Preface

After decades of relative consensus and silence on the issue, the rise of the Ottomans, who established one of the longest-lived (ca. 1300-1922), yet least studied or understood, dynastic states in world history, is back on the agenda of historians as an open question. Until the twentieth century, no attempt was made to delineate the underlying factors or causes (in the postpositivist sense of the term) behind the fascinating development of the political enterprise headed by a certain 'Osman in the western Anatolian marches of the late thirteenth century into a centralized and self-consciously imperial state under the House of 'Osman in a few generations. The former occupied a tiny frontier outpost between the worlds of Islam and Byzantium, not only physically but also
politically and culturally beyond the pale of established orders in either world; the latter, upon conquering Constantinople in 1453, represented itself as heir to the Eastern Roman Empire and leader of the Muslim world. Historians basically reiterated the legendary accounts received from frontier narratives that were first written down in the latter part of the fifteenth century — a century and a half later than the appearance in the historical record of 'Osman (d. 1324?), the eponymous founder of the dynasty. With a controversial book in 1916, Herbert A. Gibbons initiated debate on the rise of Ottoman power, and this debate continued until the publication of two influential works in the 1930s by Fuat Köprülü and Paul Wittek. [1] With these works, the gates of independent reasoning were closed, as it were. Wittek's "gaza thesis" in particular — the thesis that assigned

— xii —

a crucial role to the spirit of gaza ("Holy War ideology" in his unfortunate translation), which he claimed was prevalent among the early Ottomans — soon became textbook orthodoxy. This is not to say that there were no important studies whose coverage included that period in the context of broad developments in late Byzantine or medieval Turkish history. Except for a few cases that made no ripples, however, no direct discussion of the particular topic took place and no new hypotheses were presented until a flurry of publications in the 1980s took issue with the received wisdom, particularly on the basis of perceived contradictions between the gaza thesis and early Ottoman behavior displaying inclusiveness and latitudinarianism. This book grew partly out of the author's joy in seeing a fascinating problem reincluded in the agenda of historians and partly out of his discomfort with some of the directions taken in these new works.

The decline and comeback of the topic parallels broad trends in world historiography and in Ottomanist scholarship. The waning of interest in the question coincided with the opening of the Ottoman archives to scholarly study and the ensuing fascination with archival research. For one thing, there is a phenomenal quantitative difference between the extant materials related to early Ottoman history and those pertaining to the sixteenth century and beyond. There is still not one authentic written document known from the time of 'Osman, and there are not many from the fourteenth century altogether. Furthermore, the nature of the documents from later periods is such as to enable scholars to conduct social and economic studies of rare quantitative precision, while the pre-archival sources are mostly legends, hagiographies, and annalistic chronicles. Naturally, this quality of the material coincided so well with the rising prestige of quantification-based social and economic history worldwide that the investigation of Ottoman "origins" lost its appeal, just as did historical linguistics (philology), which was among the most cherished areas of expertise for the generation of Wittek and Köprülü. Although the field of Ottoman studies did not and still is often reluctant to directly engage in a theoretical discourse, the victory of structure over progression of events indirectly made its impact on Ottomanists.[2]

However, more recent intellectual currents reveal heightened concern with issues
like "origins," "genealogy," and "sequentiality of events" once again, though in a new manner. An example of this new spirit may be the popularity and esteem of Umberto Eco's Name of the Rose in the 1980s. I am not referring to the historical setting and flavor provided by a scholarly concern with authenticity but something more intrinsic to

the novel: its plot. After all, had William of Baskerville, the detective-monk, inquired into the succession of head librarians in the abbey, had he pursued, as a traditional historian would have, the succession of events related to the library in chronological order, he would have discovered much sooner that Jorge of Burgos should have been the prime suspect.[3]

This trend is accompanied by a renewed interest in narrative sources, which were once seen as inferior to quantifiable records. Turning the tables around, historians now indulge in the application of literary criticism or narratological analysis to archival documents, to even such dry cases as census registers, which have been seen as hardly more than data banks in previous history-writing.[4]

It is not merely in the context of developments in world historiography that we should situate trends in Ottoman studies. For one thing, the two are hardly ever synchronized, since Ottomanists are often in the role of belated followers rather than innovators or immediate participants. Besides, history-writing, like any other kind of writing, needs to be viewed through its entanglements in the sociocultural and ideological context of its time and stands at a particular moment of an evolved intellectual/scholarly tradition. As the late classicist Sir Moses Finley has demonstrated in his Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, the temporal distance of the period under investigation does not necessarily provide it with immunity against the influence of present-day concerns.[5]

In Ottoman and Turkish studies, too, it is certainly true that the intensity of the ideological dimension in historical investigation does not diminish as one moves back in time. In fact, the period of Turkish migrations into and invasions of Anatolia and the eventual establishment of Ottoman power over what had been the Byzantine Empire must be one of the most ideologically laden, for reasons I hope will become apparent to the readers of this book. It may be due partly to such an awareness that lately more studies are published on the historiography of that formative period (pre- and early Ottoman) than straight histories. In fact the ongoing assessment of the gaza thesis can be seen as part of the same historiographic stocktaking.[6]

This book itself is partly an extended historiographic essay on the rise of the Ottoman state and on the treatment of this theme in historical scholarship. It is also an attempt to develop, through this dialogue with Ottomanist scholarship, a new appraisal of the medieval Anatolian frontier setting, with its peculiar social and cultural dynamics, which enabled the emergence of Ottoman power and thus played a major role in shap-
ing the destinies of southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe from the fourteenth to the twentieth century.

Transliteration is the perennial problem of historical scholarship in different branches of Islamic studies. Materials in pre-modern Turkish rendered in the Arabic script, as in almost all the sources used in this study, are particularly difficult to standardize, and any transliteration system is bound to be esthetically displeasing. But the shortcut of using modem spelling throughout feels anachronistic and thus even more displeasing to this author.

Still, I have decided to give place names (e.g., Konya) as well as the names of principalities (e.g., Karaman) and states (e.g., Abbasid) in their modern forms since that might make it easier to look them up in geographical and historical atlases or reference works. Words that appear in English dictionaries (such as sultan, kadi) are not transliterated unless they appear as part of an individual's name.

Otherwise, all individual names and technical vocabulary are transliterated according to a slightly modified version of the system used in the Encyclopedia of Islam. The transliteration of Arabic compound names is simplified when used in reference to the Turkish-speaking Anatolian/Balkan world: hence, Burhaneddin instead of Burhan al-Din.

