist as "a people," and today's Sarts must have something to do with
the Sarts mentioned in those sources. Much of Bartol'd's evidence comes from a few scattered references in historical sources, all produced at court and usually referring only to court elites, which he sees as proof of his fundamental assumption that stable labels refer to stable communities, which retain their organic unity through the ages.[44]

[42] This explanation especially found wide acceptance in more popular works; see, e.g., A. Kruber et al., eds., Aziatskaia Rossua: illiustrirovannyi geograficheskii sbornik 3rd ed. (Moscow, 1910), 189; or V. I. Masal'ski, Turkestansku krai (St. Petersburg, 1913), 392-393.


[44] This is also the approach taken by Yuri Bregel ("The Sarts in the Khanate of Khiva," Journal of Asian and African History 12 [1978]: 120-151), who on the basis of literary references to a division of notables among "Sarts" and "Uzbeks" in Khiva concludes that Sarts "were definitely considered by the Uzbeks as a different ethnic group, a different people." Bregel's insistence that the Sarts were distinguished by a specific political position defined "by the role of their [sic] leaders in the government" makes it seem as if the Sart notables who laid claim to certain positions at court actually represented other Sarts in the affairs of government. This betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of both power and community in premodern Central Asia, for there is no reason to believe that Sart notables felt any affinity for, or were capable of mobilizing, peasant Sarts in the rest of the country.

One person not daunted by the complexity of the problem was Ostroumov. In a work titled Sarts: Ethnographic Sketches, he reviewed the "scientific" literature on the question for forty pages, but then concluded simply that "Sarts are the sedentary natives, predominantly of the Syr Darya and part of the Ferghana oblasts."[45] (Ostroumov clearly never paused to wonder at the neat coincidence of ethnic distribution with recently created administrative boundaries.) What Ostroumov thought was important, however, because his control of the TWG and his stature as an orientalist allowed him to elaborate a Sart language, distinct from Ozbek and other Turkic dialects, as a literary language. Russian orientalism knew the Turkic speech of the sedentary population of Transoxiana as "Sart," and in addition to Ostroumov's exertions at the helm of TWG, grammars and dictionaries of the Sart language made their appearance.

"Sart" also appeared as a category in the all-Russian census of 1897. The census made a brave attempt to reduce the empire's ethnic complexity to the simplicity of numbers. Although the census did not have a category for "nationality" as such, it did classify people according to native language, which was believed to be the primary attribute of a nation. The purpose was largely defeated in Central Asia. The census counted Ozbeks and Sarts separately but left a large part of the population classified simply as "Turkic" (tiurkskii) (see Table 7). This could have been an attempt to distinguish between "Ozbek" and "Turk"—the census does not make this clear—but since the same classification was used in other regions of the empire for very different groups of Turkic speakers, it
confounded not only local statistics but also those at the all-Russian level.[46] (There were other instances of less than consistent usage: In some tables, Tatars were counted separately, but in others they appeared only as speakers of "Turko-Tatar languages." In any case, "Tatar" covered the Turkic languages of the Volga, Urals, Crimea, and


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CLASSIFICATIONS USED BY THE 1897 CENSUS

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ferghana</th>
<th>Syr Darya</th>
<th>Samarqand</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>64,235</td>
<td>725,602</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>7,958</td>
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<td>1,478,398</td>
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</table>

SOURCE : Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naselenna Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g ., vols. 83, 86, 89 (St. Petersburg, 1905), table 13.

The basis of classification was native language. "Kirgiz" included both Qazaq and Qirghiz; "Tatar" included Volga, Crimean, and Transcaucasian ("Azerbaijani") speech.

Transcaucasia.) Nevertheless, enumeration produced new understandings of community. To say that in 1897 in the three core oblasts of Turkestan there were 951,337 Sarts who were only Sarts and nothing else transformed the meaning of the term by abstracting it from the contours of local relations and oppositions. It is difficult to judge whether the official use had any resonance among the population itself. To be sure, official favor for the term "Sart" led to its use, especially in bureaucratic contexts, and the TWG helped popularize the new understanding of the term. This usage was also accepted by Tatar writers, who found the notion of racial admixture as the explanation for the origins of the group quite compelling. The Jadids of Central Asia, however, were resolutely opposed to the label. Criticism of the official use of the term came as early as 1893, when concern that Russian functionaries should learn local languages led to the creation of language courses for them. One of the languages scheduled to be taught was Sart. Sher Ali Lapin, whom we will encounter again in Chapter 8, an interpreter in the chancellery of the governor of Samarqand oblast and a Qazaq himself, argued in a
lecture that "there is neither a Sart people, nor a Sart language." Rather, the word was a contraction of sari' it, "yellow dog," a derogatory appellation used by Qazaq and Qırghız nomads for all sedentary people, regardless of ori-

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gin. "We have no basis for calling the language of the Sarts 'Sart,' since the language of the Sarts includes both Tajik and the language of the sedentary Ozbeks; therefore the language should be called . . . the Ozbek language, in the dialect of the sedentary Ozbeks."[47]

Lapin was taken to task by Bartol'd, then working on his doctorate in Tashkent, who was surprised that "Mr. Lapin decided to speak with such aplomb about things with which he apparently has not the slightest acquaintance." Rejecting the explanation of the origin of the term put forward by Lapin as mere folk etymology, Bartol'd fixed the explanation in the proper realm of high culture, citing references to the term in the literary and historical sources of the post-Mongol period.[48] When Lapin had the temerity to reply in print, Bartol'd heaped further condescension on him. Writing in Turkestanskie vedomosti, where Lapin had responded, Bartol'd presented a long list of faulty citations and misquotations committed by Lapin, before concluding: "In printing Mr. Lapin's article, the editors proceeded from the opinion that the inclination to scientific work on the part of a native in any case represents a gratifying phenomenon that must be supported by every means. No one disputes this; but no one expects native writers to attain at once the scientific standards established by European science as a result of long experience."[49] Having crushed the native beneath the weight of the long experience of European science, Bartol'd went on to indulge in orientalism's fetish with literary etymologies, elaborating in the process his theory of the origins of Sart. No more was heard from the native side for a decade and a half.

When the issue arose next, it was taken up with the Tatars, who used the term routinely. In 1911, Behram-bek Dawlatshaev, the highest-ranking interpreter in Bukharan service, broached the topic in Shura, perhaps the most respected magazine in the Tatar world. "Are we Sarts or Turks?" he asked the editors in the regular question-and-answer section of the magazine. Turkestan means "the land of the Turks," he asked, "so why is it that we are called 'Sarts'? Is it that in earlier times Turks lived in this 'land of the Turks,' but later left it, leaving their name behind? If so, then where did the people called 'Sart,' that is, us, come from and when? . . . And how is it that we inherited Turkic literature? Did the Turks

[47] Quoted in Bartol'd, "O prepodavanii tuzemnykh narechii v Samarkande" (1894), m his Sochineiiia? ?, II/2: 303-304.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Bartol'd, "Vmesto otveta g-nu Lapinu" (1894), in Sochineiiia , II/2: 508-309.
leave it to us? Or did we take it, and the land, from them by force?"[50] And so forth. No Tatar writer responded, but Behbudi joined in with a lengthy article in which he argued that the origins of the word "Sart" were unknown and that it was used pejoratively only by the northern neighbors of Central Asia (Qazaqs and Tatars, from whom the Russians took it). "Upon asking Qazaqs 'Whom do you call a "Sart,"' I usually received the answer, 'Those who travel around our steppe' (meaning all traders)." The term was not used by those labeled "Sart" themselves, Behbudi further argued: "Those who have no interaction with the Russians or are unfamiliar with the press think it is the Russian word for 'Muslim.'" Finally, Behbudi noted, there were ninety-two tribes in Turkestan, but none was called Sart.[51] Behbudi was backed by his friend Baqa Khoja, who in a long article denied the existence of a Sart people. "The inhabitants of Turkestan, that is, Turan and Transoxiana, are, from the point of view of race and nationality [jinsiyat wa qawmiyat ], predominantly Turks and Tajiks." The opposition of Turk and Tajik had become a metaphor among "oriental poets," but neither old Arabic, nor Persian histories, geographies, or dictionaries contained the word "Sart." Quoting Russian authors in the original, he went on to show the many, often contradictory, explanations given for the word. "To call the Ozbek Turkic inhabitants of the five oblasts of Russian Turkestan and the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva 'Sart' is an injustice, the despotism of opinion, the cause of doubt and division; [in short,] a huge mistake."[52] The same conclusions were reached by Dawlatshaev when he himself answered the question he had raised. The matter was simple: "We Turkestanis are Turkic Ozbeks who belong to more than one hundred tribes [awmaq ] of the Mongol people [qawm ] and the Turkic race [urugh ]." The proof was simple and lay in the Turkic speech and literature of the region, as well as in its ruling dynasties. The 92 tribes "renowned from olden times to the present" had increased to over zoo, he argued, and he appended a list of 111 tribal names then current. "Now, if foisting the name 'Sart' on [the population of] Turkestan, composed of 'more than a hundred Turk-Mongol tribes,' whose history, literature, language, and [50] Sbura , 15 August 1911, 504.

customs are Turkic, is not an injustice, what is?"[53] The debate flared up again, but this time in Behbudi's Ayina , in early 1914, in response to an article by the young Bashkir historian Ahmed Zeki Velidi in which he spoke of "Sarts." Behram-bek Dawlatshaev again expressed his displeasure with "those writers who, not knowing that we Turkestanis belong to over a hundred Turkic tribes, call us 'Sart,' as well as those who, knowing full well that we are Turks, call us 'Sart' by way of insult."[54] Two weeks later, Ayina published an open letter with seven signatures expressing displeasure over the use of the term "Sart" when "everyone knows that the population of Turkestan is composed of
Ozbek, that is Turkic, Tajik, that is, Persian [Fars khalki], and Arab (Khoja) groups.

Behbudi took this opportunity to republish the 1911 articles from Shura in modified form.

Beyond such "ethnographic" debates, "Ozbek" also appeared occasionally in Jadid literature as synonymous with the nation. In a poem published in 1916, for instance, Hamza used Turkistan eli ("the people of Turkestan") and Ozbek eli ("the Ozbek people") interchangeably in exhorted the nation to "not sleep in this age of progress."

Not everyone in Central Asia shared the Jadids' position. Not surprisingly, TWG took the lead in criticizing the Jadids. A student from Osh wrote in 1913 to criticize those who wanted to protest the use of the term on two counts. First, "Sart" was not a pejorative term but rather carried connotations of "royal descent" and "philosopher." Second, the author asked if a change in terminology would make the people of Turkestan stronger or more developed?

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Other writers argued that this search for roots was a form of nationalism and divisive of the Muslim community and that labels were not important, since "the name of the renowned and developed Nemets [German] nation comes from the word nimoi, which means 'mute.' But they respect this name and do not worry about changing it. They have not lagged behind because of this name, but are the most developed; the cause for their renown is not their name, but their good morals." An author, writing under the pseudonym "Sart,

[58] Mirza Qadirjan Qabiljanbayev, "Haqqamyat," TWG, 10 January 1913.

Son of Sart [Sart oghli sart]," contended that "we Sarts do not hate the name, since our faith does not consider names and lineages important." Nevertheless, the Jadids' opposition to the term "Sart" was significant for various reasons. In disowning it, the Jadids were as far from the pre-Russian usage of "Sart" as a social marker as were Russian scholars and functionaries, but whereas the latter searched for the nation hiding behind the label, the Jadids rejected it because, they argued, there was no nation there. Nations were objective identities, but their objectivity was defined by race; hence the concern with biological origins, which made Tajiks into Iranians and Khojas into Arabs. The fact that Behbudi, with his cosmopolitan tastes, moderate politics, and Muslim education, was so prominent in demanding the use of the "proper" names for the people of Central Asia indicated how far Turkism had crept in around the edges into local discourses of identity. "In our age, the 'national' [milliyat ] question has taken precedence over the question of religion among Europeans," wrote a writer who unfortunately remained anonymous, "so there is no
harm if we too occasionally discuss the 'Sart' question, which is considered a national question, and thus remember our nation."[61] Indeed, the Tatar writer Abdurrauf Muzaффar made the point, quite popular in Ottoman circles at the time, that "religion exists only on the basis of the nation and national life A religion without a nation is destroyed."[62]

It is equally important that criticism of the use of "Sart" was directed against Turkist authors. The discourse of Turkism was polyphonic, and the debate described above was an attempt by Central Asian writers to define their own version of Turkism. More significant, especially with hindsight, is the fact that the distinction between "Ozbek" and "Turk" disappears entirely. The ninety-two tribes mentioned by Behbudi were the ninety-two tribes of the Ozbek confederation in the aftermath of the Shaybani conquest of Transoxiana and did not encompass the entire Turkic-speaking population of the region. No wonder, then, that they turn into "more than one hundred tribes" in the hands of Dawлатшав. Ozbekness became, for the Jadids, a defining feature of the Turkic-speaking population of Central Asia. We are reminded of Wickmer's ob-

[60] Sart oghli Sart, "Otvet zhurnalu 'Aina,'" TWG, 27 April, x and 4 May 1914.
The pseudonym is significant, since this form was popular with Turkist authors in the Ottoman empire.


The insistence on the "proper" identification of peoples led to the disaggregation of the sedentary population along newly drawn ethnic lines. The most difficult disentanglement was that of the Tajiks. The longstanding dichotomy of Turk and Tajik was invested with new meaning. Now the difference was seen to reside in the realm of nature and was described in a new language, such as in this description of the Tajiks of Bukhara that appeared in Sbura:

"Although the Tajiks are Iranian and their language Persian, their religion is Sunni. Their name emerged from their animosity toward the Shi'is .... Their
faces are straight, their women renowned for their beauty. They are assiduous and masters of commerce, but [also] deceptive and have low morals."[64] The low levels of morality and general effeteness of the Tajiks, taken whole cloth from contemporary European anthropology, appear quite frequently in Jadid writing. Criticisms of the maktab often carried an anti-Iranian subtext. A Jadid schoolteacher complained that although old-style maktab teachers "are Turks, [they] do not know their mother tongue and do not teach it, but rather look upon it... with hatred. Instead, they waste the poor children's time with Persian fairy tales and puzzles, whose harmfulness in the present day is quite obvious."[65]


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This re-visioning of identity remained an exercise in exclusion, since we have little evidence of any parallel assertion of Iranian or Tajik (or Aryan) identity among the Iranophone population of Central Asia. The few instances in which romantic notions of Iranianness appeared in print were all connected with the Turkist enterprise. The Transcaucasian editor of Bukhara-yi sharif published a language tree that placed Persian in its "proper" Aryan context. In another issue we read: "There are [between] 10 million and 12 million Muslims in Turkestan, Transoxiana, Bukhara, and Khiva. Approximately 7 million of them are Ozbeks, Turkmens, and Qïrghïz Qazaq, who belong to Turanian nations [umam-i turaniya ], and are Turks; their national language is Ozbek or Chaghatay Turkic. The remaining [sic] z million are Tajiks, who belong to the Aryan nations [umam-i ariyaniya ], and are of Iranian origins; their literary language is also Persian."[66] Beyond this, however, there was little discussion of Tajik or Iranian identity in Central Asia until well into the 1920s.

Watan
Patriotism (watanparwarlik ) was also an important virtue for the Jadids. Abdullah Awlani placed it in the realm of nature when he suggested that even animals and birds love the place where they are born. Because of this natural feeling, Arabs continue to live in their blistering hot deserts and Eskimos in the cold north, "just as we Turkestanis love our homeland more than our lives."[67] In its traditional meaning, the term watan meant merely one's birthplace. By the period under consideration, however, it had been attached to the nation, although its boundaries remained ambiguous. The Jadids used the term in many different ways. The most common use of "watan" was to denote Turkestan in the Russian administrative sense of the term. At other times, its extent was vaguer, incorporating the protectorates and even Chinese Turkestan, and after the outbreak of war in 1914 "watan" often meant the Russian empire. But these were all purely territorial designations. The millat and the watan defined each other in the most common designation of the nation, the Muslims of Turkestan. Similarly, the term "Turan," which became quite popular in the early twentieth century in Central Asia (it was borne by three different newspapers, and Awlani used it for
a reading room and a theater troupe he organized) did not carry the baggage attached to it by Turkists elsewhere. Rather, in Central Asia it signified "Russian Central Asia" (Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khiva), as when Behbudi wrote of "the 20 million Muslims in Russia, of which half are us Turanis."[68]

But romantic discourses had begun to encroach on this notion and to impart to it a new meaning. In its extreme formulation, this new understanding of Turkestan as the homeland of the Turks differed markedly from its premodern usage (which in Persian had connoted the land where Turks, as opposed to Iranians, predominated, just as there was an Arabistan and a Hindustan), for it now came with claims of political primacy (and ultimately sovereignty) and cultural hegemony for the nation to whom the homeland "belonged." As such, it was profoundly subversive of the symbiosis of Turks and Iranians that had existed in Transoxiana for several centuries. This was explicitly stated by the Istanbul Turkist journal TÜ>rk Yurdu, which criticized the fact that Bukhara-yi sharif was being published in Persian "when [Bukhara's] people are entirely Turks and children of Turks [Türk oglu Türk ]."[69] Elsewhere, the same journal expressed the hope that "since the Bukharans are all Turks, the situation [of Persian being the official language] will change in the near future. The official language and the publications of [this] Turkic state will of course be Turkic, and the Persian language will be used, to an extent proportionate to their numbers, only for the few Tajiks who have immigrated from Iran."[70] This argument was reproduced almost intact by Dawlatshaev, who claimed that Turan, the land north of the Amu Darya, had always been Turkic, and that the prevalence of Persian speech, limited in any case only to the three cities of Bukhara, Samarqand, and Khujand, was the result of forced migrations of Iranian population by the Turkic Ozbek khans of Bukhara in previous centuries, and of the high esteem for Persian literature among urban sophisticates.[71] The claim was preposterous, of course (and perhaps because of this it has resonated ever since in nationalist discourses in Central Asia) but, given the basic premises of the new notions of identity, logical in its own way. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that although the essential Turkicness of Turkestan was thus asserted, it did not automatically imply that it was the homeland of all Turks or that all Turks had equal claims to it. The Central Asians might be Turks, but for the Jadids they were so on their own terms. Even

as they discovered common ties with other Turkic peoples, the Jadids drew lines marking themselves off from them.

Language
If the rhetoric of the homeland marked Central Asians off from other Turks and Muslims implicitly, debates over language did so quite explicitly. At bottom lay the brand-new idea that (as a local author put it) "every nation takes pride in its language."[72] Language had never served as a marker of identity in Central Asia, and the idea that an individual should work and feel pride in his or her native language would have been incomprehensible a generation earlier. Romantic notions of nationhood were partly the cause, but the real change came with schooling. If functional literacy was a desired goal, it had to be achieved only in the child's native language. A central point in the Jadids' criticism of the old maktab was that a number of texts used in it were in Persian, which the children could not understand. The need for textbooks written in the vernacular led to the elaboration of a modern literary Central Asian Turkic language. The fact that the maktab did not teach language as such now came to be seen as a major shortcoming. Before it could be taught as a subject, however, language had to be abstracted from lived experience and rendered into an object of study. This process began with the publication in 1916 of a volume on orthography by Ashura Ali Zahiri.[73] At the same time, the Jadids hoped to simplify the written language and bring it closer to speech. The process was not simple, of course, as models, both lexical and grammatical, were borrowed indiscriminately from Tatar and Ottoman.[74] Jadid authors began to use new letters to represent the phonemes 

and /v/. But the trend toward simplification by ridding the language of borrowings from Persian and Arabic, common to all Turkic languages of the period, and underlain again by romantic notions of authenticity, was less successful in Central Asia than anywhere else. Authors commonly doubled more arcane (Arabic and Persian) words


The logic of simplifying and rendering the written language closer to the spoken led to the crystallization of distinct literary standards. The history of the transition of numerous Turkic dialects from speech to print languages is a contentious matter. Turkists insist that all Turkic languages are essentially a single language, arguing that the distinction between Turkic and Turkish does not exist in Turkic languages and that the distinctions between the "dialects" have been imposed by the divide-and-rule policies of the Soviet regime. The argument is specious, since it misrepresents the situation until the nineteenth
century and refuses to acknowledge the transition from spoken to print language undergone by all Turkic languages since then. Historically, Turki/Turkcha referred not to a single language but to a range of dialects sharing a common grammatical structure. Until the nineteenth century, two literary standards coexisted, each with its own orthographic conventions and rules of syntax. However, because literary standards were as much about virtuosity as about communication, their connection with spoken speech was minimal. The roots of the Turkist contention lie in the late nineteenth century, when Gasprinskii, motivated by the hope of bringing about the unity of deed, thought, and language (İşte, fikirde, dilde birlik, in his words) among the Turks of the world, sought to create a common literary language out of the numerous dialects that had begun to appear in print. This hope became a fundamental plank of Turkist thought, for if Turks were a single nation, then they had to share a common language. Terjüman, written in a simplified form of Ottoman, was widely read throughout the Turkic world, but the rapid rise of Tatar as a literary language at the end of the century put paid to the hope of creating a common Turkic language. The Transcaucasian press also retained peculiarities of local speech in its orthography. Written in the Arabic script, which concealed differences in vowels, all these variants remained mutually comprehensible in written form, but clearly local variants had emerged as full-fledged languages. The market and the ideal of schooling in the vernacular (with the emphasis on comprehension and literacy) combined to create new literary languages out of mere dialects. For literary languages are not a product of nature but are created historically through complex interactions of states, markets, and academies. Ultimately, the best analogy for the development of the Turkic languages is to be drawn with the manner in which imperial courts, national markets, and (later) academies marked off ranges of Romance dialects into the national languages of today. Some, such as French, Spanish, and Italian, became "national" literary languages, while others, such as Catalan and Provençal, remained (at least until recently) dialects. The Soviet period was different in the systematic manner in which languages were delineated one from another, but the process had begun well before 1917.

In Central Asia, where the spoken language was close to the literary standard of Chaghatay Turkic (which has the same relation to the Uzbek of today that Ottoman has to modern Turkish), the debates about the creation of a common language around a modified Ottoman, so dear to Gasprinskii, had little appeal. The only trace of this debate in the Jadid press of Central Asia is a short piece by Haji Muin. Titled "On Language Unity," the piece is notable more for its brevity and casual tone than for its content. There was little to indicate that the article addressed a burning issue of the day. Haji Muin wrote: "In my opinion, the first step in this direction would be to replace the words not understood by most
Turks with those understood by all." He went on to provide a list of words that Tatar authors might replace with their Chaghatay equivalents.[76] The problem would be solved if the Tatars deferred to Central Asians. The language of Central Asia might have been called "Turkic" (turki, turkcha), but it was always qualified as "Turkestan Turkic" (Turkistan shewasi, Turkistan shewa-yi turkiyasi). Similarly, primary school textbooks in Central Asia were avowedly written in "Turkestani Turkic" (Turkistan shewasida, achiq tilda), as was prominently displayed on their title pages. This was to be a common language for all of Turkestan but not one common to all of Turks of the world. Local authors whose writings bore Tatar or Ottoman influences were criticized for not writing in Central Asian Turkic. A reader criticized Awlani on this count: "Only a person who knows Ottoman [usmanlica] can understand his poems. Now, at least Ottoman is a delicious and very literary dialect [lehya]; but what do we have to do with Tatar, which neither our literati, nor our stu-


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dents know?"[77] There were instances when local newspapers refused to print articles because they were not in the local language.[78] Reviews of theatrical performances published in the Jadid press often criticized Transcaucasian Muslims and (especially) Tatars, who were prominent in the first years of modern theater, for declaiming in their own languages, which, according to the reviewers, were not easily understood by the audience.[79]

But what was the "Turkestan Turkic" to be? Behbudi's Ayina was published, according to the Turkic inscription on the title page, in "Turkic and Persian [turki wa farsi orta shewada]," the Russian inscription on the same page, however, described those languages and "Ozbek and Persian [na uzbekskom i persidskom iazykakh]." Much as the Jadids had come to see the "unmarked" Turkic population of Central Asia as Ozbek, so they saw its Turkic speech as Ozbek. The roots of modern Uzbek predate the Soviet regime.