Like many other books, this one took shape as a long adventure for its author. Along the way, I was fortunate to receive comments, guidance, encouragement, or admonition from a number of friends and colleagues, among whom it is a pleasure to mention Peter Brown, George Dedes, Suraiya Faroqhi, Jane Hathaway, Halil Inalcik, Ahmet Karamustafa, Ahmet Kuyas, Joshua Landis, Roy Mottahedeh, Gülru Necipoğlu, Nevra Necipoğlu, Irvin Schick, Rusen Sezer, Sinasi Tekin, Isenbike Togan, and Elizabeth Zachariadou. I am particularly grateful to Cornell Fleischer, whose thorough reading of and thoughtful commentary on the manuscript were of immense help in giving the book its final shape. They are probably unaware how much they contributed to the development of this book through not only intentional interventions but also casual remarks or general observations that I appropriated, and possibly twisted, to my own ends. Plunder, as I hope the readers of this book will come to agree, can coexist in harmony with the assumption, or presumption, of serving some good cause in the end.

The critical tone of my historiographic evaluations should not obliterate the profound indebtedness I feel toward all those scholars whose works on the rise of the Ottoman state are surveyed here. Their findings and ideas, even when I disagreed with them, opened many pleasant vistas and doors for me.

I also appreciate having had the chance to try out some earlier and partial versions of my arguments on audiences whose responses enabled me to focus on formulations that needed to be refined and paths that needed to be abandoned. Such opportunities were provided at the Brown Bag Lunch series of Princeton
University's Near Eastern Studies Department, at Washington University in Saint Louis, at the Istanbul center of the American Research Institute in Turkey, and at the Murat Sarica Library workshop series in Istanbul.

— xvii —

Chronology
1071
The Battle of Mantzikert: Seljuks defeat Byzantine army; the first great wave of Turkish migrations into Asia Minor.
1176
The Battle of Myriokephalon: Seljuks of Rum defeat Byzantine army.
1177
Danismendids subdued by the Seljuks of Rum.
1204
The Fourth Crusade: Latins occupy Constantinople; Lascarids start to rule in Nicaea; Comneni start to rule in Trebizond.
1220-37
The reign of 'Ala 'ud din Keykubad, peak of Seljuk control in Asia Minor.
1221
Shihab ad-din 'Umar al-Suhrawardi brings insignia of futuwwa, sent by the caliph, from Baghdad to Konya.
1220s-30s
Migrations from central Asia and Iran to Asia Minor due to Chingisid conquests; the ancestors of `Osman arrive in Anatolia according to some Ottoman sources.
1239-41
The Baba'i Revolt of the Türkmen, led by Baba Ilyas and followers, crushed by the Konya government.
1243
The Battle of Kosedag: Mongol armies defeat Seljuks of Rum and render them into vassals.
1261
Byzantine capital moves from Nicaea back to Constantinople.
1276-77
Baybars leads Mamluk forces into Asia Minor.
1277
Mongols (Ilkhanids) take direct control of Asia Minor.
1298
The revolt of Sülemish against Mongol administration in Anatolia; seems to have allowed frontier lords to undertake independent action.
1298-1301
Likely dates of earliest conquests (Bilecik, Yarhisar, etc.) by `Osman.

— xviii —

1301
The Battle of Bapheus; `Osman defeats a Byzantine contingent.
Catalan mercenaries deployed by the Byzantine Empire against Turks (including the Ottomans) in Asia Minor.

Ulu Cami built in Birgi by Aydinoglu Mehmed.

The date of the earliest extant Ottoman document accepted as genuine: Orhan is referred to as Suca’uddin, "Champion of the Faith."

Bursa conquered.

Iznik (Nicaea) conquered.

The first Ottoman medrese (college) established (in Iznik).

ca. 1332

Ibn Battuta travels in Anatolia.

Raiders from the Karasi and Ottoman principalities separately engaged in Thrace.

Izmit (Nicomedia) conquered.

The date on an inscription in Bursa that refers to Orhan as gazi; authenticity and meaning controversial.

The death of Emperor Andronikos III; beginning of civil war in Byzantium.

Help sought by different factions from the Ottoman, Karasi, and Aydinoglu principalities; Orhan marries the daughter of John Kantakouzenos; Karasioglu Suleyman marries the daughter of Batatzes. Karasi principality subdued and annexed.

Kantakouzenos enters Constantinople and declares himself (co-)emperor.

Kantakouzenos calls on Ottoman forces to be deployed in Thrace on his behalf.

First Ottoman acquisition in Thrace: Tzympe.

Kallipolis (Gelibolu) falls to the Ottomans following an earthquake.

Gregory Palamas, archbishop of Thessaloniki, captured by the Ottomans, spends time in the emirate; his writings constitute important source on cultural life among early Ottomans.

Prince Suleyman, Orhan's son and commander of Thracian conquests according to Ottoman traditions, dies in accident.

Dhidhimoteichon (Dimetoka) conquered (by Haci Ilbegi).
Orhan dies, and Murad I succeeds him.
1366
Gelibolu lost to the Ottomans.
1361 or 1369
Dates suggested for the conquest of Edirne.
1371
The (Sirpindigi ) Battle by the River Maritsa: Serbian forces ambushed (by Murad's forces in one tradition, single-handedly by Haci Ilbegi in another).

— xix —
1376 or 1377
Gelibolu recaptured.
1383-87
Suggested as the latest date by which point the imposition of devshirme had been initiated.
1385 or 1386
Nish conquered; Serbian king reduced to vassalage according to Ottoman tradition.
1389
The Battle of Kosovo; Ottoman victory over the Serbs, but with many losses; Murad I dies and is succeeded by Bayezid I.
1395?
Sermon by the archbishop of Thessaloniki that includes the earliest known reference to the tie devshirme (which indicates that it had been practiced for some time).
1396
The Battle of Nicopolis (Nigbolu ), in which Bayezid I defeats crusading army.
1402
The Battle of Ankara; Timur defeats Bayezid I.
1402-13
The Interregnum: Ottoman throne contested among brothers who rule over different parts of the realm.
1403
Suleyman Celebi , Bayezid's eldest son, signs treaty with the Byzantine emperor ceding land.
1413
Mehmed Celebi ends up winner of internecine strife; Ottoman realm reunited.
1416
Civil war due to uprising led by Prince Mustafa a surviving son of Bayezid (or a pretender).
1416
The revolt of Sheikh Bedreddin's followers crushed and Bedreddin executed.
1421-22
The accession of Murad II, followed by rebellions of an uncle and a brother.
1430
Thessaloniki (Selanik) conquered.
Armies led by Janos Hunyadi descend deep into the Ottoman realm in autumn, is forced to return after the battle by the Zlatitsa Pass, where both sides suffer great losses.