The Muslims of Turkestan

"Of course," Behbudi concluded his article criticizing the use of the term "Sart," "they will ask, 'What should we call you if we can't call you Sart?' The answer is very easy: the Ozbeks of Turkestan, the Tajiks, Arabs, Turks, Russians, Jews of Turkestan. If they say, 'We're unable to distinguish the Turks, Arabs, and Persians [Farsi] of Turkestan from one another, and need a name common to all,' we say, 'Write "the Muslims of Turkestan [Turkistan musulmanlari]."'[80] The Muslims of Turkestan constituted the Jadids' nation. It was a secular nationalism in which concern for the welfare of Muslims firmly took precedence over questions of religious doctrine. Jadid affinities extended beyond Central Asia, and the Muslims of Central Asia were part of larger communities (the Muslims of Russia and the Muslims of the whole world), nonetheless the politically significant identity remained the local, territorial one. The Muslims of Turkestan were to form the most significant node of solidarity in 1917.

[77] Rasuli, "Shair wa milli she'rlarimiz," Ayina, 14 February 1915, 214. Such
disdain for Tatar was not unusual; Behbudi once called it "a corrupt and base dialect": "Khatirat-i Farghana," Shuhrat, 8 January 1908.

[78] See, for example, the editorial response to M. Mirza Hamidzada (probably a Transcaucasian Muslim) in SF, 9 October 1914.


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At the same time, romantic notions of community had seeped deep into Central Asian discourses. The Jadids professed profound interest in their "national" origins. Acts of implicit exclusion came to define the Muslims of Turkestan primarily as Turks, and those Turks primarily as Ozbeks. However, these acts remained implicit until late 1917, when events forced a changed. In the meantime, the territorial, confessional, and national identities coexisted, as the following "Categories of Islam," taken from Munawwar Qari's primer for new-method schools, show: "Arab Turk Fars Ozbek Noghay Tatar Bashqurd Persiyan [sic] Cherkes Lezgin Tekke Turkman Afghon Qazaq Qirghiz Qipchaq Tungan Taranchi Hahafi Shafi'i Maliki Hanbali Ja'fari. All of them believe in the existence and unity of God and the prophecy of Muhammad, on whom be peace."[81]


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Chapter 7
Navigating the Nation
The recentering of social vision on the nation brought with it new responsibilities and new claims to leadership. The Jadids claimed to be motivated by the good of the nation, while their criticism of various groups in society emanated from the perception that these groups were not playing their proper role in the development of their community. Jadid authors routinely decried the selfishness and parochialism of their opponents, whether wealthy merchants who spent their money on extravagant feasts or traditionalist ulama who opposed the new method. More pertinently, it was the Jadids who, in the name of the nation, claimed the authority to define social roles and obligations for the new age. If the Jadids were important to the nation, so too was the nation important to them.

Overtly political action directed at the state occupied only a small part in the struggles of the Jadids before 1917. The possibilities for such action remained slim, even after 1905, as Turkestan's colonial position dictated its marginalization from the empire's experiment with quasiconstitutionclaim. When the greater self-assurance of the Jadids by 1914 led many of them to engage in politics, their strategies were defined by the twin needs of working within the existing legal framework and of asserting their claim to speak for the nation in the political realm. The nation of the Jadids was located at a specific point in
Turkestanian society, which their universal claims sought to hide. The Jadids' own position in society thus shaped their political action in fundamental ways.

The Location of the Nation

In attempting to locate the nation of the Jadids in society, we might begin by examining more closely their dire warnings about extinction and destruction. Whose survival was at stake? Quite clearly, there was no threat to the physical existence of the population of Central Asia in the way that was conceivable for, say, the Crimean Tatars. There was also no pressure of assimilation through proselytization or forced conversion, as had been the case with the Volga Tatars (which had left a deep imprint on Tatar Jadidism). Rather, the fear was of something else. For Behbudi, it was "imperative that we reform our schools, our shops, our workshops, our madrasas, [in short] everything, according to the needs of the age. Otherwise, we will lose everything and nothing will be left for us except menial labor."[1] This fear of immiseration appears again and again in Jadid writing. The extinction that the Jadids warned about was the extinction of the elites of Muslim society.

The challenge therefore was to create an elite that could participate in the new imperial economy. The clearest expression of this again comes from Behbudi, who as a man of substance and consequently moderate tastes in politics realized the need to work through the system, a position that his generally cautious approach to politics tended to confirm. "We Muslims constitute the second largest nation [millat] in the Russian empire," he claimed at a fund-raising event during the First World War, "but unfortunately, in the affairs of government . . . we are one of the smallest.... In order to benefit from the state and to enter government office, we must send our children to government schools."[2] Elsewhere, Behbudi suggested that money spent by the wealthy on ostentatious feasts would be much better spent providing children with an education that would allow them to become "judges, lawyers, engineers, teachers [zamana maktabdari], the supporters and servants of the community, i.e., deputies to the State Duma, technicians to reform our workshops [milli sanaatkhanalarimiz], people who have studied the science of commerce to help us in commercial establishments and banks, i.e., men of commerce, [as well as] to develop people who, in city dumas and in the zemstvos to be introduced in the future for the Russian homeland [watan], would work for the true faith of Islam, for the weak and the poor."[3]

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Other Jadids might have held a less rosy picture of the possibilities, but they shared Behbudi's basic attitudes. We need only recall the happiness brought by knowledge to characters in the fiction of Cholpan and Hamza (see Chapter 5) to
understand this basic vision of success. Participation in the imperial mainstream thus became the Jadids' fundamental political goal. Such elites would be able to undermine the Russian-native dichotomy that had framed Central Asian life since the conquest. The solution was not assimilation or Russification, however, but the modernization of Turkestani society. The new elite was to be modern but also Muslim and Turkestani. Jadid authors criticized those in Central Asia who aped Russian ways simply for the sake of imitation. Ubaydullah Khojaey once wrote that "wearing Russian dress in the way of education or official service is harmless, even required. It is a different matter when people put on a suit to look like Russians or to speak with Russian girls."[4] (Of course, the distinction was hard to make, and many of the Jadids' opponents did not make it at all; for them, the Jadids were no different from the dandies criticized by the Jadids.) Similarly, the Jadids were at one with Russian officialdom in exhorting Central Asians to learn Russian,[5] but they also criticized those who used Russian words indiscriminately in vernacular speech. Abdullah Awlani even elevated "preservation of the language [hifz-i lisan ]" to the status of a moral trait: "Learning Russian, the language of the state, is as necessary for our life and happiness as bread and food, but it is essential to keep it in its own place. Mixing [words] up like kedgeree cooked in linseed oil destroys the spirit of a language . . . . [and] the loss of the national language is the loss of the soul of the nation."[6] This was also why new-method schools were so essential. Russo-native schools offered a similar (or, as officialdom insisted, better) curriculum, but the Jadids' enthusiasm for them was always equivocal (even when some of them taught in such schools). Although Turkestani Jadids did not always share the harsh views of these schools held by Tatars, who saw in them a missionary plot, they nevertheless felt that Russo-native schools devoted inadequate time to teaching articles of the Muslim faith and taught "Russian to seven-year-old children who do not even know their


own language."[7] Future members of the elite had to master their own faith and language before they could join the battle in the wider world. Reform required resources that only money could buy. "In today's world, bravery resides in wealth... because people are necessary in order to have sovereignty; people require skills; skills require knowledge; and knowledge requires money."[8] And it worked both ways, for wealth was a sign of success in the new economy, the just desert for effort and zeal. Jadid authors came to see the existence of millionaires as the sign of the progress of the community to which they belonged. Upon arriving in Baku on his way to Istanbul in 1914, Behbudi noted with approval that "in terms of the extent of Muslim wealth, this is the second city in Russia. Here there are several Muslims who own property and
capital worth 100 million rubles; Muslim millionaires number more than 100, and
the number of those worth half a million is even greater. There are thousands of
Muslims worth 100,000 [rubles], while those whose capital is worth between
20,000 and 30,000 rubles number in the tens of thousands. Most of the property
in this city is in the hands of Muslims. May God increase [their wealth]!”[9]
Behbudi's numbers are, of course, exaggerated, but his fascination with the
numbers of wealthy Muslims was widely shared by his contemporaries (and in later
decades used as damning evidence of the Jadids' bourgeois nationalism). The
wealth of individuals was the wealth of the community and could (and should) be
put to the communal good. For Awlani, all members of a society were
interconnected: "The rich man depends on the poor, the poor on the rich; the
teacher on the student, the student on the teacher; the parents on the child,
and the child on the parents."[10] At first sight this differs little from views
long held in the Muslim tradition, but Awlani made service to the nation the
yardstick for judging all actions. The proper functioning of society required
that all its members recognize their duties to the nation. In more developed
nations, these mutual dependencies were clearly recognized, and the Jadid press
pointed to government expenditures on education or health in various countries,
or to acts of organized philanthropy, as evidence of this. When Mirza Siraj
toured Europe, he saw the fact that the theater he visited in Berlin cost 100
million marks to build,
[7] "Turkistan maktablari," ST , 22 April 1914; similar opinions were expressed
by Behbudi, who usually bent over backward to advocate the learning of Russian
(Samarqand , 9 May 1913).

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or that tens of millions of marks were spent on the construction alone of the
university in the same city, as evidence of the zeal of the people of
Germany.[11]
Such views of society and social responsibility might be naive, but do they make
the Jadids the ideologues of a nascent bourgeoisie, the chauvinist bourgeois
nationalists of Soviet lore? The nation as imagined by the Jadids was, as we
shall see, narrowly based in certain urban groups, and its core was provided by
the wealthy. However, the wealthy were to be celebrated only as long as they
fulfilled their duties to their community as defined by the Jadids. This they
did only seldom, and far more prevalent in Jadid literature are criticisms of
the wealthy for not fulfilling their duties properly. Ultimately, the Jadids'
claim to leadership was in their own right. It was as intellectuals that the
Jadids sought to set the direction for their society. "It is well known," wrote
Awlani, "that the progress and exaltation of every nation comes from valuing the
service of those who serve it with their lives, money, and pens. By celebrating
the brave scholars and poets of the past with stipends, statues, and the pen,
[other nations] increase the courage and zeal of those who work [for the glory
of the nation]."[12] The assertion of moral authority by new intellectuals had its problems. Awlani found his own situation rather different, for he complained that "unfortunately, we [Turkestanis], far from valuing such people, scorn them and even call them infidels [takfir qilmak ]."[13] If the nation was a phenomenon of the modern age, a fact the Jadids well recognized, then it needed modern leadership, which only the Jadids could provide. They were to make this claim a significant feature of their bid for leadership in 1917.

The rhetoric of the nation served to conceal the Jadids' own position in their society and their vision of its functioning. That rhetoric precluded discourses of class, of which the Jadids had the greatest suspicion. Behbudi wrote of the Social Democratic party in 1906: "Our present epoch is not propitious for carrying out their program. ... Their wishes appear fantastic and joining this party is extremely dangerous for us Muslims."[14] The radical transformation of society advocated by this party would be highly intrusive of Muslim society, its cultural practices and its solidarities, and, in the process, would jeopardize the Jadids' claim to lead reform. Of course, the predominance of Russians in the industrial work force in Turkestan, and the complete unwillingness of Russian socialist parties to attract their "native" co-workers to their cause, meant that Behbudi's fears remained largely groundless. Meanwhile, the older solidarities of craft guilds had been severely disrupted by the advent of capitalism. By the turn of the century, guild lodges (takiya ) were reported to be in disuse.[15] Caught in this transformation, Muslim artisans and craftsmen could not formulate a voice of their own.

Although the Jadids spoke of "the 10 million Muslims of Turkestan," and although the settlement of Russian and Ukrainian peasants in the Qazaq lands of Semirech'e and the Steppe krai had become a political issue of sorts, the rural population remained virtually invisible in their writings. The silence is revealing enough, but the one piece in the Jadid repertoire to address the issue is even more so. The first issue of the Bukharan newspaper Turan carried "An Address to Our Peasant Brothers," in which the anonymous author wrote: "O peasant brothers, o children of the land [watan ], you are a pure and sincere people who, unaware of the world, spend your time in hard labor .... If you did not exist, our affairs would be in ruin. May God give you power and abundance. Amen. But our duty is to teach you and to open schools for you and to give you all possible help. ... It is an obligation for us city dwellers to ensure that

[13] Ibid.
[14] Al-Haji Mahmud Khoja walad-i Qari Behbud Khoja, "Khayr ul-umur awsatiha," K'bursbid . 11 October 1906. This suspicion marked Jadid thinkers throughout the Russian empire; Musa Jarullah Bigi, the prominent Tatar Jadid, expressed very similar sentiments when taking stock of the Muslim political movement in 1915: Islahat esaslarï (Petrograd, 1915), 200.
you are not oppressed."[16] On a less positive note, many writers criticized
"shameless lazybones," such as storytellers and Sufi adepts (qalandars), who
lived off the gullibility of others.[17] Even more telling is a discussion of
the fruits of knowledge in Hamza's New Happiness: "All unskilled peoples, such
as drivers, tea shop owners, bakers, gamblers, thieves, sweepers, cobbler,
watchmen, water carriers, doormen, and others like them, are uneducated.
Educated people, even if young, are teachers, owners of large shops, clerks in
good places, well dressed and
[15] V.P. Nalivkin et al., "Kratkir obzor sovremennogo sostoiannia i
deiatel'nosti musul'manskogo dukhovenstva, raznogo roda dukhovnykh uchrezhdenii
i uchebnykh zavedenii tuzemnogo naseleniia Samarkandskoi oblasti s nekotorymi
ukazaniiami na ikh istoricheskie proshloe," in Materialy po musul'manstvu, vyp.
1 (Tashkent, 1898), 33.
[17] Abdulhakim Sarimsaqov, "Qalandarlar yakhud tanballar," ST, 4 April 1914;
anon. (Sarimsaqov?), "Qalandar, maddah (wa'iz), luli, wa gadaylarimiz, yaki
musulmanlik namini bolghatguchi be-'ar tanballarimiz," Ayina, 14 June 1914,
805.

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respected everywhere."[18] This was a far cry from Narodnik-style populism. The
nation included the peasants, but they had little to contribute to it. Only
urban folk (and then, of course, only a few of them) were qualified to lead the
nation in the battlefield of modern life.
The Jadid nation was coexistent with the reading (and hearing) public described
in Chapter 4. Within that public, the Jadids were engaged in a struggle of
elites for the right to lead the nation. As such, the Jadid vision of the nation
was elitist, although this elitism was never fully articulated as a doctrine
(as, for instance, was the case with the Young Turks)[19] but rather the logical
conclusion of the Jadids' position in their own society and the political
constraints in which they operated. The same political constraints softened that
elitism, for new-method schools (in many of which tuition was waived for poor
children) were a far more egalitarian instrument of elite formation than the
creation of universities (as in Muslim India with the Aligarh movement of Sayyid
Ahmad Khan). Such struggles were an integral part of the establishment of the
hegemony of the nation. Partha Chatterjee has argued that in colonial
situations, nationalist elites have to declare the sovereignty of nationalism in
native society before engaging the colonial state in a political struggle for
independence.[20] In Central Asia, that first struggle for sovereignty had not
been resolved by 1917.
Women and the Nation
A critique of the position of women in Central Asian society formed an integral
part of the Jadid project. In common with modernists elsewhere in the Muslim
world, the Jadids of Central Asia criticized the practice of polygyny, the poor
treatment of women, and their lack of education. Again, the Jadids sought
legitimacy for these criticisms from an understanding of "pure" Islam acquired
through modern education, but it was the nation, not religious reform, that
drove them.
A proper assessment of the place of the "women's question" in Jadid thought is made difficult by our sketchy knowledge of changes affecting urban women's lives during the tsarist period. The lot of urban women was difficult in Central Asia:
In the late nineteenth century, za'ifa ("weak") and naqis ul-aql ("deficient in judgment") were common terms


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for "woman" in learned usage. The impact of the Russian conquest on local gender relations is difficult to gauge. As we have seen, the immediate result of the conquest was the valorization of traditional practices as hallmarks of local Muslim identity. It is likely that the need to assert respectability and propriety in the new conditions led to an increase in the seclusion of women. Several other factors tended to heighten the role of respectability as a status marker. The new wealth accumulated in the cities, which led to the marathon feasts often criticized by the Jadids, created new demand for it (it likely also made polygyny into a form of conspicuous consumption), while the appearance of legal prostitution further made respectability significant. (Most of the prostitutes counted in the census of 1897 were Central Asian; Russian and Tatar women remained a minority in the profession.)

We know even less about the Jadids' personal lives or their private attitudes toward women. Hamza married a Russian woman who converted to Islam and seems to have played a small role in Jadid activities (she was invited to the annual examinations at new-method schools).[21] We also have a photograph, although of unknown date, of Munawwar Qari with his wife, who is unveiled.[22] Our main source, therefore, are the Jadids' writings. These are marked by a great sympathy for women and a concern for bettering their position. Again, the inspiration came from Tatar and Ottoman debates. Magazines by and for women, such as Ælem-i nisvan (Women's World), edited by Gasпрinskii's daughter Shafika Hanum in Bahchesaray, and Suyüm Bike , which appeared in Kazan from 1913 to 1917, had created a women's voice in the new discourses of the nation then being articulated. Veiling had disappeared among the Tatars by the turn of the century, and Tatar women in Central Asian cities were visible symbols of the change local Jadids wanted to bring about in their society; and to the extent that women had a voice in this debate, Tatar women were also agents of reform. Women wrote poetry, of course, and in 1914 the Kokand poet Ibrahim Dawran published an anthology of verse written by women. Some of the poets included in the anthology had lived in the nineteenth cen-
[22] The photograph is reproduced m San"at , 1990, no. 12, 9. Soviet sources provide some information on individual women's lives: Islam i zbenschhiny Vostoka: istorii i sovremennost ' (Tashkent, 1990); OSE , 1: 343-44, s.v.

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tury, but most were contemporaries. The anthology had a marked reformist character, with numerous poems lamenting the difficult position of women in Central Asian society, exhorting women to acquire knowledge, and calling on men to enable women to do so.[23] Women, especially Tatar women, also wrote in the press, particularly in Sada-yi Turkistan, which debated the women's question at some length. The themes as well as the mode of argument remains embedded in a nationalist discourse on women.

"In case you do not know [already], know clearly: We too are human beings and Muslims [biz insan balasi insan, musulman balasi musulmandirmiz]," wrote a woman schoolteacher from Tashkent, "and as such we need, and have the right to, education." Similarly, Zuhuriddin Fathiddinzada of Bukhara wrote in an article entitled, "Women's Rights": "Women are the mothers of all humanity: Prophets, messengers, kings, scholars, writers, and poets are all children of these esteemed mothers." Therefore, he argued, citing the Qur'an, Islam had accorded equal rights ("apart from a few partial exceptions") to them. "But we leave them without education, we marry off fourteen-year-old girls to old men of sixty or seventy for money, and we lock women up in dungeonlike houses as if they were thieves. Is this justice? Is this equality? Is this the condition of women who are the lights of civilization [madaniyat chiraghi]?"[24]

All these themes appear in Jadid literature and theater. In Abdullah Awloni's comedy, Is It Easy to Be a Lawyer?, the only sympathetic character is a woman who comes seeking divorce from her abusive husband. Dawran-bek, the Russian-trained lawyer who is Awloni's protagonist, is agitated:

O cruel civilization! When will you take root among us Turkestanis? When will you liberate us from this dungeon of ignorance? Until we start domestic education and enlighten our women, such terrible things will continue in our midst. Instead of being married to a man of her own choice, one she had seen and wanted, she was given off, like an animal . . . to a cruel man. The whole life of this innocent has passed in suffering, sorrow, and distress. . . . Now to abolish such terrible things from our midst, we must expend all our might in the way of educating our women and acquainting them with knowledge and civilization [maarif wa madaniyat].[25]

[23] Ibrahim Dawran, Ash'ar-i niswan (Kokand, 1914). I have not been able to locate a copy of this book, but it is discussed (with extensive quotations) by Tokhtamurod Jalolov, Ozbek shoiralari, 3rd ed. (Tashkent, 1890), 125-173.