1444
Murad II abdicates in favor of his son Mehmed II; crusading army arrives in the Balkans; Murad, asked to lead the Ottoman forces again, triumphs in the Battle of Varna, returns to self-retirement.

1446
A Janissary revolt culminates in Murad II's return to the throne.

1451
Murad II dies; Mehmed II's (second) reign begins.

1453
Constantinople (Istanbul) conquered.

1456
Unsuccessful siege of Belgrade.

1461
Trebizond (Trabzon) conquered; end of Comneni rule.

— xx —

Regnal Years of Ottoman Regents and Sultans

Ösman ?-1324?
Orhan 1324-62
Murad I 1362-89
Bayezid I (the Thunderbolt) 1389-1402
Mehmed I (Celebi or Kyritzes) 1413-21
Murad II 1421-44 and 1446-51
Mehmed II (the Conqueror) 1444-46 and 1451-81
Bayezid II 1481-1512

— 1 —

Introduction
Background and Overview

Osman is to the Ottomans what Romulus is to the Romans: the eponymous founding figure of a remarkably successful political community in a land where he was not, according to the testimony of family chronicles, one of the indigenous people. And if the Roman state evolved from a peripheral area to represent the center of the Graeco-Roman civilization, whose realm it vigorously expanded, so the Ottoman state rose from a small chieftainship at the edges of the abode of Islam eventually to become the supreme power within a much enlarged Islandom. Once they came to rule, the Ottomans, like the Romans, gained a reputation as better administrators and warriors, even if less subtle minds, than the former representatives of their civilizations; they possessed less taste for philosophical finesse perhaps but had greater success in creating and deploying technologies of power. The "Romanesque" quality of the Ottoman political
tradition has been noted before and was expressed recently by an eminent scholar
of the Islamic Middle East: "The Ottoman empire ... was a new and unique
creation, but in a sense it also marked the culmination of the whole history of
Muslim political societies. The Ottoman Turks may be called the Romans of the
Muslim world."[1]
They were indeed called just that when they, like various other peoples of
medieval Asia Minor, were referred to as Rumi, that is, those of the lands of
(Eastern) Rome.[2] This was a primarily geographic appella-

— 2 —
tion, indicating basically where those people lived, but it did not escape the
attention of geographers and travelers that the Turco-Muslim populations of Rum,
a frontier region from the point of view of the central lands of Islam, had
their own peculiar ways that distinguished them from both the rest of the Muslim
world and from other Turks. Namely, being a Rumi Turk also implied belonging to
a newly emerging regional configuration of Islamic civilization that was on the
one hand developing its own habitus in a new land and on the other engaged in a
competition to establish its political hegemony over a rival
religio-civilizational orientation. The proto-Ottomans, of whom we know nothing
with certainty before the turn of the fourteenth century, were a tiny and
insignificant part of this new configuration at first but their descendants and
followers eventually came to dominate it and to shape it toward the creation of
a new imperial order under their rule.
According to most historical traditions, the immediate ancestors of Osman
arrived in Anatolia with the second great wave of Turkish migrations from
central Asia, which took place in the wake of the Chingisid onslaught in the
early thirteenth century. Once in Anatolia, they would have encountered a
variety of Turkish-speaking communities — some in urban centers, some settled
down to agriculture, but the majority engaged in pastoral nomadism like Osman's
ancestors, most but not all of them speaking the Oguz dialect, most but not all
of them Muslim, and even then divided into communities that understood different
things about being Muslim — living in a complex ethnoreligious mosaic that
included Christian and non-Turkish-speaking Muslim communities (especially Arab,
Kurdish, and Persian).
The earlier wave, the tail end of the Völkerwanderungen in a way, had occurred
in the eleventh century when large numbers of Turkish tribes, belonging
primarily to the Oguz dialect group and to the Oguzid idiom of Inner Asian
political discourse, crossed the Oxus and moved toward western Asia. While the
Seljuk family from among these tribes soon became involved in politics at the
highest levels in Baghdad and ended up as a dynasty that held the sultanate,
many tribes moved further west and piled along the eastern borders of the
Byzantine Empire. Their incursions into Asia Minor were independent of and at
least occasionally contradictory to the will of the Seljuk sultanate.
The Byzantine Empire had faced a similar and at first more threatening pressure
from a more southerly direction in the seventh century with the appearance of
Arab-Muslim armies. While raids and counterraids continued to rage in the next
few centuries, however, these were rela-
tively localized in a fluid frontier zone that developed in southeastern Anatolia with its own borderland institutions, heroes, traditions, and lore. The Turkish-speaking settlers and conquerors of the later medieval era were to inherit a good deal of those traditions from both the Muslim and the Christian sides.

In any case, ongoing friction in eastern Anatolia in the eleventh century led to the fateful encounter of the Seljuk and Byzantine armies in Mantzikert in 1071, the same year that the Eastern Roman Empire lost Bari, its last possession in the Italian peninsula, to other tribal warrior bands led by the Normans. The Byzantine defeat at Mantzikert was to be followed by deeper and more frequent raids or plain migration by Türkmen tribes into Asia Minor. The political landscape of the peninsula started to change immediately and was not to fully stabilize for four centuries, until the Ottomans established unitary rule over it in the latter part of the fifteenth century.[3] Before the end of the eleventh century, most of Anatolia was divided up among petty potentates led by Turkish warriors, Armenian princes, Byzantine commanders, and Frankish knights arriving with the First Crusade (1096-99). The political configuration of the peninsula kept changing through mostly short-lived successes of different adventurers who were ready to enter into all sorts of holy and unholy alliances with others who were not necessarily of the same religious or ethnic background. Many an aspiring warrior seems to have enjoyed, to paraphrase Andy Warhol, fifteen days to fifteen years of glory before he disappeared or was sucked into the sphere of influence of a momentarily mightier one. The Byzantine Empire still held the coastline and some connected areas inland, especially after Caka Beg, who was based in the Aegean, was murdered (in 1093, with the help of the Seljuk ruler) and the crusaders recaptured Nicaea from the Seljuks of Rum for the empire (1097).