Haji Muin's play, The Oppressed Woman, describes the evils of polygyny. Ozaqbay is a rich merchant contemplating taking a new wife: "New wives bring back a man's lust and make his mouth water. Now I too have to take a fourteen-year-old for a wife and enjoy life. This [present] wife of mine has borne three or four children and is approaching thirty. There's no joy left in life with her." He is egged on in his thoughts by Ishan Baba, a man who has performed the hajj seven times and appears on stage with a long string of prayer beads. A new-method teacher, on the other hand, tries unsuccessfully to dissuade Ozaqbay. Polygyny is permissible, he argues, only if the husband can treat all his wives justly and equally, which is never possible in practice. Ozaqbay's present wife, Tunsuq Ay, is a devoted mother and a loving wife who insists that their fourteen-year-old son attend a new-method school. She is devastated by the news that Ozaqbay is contemplating taking a new wife, but her feelings are of as little consequence as the imprecations of the teacher, and Ozaqbay, on the strength of his wealth, finds himself an eighteen-year-old wife. But the new wife, Suyar Ay, spells disaster from the beginning. After six months of this menage, Suyar Ay accuses Tunsuq Ay of theft; Ozaqbay believes the allegation and in a fit of anger begins beating his first wife. The play ends in tragedy: Ozaqbay discovers the error of his ways ("I didn't take a second wife, I took on a calamity"), but Tunsuq Ay is already mortally ill and dies in the last scene.[26]

The biggest cause of Jadid concern, however, was the fact that women were denied education. Zuhuriddin Fathiddinzada's argument that women's right to knowledge was granted by Islam itself was repeated again and again by other writers and accompanied by exhortations to men to educate women.[27] Not only were women being denied a right granted by Islam itself, but doing so was bringing irreparable harm to the nation. "The progress and civilization of a nation is dependent upon the educational, moral, and intellectual progress and civilization of women,"[28] because of the crucial role of women as mothers of the next generation. "In the hands of ignorant [jahila] mothers, the young, innocent children of the nation grow up untrained, unclean, and deprived of delicacy and morals. Full of meaningless tales and superstitions heard from the mouths of their mothers, children's brains become insensate, like roses pulled up from their roots. Removed from reason and reality, they incline toward unnatural suppositions."[29] The solution, of course, was education: Child rearing was a science just as engineering or accountancy, and in civilized nations, it was taught to women in schools.[30] The nation demanded changes in the status of

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women, and the nation's needs were to determine what the new status was to be. The nation also demanded a strong, stable family, for that alone could provide the preconditions for progress. This was the fundamental reason behind the Jadids' opposition to polygyny. In The Oppressed Woman, the second wife disrupts the tranquility of the family and distracts attention from the education of Ozaqbay's fourteen-year-old son. Taking child brides or very early marriage similarly made for insecure families and inadequate upbringing. The idea of the monogamous family as the bastion of the nation was introduced to Central Asia by Behbudi, who, in a long series of articles on "Family Health," expounded the latest wisdom on the matter extracted from contemporary Ottoman and Arabic manuals. Marriage was a natural instinct for human beings, but its place in society must be clearly understood. Puberty introduces thoughts and ideas that, if left unchecked, could cause great harm; therefore civilized Muslims make their children read books explaining these dangers. Semen has to be used in the right manner, for "just as it is incorrect to use it before its time, so it is to delay its use."[31] Late marriage or bachelorhood were equally harmful, and Behbudi cited statistics from France and Holland to prove that most "crimes, murders, and sins" are committed by unmarried men and women. Sex outside of marriage creates limitless disease and is, moreover, a sin. Similar, only greater, dangers lurk behind other misuses of semen and lust: adultery, pederasty, masturbation, and excessive intercourse of any kind weaken the body, deaden the brain, and make it impossible to develop one's intellectual faculties.[32] Similarly, Awlani, saw "lust [as] a valuable treasure. If used in a legal manner [surat-i mashru'a ], it becomes the alms of the body, indeed the center of life itself.... If used improperly, it represents the embezzlement of a trust... [which] destroys virtue and ruins life."[33] Fitrat wrote a full-length book, appar-

[33] Awlani, Turki Gulistan, 65-66. The societal aspect is foregrounded here as well, for Awlani presents, by way of the consequences of improper use of lust, the example of "many of our youth . . . [who] fall victim to the oppressive disease of syphilis" and spend their hard-earned money (and waste their precious lives) in finding a cure.
grave moral harm.[34]
The invocation of the norms of scripturalist Islam should not blind us to the
real source of this new sexual morality, which lay squarely in contemporary
bourgeois Europe. Behbudi’s Ottoman and Arabic sources banked heavily on
contemporary European medical science and reproduced whole cloth the sexual
morality that underpinned it. (Not only did Behbudi cite crime statistics from
France and Holland, but he also reproduced in great detail the tale of a
fifteen-year-old English boy whose addiction to masturbation could not be cured
by anything other than marriage.)[35] Modernist Muslim discourses on women
invoked the authority of science as quickly as they invoked that of the shariat,
but their concerns were strictly circumscribed by the broader interests of the
nation.
The impact of this discourse on actual social practices was minimal.
Traditionalists rebutted Jadid claims about the equality of women's rights with
equally authoritative verses from the Qur'an.[36] The connection of the debate
with Tatar practices also had its disadvantages; and although Jadid authors
could point to Tatar (and Istanbul) women as proof that the changes they
advocated were the norm among other ("more civilized") Muslims, their opponents
could dismiss the whole argument as one more example of the Jadids aping the
Tatars, who, for many, existed at the outer limits of Muslimness. Sayyid Ahmad
Wasli, a Samarqand mudarris with substantial Jadid credentials, parted company
with other Jadids on this issue. He was happier publishing doggerel in honor of
veiling ("The veil is a beautiful treasure for women and girls/the veil is the
curtain of chastity on the face of shame and honor,"
[34] Abdurrauf Fitrat, 'A'ila. yakhud waza'if-ikhanadari (Bukhara, 1916); my
discussion is based on a review by Haji Muin (in Hurriyat, 22 September 1917)
and an advertisement for the book that reproduced its table of contents
(Hurriyat, 28 November 1917).
[36] "Mozhet h zhenshchina byt' kaziem," TWG, 15 July 1912; Bir Musulman,
"Zhenshchina ne ravna s muzhshchinoi," TWG, 20 Septmber 1912; "Sotrudmku gazety
'Sadai Turkestan'," TWG, 30 November 1914 (a direct response to Fathiddinzada).

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and so on[37] ) than following the Tatars in their misguided ways: "[Turkestani
newspapers] take inspiration directly from Tatar life and therefore alienate the
people of Turkestan. For example, if a Tatar writer describes Turkestanis as
polytheists [mushrik ], all local newspapers also start calling [Turkestani] polytheists. Trying to imitate the Tatars, they are also call for letting loose
our women [khatun-qizlarimiz qachmasun dedilar ]. Therefore, the number of
buyers for these newspapers is small."[38] A pseudonymous author wrote in TWG
that the "freedom of Tatar women is nothing more than the freedom to go around
barefaced and mix with unrelated men." All his suspicions were confirmed, he
stated, when a Tatar family moved in next door: "The women do not cover their
faces, do not pray, and have no idea of adab or proper manners."[39]
Regardless of what Wasli insinuated, the question of unveiling was never
explicitly raised in Central Asia before 1917, and Jadid attitudes on gender issues remained conservative. In 1915, Abdulwahhab Muradi, a locally resident Tatar fired off another letter to Sbura with the usual criticisms about the position of women in Turkestan and the lack of attention given to their education. No local newspaper has published anything on the issue, Muradi informed his Tatar audience, and al-Islah, far from discussing the need to educate women, has started to talk about veiling. Ignorant women in a veil only bring harm, as the author himself had witnessed at a fair in Tashkent recently, where all sorts of illicit things happened under the veil. [40] In response, Zuhuriddin Fathiddinzada, who had argued for the equality of women's rights, jumped to the defense of al-Islah and Turkestan: "Sir! No Muslim journal (including al-Islah) desires the unveiling of women, and no son of Turkestan [Turkistan balasi] (and the editorial team at al-Islah is not exempt from this) would agree that his mother or sister should dress up her hair in the Paris fashion and promenade on boulevards in a décolleté dress." [41]

The Jadids in Politics

Official Russia feared political awakening in the borderlands of the empire primarily for its potential for "separatism." The same fears that cul-

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atural reform would inevitably lead to separatism (here made worse by the fanaticism of the local population and the intrigues of Ottoman emissaries) underlay the reaction of the local administration to the growth of Jadidism in Turkestan. Russian official discourse therefore treated Jadidism primarily as a political phenomenon, a view that historians, both in Russia and the Soviet Union and abroad, have tended to adopt. This fear was largely unfounded, though, for two fundamental reasons: There existed no institutional framework within which local political interests could be articulated, and Jadidism had not vanquished its opposition within Muslim society. Jadidism remained a cultural movement rather than a political movement asserting claims against the state. What little political activity the Jadids engaged in before February 1917 bore the marks of these constraints.

The elective offices introduced by the Provisional Statute of 1867, and largely retained by the legislation of 1886 (see Chapter 2) were not meant to, and did not, lead to the emergence of organized politics. Russian legislation intended these offices to mediate between state and society, not to articulate any political goals. As such, these offices remained the domain of the informal politics of personalities. [42] Such notables also monopolized the "native" seats in the Tashkent City Duma when the city was brought under the Municipal Legislation of 1870 (modified to restrict Muslim representation to only
one-third of all seats).[43] Said Azim-bay won election to the body early in its existence, and the seat stayed in the family for most of its existence.[44] The Tashkent City Duma did not serve as a forum for the articulation of political demands, Russian or Muslim.

The Jadids were a fledgling group when the revolution of 1905 created vast new possibilities for political action. Although they lacked any organizational foundation or experience, they attempted to make use of the new freedoms in the cause of their reform. However, they could not always turn their energies into practical results. Although many writers exhorted their compatriots in the newly founded newspapers to make use of the new freedoms, they were unable to play a significant role in the brief period of political activity that followed.[45]

Much of that activity involved petition campaigns waged by the established elites. However, these petitions seldom went beyond religious issues to the question of political rights of the Central Asian population.

A common demand in these petitions was the creation of a Muslim "spiritual assembly" patterned after the three that existed in European Russia, and whose creation in Turkestan had been opposed by Kaufman. In a petition signed by the notables of Kokand in December 1905, for instance, seven of the sixteen demands concerned the formation and functions of such an assembly, while another seven concerned the reform of the office of the qazi. It also demanded complete freedom to import and publish locally books and periodicals. The petition thus sought to rescue the process of the appointment and removal of qazis from the electoral principle and to return it to the ulama. The petitioners also wanted the qazis to have jurisdiction over foreign Muslims visiting Turkestan and for them to have freedom from intervention by Russian courts in cases involving blasphemy. The last section of the petition, asking for the abolition of Section 64 of the Turkestan Statute of 1886 (which gave police officers sweeping rights of imprisonment without charge), was the only part of the petition with any directly political implications; it was also the only one to mention the term "Turkestan."[46]

Petitions for the creation of a "spiritual assembly" were no doubt political to the extent that they asserted local rights against the state and demanded a change in the structures of power. Purely religious demands could turn into political ones, as was the case with the Tatars' struggle to wrest control of the Orenburg spiritual assembly from the state. But whereas the Tatar movement sought to make the assembly entirely elective, and hence free of government control, the petitions in Turkestan were geared toward undoing some of the...
damage done to the moral authority of the ulama by Russian legislation. Hence the insistence on revoking the electoral principle in religious affairs in Turkestan and its replacement by the moral authority of the traditionally learned. In any case, such petitions often disappeared into the abyss of the bureaucracy without a trace.[47]

[46] Taraqqi — Orta Azyaning umr guzarligi , 10 January 1906.
[47] Muslim notables of Semirech'e met m Alma Ata on 13 March 1906, to draft a petition demanding the creation of a "spiritual assembly" for Turkestan. The petition was handed to the military governor of Semirech'e on 4 April 1906, for transmission to Count Witte. Eight years later the petitioners were still waiting for a response: "Yettisu wilayati Musulmanlarining iltimasi," reprinted from Vaqit (Orenburg) in Ayina , 3 May 1914, 542-544.

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The All-Russian Muslim Movement

The October Manifesto of 1905 conceded the right of political assembly and popular representation to the population of the empire. The nascent elites of the Muslims of European Russia and Transcaucasia seized this opportunity to launch an empire-wide political movement that sought to speak in the name of all the Muslims of the empire in the newly granted institution of popular representation, the State Duma. Both in the All-Russian Muslim movement and in the Duma, however, Turkestan's participation remained minimal. Existing scholarship has tended to endow the All-Russian Muslim movement with immense authority. Its creation, and the convocation of three congresses in the years 1905-1906, is seen as proof of the existence of a political and cultural unity among the empire's Muslim population. In fact, the movement was dominated by Tatar and Transcaucasian public figures, many of whom had received foreign educations, and the third congress was the only one to include delegates from Turkestan. That congress decided to create a political party (Rusya Musulmanlarining Ittifaqi, Union of Russian Muslims) to work for the defense of the religious and cultural rights of the Muslims of the empire through the new quasiconstitutional means allowed by the October Manifesto.[48] As such, this congress marked the political victory of Jadidism among the Muslims of Russia and Transcaucasia, but it had little impact on Turkestan. The congress also decided to ally the movement with the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) in mainstream Russian politics. This alliance was hardly surprising. Jadid thinking consistently saw the enlightenment of individuals as the true path for the progress of society. This individualistic thrust of their thinking gave the Jadids a natural affinity for political liberalism. The political program adopted by the Muslim Faction was hardly distinguishable from that of the Kadets except for a few clauses specifying Muslim religious rights.[49] Tatar and Transcaucasian Muslim elites could by now speak the language of Russian politics and engage the state (and other political parties) in a discourse of political rights that

[48] On Muslim political activity in this period, see Musa Jarullah Bigi, Islahat esaslari ; A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii (Moscow, 1931), 23-33; Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and
required a vocabulary entirely different from the discourse of cultural reform within Muslim society. In Central Asia, on the other hand, no groups yet existed that could participate in such an enterprise. The disparity between the language of the program of the Muslim political movement and that of cultural debate in Turkestan is indicative of the marginal position Turkestan occupied in the political movement. The agenda of the political movement was set by the largely secular elites of the Muslims of European Russia, with little contribution coming from Turkestan. There were no Central Asian delegates at the first two congresses and only a few at the third,[50] where the question of creating a Muslim spiritual assembly for Turkestan received some attention.[51] Only one Central Asian was elected to a commission of the congress.[52] In any case, the congress's deliberations never took practical form, and the organs of empire-wide organization of the Muslim community remained on paper only.

On 3 June 1907, Prime Minister P. Stolypin dissolved the Second Duma and revamped electoral laws in an attempt to manufacture a more pliant legislature. Representation of inorodtsy was cut drastically, and Turkestan was completely disenfranchised. This coup also put an end to the Muslim congresses, and their deliberations came to naught. The state never allowed the Ittifaq to register as a political party[53] and in the increasingly repressive political climate after 1907, even the purely cultural and educational activities of the body atrophied. Muslim political activity was restricted to a small Muslim Faction in the Duma. Legal action had strict limits, as the attempt by members of the Muslim Faction to organize a Fourth Muslim Congress with official permission showed. The conference, convened in St. Petersburg in June 1914 to allow members of the Muslim Faction to discuss educational and religious issues with their constituents, was attended by forty officially approved delegates, who met behind closed doors. In this era of restricted activity, Turkestan again took a back seat. Now that the Muslim Faction in the

[50] The available documents of the congress do not provide a complete list of participants. We know for certain of only two Turkestanis who attended the meeting: Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (cf. Behbudi, "Qasd-i safar," Ayina, 24 May 1914, 598) and Aminjan Ilhamjanov, whose name appears on the list of officials elected by the meeting.

[51] "Bizlargha ne lazim?" Khurshid, 21 September 1906.

[52] Aminjan Ilhamjanov was elected to the fifteen-member Presidium, but his seems to be the only Turkestan name on that or the three other commissions elected by the congress: III-i Vserossusii Musul'manskii s"ezd (Kazan, 1906), 2, 7, 11, 13-14; cf. A. Z. V. Togan, Bugunkii Turkili (Turkistan) ve Yakin Taribi, 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1981), 348.

Duma did not contain even a token Turkestani contingent, its concerns focused more and more on Tatar and Transcaucasian issues. Of the forty delegates invited to attend the Fourth Muslim Congress in 1914, only three represented Turkestan (and one of them was a Tatar), even though the agenda included the creation of a spiritual assembly for Turkestan.[54] Turkestani newspapers expressed their disappointment at this snub, but they could do little but bemoan the lack of qualified and committed individuals in Central Asia.[55]

Turkestan in the State Duma

Turkestan's experience with the State Duma was similarly short-lived and marginal. Turkestan's representation in the State Duma was subject to special election rules, which were still being drafted when the First Duma opened in April 1906 in St. Petersburg.[56] It was dissolved well before elections could take place in Turkestan.[57] Turkestan did send delegates to the Second Duma: Seven "non-native" and six "native" deputies were elected from separate curiae. Not only was the local population vastly underrepresented, but the election of its deputies took place in four stages, rather than the two for the election for the Russian deputies.[58] The franchise was limited by strict property requirements as well as a knowledge of Russian.

The Jadids had great enthusiasm for the Duma, which they saw as a tribune of liberty and equality. Even Munawwar Qari, far more skeptical of Russian officialdom than someone like Behbudi, wrote passionately of the need to elect worthy individuals as deputies of the nation.[59] The reality proved to be rather different. There existed no political parties among the local population of Turkestan at this time. The Union of Muslims projected by the Muslim congresses remained only a hope, and Rus-

[54] The three delegates were Sher Ali Lapin, Said Nasir Jalilov, and General Sahibgeray Yenikeev, a Tatar; cf. Ayina, 28 June 1914, 863. Because of its low profile, this congress has escaped most historians' notice, although it was covered in the Russian as well as the Muslim press at the time. Yenikeev's speech was reported by Novoe vremia, 19 June 1914.
[55] ST, 6 June 1914.
[56] "Polozhene o vyborakh v Gosudarstvenniu Dumu," Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossuskoi Imperii, 3rd ser., vol. 25 (St. Petersburg, 1907), no. 26662, art. 1, prilozhenie.
[58] Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe i politicheskoe polozhenie Uzbekistana nakanune oktiabria (Tashkent, 1973), 11.

sian political parties restricted their activity in Turkestan to the Russian
population. Therefore, as in the elections to the Tashkent City Duma, most of the successful candidates from the local population came from the notables. Makhtumquli Nur Berdikhanov, the deputy from Trans-caspia, belonged to the Akhal Tekke aristocracy and had actually taken part in the defense of Gök Tepe against Skobelev's armies in 1881 before going into Russian service.[60] Tashpulat Abdulhalilov and Salihjan Muhammedjanov, deputies from Samarqand and Ferghana oblasts, respectively, were merchants, while Tölëuli Allabergenev, the deputy from Syr Darya oblast, was a Qazaq tribal chief.[61] In Tashkent the election descended into farce. The forty eligible voters met for the final election on 7 February to choose from two candidates. One of the candidates withdrew, leaving the other, Arif Khoja, a son-in-law of Said Azim-bay winner by default. Later in the day, however, the presiding officer had doubts about the legality of election without voting, and therefore he convened the electors again the next day to confirm the winner by casting actual votes. At this time, Arif Khoja withdrew "for personal reasons," leaving the field open again. New candidates were hastily found, but to the consternation of the presiding officer, the election resulted in a tie, with both candidates receiving eighteen votes, and the decision was made by the drawing of lots. The winner was Abdulwahid Qari, the mudarris at Mirza Abdullah madrasa in Tashkent.[62] He took no discernible part in the proceedings of the Duma, but his election made the Okhrana suspicious of him. Two years later, he was arrested for conducting "nationalist-separatist propaganda" among the local population and exiled to Tula province for five years.[63] Muhammedjan Tinïishpaev (Tanyshbaev), a scion of the Qazaq aristocracy who held an engineering degree from the Alexander I Institute of Rail Transport in St. Petersburg, elected from Semirech'e, was the only one of the six with whom the Jadids might have felt strong affinity.[64]

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Five of the six Muslim deputies from Turkestan sat with the Muslim Group in the Duma. (Tinïishpaev, the only one of the six with a Russian education, was elected on a Kadet ticket.) Tinïishpaev and Abdulhalilov won election to the Agrarian Commission of the Duma, but otherwise Turkestani deputies left little mark on the proceedings. On 22 May 1907, in the only speech ever delivered at the Duma by a Turkestani Muslim, Abdulhalilov criticized a bill submitted by the Ministry of Finance proposing a tax levy on unirrigated lands in Turkestan.[65] The speech drew applause from the center, but the Stolypin coup
was less than two weeks away.
A Muslim Voice in Turkestan
To understand the real dimensions of Jadid political action in Central Asia, however, we have to lower our sights to the local level. Jadid concerns revolved around not separatism but a quest for participation in Russian political life; or, in the terms outlined in Chapter 4, it involved an attempt to overcome the split between the Russian and native publics through the entry of Muslims into the Russian sphere. Only by creating a Muslim voice in the Russian public could political claims be made on the state.

The fundamental problem remained that of resources. Not many Jadids had the command of Russian necessary for such participation, and the few Central Asians with Russian educations tended, as we saw in Chapter 3, to develop a different profile. Unlike the Jadids, who spoke in the idiom of Muslim cultural reform, the secular intellectuals spoke the language of modern Russian liberalism. Few of the Russian-educated intellectuals took part in Jadid activities such as teaching in new-method schools or publishing. The differences were by no means unbridgeable, however, and a rapprochement between the two groups is discernible after 1914, when many Jadids turned more and more to political action.

The bridge between the two groups was provided by Ubaydullah Khojaev (1886-1942). Born in Tashkent, Khojaev attended a Russo-native school. Upon graduation, he found work as translator for a Russian justice of the peace, whom he accompanied to Saratov when the latter was transferred there. Khojaev stayed in Saratov for several years, during which he acquired considerable legal training. He returned to Tashkent early in 1913 and set up a legal practice. At the same time, he became involved in local Jadid affairs. He was a partner in the Umid Bookstore as well as the editor of the newspaper Sada-yi Turkistan. Khojaev began his public career in Tashkent. In February 1914, he sued the publisher of Turkestanskiy kur'er on behalf of such local Jadids as Munawwar Qari and Mirza Hakim Sarimsaqov for publishing a poem they deemed blasphemous. This was an attempt to assert the religious rights of the Turkestani population through channels provided by Russian law as well as a move by the Jadids to challenge the monopoly of the decorated notables as spokesmen for the local population vis-à-vis the state. Protestations of loyalty, of course, were seldom transparent. In 1914, as editor of Sada-yi Turkistan, Ubaydullah suggested that Muslim society in Tashkent should celebrate the forthcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Russian conquest of the city: "The friendly Russian state took our city and our sovereignty from us. What harm came to us out of this? The Muslims of Turkestan have suffered no harm from the Russian government. On the contrary, our country has flourished." To celebrate the auspicious occasion, Khojaev suggested that society establish either a teachers' college or a new-method college [aliya madrasa] such as those that existed in Ufa and Orenburg. After all, Gasprinskii had obtained permission to publish Terjüman only on the
occasion of the centenary of the Russian annexation of the Crimea. In Tashkent, Khojaev's plea went unheeded, but it provides a crucial insight into the political strategy of the Jadids. By appropriating the discourse of the state, they sought to create a civic space in which the nation could organize itself, using toward that goal the institutions of the state to their advantage.

Khojaev also ran for election to the Tashkent City Duma in 1914. He used his newspaper to good effect, criticizing the general apathy surrounding the election even among the small electorate in a matter of such great importance. The duma was a forum in which the most respected men from each nation spoke in their nation's interest, for there "wealth does not matter, but carefully reasoned speeches attract attention."[69] He and a number of sympathizers ran on the basis of their claims to providing just that kind of service to the nation, with modest success. Khojaev was one of six new members elected that year.[70]

He entered the new forum with enthusiasm, speaking out against arbitrary activities of the police in the old city and unlawful imprisonment of those searched.[71] Such activities had increased after the outbreak of war in July 1914. The declaration of war had provoked the usual declarations of loyalty to the tsar from the decorated notables in Turkestan,[72] but the Jadid press, then at the moment of its greatest success, was not far behind. Khojaev, writing in Sada-yi Turkistan, called for support of the Russian army, especially since it included "many of our coreligionists."[73] Behbudi reminded his readers of the need for patriotism during this hour of difficulty for "the Russian state [which] is home for us Russian Muslims." This patriotism could take the form of "help to the state in cash or kind, to the extent possible."[74] The message was also conveyed through patriotic poetry. In his "Prayer for the Emperor," Hamza declaimed:

Give your lives to the Land, be an example  
Find success, o tiger-hearted armies  
Long live the nation, long live our Emperor  
The tiger-hearted armies were encouraged to "raze Hungary to the ground/conquer and destroy German cities."[75] Hamza was hardly unusual. Ibrahim Dawran wrote an ode "To Our Soldiers" and Mir Muhsin asked the Kaiser, "Who's the Coward?"[76] The Russian empire was unequivocally the homeland (watan) and, as such, the recipient of all the obligations due to a homeland. The situation was complicated by the entry into war of the Ottoman empire in October, especially as the Ottoman government sought to play the pan-Islamic

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card. The Seyhulislam declared the war to be a holy war (Cihad-i Mukaddes) in which aid to the Ottoman empire was incumbent upon all the Muslims of the world. In his fetvâ (legal opinion), the Seyhulislam also answered "Yes" to the following question: "Is it absolutely forbidden to Muslim subjects of the aforementioned [Entente] powers, at war with the Muslim government, to fight against the armies of the Muslim government even if they were coerced with threats to their life and even of the destruction of their families; and if they do so, do

[71] "Shahr dumasinda," ST, 2 December 1914.  
[73] Ubaydullah, "Watan muhafazasi," ST, 2 September 1914.  
[74] Behbudi, "Watanparwarlik kerak," Ayina, 16 August 1914, 1018-1022  

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they deserve ... the fires of hell?"[77] The C.U.E regime had chosen, under German pressure, to place a greater burden on pan-Islam than Abdülhamid had ever done in his three decades at the helm. Ironically, the decision to seek the fetvâ was motivated by the same assumptions about the nature of Muslim opinion that underlay European fears of pan-Islam: that it was monolithic in its religious motivation, and that it could be molded (and manipulated) by Ottoman proclamations. The reality was quite different.

True, the Balkan wars had created a groundswell of sympathy for the Ottoman empire in Central Asia, which carried over into the world war. Central Asia was rife with rumors, all dutifully transcribed by Okhrana agents, of an Afghan invasion of Central Asia, and many prayed for Ottoman successes with German help. Many in Central Asia, especially members of the traditionalist religious elite, openly expressed their antagonism to the Russian cause in the war. Russian authorities stepped up their vigilance, resulting in an upsurge in arbitrary searches and arrests. The Jadids, however, figure nowhere in the Okhrana's catalogue of its fears and anxieties. The Ottoman empire no doubt was the focus of the Jadids' sympathies, but those sympathies did not override the political realities they faced at home. The process of building a civic space for Central Asian Muslims could not be sacrificed at the altar of quixotic support for the Ottoman cause. "There is nothing to be done," Behbudi wrote of the entry of the Ottoman empire in the war, "except to express sorrow that the fires ignited by the Germans have engulfed Russia and Turkey.... We, the Muslims of Turkestan, are subjects of Russia and co-religionists of the Turks. Our common religion and common race [hamdin waya, ham-uruqlikimiz] cannot hinder our friendship with Russia, because this war is not a religious war, but one for political gain, indeed a German war."[78] The "friendship" here was, of course, a euphemism for the civic space Central Asian society enjoyed under Russian rule, but even that space (which made Jadid reform possible) would be threatened if the state was provoked by overt opposition to the war. "It should be well
understood that any ignorant and impolite action would destroy our fifty-year friendship."[79] Behbudi went on to wish that the Turks had never entered the war, but since they had been duped by the Germans,
[77] "Cihad-i Mukaddas Ilani ve Fetvâ-yi Serif," Islam Mecmuasi, 6 November 1914, 440-441.
[78] Behbudi, "Rusiya wa Turkiya arasinda harb," Ayina, 6 November 1914, 3.
[79] Ibid., 4.

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he advised his readers to "remain peaceful and help the wounded to the extent possible," because "the war between Turkey and Russia is 3,000 to 5,000 chaqirim away from us and it will stay there.... One should not trust the word of those who, knowing nothing about history, geography, or politics, claim to be ishans or divines. Those who want to know [about the war] should read the telegraph and newspapers, read the books of history and geography, and look at the map of the world to acquaint themselves with ... the warring states."[80] The "ishans and divines" were obviously those in Central Asia who hoped for liberation from Russian rule through the war. Behbudi here was arguing, on the basis of his new-method knowledge, that such hopes were not justified by the geopolitics of the war. The war was too far away to benefit Turkestan; a look at the map also told Behbudi that rumors of an Afghan intervention in Central Asia in the name of Islam were mere fantasies (Behbudi could not have known that the German and Ottoman high commands were to try to make them come true in the following years). Since liberation by Ottoman arms was not a possibility, Behbudi urged his readers to value the "friendship" of Russia.

Nor was this the personal opinion of Behbudi alone. Most Jadids displayed the caution he suggested. The police reports from the period meticulously record countless rumors, many of them outlandish, overheard by agents, but none of them mention anyone active in Jadid reform except Munawwar Qari. Instead, the Jadids began organizing a number of events to raise funds for wounded soldiers and their families. Over the three years of its existence, Jadid theater was staged at least as often to raise funds for the war effort as for Jadid cultural activities. The most popular causes with Turkestani Jadids were a field hospital for Muslim soldiers and aid to the victims of war on the Kars front. Patriotic, pro-war sentiment continued to be expressed in Jadid poetry and journalism after the Ottoman entry into the war.

The war came to Central Asia in June 1916, when, faced with two years of disasters in the battlefields, the government decided to revoke Central Asians' exemption from military service and to levy troops for work at the rear. Since no records of births existed, lists of men to be conscripted were to be drawn up by volost administrators enjoying considerable discretionary powers. Both the decree and the manner of its proposed implementation provoked hostility from the beginning. Throughout the sedentary regions of Turkestan, crowds gathered at volost offices.
[80] Ibid.
demanding the destruction of the lists and the revocation of the decree. These gatherings were accompanied by mob justice, in which volost administrators and accompanying troops were attacked and killed. In Jizzakh uezd of Samarqand oblast, such opposition turned into open revolt, as insurgents destroyed railway and telegraph lines and attacked Russian settlements. But it was in the nomadic areas of the Steppe krai and Semirech'e that the colonial peace was shattered most dramatically. There, Qazaq and Qïrghïz nomads refused to be conscripted and went on the offensive. Unlike in the core oblasts of Turkestan, where native functionaries were often the target of the rebels, in the nomadic areas resentment over massive state-sponsored settlement over the previous decade made Russian settlers the focus of attack. These attacks were accompanied by flight by large numbers of nomads (as well as the sedentary Dungans) into Chinese territory.[81]

Russian control could be reestablished, and then tenuously, only by reinforcements from Russia, who, along with armed settlers, repaid the atrocities with usurious interest. At the height of the uprising, A.N. Kuropatkin, an old Turkestan hand, was appointed governor-general of Turkestan. He arrived in Tashkent resolved to set matters right using the methods he had used in Andijan in 1898. Land where "Russian blood had been spilt" (in the Przheval'sk, Pishpek, and Jarkent uezds in Semirech'e, and in Jizzakh uezd in Samarqand) was confiscated. Kuropatkin also contemplated separating Russian and "Kirgiz" (the generic Russian term used to denote both Qazaq and Qïrghïz nomads) populations in large parts of Semirech'e, cleansing the area around the Issiq Köl and the Chu River of its Qazaq and Qïrghïz population, and creating a "Kirgiz"-only uezd in the Narîn region. In more practical terms, Russian soldiers and settlers wreaked vengeance on those nomads who remained behind. Those who had fled to Chinese territory, where they spent the winter in miserable conditions and were preyed upon by Chinese officials, returned to find their crops destroyed, their grazing land taken over by Russian settlers, and their cattle lost en route. The total Russian losses were substantial, although they were concentrated mostly in Semirech'e (a total of 2,246, of which 2,108 were in Semirech'e), but in typical colonial fashion, native casualties far outnumbered them. According to early So-

[81] The only substantial narrative account in English of this episode is the dated work by Edward D. Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore, 1954). Of the several accounts in Russian, the most comprehensive is Kh. Tursunov, Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane (Tashkent, 1962).
The fact that the Jadids were not involved in the uprising is not surprising. They had no presence in the rural areas, let alone the nomadic territory where the uprising was the strongest. What is surprising, however, is their enthusiasm for recruitment and their dismay at the uprising. Ubaydullah Khojaev was involved in the process and chaired the Tashkent city committee for recruitment.[83] Others sought to cooperate with the authorities. Tawalla welcomed Kuropatkin upon his arrival in Tashkent, at the height of the uprising, with a poem in TWG.[84] When the first batch of one thousand conscripts left Tashkent on 18 September 1916, the ceremonies included patriotic poetry recited by members of Awlani's Turin theatrical troupe and students of new-method schools. (The latter were rewarded with zoo rubles and candy by the city's governor.)[85] The new volume in Hamza's series of National Songs, published in November 1916, was entirely dedicated to poetry in support of the war effort. The refrain of his poem "A Sincere Prayer" was quite unequivocal: "O compatriots, be true to our King / until even our lives are sacrificed."[86] This is strange behavior for pan-Islamists or nationalists. It becomes impossible to explain if we insist on seeing Turkestani society as a monolithic whole in its response to colonial rule. Rather, we have two different strategies located in very different parts of society. The nomads and peasants of Turkestan, operating along the solidarities of tribe and clan, sought to drive the Russians (functionaries and settlers) out of their lands. The Jadids sought to use the conscription edict as an opportunity to establish a Central Asian Muslim presence in mainstream Russian life. Behbudi for one had long seen Turkestan's exemption from military service as a practice of exclusion;[87] the 1916 edict, born of necessity, was a chance to overcome this exclusion and, by contributing to the war ef-

[82] Sokol, The Revolt, 146, 159.
[83] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 1144, ll. 5, 370b.
[84] TWG, 21 August 1916.
[86] The text is in Hamza, Tola asarlar toplami, II: 66.

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fort, stake out a place in Russian political life after the war. Indeed, the mobilization in itself was a political issue, even before the ensuing uprising made it a matter of empire-wide importance. While he helped organize the mobilization, Khojaev also traveled to Petrograd along with the Andijan millionaire Mir Kamil-bayand Khojaev's friend Vadim Chaikin, a Social Revolutionary, to invite a delegation from the State Duma to visit Turkestan and examine the situation themselves. The quest was successful, and a two-member delegation, consisting of Kutlugmurad Tevkelev, the chairman of the Muslim Faction, and the Social Revolutionary deputy Aleksandr Kerenskii (who was born in Tashkent), toured the province in August. Upon his return, Kerenskii gave a two-hour speech, highly critical of Russian policy in Turkestan, in a closed session of the Duma. At the same time, Khojaev's success in bringing two
worthies from Petrograd increased his influence in Tashkent. Russian officials noted with concern that many people in Tashkent had begun to think of him as an aristocrat and had begun to address him directly with their grievances as someone enjoying great power.[88]

The alliance between Khojaev and Chaikin provided one of the few instances in prerevolutionary Turkestan of political collaboration between members of the Russian community and the native population, but it is a good example of Jadid strategy in this tumultuous period. Its origins remain unclear. When Sada-yi Turkistan collapsed due to financial problems in May 1915, Khojaev moved, his membership in the Tashkent City Duma notwithstanding, to Andijan, where he started a legal practice. By summer 1916, Khojaev was on friendly terms with several Russians of Social Revolutionary persuasion, such as Vadim Chaikin and I. Ia. Shapiro. Chaikin had been arrested in Kursk province in June 1908, for agitating among the peasants, for which he had spent five years in exile in Yakutia. In 1916 he worked with his brother Anastasii, who as an "honorary citizen" had far more solid credentials.[89] Shapiro was a lawyer who had a long history of antigovernment activity and who had first been arrested in Kharkov in 1904.[90] After the events of the summer of 1916, they launched the Andijan Publishing Company as a joint-stock venture, in which Ubaydullah Khojaev was apparently a shareholder. The company hoped to publish two newspapers, one in Russian and one in Turkic, called The Voice of Turkestan, although financial constraints meant that only the Russian version (Turkestanskii golos) ever saw the light. The Ghayrat Company of Kokand was also interested in publishing the Turkic version (to be called Sada-yi Turkistan), and negotiations were underway between the two organizations in November 1916. Preparations were far advanced, for in December 1916, Cholpan, on behalf of the editorial board, solicited the customary poem in praise of the new newspaper from Hamza.[91] The Russian version remained a Russian newspaper, catering to local Russian society but, unusually, providing comment favorable to Muslim positions on issues such as Russian settlement in Semirech'e.[92] The activities of this group went beyond publishing, however. The offices of the newspaper had become the meeting place for local Jadids, who counted among their numbers merchants, interpreters, and booksellers.[93] In 1916, they launched a campaign of petitions and denunciations against corrupt local officials, as a result of which a number of officials were dismissed. Again, as with the lawsuit over blasphemy, the purpose of this campaign was to assert the presence of the group in local society by forcing the administration to play according to its own rules. The campaign was successful enough to attract the notice of oblast authorities, who, not surprisingly, did not share this view of accountability. The governor of Ferghana oblast, took a dim view of the situation and the people involved. What he had on his hands was a "local party called 'Taraqqiparwar,' which covers itself in pan-Islamist ideas, but which in reality pursues the goals of profit
through blackmail, vile slanders, graft, intrigues, and lies." These unscrupulous individuals—corrupt interpreters, slimy lawyers, self-serving members of the Russian community, and Jews—had "terrorized" the population and succeeded to the extent that "power had passed from the hands of the administration to this group." The governor recommended exiling the whole group from Turkestan.[94] The matter was still being investigated when revolution broke out in the streets of Petrograd.

Of National Interest
Jadid political strategies aimed at the creation of a Muslim voice in Turkestan and of Muslim participation in the imperial mainstream. To this

[91] Hamza arkhwi katalogi, II: 23-24; TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 1144, l. 340b.
[93] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 1144, l. 20.
[94] Military Governor, Ferghana, to Governor-General, Turkestan, 12 December 1916, in TsGARUz, f. 461, op. 1, d. 2023, ll. 5-10.

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end, they sought alliances with sympathetic Russians in their midst and attempted to work for the state. The continuation of this strategy during war and insurgency was the only choice open to the Jadids, who had no roots in the countryside that would allow them to launch a popular movement of armed resistance against the colonial regime. Indeed, as the foregoing should have made clear, they had no interest in doing so even if they had the resources. The logic of a modernist, urban, intellectual-led political movement and that of rural insurgency remained fundamentally incongruent. Rather, their ultimate hope remained that politically cautious participation would bear fruit and produce political concessions after the war from which the nation, and the Jadids as the nation's leaders, would benefit. National interests do not exist beyond the competing parochial interests of the social agents that compose the nation, but are articulated in the struggles of those groups.

Ultimately, the strategy was unsuccessful. Russian officialdom mistook the striving for inclusion for separatism, and the campaign against corrupt functionaries became, in its eyes, terrorism. Jadid involvement in the mobilization of 1916 was either easily forgotten or else ascribed to the opportunism of ambitious individuals. The revolution of 1905 had not dented autocracy's will to exclude all social groups from matters of political import in the colonial periphery that was Turkestan. Turkestan might be defined by the "fanaticism" of its inhabitants, but the ambitions of its modern elites were equally, if not more, dangerous. Official hostility proved insurmountable. That was only half the battle for the Jadids, however. Equally significant was conflict within their society. Officials investigating the dark deeds of Khojaev and his associates in Andijan had no trouble finding people in Andijan and elsewhere to fill its dossiers with denunciations of the group.[95] The nation was deeply divided just as revolution in distant Petrograd hurled it into a new era of political opportunity.

[95] TsGARUz, f. 276, d. 916.
Chapter 8
1917: The Moment of Truth

The Russian revolution of February 1917 arrived in Turkestan by telegram and took everyone by surprise. Overnight, the political order in place for a half-century disappeared. Groups scrambling to organize in the new order followed the example of events unfolding in Petrograd, but since social tensions in Turkestan had little in common with those of distant Petrograd, the politics of the new era were fully embedded in the colonial realities of Turkestan. The familiar patterns of dual power appeared in Turkestan, too, as executive committees of the Provisional Government appeared side by side with soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies within the first few days of the revolution, but both sides represented the Russian population. Far more significant was the divide between Russian and Muslim politics, as the Russian-native dichotomy that had framed Central Asian life since the conquest became a significant political vector.

The revolution also transformed the nature of Muslim politics in Turkestan. Overnight, the struggle over culture, confined to a restricted public space and fought over schools and newspapers, was transformed into an explicitly political struggle to be decided by the vote. This put the Jadids in a difficult position, for it was quite clear that their struggle for authority within their society had just begun. Strategies that worked in the struggles of urban elites did not always succeed in the era of mass mobilization. As the conflict between the Jadids and their opponents came into the open, it shaped the reactions of both sides to the opportunities opened up by the revolution. The Jadids embraced the promise of liberal constitutionalism embodied in the February revolution and, in keeping with their political strategies of the tsarist period, sought to maximize Turkestan's participation in Russian life, a hope reiterated by Jadid writers throughout the year. Their opponents sought to protect the local specificities that marked Turkestan's position in the empire and upheld their position within Turkestani society.

For the Jadids, 1917 was a turning point. The emergence of open politics pitched them in unforeseen directions. They struggled on two fronts: for the defense of their nation's interests against the colonial aspirations of the Russian population of Turkestan, and for control of their nation's destiny against many opponents in their own society. Before the year was out, many of them found themselves experimenting with running a government. Their lack of success led to a fundamental shift in both the premises of their reform and the political strategies they were willing or able to employ. The year 1917 marked a shift from the politics of admonition to those of mobilization, while the nation for whose benefit the Jadids acted in politics came to be imagined increasingly as
an ethnic entity, with the rhetoric of Turkism firmly being foregrounded. As we will see in the Epilogue, both of these shifts were of paramount importance in understanding the politics of the early Soviet period.

Colonial Revolution

A. N. Kuropatkin, the recently appointed governor-general, put the matter in its imperial context when he confided to his diary on 6 March: "Nothing special has happened yet, but we can expect anything, even terrorist acts, which are especially dangerous in Asia where we Russians form a third [sic] among the 10 million strong native population."[1] His first instinct, therefore, was to suppress the news of the revolution in Petrograd, but his efforts at concealment were unsuccessful, and the news became widely known through unofficial channels in Tashkent early the next morning.[2] On 3 March, Russian workers of the Central Asian and Tashkent railways organized a soviet, which in turn elected a Tashkent Soviet of Workers' Deputies on 3 March. Soldiers at the Tashkent garrison followed two days later and organized a Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies.[3]


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on 5 March. The same day, the Tashkent City Duma called a meeting of all public organizations, which proceeded to elect a nineteen-member Executive Committee of Public Organizations with V. P. Nalivkin, a moderate Menshevik in spite of his long career as a functionary in Turkestan, as chair.[3] All the trappings of dual power were in place in Tashkent.

The initial assumption among all sectors of Russian society was that the revolution would not question their supremacy in Turkestan and that it would remain a largely Russian affair, as had been the case in 1905. The earliest efforts to organize public life in Tashkent therefore made no attempt to include the native population. The public organizations represented in the Executive Committee were all organizations of Russians in the Russian part of Tashkent, and dual power was at first a purely Russian affair. The token presence of "natives"—Ubaydullah Khojaev and Tashpolad Narbutabekov were coopted into the Tashkent Executive Committee to represent the old city—only served to underscore this assumption. On 6 March, Kuropatkin addressed separate assemblies of Russians and Muslims, assuring the latter (in an abridged version of his speech to the Russian assembly) that "under the new order of life in Russia their lives, too, will be easier than before."[4]

But this was not to be a repeat of 1905. The rise of the reading and listening public over the previous decade and, more importantly, the war and the uprising of 1916, had politicized local society, and in March 1917 the proclamation of the new order was universally celebrated as the dawn of a new age of liberty, equality, and justice. A long poem, "The New Freedom," by the Tashkent poet Sirajiddin Makhdum Sidqi, published in an enormous edition of 10,000 copies on 12 March, provides a glimpse at how the revolution was received in this distant colony of the Russian empire. "Praise be that the epoch of freedom has arrived. The sun of justice has lit the world.... The time of love and truth has come....
Now, we have to set aside our false thoughts; ... the most important aim must be
to give thought to how we will live happily in the arena of freedom."[5] A few
weeks later, Sidqi published another narrative poem giving an account of the
revolution in Petrograd with a print run of 25,000. Here again, Sidqi's
fundamental theme was liberty: The events in Petrograd, which he recounts in
considerable detail, were the
Turkestane (Tashkent, 1971), 217.

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culmination of a long struggle by the people of Russia for liberty that dated
back to the Pugachev revolt in the 1770s. The verse format of the pamphlet
bridged the gap in intelligibility by translating the episode into a form fully
accessible to the local population.[6]
Sidqi's call for action was echoed by many others in Turkestan. The newly
established newspaper Rawnaq ul-Islam declared that "it ... [was now] necessary
to pass from the epoch of words to the era of deeds."[7] Even Behbudi broke his
composure and in a moment of excitement criticized the old regime, in which
"missionaries, or rather men wishing to destroy us and our sacred shariat," had
subordinated the shariat to the Turkestan Statute.[8] And indeed, in the very
first days of the new order, a number of organizations appeared among the Muslim
population. The Jadids played a crucial part in this period of organization. As
early as 5 March, activists in the old city of Tashkent formed a committee to
"explain the meaning of the revolution to the Muslim population and to prepare
it to take advantage of the new political situation."[9] On 9 March, a public
meeting in old Tashkent, presided over by Ubaydullah Khojaev and Munawwar Qari
, attracted 20,000 people.[10] Another, even larger public meeting on 13 March at
the main mosque elected by acclamation four deputies to the Tashkent Executive
Committee. The meeting also elected a separate commissar for the old city and
resolved to elect a forty-eight-member committee to administer it. This
committee met the following day and chose the name Tashkand Shura-yi Islamiya
(Tashkent Muslim Council) for itself. In due course, the Shura decided to send
delegations to other cities in Turkestan to initiate organizations, induct new
members, and raise funds.[11] But similar meetings, perhaps on a less
spectacular scale, took place in almost every city of Turkestan.
The Tashkent Shura, which in contemporary Russian sources was commonly
translated as the "Soviet of Muslim Deputies," was clearly intended to be the
counterpart of the soviet in the Russian city. In the long run, this audacious
bid to secure self-administration did not suc-
[6] Sidqi, Buyuk Rusiya inqilabi (Tashkent, 1917). Sidqi's poems are only one
example of a minor literary explosion unleashed by the February revolution in
Turkestan. For obvious reasons, this corpus has received no scholarly attention.

ceed, and the Shura came to be a coordinating committee of Muslim organizations in Tashkent. By the summer, when other organizations had emerged beyond its ambit and, eventually, in direct opposition to it, it had become one Muslim organization among many in Tashkent. But in March, it served to assert a Muslim presence in the politics of the most important city in Turkestan, and it tapped the widespread enthusiasm aroused by the revolution.

This enthusiasm was also reflected in the rebirth of the vernacular press. The first month of the new order saw a number of newspapers launched in Tashkent, Samarqand, and Kokand. However, the biggest coup was the takeover of the TWG by a group of Jadids in mid-March. In pursuance of demands by social organizations that both TWG and its parent publication, Turkestanskie vedomosti, be given over to the public (obschestvo),[12] the Tashkent Executive Committee of the Provisional Government organized a public meeting on 12 March to discuss the fate of TWG. The meeting, with Nalivkin in chair, convened in the Teachers' Seminary, which since its inception in 1879 had been headed by N.P. Ostroumov, who was present as editor of TWG. In attendance were Munawwar Qari, Ubaydullah Khojaev, and a host of other Tashkent Jadids. Ostroumov resigned as editor before the meeting began, and his permission to leave was granted. Nalivkin, speaking in Turkic, decried "the extremely constrained position" of the vernacular press that had existed until then but expressed hope for a better future "now that there are no secrets between the government and the Muslims."

The evening ended with Munawwar Qari being elected the new editor of the newspaper, which was renamed Najat (Salvation).[13] Ostroumov might have thought the world had turned upside down. The same bewilderment is clear in a letter sent to a Tashkent newspaper by N. S. Lykoshin, the orientalist and longtime Turkestan hand who until recently had been governor of Samarqand oblast. Lykoshin drew his readers' attention to "the transformation in the worldview of our natives," who never had even as many popular rights as those expressed in the Novgorod veche. The difference between Russian and native had to be established, even if only through an appeal to the hoary myths of eleventh-century Novgorod. "These people lived for centuries under...