Among Turco-Muslims, who were largely restricted to the inner plateau after some very early excursions to the coastal areas and who were replenished by continued migrations of Türkmen tribes, two powers were able to acquire prominence and enjoy some longevity. An offshoot of the Seljuk family and the House of Danismend competed for the ultimate leadership of the Muslims of Anatolia for nearly a century. Melik Danismend, whose gests were to be woven into the epic cycle of Anatolian Muslims, and his family seem to have cared less for state building than for what they did better than anyone else for a while: namely, capturing towns and undertaking daring raids that brought them tremendous prestige. The Seljuks of Rum, on the other hand, were

keen to emulate more stable and structured modes of governing; they were particularly successful in that task after establishing Konya (ancient Iconium) as their capital during the reign of Mes`ud I (r. 1118-55). The often violent competition between the Danismendids and the Seljuks of Rum, both of whom
sought the alliance of the Byzantine emperor or local Christian or Muslim powers when it seemed expedient, was ultimately resolved in 1177 in favor of the latter, who captured their rivals' last major holding, Malatya, and decisively reduced them to vassalage.

This feat was accomplished only one year after another Seljuk victory, this one over Byzantine imperial armies in Myriokephalon (1176). This was, in the words of one of the most prominent scholars of medieval Anatolia, "after an interval of a century, a replica of Mantzikert, which showed that henceforward there existed a Turkey which could never be further assimilated."[4] Although the word "Turchia" indeed appeared in Latin geographic designations in the twelfth century, from the point of view of the Turkish-speaking populations and polities of the area, there was no Turkey, either as a geographical or as a political entity, until the end of World War I, when the European designation was finally accepted by the locals themselves. Instead, there was a changing set of competing political enterprises, many of which were led by Turkish-speaking warrior elites but which were never organized along ethnic lines or with an eye to eventual ethnic unity. The land was known as the land of Rum, and its people were divided into different communities of religious, linguistic, or political affiliation. The Ottoman ruling class eventually emerged as a combination of Muslims (some by conversion) who spoke Turkish (though not necessarily as a native tongue), affiliated (some voluntarily and some involuntarily) with the dynastic state under the rule of the House of Osman. And "Turk" was only one, and not necessarily a favored one, of the "ethnicities" ruled by that class.

With their victories in Myriokephalon and Malatya behind them, the Seljuks looked like they had accomplished, "from the Byzantine territories in the West almost to the further limits of the East, the political unity of Asia Minor."[5] But to a student of the later and much more solid Ottoman state, like this author, the rule of the Seljuks of Rum in any period seems too fragile and ephemeral to be considered real political unity. All the major fault lines of those medieval Turkic states, built around the energies of tribal forces and ambitious warrior chieftains, were at work in the sultanate of the Anatolian Seljuks: there were many frontier zones of various sizes where the administrative apparatus hardly reached; there were many tribal groups that were not controlled; there

— 5 —

were many ambitious warriors, some of them possibly made by the Seljuks, ready to imagine themselves independent of Seljuk authority; and when two or three of these came together, as they frequently did, they were able to shake, if not dissolve, state power. Finally, the Seljuks of Rum also continued the practice of dividing up their land among the heirs of the dynast; the same Seljuk sultan who won the two victories mentioned above carved his realm into eleven pieces for his nine sons, a brother, and a nephew. The realm could still remain united in principle, under the leadership of a "senior partner" recognized by the others, but it proved only a matter of time before some of the heirs found support among Türkmen tribes or warrior bands, and rival loci of power emerged. As we shall discuss in later chapters, the Ottomans, as if or perhaps because
they were good students of history, and under different conditions no doubt, proved themselves much more successful in confronting these fault lines and eventually steering their course dear of them on the way to creating one of the most durable states in history.

In all fairness to the Anatolian Seljuks, it must be admitted that they were approaching a firm consolidation of their power in the first four decades of the thirteenth century, and that their ultimate failure is closely related to an unforeseen external factor: the invincible Mongol armies. Even before the Mongols, however, a Türkmen rebellion under the leadership of Baba Ilyas and his followers presented a severe challenge to Seljuk authority between 1239 and 1241. It seems that the plight of the Türkmen tribes was due, among other things, to the squeeze for land that arose with the second bag wave of migrations, which is said, as was mentioned above, in most sources to have brought the tribe of Osman's grandparents into Anatolia.[6] With the Seljuk defeat by the Mongol armies in Kosedag (central Anatolia) in 1243, the tension-ridden pendulum of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies started to swing once again in favor of the latter. The political landscape was eventually, especially after the Mongols sent soldiers and horses to be fed in the name of establishing direct control over Anatolia (1277), thrown into turmoil with various forces waging a life-and-death struggle in a period of extreme violence and disarray. It is probably no coincidence that Yunus Emre, the classical poet of the newly forged Anatolian Turkish dialect, emerged in that context and produced a corpus of poems that are distinguished by the profundity with which they looked death right in the eye. In any case, continued political disarray and demographic pressure pushed many Turkish tribes and warriors further into western Anatolia, especially since the Byzantine capital was moved back to Constantinople.

---

in 1261 after having been seated in Nicaea since 1204 (the Fourth Crusade) and having brought heightened security and prosperity to the area for half a century or so. Before the end of the thirteenth century, endemic political fragmentation had led to the emergence of numerous small chiefdoms and relatively autonomous tribal domains in various parts of Anatolia. The political turbulences and human catastrophes of the thirteenth century should not prevent us from observing the tremendous possibilities unleashed by an unprecedented "globalization" of the Eurasian economy thanks, in good part, to the Chingisid conquests and the pax mongolica. It is for good reason that it has become a commonplace to refer to the travels of Marco Polo when speaking of the Chingisids. There were signs even before Chingis that Asia Minor, once the jewel in Byzantium's crown and then having suffered a series of depredations, had regained sufficient stability to serve as a long-distance trade link (along a North-South as well as an East-West axis) and to benefit from the new commercial potential created by the mixed economies of urban, agrarian, and pastoralist populations. The outburst of caravanserai building activity, the primary area of architectural patronage by the Seljuk elite, was initiated in the late twelfth century and was to increase its tempo no matter what the nature
of Political turbulences. The early thirteenth-century acquisition of the port towns of Sinop (by the Black Sea) and Alanya (by the Mediterranean) brought the Seljuk system and the Turco-Muslim-dominated economies of Anatolia that it controlled at the time into direct touch with the Levantine sea trade. By the end of that century, more than one hundred caravanserais in the peninsula provided lodging and protection to merchants (and other travellers).[7]