[12] TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 8, d. 528, ll. 16-160b.
the despotic administration of their khans and amirs, under the severe statutes of their strict religion.... Our natives were never citizens; they were always only members of the general Muslim religious community, regardless of which state they happened to live in." Their incapacity to become citizens was clearly demonstrated in 1916, when, "presented with the demand to raise troops, our natives responded not as citizens, but simply as people in whom the instinct for self-preservation was much stronger than [the sense of] duty.... Disorders erupted in the region, Russian blood flowed, and punitive expeditions were called up." Once "pacified" (and Lykoshin knew all about the "pacification," for he had been responsible for the suppression of the uprising in Jizzakh, one of the bloodier episodes in the uprising), the natives had turned to other unsavory practices, such as the campaign of petitions against functionaries launched by "the secret society 'Taraqqiparwar.'" It was in these conditions that the natives entered Russian political life. "The administration explained to the natives the recent events, but of course it was not possible to explain everything completely. The native mass heard nothing sensibly, and understood nothing sensibly. Only it became clear that with the change in the government, our native population was also given the same rights as the other citizens of our fatherland.... This our practical natives understood very well and, not thinking apparently of the obligations of Russian citizenship, turned all their attention to the most rapid realization of their new rights." Lykoshin's ire was raised by events in Samarqand, where the organizers of the first executive committee, formed on 5 March, had coopted two Muslims (one of whom was Behbudi) as its members. At its first meeting, however, the committee had decided that the Muslim population should elect its own deputies. A mass meeting held two days later had resurrected the petition campaign and, in addition to calumniating various members of the administration, had been impertinent enough to ask that taxes raised in old Samarqand not be spent on the Russian part of town and that Muslims be granted not two, but fifty-eight of the ninety seats in the executive committee.[14]

Lykoshin's views were not necessarily typical of the Russian population, but the unease at the prospect of the transformation of natives into citizens was widely shared. Once the bewilderment had worn off and it became clear that the Provisional Government intended to extend full citizenship to Turkestan and to grant its Muslim inhabitants the fran-


chise on the same basis as other citizens, Russian organizations acted to protect their privileged status in the region.[15] This took the form of a demand at the Regional Congress of Executive Committees in April to create separate dumas for the Russian and "native" parts of cities in Turkestan, each controlling separate budgets. This attempt to protect the privileges that had been assured under the old regime (the Tashkent Duma was assured a two-thirds Russian composition) and to protect the interests of the Russian population from the impact of democracy clearly pitted the Russian community against the local
population. In mid-summer, this issue took a different form, as local Russians demanded the creation of a special electoral unit for the Russian population of Turkestan in the elections to the Constituent Assembly to ensure that the local Russian population was not drowned in the sea of local voters. Both these demands directly contradicted the principle of universal and equal franchise and were contested by Muslim representatives.

The Russian left, which had a considerable presence in Turkestan (the region had returned several socialist deputies to the Second Duma), did not differ markedly in this respect from the rest of Russian society. A Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies had emerged in Tashkent at the very beginning of the revolution. Given the situation in Turkestan, it was by definition a Russian institution. The labor movement in Turkestan had always been a Russian affair, with little effort to propagandize the "natives." In the conditions of empire, even Russian workers were a prosperous elite in Turkestan, since "belonging to the industrial proletariat in [this] tsarist colony was the national privilege of the Russians."[16] For the labor movement, native society with its dark Asiatic masses signified little more than the panorama of backwardness that socialism was to conquer. It had failed to protest against the atrocities committed against the local population in 1916. For its part, the Muslim artisans were organized along very different principles. The struggles of the Russian labor movement would scarcely have been intelligible to them even if the Russians had made any effort to be inclusive.[17] The case of the soldiers


[17] Ibid., 83 et passim. For a similarly harsh appraisal of the Russian labor movement and the early Soviet regime in Turkestan, see the opening pages of S. Ginzburg, "Basmachestvo v Fergane," in Ocherki revoliutsionnogo dvizhenua v Srednei Azii: sbornik statei (Moscow, 1926)

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was even more obvious: Even the most humble Russian soldier in Turkestan was a member of an occupying force and derived his identity on the colonial fringe from that fact. Moreover, many of the soldiers stationed in Turkestan in February 1917 were recent arrivals, having been sent just the previous autumn to quell the uprising against recruitment. Russian peasants, mostly armed settlers competing with the local population for land and water, were also quick to organize soviets. The majority of them lived in Semirech'e, where the bloodshed from the previous year continued well past the revolution.[18] The soviets' claim to power thus violated the principle of autonomy of Turkestan on both "national" and territorial grounds, but their monopoly over armed force in the region at a time when all constituted authority was disintegrating ensured that they emerged as very significant political actors.
Many of the local Muslim organizations founded in the first weeks of the revolution were concerned primarily with cultural or educational issues, while others had more overtly political aims, although the two sets of goals were rarely separable. The Splendor of Islam Society (Rawnaq ul-IslamJamiyati) in Katta Qorghan, for instance, aimed to "acquaint the people with the present situation and to send people to the villages to spread ideas of citizenship [ghrazhdanliq] and knowledge, in order to prepare our brothers for the Constituent Assembly and to reform our schools."[19] Along with the mushrooming of organizations went the adoption, no matter how superficially, of new norms of procedure. On 22 March a meeting of the prominent ulama of Kokand began with the election of a chair and a secretary to record the minutes of the proceedings.[20] Agendas were drawn up for meetings and minutes diligently kept and promptly published in the press. The revolution had produced new forms of sociability among the local population that the tsarist regime had done its utmost to curtail. Although the more ambitious among them could still comment with dismay that most of the new organizations remained mere societies or circles,[21] there was little question that the nature of politics had changed irrevocably in Turkestan.

For the Jadids, the revolution was a summons to action, and they acted to realize their long-held wishes. The organizational activity of the first weeks of the revolutionary era bore the marks of cultural struggles of Central Asia. The enthusiasm that led to the reemergence of the periodical press was replicated in other areas of Jadid concern. Munawwar Qari organized a commission in early March to work toward creating a common program for all Muslim schools in Turkestan and to suggest ways of introducing the teaching of Russian into them.[22] New-method teachers formed unions in Tashkent and Kokand and, in true revolutionary fashion, convened a Turkestan Teachers' Congress, which met in Tashkent on 20 May.[23] Over the summer, the Jadid-led Turkestan Central Council organized teacher training courses in Tashkent, which paralleled similar initiatives in Samarqand.[24] Abdullah Awlani went as Turkestan's delegate to the All-Russian Muslim Teachers' Congress in Kazan in August 1917, where he was elected to the presidium.[25] The revolution opened up entirely new domains to competition among Muslim elites of Turkestan. Now the state came to occupy a central place in their thinking about the future; the politics of admonition gave way to the politics of mobilization, and votes took the place of exhortation. They sought to use the freedoms allowed by the revolution to ensure full participation for Turkestan in the political life of the Russian republic (which had been a basic political
goal of the Jadids before the revolution). The possibilities seemed limitless now. The fundamental task was to ensure that the nation knew how to take advantage of them. Exhortations to unity and action abounded in the Jadid press, and they were combined with warnings about the dangers of not seizing the opportunity provided by the revolution: "[If we let this moment go,] it will be an enormous crime, a betrayal of not just ourselves, but of all Muslims.... We will leave a bad name behind in the history of Turkestan. God forbid, we will be accountable both to coming generations and to our ancestors and will receive retribution both in this world and


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afterlife. O Muslims of Turkestan! ... Let this time not pass!"[26] The Jadids also asserted their claim, implicit in their rhetoric of the previous decade and a half, to lead their society in the new era. Their possession of modern knowledge, especially of the Russian language, gave them the necessary qualifications for that role. Conversely, the Jadids commonly asserted that the traditional educations of the ulama had left them incapable of understanding, let alone making use of, the opportunities offered by the new turn of events. The emergence of open politics brought the Jadids in cooperation with those Russian-educated Central Asian intellectuals who had played little or no role in the politics of cultural reform. Tashpolad Narbutabekov , a lawyer, was from the beginning very prominent in Muslim politics. The revolution found Mustafa Choqay in Petrograd, where he worked in the offices of the Muslim Faction at the State Duma. He took the first train to Turkestan. Also taking the train was the young Bashkir historian Ahmed Zeki Velidi (1894-1970), who had spent some time in Central Asia several years earlier doing his research. Until August, when Bashkir politics claimed his attention, he played a very visible role in organizational matters. Delegations from Kazan and Transcaucasia arrived to help local Jadids organize, and some of their members ran for office. A number of lines dissolved in 1917, and the Jadids became part of a broad coalition of groups whose major common characteristics were their youth and a will to participate in the liberal politics of the revolution.

The Jadids' claim to leadership was contested by other groups in society. Tensions appeared at the outset. The induction of Khojaev and Narbutabekov into the Tashkent Executive Committee on March 6 led to grumbling in the city about "why have the youth [yashlar ]entered the committee when no ulama, functionaries, or merchants were included?" The Jadids were able to contain conflict on this occasion by going door to door over the next few days and putting the matter before the public meeting of 13 March, which in addition to ratifying the election of these two, elected two more representatives (both Jadids) to the committee.[27] But much tougher struggles lay ahead. The Jadids retained control of the Tashkent Shura, but many other organizations, especially
outside the
[26] Muallim M. H., "Bukun qanday kun?" Kengash (Kokand), 15 April 1917, 12. For other expressions of such anxiety, see Shakirjan Rahimi, "Eng zor wazifalarimiz," Najat , 23 March 1917; Abidjan Mahmudov, editorial in Tirik soz , 2 April 1917; Mirmuhsin Shermuhammadov, "Hurriyatdan nechuk fai'dalanamiz," Najat , 9 April 1917.

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capital, appeared far beyond their purview. Many revolved around personalities, in effect transforming the informal politics of colonial Turkestan into the formal politics of the revolutionary era. Tashkent Jadids hoped to create a network of organizations covering all of Turkestan, but no coordinated effort ever came about. The title "Shura-yi Islam "proved quite popular, but the various shuras in Turkestan had little in common with the Tashkent organization. In Samarqand, the local shura was the organization of the ulama, many of whom were inimical to the Jadids. The three organizations in Aq Masjid represented various factions of local notables.[28] But the most intriguing story came from Andijan.

Representatives of the Tashkent Shura arriving in Andijan walked into the ancient rivalry between two local millionaires, Mir Kamil-bay and Ahmetbek Temirbekov. Mir Kamil interfered in the meetings of the newly established organization (in one instance, his minions forced all Tatars present to wear a chalma (turban), and expelled those who refused),[29] while Temirbekov refused to have anything to do with the Tashkent delegates. Instead, he asked the local executive committee for permission to start "his own" Shura-yi Islam . When permission was not granted, he named his organization Hurriyat (Liberty). By late May, though, numerous other organizations had come into existence and joined together to form a Ferghana Oblast Soviet of Deputies of Muslim Organizations. On 20 May, this soviet, in conjunction with the Turkestan Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, managed to have Mir Kamil exiled from Turkestan and Temirbekov sent off to Tashkent. They were allowed to return in mid-July, but only on condition that they not interfere with public affairs until the election of the Constituent Assembly.[30]

Moderate Jadids emphasized unity in their attempts at organization. When Munawwar Qari organized the school commission in March, he invited maktab teachers to participate, clearly an attempt to build bridges with more conservative groups. The Union of Teachers in Kokand similarly took a conciliatory stance toward the ulama. As the editorial in the first issue of its magazine asserted, the community needed the ulama for guidance in religious affairs just as much as it needed open-minded, Russian-speaking, modern-educated people to take the helm in the po-


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However, other aspects of Jadid activity worked against this attempted conciliation. One of the Jadids' first organized efforts after the revolution was a campaign against corrupt or incompetent qazis. This was clearly a continuation of the campaign pursued the previous winter by Ubaydullah Khojaev and Vadim Chaikin, but now it tapped into the general revolutionary sentiment against the old order. The Tashkent Shura called for the re-election of all qazis who had been serving for more than three years, and two days later it resolved to form a committee to "dismiss those old functionaries whose continued employment is harmful" in the new era. In Kokand, one of the first acts of the local shura was the dismissal of several qazis. Many of these functionaries, and especially the qazis among them, were to form the backbone of the opposition to Jadids that emerged by late spring.

The high point of the political movement came early, when it organized the First Turkestan Muslim Congress, from 16 to 22 April, in Tashkent. Although the congress was not representative in the strict sense of the word (Muslim organizations from all over Turkestan were invited to send delegates with mandates, but more than 100 delegates arrived on their own out of a sense of civic duty), the mere fact of its convening only seven weeks after the fall of the autocracy was remarkable. The congress opened in the mansion of the governor-general with typical revolutionary pomp, as representatives of the Provisional Government, Turkestan Congress of Executive Committees, and Turkestan Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies greeted its inaugural session. The elections to the presidium of the congress signified a victory for the Jadids: Munawwar Qari was elected president, and Ubaydullah Khojaev, Mustafa Choqay, Narbutabekov, Islam Shahiahmedov, and Zeki Velidi were among those elected to the presidium. The congress also elected a twelve-member delegation to attend the forthcoming All-Russian Muslim Congress organized by the Muslim Faction of the Duma in Moscow and decided to establish a Turkestan Muslim Central Council (Turkistan Milli Markaz Shurasi) as its standing executive organ. Although this organ did not begin work until 1 June, it was to provide an invaluable institutional base.

[33] Muallim Shakir al-Mukhtari, Kim qazi bolsin (Kokand, 1917), 2; UT, 5 May 1917.
[34] UT, 25 April 1917.
[37] Kengash, 31 August 1917.
Muslims of Turkestan. The sixteen-point program for the congress included a wide array of questions dealing with the political future of Turkestan, ranging from the attitude toward the new government, the forms of state organization, food supply, and land and water rights, to questions of education reform.\[38\]

Yet, even the euphoria of the occasion could not hide the acute tensions within Muslim society. The congress was sharply divided on the question of autonomy. All had celebrated the dawn of freedom, and all could agree on the desirability of autonomy, but different groups had very different ideas about the meaning of these terms. The ulama were wary of a redefinition of culture that undermined their position as its authoritative interpreters. The Jadids' eagerness to use the opportunities afforded by the revolution to seek full participation for Turkestan in the new order also threatened to collapse the walls that sustained the ulama's status within the community. The ulama's response to the revolution therefore took the form of an attempt to maximize the space allowed by the regime to the regional and cultural peculiarities of Turkestan and to attempt to cordon off as much of their society as possible from the depredations of the new universalist order inaugurated by the revolution. In practical terms, it meant demands for broadening the competence of Muslim courts to new areas of criminal and personal law, which would have placed the ulama in greater control of Muslim society.\[39\]

The ulama were less concerned with participation in mainstream imperial life, for while they could reach accommodation with outsiders, they had no patience for those within their own society who sought to undermine their authority.

Non-Russians in the country widely assumed that the democratic Russia of the future would provide some sort of autonomy for its various nationalities. As various groups across the empire organized politically and sought to be recognized as future autonomous subjects, they debated the choice between territorial and cultural forms of autonomy (the latter would have guaranteed nationalities such cultural rights as those of language, education, and representation, without attaching those to a territory). The debate came in this form to Turkestan. Most Jadids favored cultural autonomy, for they feared that without outside help they

\[38\] UT, 25 April 1917; see also Browder and Kerensky, eds., Russian Provisional Government, I: 420-421.

\[39\] Çokay, 1917 Yili, 49.
(Counsel) provoked criticism for its generally harsh tone.[41] In Tashkent, the Turan party (toda ), under the leadership of Abdullah Awlani, consistently took a more radical line than the Shura. It began by requisitioning, in true revolutionary fashion, the offices of the municipal chief of Tashkent for use as its headquarters (a rare, perhaps unique, instance of such revolutionary initiative from a Muslim organization).[42] In July it was instrumental in hosting a delegation from the Turkic Federalist Party based in Ganjä in Transcaucasia. But it was an article by Mir Muhsin Shermuhammadov in the second issue of its newspaper Turan that brought matters between the Jadids and their opponents to a head. Mir Muhsin, recently returned from a year at the new-method Galiye madrasa in Ufa, expressed the usual Jadid criticisms of traditional education. These sentiments had been repeated ad nauseum by Jadid writers and orators since the turn of the century, but now certain ulama seized upon it as a show of strength. Mir Muhsin's criticism of a medieval tract on Arabic grammar was deemed blasphemous by the qazi of the Sibzar section of Tashkent, and although Awlani apologized publicly in the next issue of the newspaper, Mir Muhsin was arrested and sentenced to death for apostasy.[42] The sentence far exceeded the qazi's competence, but what was truly at stake was not blasphemy but an assertion by the ulama of their power within Muslim society as well as a challenge to the new Russian authorities. Ultimately, Mir Muhsin was rescued by the police from the Russian quarter and his sentence was "commuted" to eighteen months' imprisonment. Mir Muhsin managed to escape and with financial help from friends among the Jadids returned to Ufa, but the absence of widespread protest against this action was proof that the ulama retained moral and religious authority among the population at large, surely a disturbing sign for the Jadids. As disagreements deepened, the ulama in Tashkent split from the Shura and formed their own organization, the Ulama Jamiyati (Society of Ulama). Again, the new principle of sociability is worth noting, for the Ulama Jamiyati was a modern organization quite distinct from the ulama's traditional modes of association.
Although technically not a political party, the Ulama Jamiyati often functioned as one, as is clear from its actions during the rest of the year, when it mounted political campaigns, ran candidates for office, held conferences, and published magazines. Nor was it merely a trade union for the ulama; it was a political organ representing the interests of all traditional elites in Turkestani society. It was headed not by a religious dignitary but by Sher Ali Lapin, a Russian-educated Qazaq who had spent years in Russian service as an interpreter and was currently a lawyer.[44] Nor was the Jamiyat averse to forming alliances with Russian parties of the right and the left, as its progress through the year showed.

The campaign for elections to the Tashkent Duma, set for late July after the Russians had dropped their demand for segregated dumas, pitted the Jadids directly against the ulama in a test of political strength.[45] An offer by the Shura to field a joint slate of all Muslim groups in the city was rebuffed by the ulama, who saw little need to cooperate with their rivals. The Shura responded with a pamphlet that severely criticized "certain mullas and old functionaries who have united with foreign enemies who do not wish Muslims to achieve progress and take their affairs in their own hands and [who therefore] oppose the Shura-yi Islamiya."[46] Here and throughout the campaign, the Shura stressed that its candidates


would be able to function fruitfully in the duma because they had modern educations and were fluent in Russian. The purely traditional education of the ulama, the pamphlet went on to argue, rendered them ignorant of the times and of contemporary politics, and led them to be taken in by mischief makers (fitnachilar). The pamphlet also asserted the credentials of the Shura's candidates, many of whom were learned in traditional knowledge.[47]

The ulama's response was brief and caustic. In the few months of freedom, they stated in their response, the ulama of Tashkent had heard several criticisms from "inexperienced youth [yashlar]... who had not received a complete religious or worldly education." The ulama had refused to field a joint slate because they knew who would be on that list and "which children [balalar] would gain control of the public affairs of the Muslims of Tashkent. Keeping in mind the great importance of the duma, the ulama saw no public good coming out of cooperation in this matter with such youth."[48] The list of candidates put forward by the Ulama Jamiyati was dominated by members of the religious elite.[49]

Two different bases of authority were at stake here. The Shura based its claim to authority and leadership on its superior knowledge of the current situation
and its claim to be able to function fruitfully in the Duma and, later, in the Constituent Assembly. The ulama derived their authority from their possession of traditional knowledge still greatly valued by society. Their condescension about the inexperience of youth also tapped into the great respect accorded to age in Central Asia. Ultimately, the ulama's claims to leadership proved more authoritative as they won the election by a landslide, gaining an absolute majority in the new duma, while the Jadids could scrape together only eleven seats. Voting was strictly according to national lines, with much of the Russian vote going to the Socialist Revolutionaries (see Table 8).

Once elected, the Tashkent Duma found it difficult to accomplish much in the chaotic situation of the summer except to provide further evidence of the tensions that existed between the ulama and the Jadids. The election of a new chairman for the duma produced the first crisis. The Ulama Jamiyati had no hesitation in putting forward as its candi-

[47] Ibid., 5, 13.

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TABLE 8
TASHKENT CITY DUMA ELECTION RESULTS, 1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>2,946</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Revolutionaries</td>
<td>15,753</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulama Jamiyati</td>
<td>40,302</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Houseowners</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of (Muslim) Construction Workers</td>
<td>4771</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Democrats</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Jews</td>
<td>4661</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet of (Russian) Public Organizations</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Russian) Construction Workers</td>
<td>18—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shura-yi Islamiya</td>
<td>7,160</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Shop Assistants</td>
<td>173—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossacks</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party of People's Freedom</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society of Native Jews</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soldiers' Wives</td>
<td>27—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Women (Russian)</td>
<td>21—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72,241</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE : Kengash, 6 August 1917

date Lykoshin, whose amazement at natives becoming citizens we noted above. However, strong protest from other parties led to his nomination being withdrawn, to be replaced by that of A.K. Iakhimovich, whose politics were
described by a disgruntled Jadid newspaper report as "to the right of the Kadets." So Iakhimovich was finally elected chair in late August, signifying an alliance between the ulama and conservative Russians.

The issue of schools provided the ulama another opportunity to humiliate the Jadids. The ulama elected five of their number to the eight-member commission formed in August to inspect schools in the city, and


one place went, ex officio, to the head of the duma. For the other two places, the Shura nominated Munawwar Qari, the founder of the largest new-method school in Tashkent and widely recognized as the leader of the Jadid movement in the city. In a public insult to Munawwar Qari and the Jadid cause, the ulama voted him down and instead elected two Russian socialist members of the duma to the commission.[51] The ulama deemed even radical Russians preferable to the Jadids in questions of cultural policy, an indication of how far apart the two sides had drifted over the summer.

Tashkent provided only the most telling example of a conflict that raged throughout Turkestan. First blood had been shed in mid-April during a confrontation in Namangan, although details of the incident are extremely sketchy.[52] In June, a meeting of the notable ulama of Kokand, called on the initiative of a qazi who had been dismissed earlier in the year, decreed that Musa Jarullah Bigi, the renowned Tatar modernist alim, and Ayaz Ishaki, the Tatar writer, were both infidels whose books should be gathered and burnt. The assembled ulama also demanded that they should have the right to supervise and censor all books and newspapers published in Turkestan.[53] Attitudes were also influenced by events in Bukhara, where the amir had mustered conservative forces against the Jadids. In May, a certain Mulla Khalmurad Tashkandi, a conservative scholar in Bukhara, had obtained a fatwa decreeing all Jadids of Turkestan and Bukhara to be "enemies of the Islamic faith."[54]

The question of women's place in the new era proved to be a major source of conflict. The Provisional Government granted the franchise to all citizens of Russia over the age of twenty, regardless of sex. This momentous change upset all existing calculations in Turkestan. The Jadids welcomed these new rights and set about registering women voters. They saw the right to vote as a boost to the position of women, but they also deemed women's votes to be crucial to the success of Muslim candidates in an election based on proportional representation. They succeeded in

[51] "Duma jivilishi," UT, 23 August 1917. In a few weeks, the commission decided to coopt four experts to help it in its work, and elected Munawwar Qari, as one of the four. But the ulama still managed to elect two teachers of old-method schools. "Maktab kamisiyasi," Kengash, 8 September 1917.
[52] I have encountered several indirect references to this incident: TsGARUz, f. 1044, d. 1, l. 36; see also a letter signed by representatives of two Andijan organizations expressing dismay at the activities of "the Protopopovs of Turkestan": "Turkistan Protapapavlari," UT, 14 June 1917.
[53] "Khoqand ulamasining qarari," UT, 13 July 1917
securing a resolution of the April congress in favor of "giving" women the vote,[55] and in July they garnered the help of Tatar women in registering women voters. As a conciliatory measure, the Jadids approached the ulama for a fatwa on whether it was permissible for women to vote if separate polling facilities existed for them and they encountered no men in the process. For the ulama, the choice between ensuring the electoral strength of the Muslim community and relinquishing their vision of a Muslim society built on gendered patterns of authority was clear-cut. They ruled that women's right to vote contravened Islamic laws and was therefore impermissible. Eventually, some Muslim women did vote, but the issue proved highly divisive throughout Turkestan. Behbudi, ever the moderate, suggested that the Jadids yield on this question for the sake of "national" unity, although in a different context he rued the fact that women's votes were crucial in assuring Muslim control of the new organs of self-government.[56] This kind of unity was achieved in Katta Qorghan at least, where women simply did not vote in the elections.[57]

Class was conspicuously absent from this intense political conflict, which was played out in the language of the nation and of its culture. The local urban workforce had plenty of grievances: It had suffered the consequences of the rapid transformation of the local economy under the impact of cotton and had been adversely affected by the severe economic crisis that hit Turkestan after the outbreak of the war. But it was in a period of transition, in which older patterns of organization such as the guilds were dissolving and new forms of solidarities had not emerged. The political language of the Russian labor movement remained unintelligible to Muslim artisans operating in a very different moral economy. Artisans did begin to organize, and a Soviet of Muslim Workers' Deputies was formed in Tashkent in June at the initiative of Muslim soldiers returned from duty in the rear of the front.[58] A Union of Muslim Toilers (Khoqand Musulman Mehnatlashlar Ittifaqi) appeared in Kokand on 25 June, and a Muslim Artisans' Union (Sanna' ul-Islam) organized in Andijan with as many as 1,500 members.[59]

Although Soviet historiography made much of the existence of Muslim labor organizations, it is unlikely that they shared much with the Russian soviets, which in turn made little effort to proselytize among the natives. A number of organizations

of Muslim artisans were headed by Jadids. The Tashkent Soviet of Muslim Workers
was led by Abdullah Awlani and Sanjar Asfendyarov, a Qazaq medical doctor who was active in the Shura and who was to be prominent in the Kokand Autonomy. Its journal, despite its proletarian title (Ishchilar dunyasi [Workers' World]), differed little from any other Jadid publication.[60] The most prominent class-based Muslim organization existed in Samarqand, where by July, Muslim politics had split between an organization called the Shura-yi Islamiya, dominated entirely by the ulama, and a Muslim Executive Committee, which included members from "the merchants and all other groups."[61] In August, a public gathering established the Samarqand Labor Union (Samarqand Zehmat Ittifaqi), which fielded a full slate of candidates for the municipal elections held on 8 September. Eschewing the rhetoric of Muslim unity, it openly stressed the specific needs of the poor.[62] Many candidates on the list were workers, but among its organizers was Sayyid Ahmad Ajzi, and it acquired the support of the Jadids of the city and of their newspaper, Hurriyat (Liberty). Behbudi stood aloof, however, while Wasli campaigned actively against it. The campaign turned nasty, as the ulama declared supporters of the Ittifaq to be infidels and threatened anyone who voted for them with eviction from his neighborhood. Violence broke out on the day of the election, in which eight supporters of the Ittifaq were badly injured.[63] In the event, the Ittifaq won only 1,796 votes and four of the seventy-five seats. The Shura had entered the election in a coalition with the (Russian) Householders' Union, and their joint list (on which there were twenty-five Russians) won fifty-five seats.[64] It was obvious to the Jadids that they needed outside help. Their domination of the Central Council gave them an institutional base from which they could claim to speak on behalf of the indigenous population of Turkestan, and in doing so, they could look for support to two outside sources that held considerable promise. A liberal democratic Russia

[60] Its first issue included an article (in Ottoman) on universities m Japan, two articles on the history of early Muslim dynasties, complete with tables on the titles and reigns of Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs, and a piece of political commentary borrowed from UT .


[64] "Shahr dumasi," Hurriyat , 19 September 1917.

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willing to recognize the principle of national rights while upholding a commitment to secularism and civil liberties could provide a cushion against the more reactionary demands of the ulama (as had clearly been demonstrated in the Mir Muhsin case). Similarly, incorporation into an all-Russian movement for Muslim unity under the modernist leadership of the Tatars, among whom Jadid reform had succeeded to a far greater extent, might have allowed the Jadids of
Central Asia the moral and political support they needed to implement their
reform, as well as providing a broader sphere of action at the all-Russian
level. Yet, in the chaotic conditions of 1917, both these sources of support
melted away, leaving the Jadids to wage their struggles by themselves.
The support of democratic Russia had great potential, and the early signs were
hopeful. When the Tashkent Soviet of Soldiers’ and Workers’ Deputies placed
Kuropatkin under arrest on 31 March, Petrograd approved the action and,
recalling Kuropatkin, appointed a Turkestan Committee of nine members (five
Russians and four Muslims, none of them from Turkestan) to govern the region
until the Constituent Assembly could meet and determine its political status.
The committee began with great enthusiasm and high hopes, holding its first
meetings on the train to Tashkent as its members prepared to take on the
challenge of governing a distant colony. It was welcomed upon its arrival in
Tashkent on 13 April by a throng of thousands. Troops played the "Marseillaise,"
and children from new-method schools sang "national" songs in the committee's
honor. But the euphoria evaporated almost immediately, as the Kadet
background of its members led to opposition from the Turkestan Soviet, leading
six of them to resign within weeks. For much of the summer, the committee
was inactive, although Nalivkin became its acting chair. Attempts to resurrect
it continued down to October, but the committee was never a force to be reckoned
with.
The All-Russian Muslim movement proved equally disappointing. participation in a
larger Muslim community whose overall leadership was firmly in the hands of
fellow Jadids appeared to Turkestani Jadids to be a guarantee against the
influence of ulama at home. But the movement had tried, ever since its inception
in 1904, to reconcile varied interests. Its Tatar leadership had hoped to use it
as a vehicle for extending Tatar leadership to a wider constituency, hopes that
were renewed in

[65] Minutes of the meetings of the committee are in TsGARUz, f. 1044, d. 1.
[66] Najat, 17 April 1917.
[67] TsGARUz, f. 1044, d. 1, ll. 173-1730b.

1917. The Kazan Muslim Committee sent a six-member delegation to Tashkent to
help the local population organize for the awesome possibilities opened up by
the revolution. Their natural affinities lay, of course, with the Jadids, but
the venture proved ineffective from the beginning. The members of the delegation
arrived one at a time, and although they were welcomed loudly,[68] the
leadership of the Shura had ambivalent feelings toward them. The delegation
spent considerable energy on organizational matters, but local leaders were
suspicious of the uninvited guests, who understood little of the local realities
but felt called upon nevertheless to give advice.[69] Differences came to the
fore quite quickly; three of the members resigned and returned to Kazan by early
June,[70] and another two returned at the end of August.[71] The All-Russian
Muslim Congress at Moscow also proved unsuccessful in the long run. The fanfare
of the occasion could not hide basic differences, and the conference turned into
a contest between the Tatars and the rest over the question of autonomy:

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Mainstream Tatar opinion favored national-cultural autonomy, while almost everybody else voted in favor of territorial autonomy. Although, after lengthy debate, the congress passed a compromise resolution that recognized both forms of autonomy,[72] the confrontation cost a de facto Tatar withdrawal from the movement. The Second All-Russian Muslim Congress, held in Kazan in July, was an all-Tatar affair, its exclusivity underscored by its organizers' refusal to avoid a conflict with a Qazaq congress in Orenburg.[73]

Transcaucasian politicians attempted to fill the space vacated by the Tatars after June. The Ganja-based Türk Adâm-i Märkâziyât Firqâsi (Turkic Federalist Party)[74] sent a four-member delegation to Tashkent in June to establish a local organization of the party with the aim of forming a bloc of autonomist movements in the Constituent Assembly.[75] The delegation began by building bridges with the ulama and exhorting the Jadids to greater caution.[76] Its members traveled to various cities in Turkestan, establishing local cells and raising money. They seem to have achieved considerable success in garnering a consensus around the idea of autonomy, for in early September the party published its program, signed by fourteen men from several cities of Turkestan, including Munawwar Qari and Behbudi.[77] Yet again, the ulama of Tashkent remained aloof, and not a single one of them appears among the signatories of the program.

The crisis deepened further in September, when the Jadids and the ulama held separate congresses. The Shura had called the second Turkestan Muslim Congress for early September to discuss the activity of the Central Council, the questions of land, water, and food supply, and the political future of Turkestan.[78] The ulama effectively sabotaged the congress by vehemently criticizing it in a pamphlet as a conference of atheists.[79] The congress opened with barely 100 delegates, instead of the 500 expected, and almost no ulama in attendance. It nevertheless heard a proposal, drafted by Islam Shahiahmedov, a graduate of the law faculty in Petrograd, outlining a plan for
far-reaching autonomy for Turkestan. Shahiakhmedov saw Turkestan enjoying territorial autonomy in a federal Russia. It was to have its own duma with authority in all matters except external affairs, defense, posts and telegraphs, and the judiciary. The region was to enjoy complete autonomy in the economic realm, including control over mineral and water resources. The project also called for the equality of all citizens of Russia, regardless of religion, nationality, or 

[75] Members of a delegation from Baku had attended the meeting of the Central Council on 26 June and been coopted into it: Kengash, 28 July 1917.

[76] The first issue of its newspaper, Turan, published an article lavishing praise on the ulama: "A number of complaints have arisen since the beginning of Freedom because of discord between the ulama and the youth [yashlar]. Gentlemen, even a little prudent reflection would force us to admit that today the ulama are our spiritual fathers and the supporters of our faith. If we youth deny their existence, we will be guilty [gunahgar] for all time" ("Jahalat yuzindan i'tilafsizlik," Turan, 1 September 1917). The next issue of the newspaper published a similarly laudatory article about the ulama: "Al-'ulama warsat ul- anbiya'," Turan, 6 September 1917.


[78] See Kengash, 31 August 1917, for the agenda of the congress.


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class, the freedoms of assembly, religion, and conversion, and the abolition of censorship and the passport system. The congress recommended broad dissemination of the project for discussion before being put to a vote at the next conference.[80] The congress also passed a resolution on questions of "education and civilization," which called for universal, compulsory, free elementary education in the vernacular, the organization of a hierarchy of new-method schools and teachers' colleges, and the creation of a university. All education was to be funded by the state but under Muslim control. Russian was to be introduced only in middle school. Madrasas were also to be reformed and regulated.[81] Finally, a resolution called for the establishment of a shariat administration (mabkama-yi shar'iya) in each oblast, but with the crucial proviso that the electoral principle be maintained and that its members be "educated and aware of contemporary needs" (zamaindan khabardar, ilmlik kishilar).[82]

The ulama met in their own congress a week later, a huge affair with over 500 delegates from the five oblasts of Turkestan as well the Turgay and Ural'sk oblasts of the steppe region. The congress unanimously resolved itself to be in favor of a federative democratic republic, with Turkestan having its own duma with jurisdiction over issues of land and water, as well as its own militia. It also called for a halt to the creation of land committees and the socialization
of land. None of this was drastically different from the form of autonomy the Jadids' congress had heard the previous week. The crucial difference lay in the ulama's resolution of the questions of religion and women. The congress resolved that "the affairs of religion and of this world should not be separated, i.e., everything from schools to questions of land and justice should be solved according to the shariat." Similarly, "Women should not have rights equal to those of men, but everyone should have rights according to one's station as adjudged by the shariat."[83] (Of course, since the only people capable of interpreting the shariat were the ulama themselves, this guaranteed the entrenchment of their authority in the new regime.) Finally, the congress called for the Muslims of Turkestan to maintain unity and suggested that this unity be embodied in a new party to be called the Ittifaq ul-Muslimin (Union of Muslims), which should replace all existing or-

[80] Kengash, 13 September 1917; the text of the draft resolution in autonomy is in UT, 7 and 10 September 1917.
[81] Turan, 21 September 1917.
[82] Turan, 14 September 1917.

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ganizations such as the Shura-yi Islamiya.[84] This was nothing less than a call for the abolition of the organizational infrastructure of Jadidism in Turkestan, an aggressive assertion by the ulama of their power. Each side now saw itself as the sole legitimate representative of the community and sought to act on its behalf.

Bread and Revolution
Ultimately, the fate of the region was decided by its Russian population, which enjoyed a monopoly on armed force rooted directly in the fact of empire. Much more than political supremacy was at stake in Turkestan in 1917. By that spring, Turkestan was in the midst of a severe economic crisis, and famine was already a possibility. The grain shortage had afflicted the whole empire since the outbreak of the world war,[85] but it afflicted Central Asia with special force. The area under cotton had increased dramatically once the war began, making Turkestan dependent on grain imported from European Russia. The destruction wrought by the uprising of 1916 and its suppression had further disrupted agricultural production. In 1917, the rains failed and the ensuing draught crippled the grain harvest, just as political instability rendered shipments from European Russia unreliable. By autumn, when Cossack forces besieging Orenburg cut off the most direct route from Russia, Central Asia was in the grips of a full-scale famine. The struggle for political power in 1917 and the following years was played out against the backdrop of famine and the collapse of the imperial economic order.[86] Maintaining the political supremacy of the Russian community in Central Asia had become, quite literally, a matter of life and death, since only such control could assure the settlers privileged access to food. As Marco Buttino has

[85] Lars T. Lih, Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921 (Berkeley, 1990).

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persuasively argued, the actions of the Russian inhabitants of Central Asia in 1917 were motivated by this imperative.[87]

In March, the Provisional Government proclaimed a monopoly on grain and established a network of food supply committees at every administrative level to oversee the distribution of food among the population. Turkestan, however, was exempted from this monopoly, largely because the situation there had become so dismal that the government did not want to add to the liabilities it was taking on. The food supply committees became an arena of overtly political conflict between Russians and Muslim, as various organizations struggled for control of them. The Muslim congress in April passed two resolutions on the food supply question. The first called for all grain currently in Turkestan and that which was to be imported to be distributed among the population in proportion to the weight of each community in the local population. As an operational tool, the conference called for the creation of a network of bakeries under the control of local food supply committees to ensure proper distribution. The second resolution called for the dissolution of all existing food supply committees and for their reelection, giving the local population proportional representation on them.[88] The resolutions were largely ignored, but the question remained a major issue throughout the year. When in early June the Syr Darya oblast food supply committee decided to reconstitute itself, the representation was by organization. The Tashkent Soviet got ten seats out of forty-one, but only four members were guaranteed to be Muslims.[89]

While these struggles continued, many Russians, especially soldiers and (newly armed) workers organized in soviets, sought other ways of intervening in the distribution process. Many Russians in Tashkent were convinced that the inhabitants of the old city had stockpiles of grain and that Muslims merchants were hiding these in order to push food prices up. The requisitioning of food from hoarders and speculators had perfect revolutionary credentials, and groups of Russian soldiers began routinely to indulge in the practice. Buttino notes several waves of req-

uisitions in the old city in Tashkent, as well as similar incidents in Samarqand and Skobelev.[90] But matters acquired a different shape in early September around the Feast of the Sacrifice (Id-i qurban), which fell on 10 September that year. On that day, soldiers from two regiments arrived at the railway station and began confiscating all grain in possession of the passengers, many of whom were peasants from villages around Tashkent who had come to town to sell their animals and buy grain for the holiday. Matters escalated rapidly, and the following day a vast meeting of soldiers formed by acclamation a provisional revolutionary council, which proclaimed the overthrow of both the Provisional Government and the Turkestan Soviet and took power in its own hands.[91] Contemporary observers explicitly noted the connection between the food crisis and this putsch, but it has ever since been misrecognized as part of the revolutionary upsurge throughout the empire in the aftermath of Kornilov's march on Petrograd.[92]

The other political issue of the summer that had a clear Russian-Muslim dimension was the continuing bloodshed in Semirech'e, and the timing of the putsch was probably connected to it. If requisitioning of food provided good revolutionary cover for protecting the interests of the urban Russian population, the soldiers' soviets provided impeccable revolutionary credentials for carrying out devastating warfare in the countryside against the nomadic population. The issue came to the fore in Muslim politics in Tashkent. It had occupied the Turkestan Committee substantially, to the extent that two of its members, Shkapskii and Tinishpaev, spent most of their sojourn in Turkestan in Vernyi, inspecting the carnage. In April, the Shura and the Soviet had agreed to form a joint commission to investigate the situation in Semirech'e, but it took until 15 June for the commission to leave Tashkent.[93] In July, reports by its members, returning individually, began to appear in the Muslim

[90] Buttino, "Turkestan 1917," 69-70. At times, "requisitioning" extended to other commodities as well. On 31 July, soldiers in Kokand commandeered two cartloads of draperies, which they planned to sell off. The goods belonged to solid merchants of the city, who approached the Turkestan Soviet, more moderate than its local counterparts, which directed that the goods be returned, otherwise the perpetrators "would be accountable according to the law" (PORvUz, I, 201). We do not know whether the Turkestan Soviet's writ bore fruit or not.


[92] The incident was reported prominently in the Provisional Government's Vestnik, where the connection with food riots is made explicitly (see Browder and Kerensky, eds., Russian Provisional Government, I: 422-424).

press, and several Muslim organizations began to plan a demonstration in support of the Muslims of Semirech'e.[94] The demonstration came off spectacularly on 18 August. A massive procession, carrying banners and red flags left the old city and marched through to the streets of Russian Tashkent to the governor-general's mansion. Nalivkin, then acting chair of the largely moribund Turkestan Committee, addressed the crowd in Turkic, laying the blame for the events on Russian settlers. But the demonstrators wanted more. According to the report in Ulugh Turkistan, Nalivkin was heckled: "We did not come here to listen to past history. Give us a clear answer. . . . It's been six months since freedom was declared, but the government hasn't given a thought to them [the Muslims of Semirech'e]. This is because the blood flowing in Semirech'e is Muslim and Turkic blood." A clear answer was not forthcoming, and the demonstration moved off after two hours to Kaufman Square, the center of Russian Tashkent, to listen to more speeches.[95] The episode was remarkable for several reasons. For all the setbacks the Jadids had suffered recently, this demonstration showed that they retained the ability to put masses of people on the streets. The ulama do not seem to have taken an active part in it, but they did not obstruct it either. The Shura's major demands were substantial: that fresh troops be sent to stop the carnage and that half of them be Muslim, that arms given to the settlers at Kuropatkin's command be taken back, that refugees returning from Chinese territory be allowed to settle on their own lands, that Cossack regiments sent to Semirech'e be withdrawn, and that a Muslim representative be added to a Provisional Government delegation being sent to the area.[96] But it was the physical presence of large numbers of Muslims in the Russian city in an overtly political cause that upset the balance and led to the panic that culminated in the putsch of 17 September. This putsch won less than unanimous support locally. The Provisional Revolutionary Committee had acted against not just the authority of the Provisional Government but also that of the Turkestan Soviet, whose much more moderate leadership was forced to flee to Skobelev in Ferghana, where it continued to denounce this usurpation of power.[97] The putsch was also denounced by various Muslim organizations, the Jadid conference resolving that "Muslims will never accept the acquisition of"

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[97] PORvUz, I, 328-330.

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power by a single party in a democratic Russia."[98] Ultimately, however, the putsch was unsuccessful because not every group among the local Russian population supported it. Petrograd was able to quell the rebellion by rushing loyal troops from Kazan under the command of Major General B.A. Korovichenko,
who was able to restore order. Korovichenko began a fresh round of all-party negotiations for rejuvenating the Turkestan Committee while attempting to reassert the authority of the center. However, the coincidence of interests between the various groups that had opposed the putsch proved evanescent. As the legitimacy of the Provisional Government declined throughout the empire, the commitment to constitutional procedure on the part of Tashkent Russians, never very strong to begin with, rapidly gave way to concern for survival. As preparations began for the elections to the Constituent Assembly,[99] the second congress of soviets in October elected a far more radical regional soviet that had fewer qualms about taking power by force. When the Tashkent Soviet took power on October 23, after four days of fighting, the regional soviet did not oppose it.

It is crucial to realize that the conquest of power by the Tashkent Soviet preceded the Soviet victory in Petrograd and was largely unconnected to it. The roots of the October "revolution" in Turkestan lay in the balance of power between the forces represented in the soviets (predominantly soldiers and settlers) and the rest of society ("privileged" Russians and natives) as it existed on the ground. The struggle might have been clothed in the language of revolution then fashionable throughout Russia, but its reality was very different than in Petrograd. Contemporary observers in Central Asia saw the two takeovers as separate. The revolution in Petrograd was not without its possibilities, as we shall see, but the assumption of power by the soviets in Tashkent was of much greater practical import.

Contrary to the general impression in the literature, the Soviet takeover in Tashkent did not galvanize the Muslim population to united political action.[100] The positions of the two sides were too far apart for that, and few saw the takeover as the end of politics. The pattern of parallel responses continued. The ulama convened a general Muslim congress in the second week of November, to which no Jadids were invited,

in order to discuss the question of relations with the new regime. The congress met when many Jadid leaders were out of town in the immediate aftermath of the fighting, and their absence led to the withdrawal of the delegation from Transcaspia.[101] After the initial chaos, however, the congress heard more than twenty speeches. Its final resolution, noting that "the Muslims of Turkestan ... comprise 98 percent of the population," deemed it "impermissible to advocate the assumption of power in Turkestan by a handful of immigrant soldiers, workers, and peasants who are ignorant of the way of life of the Muslims of Turkestan."[102] Rather it decided to propose to the Soviet the creation of a new Turkestan Committee to govern Turkestan until the convening of the
Constituent Assembly. The committee was to have twelve members, six from the present congress and three each from the regional congresses of municipal dumas and the soviets. The committee was to be responsible to a council of twenty-four, with the ulama's Muslim congress receiving fourteen seats. The congress elected a five-member commission, headed by Lapin, to convey these proposals to the Soviet.[103]

Even as a negotiating position, these proposals are remarkable. They indicate how secure the ulama felt in their leadership of the Muslim population and of the political weight of that population in the affairs of the region. At the same time, they indicate the continuity in politics perceived by the ulama, for the proposals were aimed at the creation of a new Turkestan Committee, the same process that Korovichenko had been attempting. The Soviet, of course, had no intention of sharing its power and curtly refused the offer. The resolution of the Bolshevik-Maximalist faction passed by the Soviet gives clear indication of its views on the matter: "The inclusion of Muslims in the organ of supreme regional power is unacceptable at the present time in view of both the completely indefinite attitude of the native population toward the power of the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers', and Peasants' Deputies, and the fact that there are no proletarian class organizations among the native population whose representation in the organ of supreme regional power the faction would welcome."[104] The language of class could easily conceal the national and colonial dimensions of the conflict.

[104] The text of this resolution is in A.A. Gordienko, Obrazovanie Turkestanskoi ASSR (Moscow, 1968), 309-310.

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Experiment In Government

While the ulama were negotiating with the Tashkent Soviet, several members of the Central Council had fled from Tashkent during the fighting and gathered in Kokand, where they convened their own "extraordinary" conference to address the new political situation. The Kokand conference was not convened as a result of the rebuff to the ulama by the soviet congress; rather, it was a counterpart to the ulama's conference of early November and was dominated by the Jadids and their sympathizers. Although conditions in Turkestan made travel difficult and the majority of delegates came from the Ferghana oblast,[105] the major figures in the Shura were all present when the congress opened on 26 November. Also present were large numbers of Russian and Jewish representatives of municipal and other public organizations from Turkestan (although most in fact came from Ferghana). The Jadids had veered into an alliance with moderate Russian forces in Turkestan.

After only brief debate, the congress passed the following resolution: "The Fourth Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress, expressing the will of the
peoples of Turkestan to self-determination in accordance with the principles
proclaimed by the Great Russian Revolution, proclaims Turkestan territorially
autonomous in union with the Federal Democratic Russian Republic. It entrusts
the elaboration of the form of autonomy to the Constituent Assembly of
Turkestan, which must be convened as soon as possible. It solemnly declares that
the rights of the national minorities inhabiting Turkestan will be safeguarded
in every possible way."

The congress elected an eight-member "provisional government of Turkestan," which was to be responsible to a fifty-four-member
council. It elected thirty-two members from among those attending; eighteen of
the remaining seats were to be filled by representatives of various non-Muslim
parties and organizations while four seats were to go to representatives of
municipal dumas.

In following up on the resolutions of the September congress, the congress
affirmed the Jadids' sense of continuity with the period since February.
Nevertheless, speakers were also aware that the assumption of
power by the Soviet had altered the situation drastically. Mustafa Choqay, who
was elected foreign minister, spoke of "the absence of government in Russia
today ... [which] makes the convocation of the Constituent Assembly
doubtful." The congress linked Turkestan's future to a liberal democratic
Russia and yet promised to convene Turkestan's own Constituent Assembly. In his
speech, Behbudi stressed the necessity of having Turkestani delegates present at
any peace conference in the future. More practically, the congress decided,
after lengthy debate, to join Kaledin's South-Eastern Union. Many speakers
disputed the wisdom of an alliance with a Cossack force known for its
counterrevolutionary tendencies as well as its avowed intention of "placing a
cross over the Aya Sofya," but the union controlled rail routes to Russia, the
only source for importing grain.