It is revealing, for instance, that what is no more than a remote backwater in modern Turkey, an obscure plateau between Kayseri and Maras, once entertained a lively international fair where Middle Eastern, Asian, and European merchants exchanged commodities like silk textiles, furs, and horses. True, the fair does not seem to have survived long into the era of Mongol Ilkhanid direct rule, but trade is not known to have suffered in general. The chiefdoms that emerged in western Anatolia, where even Mongol power could hardly reach, to some extent built their power on raids and pillaging, but the western Anatolian coastline was integrated into a brisk Levantine trade around 1300, and the chiefs were signing commercial treaties with the likes of Venice in the early fourteenth century.[8] In fact, fragmentation and the emergence of small local powers may well have increased the possibility for a more local redistri-

— 7 —

bution of resources that would otherwise have been siphoned off to distant imperial capitals.

One of those small chieftains, situated in the northwest in what was still partly Byzantine Bithynia, belonged to the clan of a certain Osman. He belonged to an exceptional generation (or two) of creative minds and social organizers who, either personally through their deeds or through their legacy as it was constructed and acted upon by followers, became the pivotal figures, the magnets, around whom the vibrant yet chaotic social and cultural energies of the Turco-Muslims of medieval Asia Minor ultimately found more-regular paths to flow. Since then, these figures, as embodied in the rich lore that has been built around them (whatever the relationship of such lore to their "real" or "historical" life), have represented the "classics" of western, or one might also say Roman, Turkish culture. Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi and Haci Bektas Veli, for example, are the spiritual sources, respectively, of the two largest and most influential dervish orders in Ottoman lands. But their influence reaches far beyond any particular set of institutional arrangements, however large these may have been, and cuts across orders, social classes, and formal institutions. They have rather been fountainheads of broad cultural currents and sensibilities over the centuries. Yunus Emre's appeal has been even more ecumenical, with his poetry considered by successive generations to be the most moving and unadulterated expression of piety in Anatolian Turkish; dozens of imitators tried to pass their own works off as those of Yunus, and dozens of villages claimed to have his shrine. A certain Nasreddin of thirteenth-century Anatolia seems to have been at least the excuse for the creation of the lore of Nasreddin Hoca, the central figure of a corpus of proverbial jokes that now circulate, with many later embellishments of course, from the Balkans to central Asia. Ahi Evren may be the least well known of these figures in the modern era, but his
cult once played the most central role in the now defunct corporations of artisans and tradesmen, providing the basic structures and moral codes of urban economic and social life, at least for Muslims. Widely popular legends of a certain Sari Saltuk, who also is honored at numerous burial sites, portrayed him as the most pivotal character in spreading Islam in the Balkans. It is much more coincidental but still worthy of note that Osman was also a near contemporary of two figures, very remote from his sphere of action in thirteenth-century terms, whose descendants were to share with his house the limelight of international politics in the sixteenth century. One of these was Rudolf of Habsburg, who acquired his Erb-

— 8 —

lande in 1278. The Habsburg dynasty was to become the main competitor of the Ottomans on the central European and Mediterranean scenes, and the two states were to follow more or less the same rhythms until both disappeared as ruling houses in the aftermath of the First World War. And the other relevant member of the cohort, a much less likely candidate at that time for inclusion in our comparison here, was Sheikh Safi al-Din (1252-1334) of Ardabil, whose own political role as a renowned Sufi may have been considerable but was primarily indirect. His legacy and the huge following of his order would eventually be shaped by late-fifteenth-century scions into the building blocks of the Safavid Empire, the main competitor of the Ottomans in the Muslim world in the early modern era.

Osman, a near contemporary of theirs, is the founder of a polity that rose over and above all its Anatolian and Balkan rivals to be eventually recognized, whether willingly or reluctantly, as the ultimate resolution of the political instability that beset Eastern Roman lands since the arrival of Turkish tribes in the eleventh century. He is a much more historical (i.e., much less legendary) character than Romulus of course. Nevertheless, he is equally emblematic of the polity that was created after his name and legacy. As Marshall Sahlins points out in his study of the stranger-king motif in Hawaiian and Indo-European political imagination, "it is not significant that the exploit may be 'merely symbolic,' since it is symbolic even when it is 'real."'[9]

One of the most influential legends concerning Osman is the one that depicts his whole conquering and state-building enterprise as having started with an auspicious dream. Variants of this legend were retold in dozens of sources until the modern era, when the dream was dismissed in terms of its historicity but still, by some vengeful intervention of ancestral spirits perhaps, did not fail to occupy a central place in much of the debate among historians, as we shall see in the next chapter. According to one of the better-known versions, Osman was a guest in the home of a respected and well-to-do Staff sheikh when he dreamt that a moon arose from the holy man's breast and came to sink in Osman Ghazi's breast. A tree then sprouted from his navel, and its shade compassed the world. Beneath this shade there were mountains, and streams flowed forth from the foot of each mountain. Some people drank from these running waters, others watered gardens, while yet others caused fountains to flow. [When Osman awoke]
he went and told the story to the sheykh, who said, "Osman, my son, congratulations for the imperial office [bestowed by God] to you and your descendants, and my daughter Mahun shall be your wife." He married them forthwith.[10]

— 9 —

Thereafter, it is a story of success that culminated in the phenomenal expansion of the territories controlled by the House of Osman. In the early twentieth century, after various parts of the empire had been gobbled up or seceded throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Ottoman forces were still defending what they considered to be their own territory in as diverse parts of the world as Macedonia, Libya, Yemen, and the Caucasus. Phenomenal as it was, however, the Ottoman expansion was slow when compared to the empire-building conquests of some other Inner Asian/Turco-Mongol tribal formations, such as those led by Chingis and Timur, or when compared to the swift rise of the House of Seljuk to the sultanate in Baghdad, the fabled seat of the Islamic caliphate. That is probably why it was so much more durable. Relatively speaking, the Ottomans took their time building their state and it paid off. They took their time in constructing a coalition of forces and reconstructing it as it changed shape, while they were also keen on institutionalizing their political apparatus. It was a gradual and conflictual process of state building that took more than a century and a half from Osman's earliest ventures to the conquest of the Byzantine capital by his great-great-great-grandson, Mehmed II (r. 1451-81), when the Ottomans can finally be said to have graduated to an imperial stage.