This provisional government, which became known as the "Kokand Autonomy," was
dominated by Russian-educated Muslim intellectuals, with whom the Jadids had
cooperated all year. Muhamedjan Tïnishpaev served as prime minister and minister
for internal affairs; the other ministers and their portfolios were Islam
Shahiahmedov, deputy prime minister; Mustafa Choqay, external affairs;
Ubaydullah Khojaev, in charge of creating a people's militia; Yur Ali Aghaev,
land and water affairs; Abidjan Mahmudov, food supply; Abdurrahman-bek Urazaev,
deputy minister for internal affairs; and Solomon Gertsfel'd, finance.

The thirty-two members elected to the council included Sher Ali Lapin but no other
members from the Ulama Jamiyati. Indeed, the council was remarkable for its
complete exclusion of the ulama. At the same time, the congress offered moderate
Russians a disproportionate role in the proposed government in an attempt to
distance them from the soviets. The congress and the government elected by it were thus characterized as a broad alliance of moderate forces of the region that excluded both the ulama and the soviets. Events had pitched the Jadids into the unfamiliar business of running a government, but November 1917 was a singularly inauspicious time for embarking on such an experiment. As a symbolic gesture, the proclamation of autonomy was widely celebrated by the Jadids throughout Turkestan. It also attracted support from several Russian organizations,

[110] Ibid.

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especially those of Ferghana.[112] Many others in Muslim society held out little hope for it, and many feared that it would lead to war.[113] The new government therefore called for demonstrations in its support throughout Turkestan. Demonstrations took place successfully in Andijan on 3 December and Tashkent on 6 December.[114] The Kokand Autonomy then called a second meeting in Tashkent on the following Friday, 13 December, which that year was the birthday of the Prophet. The second meeting was intended both as a show of support and a direct challenge to the Tashkent Soviet on its own turf. The second demonstration was supported by the Tashkent Duma, which had refused to accept its dissolution by the Soviet in early December.[115] The Soviet briefly debated participating in the demonstration under its own banners, but decided against it.[116] Instead, it decided to allow the demonstration to take place, but not to allow it into the Russian part of the city; it also placed Tashkent on war footing on the day of the demonstration.[117] A clearer admission of the geographic limits of its authority could not have been possible. In the event, the demonstration attracted tens of thousands of people from Tashkent and beyond, including many non-Muslims. The ulama in Tashkent had showed little enthusiasm for the Kokand Autonomy, but a group of them also joined the demonstration. The demonstration then marched into the Russian part of the city, where it quickly turned into a confrontation: It attacked the prison and freed political prisoners taken by the Soviet during its conquest of power the previous month. Russian soldiers fired into the crowd, killing several people, while many others were killed in the ensuing stampede.[118] The freed prisoners were recaptured and summarily executed.

Two weeks later, in a transparent attempt to garner "proletarian" credentials for itself, the Kokand Autonomy organized a Congress of Muslim Workers and Peasants in Kokand. It was attended by about 300 deputies who declared that the Kokand Autonomy was not a government of the bourgeoisie alone but was "composed of the best sections of our society." Few of those taking part were either workers or peasants, and

[114] UT, 10 December 1917; 16 December 1917.
among the presidium we find the names of Dr. Sanjar Isfendiyarov, Abdullah Awlani, and Piti Mursilzade, a member of the delegation from the Turkic Federalist Party.[119]

While the Kokand Autonomy could bring people out into the streets, it lacked the means to assert its power. Forming a standing army in a colony of occupation was of course difficult, and the uprising of the previous year had shown how unpopular the idea of conscription was in the area. The government invited Russian and Tatar officers and Ottoman prisoners of war quartered in the area to its side, but it could recruit only sixty-odd volunteers for the ranks. Its financial resources were equally scarce. Even a government with much greater coercive power behind it would have found it difficult to raise revenue in the region's crisis-ridden economy. The Kokand Autonomy found it impossible to levy taxes. Its writ did not even extend to Russian institutions in the new city. In January, P. G. Poltoratskii, the commissar for labor in the Soviet government, came to Kokand and "nationalized" the Kokand branch of the State Bank.[120] The government raised 3 million rubles through a loan, but they were spent quickly, and nothing more could be raised.[121] And there was little outside help to be found in the chaotic conditions of that winter. The Kokand Autonomy sought cooperation from Ataman Dutov as well as the Alash Orda regime among the Qazaqs.[122] A mission dispatched to the amir of Bukhara produced predictably scanty results.[123] Help from beyond the borders of the Russian empire was out of the question. Tendentious claims of Soviet historiography notwithstanding,[124] the British were in no position to give any help. Indeed, the fear of pan-Islam paralyzed British thinking on Central Asian affairs throughout the period of Russian civil war, rendering it incapable of distinguishing be-

[120] Alekseenkov, Kokandskaia avtonomia, 43-44.
[121] Choqay claimed that, although the sum was raised, the government could not find any arms to buy (Chokaev, "Turkestan," 408).
[124] The Kokand Autonomy was demonised early in Soviet historiography. To its sins of being a counterrevolutionary alliance of local and Russian bourgeoises was added the accusation of being "an attempt of imperialist states, especially England and America, to come to the help of exploiter classes overthrown by the October revolution and to realize their aggressive plans of turning Turkestan
into their colony and a bridgehead for an attack on Soviet Russia" (Kh. Sh. Inoiatov, Otvet fal'sifikatoram istorn sovetskot Srednei Azii i Kazakbstana [Tashkent, 1962], 61).

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tween various political currents in the struggle. In any case, the period in which the Kokand Autonomy existed was too early for any British action. In December 1917, a report received at the British consulate in Kashgar that the Kokand Autonomy was "doing great honor" to two aqsaqqals from Chinese Turkestan set off pan-Turkist alarms, and the British minister in Beijing unleashed a thunderous letter to the concerned authorities upbraiding them for their laxity.[125] The British did intervene, briefly and ineffectively, in Central Asia, but the Kokand Autonomy had ceased to exist long before then. The end came in early February. Hostilities grew between the Kokand Autonomy, entrenched in the old city, and the Kokand Soviet, which controlled the Russian quarter and the citadel. Again, Soviet power was entrenched in the planned spaces of the colonial city. By February, Dutov's blockade of Orenburg was broken, and the Soviet in Tashkent could spare enough forces to Kokand. Anticipating the arrival of reinforcements, the Kokand Autonomy opened hostilities but was soon outgunned.[126] As the last Soviet scholar to write on the episode, P. Alekseenkov, stated in a matter-of-fact manner, "Not knowing exactly where the enemy was, the defenders of the citadel opened machine-gun fire on the old city."[127] After the machine guns came the burning and looting. The city burned for three days. Russian soldiers were in control of whatever power remained in Turkestan.

[125] IOLR, L/P&S/10/721, 245.

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Epilogue

The Transformation of Jadidism

The revolution marked a turning point in the history of Central Asian Jadidism. By 1917, the Jadids had been successful in asserting their presence as a new group in society and pursuing their claims to leadership in it. The advent of print (and later the use of theater) had allowed them to create a new public space from which older cultural elites were increasingly marginalized, their cultural capital slighted by the Jadids as being irrelevant to the needs of the age, and their commitment to the good of the nation questioned. The new knowledge brought in by print and reproduced in new-method schools led to new understandings of the world. The nation appropriated from dominant discourses of contemporary Europe was now used as a yardstick for measuring the utility of
ideas and practices in Muslim society. Islam itself came to be abstracted from
the social practices of religious scholars and anchored in sacred texts, access
to which, the Jadids claimed, was open to anyone with the requisite knowledge.
At the same time, the Jadids saw the welfare of Islam inextricably linked to the
progress of Muslims. The Muslim community thus became a modern nation, with all
the rights and obligations that went with it. Measured in terms of the number of
new-method schools, publications, and theater, the Jadids' success was
unquestionable before 1917. Central Asian cultural life in 1917 was very
different from even a generation earlier.

Yet, Jadid success was very far from complete. The new public space was still
minuscule, and the status and prestige of the older elites, though diminished,
remained very strong in society, at large. When the February revolution
transformed overnight the old politics of cultural reform into one of mass
mobilization, the Jadids found themselves on new, uncertain terrain. Their
political strategies until then had been dictated by the constraints imposed on
political activity by an autocratic colonial state. The promise of an inclusive
liberal constitutionalism proffered by the Provisional Government marked a
complete transformation of the political arena. The Jadids saw in liberal
constitutionalism the promise for the fulfillment of their hopes for their
nation, and as numerous pronouncements throughout the year show, they sought to
work within that framework. This strategy failed, however: the Jadids were
surprised by the vehemence of the opposition from within their society, just as
the constitutional order collapsed under the weight of social radicalism. The
new politics brought into the open deep conflicts that had existed ever since
the rise of Jadidism but had remained confined to debate over culture. Through
the course of 1917, the Jadids found themselves capable of organizing massive
demonstrations but repeatedly failed to convert that support into votes. Rather,
the ulama emerged as the leaders of the society, their claim confirmed, in many
elections, by votes. The ulama's triumph was rendered moot, however, by the
collapse of the constitutional order, which put an end to electoral politics and
put power in the hands of members of the settler community.
But the struggle was far from over in Turkestan after the Soviet victory at
Kokand. The three years following 1917 were a period of intense upheaval during
which the entire social and political order in the former Russian empire was
reconstructed in a multifaceted struggle of various social groups. For the
Jadids the years were transformative of both their worldview and their
strategies. They succeeded in becoming active agents in the contests over the
reestablishment of state order in Central Asia, in which the future of Central
Asia was defined. When the exclusionary policies of the Tashkent Soviet changed,
under pressure from the central government, a remarkable concatenation of
circumstances allowed the Jadids to first enter, and then briefly take over, the
new institutions of power being created by the Soviet regime in Turkestan.
Although the attempt was unsuccessful, the state had come to play a significant
role in Jadid strategies. This marked a significant break from the tsarist
period, when Jadid reform was formulated solely in society, often against the
suspicions of an exclusionary state.

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The experiences of 1917 went a long way toward defining the new strategies. The nation had let the Jadids down. Their vision of the good of the nation was clearly not shared by large parts of the urban population (the rural population had remained largely invisible in Muslim politics throughout the year). Although the Jadids continued to blame ignorance for the ills of their society,[1] and struggles in the realm of culture and education remained at the forefront of their agenda, they had realized that new methods were required in the new era. Years of exhortation had produced scanty results. The new era was to be one of action and institution building. At the same time, the emphasis on politics had come to stay, but liberal constitutionalism gave way to the politics of mobilization. As Soviet attitudes changed, the Jadids came to see the state not as an enemy but as an instrument of change. The new regime was quite different from the old and presented its own opportunities and constraints. Jadid strategies accordingly shifted in the years after 1917. The revolution provided the chance for a politicized and radicalized cultural elite to win control of the destiny of the nation it sought to change. In the process, the nation itself came to defined anew, as an ethnically charged patriotism came to be synonymous with a nationalism expressed in confessional terms.

Toward Soviet Power
In some ways, the carnage at Kokand made surprisingly little difference for the Jadids. Most delegates to the November congress remained active in public life in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Mustafa Choqay represented "Autonomous Turkestan" at several all-Russian gatherings of anti-Bolshevik forces in 1918 and 1919, before going into exile through Transcaucasia.[2] The Kokand Autonomy had never been able to assert its power beyond the old city of Kokand, and therefore its fall did not affect any significant part of the population beyond Kokand. Nor did military conquest result in effective rule by the Soviets. The Soviet government in Tashkent had admitted its own limits in December when it had allowed the demonstration in support of the Kokand Autonomy to take place in the old city but refused it entrance into the Russian quarter. There matters stood for quite some time. The old city, with its labyrinthine alleys and unfamiliar sights, remained alien to the new Russian power and largely beyond its control. The only manner in which Soviet power could be asserted in the old city was through requisitioning, carried out in brief armed sorties. These had picked up immediately after the Soviet takeover. The newspaper Ulugh Turkistan complained in early January of the numerous requisitions in recent days. "There was a time when people were dying every day

of hunger in the old city, but the European inhabitants of the new city did not
grieve. Now that the food supply is diminishing in the new city, they turn their
gaze to the old city. "[3] Beyond Tashkent the situation was chaotic still.
Soviet power, to the extent that we can speak of it as a unitary entity, came to
different places at different times, its fortunes varying greatly according to
local conditions. In areas of Russian peasant settlement, Russian-dominated food
supply committees took requisitioning in their own hands, often acting against
the commands of the Tashkent regime. The establishment of Soviet rule in
Turkestan ultimately became a matter of reestablishing the rule of the city over
the countryside. [4]
The dislocation caused by the revolution also redefined the geopolitical
situation in Central Asia. Although the Russian civil war did not officially
begin until May 1918, the military situation in the empire had been uncertain at
least since the autumn of 1917, and had seriously undermined the apparatus of
colonial power established a half-century earlier. Soviet power was not
established in any militarily meaningful way until 1920, when the central
government, having emerged victorious in the civil war in European Russia, could
send reinforcements to Central Asia. Until then, the Soviet regime in Tashkent
remained vulnerable.
This geopolitical uncertainty was accompanied by a profound economic crisis. By
1918, the cotton economy was in utter ruin. Production had declined after a peak
in 1916, and inflation, dating back to 1914, had rocketed in the revolutionary
era (prices had increased by 466 percent in 1917, 149 percent in 1918, and 1065
percent in 1919, by which time they stood at 588 times the level of 1914). [5]
Most significantly, how-
[4] The extremely complex politics of famine in Turkestan after 1917 are analyzed
by Marco Buttino, "Politics and Social Conflict during a Famine: Turkestan
Immediately after the Revolution," in Buttino, ed., In a Collapsing Empire:
Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union (Milan,
1993), 257-277.
Moscow, 1921]), 164.

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ever, the famine of 1917 had assumed disastrous proportions over the winter.
Over the next three years, the famine and the accompanying epidemics and armed
conflict with the Russians devastated the local population of Central Asia.
According to Marco Buttino's careful estimate, the indigenous rural population
decreased by 23 percent between 1917 and 1920. (The figure was 30.5 percent for
1915-1920, which included the destruction of the 1916 uprising.) The loss was
offset only in very small part by a modest 8.3 percent increase in the urban
population, and there were doubtless some emigration to other parts of the
Russian empire as well as to China, Afghanistan, and Iran. But the majority of
the decline in population is attributable to hunger and war. [6]
Such were the political realities faced by the Jadids in the spring of 1918.
Many entertained hopes of foreign intervention against the Soviet regime. One
émigré account, written a quarter of a century later, suggests that many Jadids were in contact with Ottoman authorities in Transcaucasia as well as Istanbul, hoping to attract military intervention.[7] Rumors of such action had reached P.T. Etherton, the British consul in Kashgar, who also reported in December 1918 that "a deputation of the leading merchants of Ferghana and Kashgaria, men of great wealth and influence, came to see me and expressed the hope that British intervention would eventuate, whilst at the same time they voiced the confidence of the people in any action the British might take."[8] The Ottoman foray into Transcaucasia ended quickly, and the British, for all their concern about the security of India, were wary of active involvement in an unstable situation while the war still continued in Europe. Armed resistance did not appear as an option to the Jadids.

The Jadids had little connection with the Basmachi revolt in Ferghana, which began in 1918 and continued for several years, by which time it had also spread to eastern Bukhara. Conventional wisdom connects the Basmachi to the destruction of the Kokand Autonomy. Soviet historiography saw in them the force of counterrevolution, acting in unison with every reactionary force in the region to nip Soviet power in the bud. Non-Soviet scholarship has generally accepted the romanticized émigré view of the Basmachi as a guerrilla movement of national liberation.[9] Both views place a greater burden on the Basmachi than historical evidence can sustain. Instead, the revolt was a response to the economic and social crisis produced by the famine and the resulting "bacchanalia of robbery, requisitions and confiscations on the part of 'Soviet authorities.'"[10]

Ferghana had been a turbulent area in the last decades of imperial rule, when the term basmachi was commonplace in TWG, whose pages were replete with accounts of banditry and murder in the region. The Basmachi represented one strategy of the rural population to cope with this dislocation.[11] The potential military threat that the Basmachi represented to Soviet power was recognized by many contemporaries, but always greatly overestimated. Both in terms of its organization and its goals (or rather the absence thereof), the movement was embedded in local solidarities, which remained alien to the more abstract visions of national struggle espoused by those who sought to coopt it to their goals.[12] We might do well to remember that Choqay on more than one occasion disowned any connection between the struggle he had led and that of the Basmachi, who were little better than bandits in his opinion.[13]

The main political strategy of the Jadids came to focus instead on a struggle for participation in the new regime and its fledgling institutions. "Knowing that struggle in Turkestan was useless and could lead only to the ruin of the land," Choqay wrote in 1923, "the core of the autonomists remaining after the
defeat at Kokand called upon its supporters to work with existing authorities in order to weaken the hostility directed at the indigenous population by the frontier Soviet regime.” 14 For reasons beyond their control, the Jadids were remarkably successful in this bid; in the process they outflanked the ulama in their quest for leadership of urban Muslim society.


[12] The most quixotic of these attempts was that of Enver Pasha, who in 1921 briefly placed himself at the helm of the Basmachi in a bid to oust the Soviet regime from Central Asia. On this episode, see now Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia , 1919-1922 (Tokyo, 1991).


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Muslim Communists

One of Lenin's first decrees had been directed "To the Toiling Muslims of Russia and the East," whose grievances the Bolsheviks sought to coopt. The policies of the Tashkent Soviet were, from this point of view, totally reckless and were challenged by the central government (which moved to Moscow in March 1918) early on. Yet, Moscow's influence was highly mediated. The civil war and the tenuousness of the Bolshevik hold on power in central Russia itself ruled out any direct intervention. Still, Turkestan's avowed adherence to Russia, an important pillar of its claim to legitimacy, gave Moscow some scope for moral suasion, which it sought to utilize to the fullest extent possible. The newly formed People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs (or Narkomnats, in the revolutionary argot then coming into vogue) sent a mission with plenipotentiary powers to Turkestan to assert its will. The mission, composed of A. P. Kobozev and two Tatars, Y. Ibrahimov and Arif Klevleev, arrived in Tashkent in February 1918 and began the task of attracting Muslims into the new regime. Kobozev's tactics were straightforward: to support local Muslims almost indiscriminately against the Russians in control of the Soviet.[15] In a telegram to the Tashkent Soviet announcing the Kobozev mission, Stalin, then commissar for nationality affairs, informed the Tashkent Soviet that Klevleev was a former nationalist, but suggested that the new regime not be afraid of "the shadows of the past" and "attract to [Soviet] work other supporters of Kerenskii from the natives, to the extent that they are ready to serve Soviet power."[16] Kobozev's efforts bore fruit, and on the eve of the Fifth Turkestan Congress of Soviets in April, he was able to inform the Council of People's Commissars in Moscow that "white
Muslim chalmas [turbans] have grown [in number] in the ranks of the Tashkent parliament." 17 Seven of the thirty-six members of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan Autonomous Federative Republic that was proclaimed by the congress were Muslims. Kobozev also pushed for the formation of a Commissariat for Nationality Affairs (Turkomnats) in the new autonomous republic, to which the Tashkent government acceded in June after much footdragging. This was the first in a series of institutions that provided Muslims access to the new power structure. The terms of reference of the Turkomnats were fairly modest. Its main function was to represent and defend the interests of workers of various nationalities (including non-Russian Europeans living in Turkestan). With the moral support of Moscow, however, it gathered considerable political power around it and became the mouthpiece of Muslim opinion within the party. By the autumn of 1918, all oblast level executive committees of the Soviet regime had sections on nationality affairs.

Over the next few months, large numbers of Muslims flocked to the new institutions of power. The Bolsheviks finally formed their own party, the Communist Party of Turkestan (KPT), in June 1918. Archival research on the recruitment of Muslims into the party in its first years is still not possible, but all evidence suggests that large numbers of Jadids joined it as soon as it was possible. Klevleev was especially active in recruiting Muslims into the party and state apparatus. In May, he visited Samarqand, where he addressed a mass meeting in the Sher Dar madrasa organized by the Samarqand Labor Union. Later in the month, the union renamed itself the Muslim Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies of Samarqand uyezd, and by August, a Muslim Workers' Communist Society (Musulman Zehmatkash Istitirakiyun Jamiyati) boasted 1,600 members in Samarqand. The Jadid newspaper Hurriyat had been adopted by the education section of the Samarqand Soviet as its organ. [18] In Tashkent, the Tatar Union reorganized as the Tatar Socialist Workers' Committee in June. Then, on 2 August, in a meeting held in the main mosque of Tashkent and chaired by Klevleev, it transformed itself into the Tatar section of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).[19] A Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies had appeared in old Tashkent, and it provided an important channel for recruitment of Muslims. After Klevleev engineered new elections for its Executive Committee in June, it included the Bolsheviks Abdullah Awlan and Said Akram Said Azimbaev and the Left Social Revolutionary Tawalla. By August, Tawalla had been elected to the Executive Committee of the Tashkent Soviet, as was Bashirullah Khojaev, the brother of Ubaydullah Khojaev and an old Jadid in his own right. [20]

The Jadids thus rapidly transformed themselves into Muslim Communists and asserted the claim, again, to speak in the name of the Muslims of Turkestan. "Muslim" also functioned as an identity label in the

[16] Stalin to Kolesov, 7 April 1918, in PORvUz , II: 223.
early Soviet period. For the new regime in Moscow, "Muslims" represented a nationality alongside Ukrainians, Jews, and Georgians in the vocabulary of the Narkomnats. (In Turkestan, "Muslim" had the added benefit of being usable as a synonym for "native.") The ulama, who had contested the Jadid claim to leadership the previous year, proved far less adept at operating in the new political language and quickly lost the initiative they had gained in Muslim politics in 1917. The Jadids went on the offensive quickly. In early 1918, they organized a Fuqaha Jamiyati (Society of Jurists) comprising ulama sympathetic to reform, which was clearly meant to counter the influence of the ulama. Then in April the Tashkent Soviet of Muslim Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, essentially a Jadid organization, asked the City Soviet to arrest the "counterrevolutionary" ulama belonging to the Ulama Jamiyati and to requisition the property belonging to the organization. The request was duly carried out, and the Jamiyat was abolished on 5 May for "not corresponding to the interests of the working people" and its organ, al-Izah, was banned.[21] The Fuqaha Jamiyati did not last very long, but it had done its work. When it was dissolved in its turn for being "irrelevant to current problems," its property was turned over to Madaniyat (Civilization), a new educational society formed by Jadids.[22]

For their part, the new Muslim Communists assimilated the language of class that legitimated the new regime. The Tashkent Soviet, in using the language of class to assert the national rights of the region's European settler population, had highlighted the importance of the new language. The Kokand Autonomy had also sought "proletarian" legitimacy for itself by organizing a Muslim Workers' and Peasants' Congress. From then on, class and revolution entered Jadid vocabulary and over the next several years were repeatedly used to assert the rights of the local population. To be sure, most of the Muslims who entered the party in 1918 and subsequent years had not been active Jadids before 1917. The revolution had seen a major influx of new people into public life, and their numbers continued to increase, thus broadening the base of the politically active elite in Turkestan. The politics of these Muslim Communists, however, represented in many ways a direct connection with the main thrust of Jadidism. Education and enlightenment continued to hold a central place in their strategies. The burst of activity that took place in 1917,

[21] Ibid., 203-204, 265.
[22] "Maqsad-u maslak," Bayan ul-baq, 16 August 1918 (n.s.).
the influx of Jadids into the new apparatus. Russo-native schools had been abolished in the summer of 1917, and now a new network of "Soviet" schools began to emerge around existing new-method schools. In the summer of 1918, twenty new schools were opened, and in 1919, in Tashkent alone, there were forty-eight Muslim schools with 158 teachers and 9,200 students, a significant increase over the figures of the tsarist period.[23] (This was in addition to the maktabs, which continued to exist.) Although details of the curricula of these schools remain elusive, there is no doubt that these schools were a direct continuation of the Jadids' new-method schools. The increase in the number of schools was made possible by the presence in Turkestan of Ottoman prisoners of war, many of whom were pressed into service as teachers.[24] They brought with them curricular and political attitudes that had little in common with those of the new regime. Ottoman Turkish was widely used in instruction, and the "national poetry" of the Jadids gave way to Ottoman martial songs and military drill.[25] Old textbooks were reprinted and new ones continued to appear in a very similar mold. Textbooks such as Wasli's Ortaq (Friend) or Shakirjan Rahimi's Sawgha (Present) scarcely differed, in tone or content, from any new-method textbook of the past, even though they were published by Soviet authorities.[26] In addition, several textbooks were translated from Russian or Tatar.[27] The lithography-based publishing trade did not survive the revolution. The year 1917 had been the most prolific in Central Asian publishing, and the same activity continued into the first half of 1918, when several new periodicals appeared. By the summer, however, the Soviet regime had managed to nationalize all printing presses (the majority of

[23] Rakimi "Prosveshchenie uzbekov," Nauka i prosveshchenie , 1922, no. 2, 41-42; Safarov, Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia , 149.
[24] This episode remains little known; the only substantial piece of documentation is the reminiscences of Râci (Çakiroz, one of the prisoners of war, in R. (Çakiroz and Timur Kocaoglu, "Turkistan'da Turk Subaylari," serialized in Turk Dunyasi Tarih Dergisi in 1987-1988.
[26] Wasli, Ortaq (Samarqand, 1918); Shakirjan Rahimi, Sawgha (Tashkent, 1919).