When Mehmed the Conqueror visited Troy later in his reign as sultan, khan, and caesar, he seems to have been aware of the explanation of Ottoman successes by the theory, upheld by some in Europe, that Turks were, like the Romans before them, vengeful Trojans paying back the Greeks.[11] Standing at the fabled site, the sultan is reported to have inquired about "Achilles and Ajax and the rest" and then, "shaking his head a little," to have said: "It was the Greeks and Macedonians and Thessalians and Peloponnesians who ravaged this place in the past, and whose descendants have now through my efforts paid the right penalty, after a long period of years, for their injustice to us Asiatics at that time and so often in subsequent times."[12]

Historiography

Modern historiography, of course, has had little patience with dreams and legends as explanation. Still, both the dream story mentioned above and, even more so, the "true origins" of the proto-Ottomans have functioned as pivotal issues in twentieth-century discussions of Ottoman state building.

The first study devoted to the rise of the Ottoman state, published in 1916 by H. A. Gibbons, held that that successful enterprise could not have been built by "Asiatics." The dream story, contended Gibbons, though not to be taken
at face value, implied that Osman and his tribe, who must have been pagan nomads of Inner Asian background, convened to Islam at some point and set out to Islamize their Christian neighbors in Byzantine Bithynia. Converts among the latter made up the majority of the proto-Ottomans and provided the expertise for setting up an administration.

In the charged environment of the early twentieth century, where nationalism was linked with racialism even more explicitly than it is today, this argument was obviously loaded. The emerging Turkish nationalism of the republican era (1923-), busily occupied with redefining the role of Turks in world history, was not entirely sympathetic to the later and "corrupt" phase of the Ottoman Empire that the Republic replaced; however, the same nationalists could not but proudly appropriate the earlier history of invasions, settlement, and state building, including the most successful case, represented by the Ottomans, that established the Turkish presence in the region.

In the formulation of M. F. Köprülü, the leading Turkish historian of his generation, who elaborated his views in the 1930s and framed them partly as a response to Gibbons, the military-political expansion of medieval Anatolian frontiers was primarily due to the demographic pressure of Turkish tribes fleeing the Chingisid armies. According to Köprülü, Osman's immediate entourage consisted of members of his tribe, who must have been of common descent as later Ottoman rhetoric claimed. As they set out to carve themselves a body politic, their numbers were replenished, on the one hand, by other Turkish elements of the same region and, on the other, by experienced representatives of the hinterland's sophisticated Turco-Muslim political-administrative culture. A number of conversions took place, but the Ottoman state was essentially a Turkish state; it was built by Turks, and almost all elements of Ottoman political culture can be explained by reference to their Turco-Muslim heritage deriving from central Asia and the Middle East. Tribal and ethnic cohesion as well as a sophisticated institutional legacy enabled the building of a state out of demographic pressure in a relative political void. Köprülü's vision was hailed and continues to serve as a building block of Turkish national historiography.

It was Paul Wittek's theory, however, formulated in the 1930s and partly as a response to Köprülü, that was to gain international recognition as the most convincing account of Ottoman success. Wittek found the rhetoric of tribalism unconvincing; nor did he dwell on the question of ethnicity as such, though he underlined continuities in Turco-Muslim culture without failing to note the occurrence of conversions and Christian-Muslim cooperation in some passages. For him, what fueled the energies of the early Ottoman conquerors was essentially their commitment to gaza, an "ideology of Holy War" in the name of Islam. Ottoman power was built on that commitment, as expressed in an inscription erected in Bursa in 1337, which referred to Osman's son as a "gazi, son of gazi." Wittek found the same spirit in the earliest Ottoman histories, none of which, however, dates from before the fifteenth century. While a shared ethos provided warriors who banded together with
cohesion and drive, the realm they brought under their control was organized according to the administrative experiences of scholars and bureaucrats from the Islamic cultural centers. There was some tension between the two elements because the gazis belonged to a heterodox frontier culture; over time, orthodoxy prevailed as the Ottomans established a stable administration. Wittek’s formulation, which has much in common with Köprülü’s but avoids the ethnicist controversy and seems to place singular emphasis on religious motivation as the root cause of Ottoman power, was widely accepted and recycled in the pithy formula of "the gaza thesis."

Lawrence Stone, historian of early modern England, has described the fate of historical theses in terms of a tongue-in-cheek quasi-Hegelian spiral of generational cycles.[13] The dominant view of one generation is turned on its head by the next but is then reclaimed, hopefully in an improved version, by the next. It may be due to the ambiguous nature of "generation" as an analytical concept or the backwardness of Ottoman studies that the beat seems to have skipped a generation or two with respect to the gaza thesis, which was formulated in the 1930s. Alternative or supplementary explanations were occasionally aired in more-general studies, but there was no lively debate producing new research and ideas — until, that is, the 1980s, when many voices were raised, independently of each other, against the Wittek thesis.

The main tenor of those voices reflected a dissatisfaction with an explanation that put so much emphasis on "Holy War ideology" when early Ottoman behavior, it was claimed, displayed heterodoxy vis-à-vis Islam and accommodation vis-à-vis Christian neighbors. The early Ottomans could not have been driven by the spirit of gaza, because they were neither good orthodox Muslims nor zealous exclusivist ones. Ottoman sources that speak of gaza might as well be read as representatives of a later ideology, addressing Islamized audiences by putting a respectable religious veneer on earlier actions that had been driven by pragmatic considerations such as plunder and power.

No matter how radical a departure they claimed to represent from the consensus of the former generations, however, all of these critical voices still subscribed to the essentialism of earlier historiography. Its legacy, in other words, has proven sufficiently powerful even in the hands of critics to perpetuate a dichotomous analysis that wishes to see the early Ottoman conquerors and state builders as fundamentally Turkish, tribal, and driven by pragmatism and plunder or fundamentally Muslim and driven by zeal for holy war.

It is argued in this book that early Ottoman history and the state-building process cannot be properly appreciated within the framework of such dichotomous analyses. While the identities, beliefs, values, and actions of the early Ottomans are naturally bound to constitute the basic material for analysis and explanation, they do not need to be framed in terms of ahistorical either/or propositions. Human beings display many complex and even contradictory behaviors, and it is in that very complexity that explanations for historical phenomena must be sought. To be more specific, it is argued that the recent
debate over the normative "Muslimness" of the gazis obscures the historical reality of the distinctive culture and ethos of the march environment within which the Ottoman state was born. Beyond reassessing the historiography, it is my aim to reconstruct that distinctive ethos as well as the social and political environment of the marches in late medieval Anatolia in order to reach a better understanding of the rise of the Ottoman state.