— 291 — which had existed in Russian parts of towns and for whom the printing of Arabic-script texts was a side operation), thus sounding the death knell of the book trade. The official monopoly on printing and publishing was in place, but again the only qualified personnel available were Jadids, and the new official press bore an uncanny resemblance to the Jadid press of old. The unofficial vernacular press had ceased to exist by mid-1918, to be replaced by Ishtirakiyun (Communists), the official organ of Turkomnats, which, as its Arabianate title indicates, retained a distinctly Muslim flavor. Jadid authors retained a commanding presence in the many such quasi-official newspapers that appeared throughout Turkestan over the next three years, as the officially sanctioned
press became in those years a conduit for a Jadid voice. But that voice had changed dramatically in the aftermath of the collapse of the old order. An ethnically charged patriotism rapidly came to characterize the Jadid rhetoric of the nation. In the first days of the revolution, the nation was universally defined as comprising the Muslims of Turkestan. Over the course of the year, the Jadid emphasis shifted gradually to Turkestan, which was now insistently seen as the homeland of the Turkic peoples. The ulama's appropriation of Islam was partially responsible for this, for it pushed the Jadids to cast their appeal increasingly in terms of ethnic nationalism. For Turkestanis Jadids, the new conditions pushed to the fore the romantic notions of Turkicness that had been present in their rhetoric before the revolution. All through the year Jadid writers evoked Chinggis, Temur, and Ulugh-bek. Nowhere is this clearer than in the writings of Fitrat, who wrote a regular column in Hurriyat after becoming its editor in August 1917. In July, he wrote: "O great Turan, the land of lions! What happened to you? What bad days have you fallen into? What happened to the brave Turks who once ruled the world? Why did they pass? Why did they go away?"[28] This newfound Turkism was also reflected in Fitrat's language. Up until the revolution, Fitrat had published almost exclusively in Persian; in that year he switched to a highly purist form of Turkic. In September 1917, he published a reader for the fourth year of new-method schools (ostensibly for use in Bukhara) with a vocabulary so rigorously Turkist that Fitrat felt compelled to translate several words in footnotes. All the characters in the reading passages bear Turkic names.[29] In the spring of 1918, a news-paper, Turk sozi (Turkic Word), was being published in Tashkent by an organization called Turk Ortaqlighi (Turkic Friendship). Over the next two years, the same mood was to lead to the elaboration of a Chaghatay nationalism by a number of Jadid writers under Fitrat's leadership, grouped in the Chaghatay Gurungi (Chaghatay Conversation).[30]

There were several sources of this new emphasis on Turkism. The abolition of censorship made possible the expression of hitherto unmentionable visions of identity. The most extreme expressions of Turkism still came from the Tatars, whose newspaper in Tashkent was called Ulugh Turkistan (Great Turkestan). In its first issue, Nushirvan Yavushev had claimed that the "30 million Turk-Tatars in Russia" were, "from the point of view of race, nationality, and language, tied to one another like the children of the same father and the branches of the same tree. Turkestan is the original homeland of the Turks. Therefore, no Turkic nation of Russia will stand back from helping our Turkestani brothers in their quest for autonomy. No Turkic son can forget that Turkestan is his own homeland."[31] This tenor was kept up throughout the year by Ulugh Turkistan and the Tatar press in European Russia. The other source of this new Turkism was the Ottoman empire, where pan-Turkism had reached an apogee of influence during the war, the fetvâ depicting it as a
holy war notwithstanding. Strict censorship imposed at the beginning of the war had excluded much of this rhetoric from Russia, but with the weakening of the Russian war effort by the autumn of 1917, such censorship waned. Ottoman victories in Transcaucasia in the spring of 1918 further heightened enthusiasm for Turkism among the Jadids. Yet, this was not the Ottoman-directed spread of pan-Turkism that Russian official had long feared (and that contemporary British intelligence services suspected). No evidence of direct Ottoman government support for Turkist or pan-Turkist groups in Central Asia has come to light. Rather, this enthusiasm for Turkism sprung from the radical mood of the Jadids. The most tangible connection between the Ottoman empire and Turkestan was the presence of several thousand Ottoman prisoners of war in Turkestan, who, in the chaotic circumstances of 1918, found themselves having to fend for a living. Yet their participation in


local cultural life, although important, was hardly part of a centrally directed plot to disseminate pan-Turkist ideas.[32]

It is also important to note that this rigorous Turkism did not come at the expense of Islam, which continued to figure prominently in Jadid rhetoric. Consider the following appeal for unity among Muslims published in October 1917 by the Shura's Central Council: "Muslims! All hopes, all goals of us Turks are the same: to defend our religion [din ] and our nation [millat ], to gain autonomy over our land [topraq ] and our country [watan ], to live freely without oppressing others and without letting others oppress us. Turkestan belongs to the Turks."[33] "Muslim" and "Turk" were still used interchangeably, but all the Muslims of Turkestan were now assumed to be Turks.

This shift toward Turkism was accompanied by a sudden turn to anticolonialism in Jadid rhetoric. This turn, first noticeable in the autumn of 1917, is largely to be explained by contemporary events. The Jadids had supported the Russian war effort in the hope of securing a voice in imperial politics after the war. The February revolution had changed little in this regard; however, by autumn Russia's commitment to the war, and the geopolitical calculations that underlay it, had unraveled. Upon taking power in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks immediately cast their appeal in antiwar and anti-imperialist terms. Their appeal to toiling Muslims, meant to rattle the governments of the Entente powers,[34] was followed by the publication of secret treaties signed during the war, many of which were at the expense of the Ottoman empire. The publi-

[32] The main sources for our understanding of pan-Turkism have been contemporary British intelligence reports. Written in the heat of the moment, during a war that had taken a turn that their authors often did not understand, these reports can easily exaggerate Ottoman influence in Central

[33] The main sources for our understanding of pan-Turkism have been contemporary British intelligence reports. Written in the heat of the moment, during a war that had taken a turn that their authors often did not understand, these reports can easily exaggerate Ottoman influence in Central
Asian affairs. They also assumed political manipulation behind every change of opinion among the "natives," who were usually assumed to not be able to think for themselves.

It is true that in the aftermath of the Ottoman collapse, both Enver and Cemal pashas found themselves in the Russian empire. But it is simplistic to assume that they were still chasing a pan-Turkist dream. Based on unprecedented access to Enver Pasha's private correspondence, Masayuki Yamauchi (The Green Crescent under the Red Star) has argued persuasively that Enver was motivated ultimately by a desire to recapture his political position in Anatolia. For much of his time in Soviet Russia, Enver sought ways in which he could upstage Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) as the leader of the anti-Entente struggle in Anatolia by appealing to a mixture of anticolonial, anti-Entente, Muslim, and Turkic sentiments. It was only when he realized that the Soviet regime had little interest in backing him that he went to Bukhara and sought to rally the Basmachi against Soviet rule.


[34] The move achieved its goals, for the British were truly concerned and sought to ensure that news of the proclamation did not reach India or Egypt. The correspondence in this regard is in IOLR, L/P&S/11/130, file P4/1918.

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cation of the treaties had a significant impact on Jadid thinking. For Fitrat, "it had now become clear who the real enemies of the Muslim, and especially the Turkic, world are."[35] The defeat of the Ottoman empire in 1918 further fueled anti-Entente sentiment, and anticolonialism (with an acutely anti-British ring) became a constant feature of Jadid rhetoric.

This marked a significant break from the Jadid admiration for the "developed" and "civilized" nations of Europe, which had withstood all evidence to the contrary. Fitrat, who had chosen Europeans as his mouthpiece in his exhortatory tracts earlier in the decade, wrote Sharq siyasati (Politics of the East), a bitter denunciation of Europe's imperial record in 1919. "To this day, European imperialists have given the East nothing except immorality and destruction. Even though they came to the East saying, 'We will open schools of civilization and colleges of humanity,' they have opened nothing but brothels and winehouses." The European policy of "enslavement and destruction" was current everywhere in the East and the Muslim world and had reached new heights after the recent war. The British now occupied all Arab lands with the exception of Hijaz, which, Fitrat wrote, they were about to swallow. "They will make an Englishman who has falsely converted to Islam the caliph and thus turn 350 million Muslims into their eternal slaves." The only solution for Muslims, and for the people of "the East," was to seek the support of Soviet Russia, which had already fought the imperialist powers and which needed help from "the East" for its own survival. Most significantly, "Today it is necessary to drop everything else and take on the English. In order to do that, it is our responsibility to befriend every enemy of the English."[36]

The plight of their counterparts in Bukhara further drew the Jadids to the Soviet regime. Bukharan Jadids has sought to force the amir's hand in April 1917, but the move had backfired. The amir turned the matter into one of
Bukharan sovereignty and Islamic purity and persecuted the Jadids, most of whom fled to Kagan and Turkestan, where they continued to plot and publish.[37] Their writings from this period are

[37] Accounts of the revolution in Bukhara are to be found in S. Ayni, Bukhara inqilabi tarikhi uchun materiallar (Moscow, 1922); Faizulla Khodzhaev, K istorn revoliutsii v Bukhare (Tashkent, 1926); Khodzhaev [Fayzulla Khojaev], Bukhara inqilabinin tarikhiga materiallar (Tashkent, 1930); Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l'empire russe, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1981), 190ff.; Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, 1968), chs. 14-17; Reinhard Eisener, "Bukhara v 1917 godu," Vostok, 1994, no. 4, 131-144; no. 5, 75-92.

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also marked by a conflation of revolution and national struggle. Abdullah Badri, who had written several plays before 1917, published two pamphlets in 1919 presenting the Young Bukharans (as the Bukharan Jadids had come to be known after 1917) to the peasant population of Bukhara. The amir appears not as the last surviving Muslim monarch in Central Asia, as Bukharan Jadids had seen him before 1917, but as a corrupt, bloodthirsty despot living off the toil of the peasants in his realm; other high-ranking dignitaries fare no better.[38] Fayzullah Khojaev, the leader of the Young Bukharans, writing in the first issue of the party's newspaper, Uchqun (Spark), connected the amir to imperialism, especially that of the British (who had forced the government of Turkey, the center of the Muslim world, to move to Anatolia and who had bombed Mecca and Medina). "Therefore, it is necessary for us," he concluded, "to destroy the cruel, bloodthirsty, and despotic amir [and his functionaries], and to form in their place a just and equitable government, so that poor peasants, artisans, and soldiers may live together in liberty and peace, like the children of the same parents. Thus, hand in hand with our coreligionists throughout the world, Afghans, Iranians, Indians, Arabs, and Turks, we will counter the English, accursed throughout the East, and their lackeys." Khojaev also concluded the need for assistance from Soviet Russia, "the tribune of justice and liberty in the whole world."[39]

But the conflation of class and nation allowed by anticolonialism could be used against Russian Communists in Turkestan just as easily as against the British. As the First Regional Conference of Muslim Communists, held in May 1919, noted, "The spirit and direction of the old privileged classes has not been removed decisively and... members of the former privileged classes as well as some self-styled Communists treat Muslims as subjects."[40] Another conference of Muslim Communists of Tashkent "consider[ed] it necessary to note that the primary hurdle to the Soviet construction of Turkestan is the mistrust shown by the

[38] Abdullah Badri, Yash Bukharalilar kimlar? (Moscow, 1919); Badri, Yash Bukharalilar, bechara khalq wa dehqanlar uchun yakhshimi, yamanmi? (Moscow, 1919).
European proletariat toward the toiling Muslim masses, as a result of which the Muslim proletariat is sidelined in the construction of the new life.\[41\] Food supply committees, subordinated to the soviets by early 1918, became the most significant arena of political conflict, but the conflict soon spread to the highest organs of the party itself.

The process was set in motion by the highest authorities of the (newly renamed) Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), or RKP(b), themselves, who by the spring of 1919 were stressing the need for "particular care and attention" toward "the remnants of national feelings of the toiling masses of the oppressed or dependent nations." This concern led to the formation in April 1919 of the Muslim Bureau (Musbiuro) of the Regional Committee of the KPT as the party analog of the Turkomnats.\[42\] Quite rapidly, the Musbiuro became autonomous of the Regional Committee of the KPT and began to assert its will quite openly. A Central Committee decree demanding that the indigenous population of Turkestan enjoy proportional representation in all state organs provided an opportunity for the Musbiuro to act. New party and Soviet congresses were hurriedly convened to act upon the new directive, and both elected new executive committees, both of which were dominated by Muslims. Turar Risqulov, a Qazaq from Awliya Ata, was elected president of both committees.

Muslim Communists made their most ambitious bid in January 1920, at the Fifth Regional Conference of the KPT, where they succeeded in passing a resolution changing the name of the KPT to the "Communist Party of the Turkic Peoples" and that of the Turkestan Republic to the "Turkic Republic."\[43\] This was accompanied by another resolution demanding wide-ranging autonomy for Turkestan. Risqulov had explicitly drawn a parallel with the Kokand Autonomy in describing to the congress the kind of autonomy the resolution hoped to institutionalize,\[44\] but the resolution, "On the Autonomy and Constitution of Turkestan," went much further. "In the interests of the international unity of toiling and oppressed peoples, to oppose by means of Communist agitation the [41] Quoted by U. Kasymov, "Iz istoru musul'manskikh kommunisticheskikh organizatsii v Turkestane v 1919-1920 godakh," Trudy Tashkentskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, n.s., no. 207 (1962): 10.
[42] T. Ryskulov, Revoliutsiia i korennoe naselenie Turkestana (Tashkent, 1925), 121-127.
[43] Safarov, Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia , 171.
[44] V.P. Nikolaeva, "Turkkomissiia kak polnomochnyi organ TsK RKP(b)," Voprosy istorii KPSS , 1958, no. 2, 83.
strivings of the Turkic nationalities to divide themselves into different groups...

... and [their desire] to establish separate small republics; instead, with a view to forging the unity of all Turkic nationalities who have so far not been included in the RSFSR, it is proposed to unify them with the Turkic Soviet Republic, and wherever it is not possible to achieve this, it is proposed to unite different Turkic nationalities in accordance with their territorial proximity.

The juxtaposition of nationalist and Communist language was used again when Risqulov traveled to Moscow in May 1920 to present the Muslim Communist case to the highest party authorities after the resolution had been overridden, after some vacillation, by the recently appointed Turkestan Commission (Turkkomissiia) of the Moscow Central Committee. In a presentation to the Central Committee, Risqulov argued that there were only two basic groups in Turkestan, "the oppressed and exploited colonial natives and European capital." He went on to demand, in the name of the KPT and the government of Turkestan, the transfer of all authority in Turkestan to the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan, the abolition of the Turkkomissiia, and the establishment of a Muslim army subordinate to the autonomous government of Turkestan. In their substance, these demands harked back to the hopes of 1917, but they were now couched in the language of revolution. But class had been replaced, in the colonial situation of Turkestan, by nation; national liberation of the Muslim community could be achieved through Communist means and in the Soviet context.

Soviet Central Asia

The attempt to transform the KPT was, of course, defeated. The Turk-komissiia, shifting its attention to combating local nationalism, rescinded the resolution on autonomy as being "contrary to the principles of internationalist construction of the Communist Party." Instead, the Central Committee in Moscow passed its own resolution on the autonomy of Turkestan, which offered a strictly territorial autonomy to Turkestan. In June 1920, the Central Committee passed another four resolutions calling for stricter central control over Turkestan affairs. The Bolshevik victory in the Civil War and the massive presence of the Red Army in Turkestan made such resolutions meaningful. In September, party and Soviet congresses met to elect new executive committees that excluded Risqulov and his supporters and adopted the RKP(b) resolutions of July. This setback did not spell the end of Muslim participation in Soviet political life, though. The new central committees elected in September 1920 had a Muslim majority, and the people's republics formed in Khiva and Bukhara in that year were governed entirely by Muslims, mostly Jadids. The strengthened central position did not mean an unrestricted enforcement of a central will. The regime in Moscow had neither the means nor
the resources for that. Indeed, ideologically committed to granting autonomy to all national groups within its domain, the regime was only too willing to accept the particularism of Central Asia. How that particularism was to be defined became the crucial question. The Turkic Muslim nation of the Jadids conflicted with the more narrowly defined ethnic nations supported by the Soviet regime (but also, increasingly, by many Muslims in Central Asia itself). Ultimately, with the "national delimitation" of 1925, ethnic nationalism supplanted broader Turkist visions of identity as the legitimate basis of autonomy. This process created new ethnographic knowledge, which made possible, but also legitimized, the new national identities.

By 1925, then, the political boundaries of modern Central Asia were largely in place. The political and cultural transformations they represent have only been briefly sketched here, but the involvement of the Jadids in the process cannot be overemphasized. Their adroit appropriation of the new language of class and revolution, perhaps most clearly visible in the resolutions passed by the Muslim Communists of Turkestan in January 1920, expressed what Alexandre Bennigsren has called "Muslim national communism," which was best developed by the Tatar Mirsaid Sultangaliev.[48] This was a new strategy called for by a new age. Prerevolutionary Jadidism had been fully imbricated in the imperial order, making use of the opportunities allowed by it while subject to its constraints. Hence the emphasis on self-improvement by the Muslim society with the hope of its inclusion in the imperial economy and the impe-


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rial political order. Muslim national communism was the Jadids' strategy for the new age ushered in by the revolution. After 1920, Soviet rule provided the new context in which Central Asian cultures were to be imagined. The regime was quite different from tsarist autocracy: Instead of exclusion, it offered mobilization, and it increased the reach of the state into spheres of activity autocracy had been content to leave alone. Its emphasis on enlightenment and progress was easily comprehensible to the Jadids, and its methods of mobilization and organization evoked their respect. The Jadids had not forgotten the lessons of 1917. They had found in the Soviet regime the outside support they had been unable to muster in that year.

Muslim national communism represented a new expression of the secular Muslim nationalism that had motivated the Jadids before 1917, now expressed in the language of revolution and combined, seamlessly in the minds of those involved, with anticolonial struggle.[49] The Jadids' commitment to revolution was genuine, and the language of class was not evoked simply out of cynicism; yet, the Jadids' understanding of both these concepts was their own. Scholars outside the former Soviet Union have wasted much energy in debating whether the Jadids were "true" Communists or not. The assumption that both "Jadids" (or "Muslims")
and "Communists" are stable entities whose essential characteristics are mutually exclusive is of course untenable in the light of historical evidence. To a radicalized cultural elite, the mobilizational methods of communism appealed greatly, and the rhetoric of revolution provided a means for struggling with enemies both within and without society. For much of the 1920s, the Jadids played central roles in the political and especially the cultural life of Central Asia. Fayzullah Khojaev was prime minister of the Bukharan People's Republic and then president of Uzbekistan, while Fitrat served as minister for education in Bukhara. Cholpan, Qadiri, Hamza, Munawwar Qari, Awlan, Ayni, Ajzi, and Haji Muin, to name only a few of the most important figures, were all central figures in the worlds of letters, arts, and education all through the decade. They saw themselves creating a new civilization—modern, Soviet, Central Asian, Turkic, and Muslim all at once. They hoped to coopt the state to the work of modernization that exhortation alone had not achieved in the prerevolutionary era. As such, the Jadids in the 1920s were hardly the pawns of a monolithic Soviet regime; rather, they are best compared with fellow modernists in Iran and (especially) Turkey in the same decade who also used the newly established apparatus of a modern centralized nation-state to revolutionize society and culture. But unlike their counterparts in Turkey and Iran, the Jadids' triumph was short-lived. By the late 1920s, the regime in Moscow had given up on the experimentation that had characterized much of that decade, and the Jadids' understanding of Soviet reality collided head on with the centralizing impulse of the new period. The results were catastrophic for the Jadids personally and for Jadidism as a cultural movement. Of the major figures, only Ayni died in his bed; most others met violent deaths at the hands of various enemies. Behbudi was the first to go, tortured to death in March 1919 by (appropriately enough, perhaps) the functionaries of the amir of Bukhara after they had apprehended him as he traversed Bukharan territory on his way, in all likelihood, to the Peace Conference in Versailles to plead the case of Turkestan. Hamza was killed by a mob in 1929 as he took part in a campaign against the veil. Munawwar Qari, Cholpan, Qadiri, Haji Muin, and Ubaydullah Khojaev all disappeared in the Gulag in the 1930s. By 1938, when Fitrat was executed and Fayzullah Khojaev, most famously of them all, mounted the podium at the Great Purge Trial in Moscow as part of the "anti-Soviet bloc of 'Rights and Trotskyites'" to face the fatal charges of counterrevolution and anti-Soviet activity, the Jadid generation had been obliterated. They were replaced by a new generation (the so-called Class of '38), whose education and worldview had been shaped entirely within the Soviet context. Although this generation inherited many of the compromises of the 1920s and 1930s, it shared little else with the Jadids. It was a new political elite that over the next several decades came to entrench itself in the
political structures of the Soviet Union. And although this new elite developed its own versions of (often virulent) nationalism, it had little in common with the visions of the Jadids. Given such a conjuncture of political interests between the new republican elites and the central regime, the memory of the Jadids was rapidly consigned to oblivion. That oblivion has proved quite difficult to overcome. The process of reclaiming the memory began with the belated advent of glasnost to Central Asia, and in the heady days of 1911 and 1992, much was written about the Jadids. But the Class of ’38 survived in power (especially in Uzbekistan) and has sought to base its legitimacy in a nationalism that appeals to the safely distant past of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. "Amir" Temur, Ulugh-bek, and Alisher Nawa'i are the new heroes of independent Uzbekistan, while the Jadids serve largely to symbolize the martyrdom of the Uzbek nation at the hands of the colonial Soviet regime. The Jadids have thus been appropriated by a nation imagined largely in the Soviet period.

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