Plan and Approach
This book analyzes its problem and elaborates its perspective in three layers. Chapter x is a discussion of modem scholarship on the rise of the Ottoman state. It introduces, in a much more detailed canvas than the sketch given above, the specific issues that have been raised and the main perspectives developed with respect to that particular theme. It is not a survey of scholarship on medieval Anatolia, the way Norman Cantor, for instance, has recently examined the history of medieval European studies as a field.[14] Rather, this chapter is only a narrowly focused treatment of history-writing on the problem of the Ottoman state's emergence. It maps the wiring, as it were, of modem historiography on that problem in order to highlight the currents of tension and the

— 13 —

nodes that are charged; any new conceptualization or reconstruction, including that of this author, will need to be assessed in terms of such a map.
Chapter z presents first a survey and analysis of the sources emanating from the Turco-Muslim frontier milieux of Anatolia, legendary accounts of the lives of warriors and dervishes, in order to illuminate how the people of the frontiers conceptualized their own actions and assigned meaning to them. This is the first attempt to reach a historicized understanding of the complex of values and attitudes embodied in or related to the notion of gaza, which both Wittek and his critics were more or less content to treat in terms of its dictionary definitions. This first part of the chapter demonstrates that the frontier ethos was intricately bound up with the gaza spirit, ubiquitous in the relevant sources, but nonetheless incorporated latitudinarianism and inclusiveness. The second part of chapter 2 turns to a dose reading and comparison of certain passages in a particularly relevant body of interrelated sources: the chronicles of the House of Osman, which were at least partly based on earlier oral narratives but were not rendered into writing before the fifteenth century, the more substantive compositions not emerging until the latter decades of that century. While enmeshed in frontier legends and myths, these sources at the same time present themselves as straight histories. As such, they have by and large suffered from either an uncritical adoption as factual accounts — a naive empiricism — or a nearly wholesale dismissal as myths — a hyperempiricism. The latter attitude or an outright neglect has severely limited the use of relevant hagiographical works that also develop their own historical arguments, in terms of the parameters of that genre of course, with respect to the early Ottomans. Methodologically, my discussion is an attempt to transcend the positivistic attitude, still dominant in Ottoman studies, that every bit of information in the sources can and must be categorized as either pure fact or fiction. More specifically, my reading of the sources reveals that representatives of
different political tendencies tried to appropriate the symbolic capital embedded in claims to success as gazis in their own ways through differing historical accounts. It is established through this discussion that the pertinent hagiographies and "anonymous" calendars and chronicles are far from being the inert products of accretion of oral tradition or chance coagulation of narrative fragments but rather represent internally coherent ideological positions articulated by authorial or editorial hands. By drawing out these several historiographical strands embedded in variants, the chapter enables an understanding of the gazi

— 14 —

milieu as a social and cultural reality that sustained political and ideological debate. It identifies the major point of tension in the early Ottoman polity between centralizing and centrifugal tendencies, which shaped its trajectory until the conquest of Constantinople, when the triumph of centralized absolutism was sealed.

Chapter 3 proceeds to the old-fashioned task of reconstruction and is intended to be neither exhaustive nor definitive. It deals selectively with aspects of the process whereby the political enterprise headed by a certain Osman in the western Anatolian marches of the late thirteenth century was shaped into a centralized state under the House of Osman in a few generations. The discussion here moves from the gaza ethos to the gazis and other social agents in that scene and aims to re-present the pre-imperial Ottoman polity as the historically contingent product of a culturally complex, socially differentiated, and politically competitive environment rather than as the necessary result of a unitary line of developmental logic. It focuses on the sociopolitical plane, with particular emphasis on locating gazi warriors and dervishes, as well as their neighbors — tribal or settled, Christian or Muslim, rural or urban — within a matrix of shifting alliances and conflicts in late medieval Anatolia.

Insofar as it is a narrative of early Ottoman history, it is a highly selective treatment, intended only to highlight the process of coalition formation and dissolution and some of the most significant steps in the institutionalization of Ottoman power along a contested path that succeeded in circumventing the fault lines of medieval Turco-Muslim polities mentioned above.[15] A brief overview is provided here for the reader who may need an introduction to the orientation of the author and to the discussion of specifics before the third chapter. It might also be worthwhile to consult the chronology of events (pp. xvii-xix) after reading this introduction.

Overview

The scene is set in terms of the political wilderness and competition that characterized western Anatolia at the end of the thirteenth century. Byzantine, Mongol-Ilkhanid, and Seljuk powers still had some control over the region, but a number of chieftains or community leaders engaged relatively freely in acts that would determine their political future. A Turco-Muslim leader with a following and a recognized realm was called a beg or emir, and his competitive, expansion-oriented enterprise was called a beglik or emirate. Some local Christian lords,
called tekvur in Turkish sources, controlled fortified or naturally protected settlements and surrounding agricultural areas that constituted raiding territory for the forces of the begs. This frontier environment also witnessed a high degree of symbiosis, physical mobility, and religious conversions that facilitated the sharing of lore (legends about earlier heroes, for instance), ideas, institutional practices, and even warriors among inclusive political formations that were at the same time steeped in the ethos of championship of the faith. Like his competitors, Osman Beg not only undertook raids with forces under his command and carried off booty (mostly slaves and precious objects) but also constructed a set of alliances with some of his neighbors with an eye to increasing his sphere of influence. Bonds of solidarity would be formed in joint raids or through neighborly relations that included trade and intermarriage. One of Osman's wives was the daughter of a rich and respected sheikh of a dervish community; one of Osman's sons married the daughter of a tekvur. The chieftain of a Christian village near Osman's base was a scout and an ally in some early expeditions. It cannot be imagined that other begs of the frontiers failed to appreciate the value of such ties and to forge similar alliances. Cliental relations with wonder-working dervishes, who indeed worked wonders in capturing the hearts and minds of tribesfolk as well as of Christian or ex-Christian peasants through syncretism, were not the monopoly of the Ottomans. Nor were the Ottomans the only ones who could claim to be "raiders in the name of the faith." Moreover, a policy of fiscal leniency (relative to late Byzantine practices), which worked well toward gaining Christian producers as subjects, was followed not only by the Ottomans but also by their rivals. They all benefited from the military potential in the restless energies and martial skills of the nomads and adventurers who had been "going West" in search of pastureland and other opportunities since around the mid thirteenth century. Though it is difficult to assess whether the Ottomans had any comparative advantages in the use of any of these means toward expanding their sphere of control, it must at least be noted that Osman and his followers made effective use of them. Osman's political career seems to have started during the last years of the thirteenth century and to have carried him from the leadership of a community of nomadic pastoralists to the chieftainship of a beglik after he seized a few Bithynian fortresses. One particular advantage of his beglik was its location, since this base provided its forces with relatively easy access to poorly defended Byzantine territory. Successful military expeditions brought fame and riches,
to strike coins, issue endowment deeds, and use siege tactics that required much more than competency in nomadic warfare. Particularly with the conquests of Bursa (1326) and Iznik (Nicaea) (1331) under Orhan, Osman's son, the Ottomans controlled all the major towns of Bithynia and were in a position to build lasting institutions. Some recognized scholars, such as Çandarlı Kara Halil (d. 1387), seem to have arrived in Ottoman lands around this time, occupied top administrative positions (judicial and vezirial), and initiated new institutional mechanisms. The first Ottoman medrese, or college, was established in Iznik in 1331 and started to train scholar-scribes and judges. But the Ottomans were not the only ones who undertook lucrative expeditions, and at first they were not the most renowned of the emirates. Even their location right next to Byzantine territory to the southeast of the Marmara Sea was matched by that of the Karasi emirs, who controlled the southwestern half of the region. Insofar as the extension of gazi activity into southeastern Europe constituted the next significant step in the imaginations of the begs of western Anatolia, the Karasi were in fact more favored in terms of their location and more knowledgeable in military-strategic terms. Factional strife in Byzantine imperial politics in the 1340s invited both emirates to Thracian ventures, where the Ottomans and the Karasi were called to aid the factions, respectively, of Kantakouzenos and his rivals (including Batatzes, the father-in-law of a Karasi beg). The former won, and the Ottomans overran the Karasi emirate and incorporated its experienced gazis. By 1354, Gelibolu (Kallipolis), the strongest Byzantine fort across the Dardanelles, was captured, and the gazis could now hope that their engagements in Thrace would be more than temporary. The goal of permanent control in this new territory was buttressed by the colonization of kindred populations there.

In taking charge of the raiding and settlement in Thrace, which eventually paved the way for conquests in southeastern Europe, the Ottomans gained a decisive advantage over other emirates, since this role brought not only immense prestige but also access to substantial material resources in the form of booty and tax revenues. But they soon faced the quintessential Ibn Khaldunian predicament of tribal war-band leaders-turned-state builders: namely, the loosening of the bonds of solidarity among members of the war band as the administrative mechanisms and stately pomp of imperial polities are adopted by the leaders of the suc-

— 17 —

cessful enterprise. In other words, as the House of Osman was being transformed into a dynasty at the head of an emerging administrative network of controls, the relatively egalitarian community of gazi commanders was giving way to a widening hierarchical space between central power and subordinate begs; not all of the latter were content with this role. The disruption of communications between Asia Minor and Thrace for a decade after 1366, when Orhan's son Murad I (1362-89) lost control of Gelibolu, encouraged some of the gazi warlords in Thrace to imagine themselves at the head of autonomous enterprises, especially because they could claim that many of the Thracian conquests were their own achievements. Many former states in the Muslim
world, as Ibn Khaldun observed, had begun a process of disintegration at a similar stage; the nature of the challenge might differ somewhat from case to case, but the basic problem was one of dissolving cohesiveness. The Ottomans rose to the challenge, however, not only by eliminating the challengers after Gelibolu was recaptured ca. 1377 by also by creating an institution of artificial kinship, the Janissary standing army, that functioned as an extension of the royal household. This institution was the centerpiece of what hereafter would be a self-consciously centralizing administrative apparatus under "sultans" from the Ottoman family.

The goal of the sultanate thereafter was to enlarge its territory on the one hand and to control fissiparous dynamics on the other. Deftly making use of divisions among feudal polities, either by carrying out fierce raids or by gaining the loyalty of local populations through fiscal concessions and/or religious propaganda and of some of the local lords through incorporation, the Ottomans rapidly extended their power in the Balkans in the final decades of the fourteenth century. Of their major rivals, the Serbian kingdom was reduced to vassalage after the Battle of Kosovo (1389), and the Bulgarian one eliminated by 1394. Keeping almost a geometric sense of centralism, the Ottomans pursued a symmetrical expansion in Anatolia and reduced some of the weaker begs — first to unequal partnership, then to vassalage, and then to incorporation as removable appointees — just as they had done to many early Bithynian allies, gazi commanders, and Balkan local lords. It should be added that the forcefulness of Ottoman expansionism was also due to their extra-political logic in targeting important routes of commerce and sites of production.

In both the subjugation of gazi emirates and the building of bureaucratic mechanisms to buttress central government control over re-

— 18 —

sources, Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) was widely perceived, especially among gazi circles and the dervishes close to them, to have gone too far and to have relied too heavily on the help of scholar-bureaucrats like members of the Çandarlı family. The latter were in fact seen as the arch-enemies of a nostalgically reconstructed frontier ethos devoid of all imperial trappings. The last great conquering army of Inner Asia, led by Timur (Tamerlane), was drawn into Anatolia through the pleas of the leading families of subdued emirates. In the ensuing Battle of Ankara (1402), Bayezid was routed when his Anatolian Muslim vassals defected to the other side and his gazi commanders abandoned the battlefield, where the sultan was left with only his Janissaries, still a small force, and Balkan Christian vassals.

The Timurid debacle did not end the Ottoman empire-building project, especially since Timur soon left Asia Minor to pursue higher ambitions as a conqueror in Asia itself, but only led to temporary confusion until the whole realm was reunited under one heir after eleven years of internecine strife among Bayezid's sons. The gazi warlords, most of whom were based in the Balkans, were no longer powerful enough to challenge the House of Osman, but they did play a major role in the unfolding and outcome of events as the different princes negotiated for their support. For a few decades after the Interregnum, under Mehmed I (r.
1413-21) and Murad II (r. 1421-44, 1446-51), state-controlled expansionism and raider activity coexisted with relatively little tension, partly due to pragmatism on both sides and partly due to the great success of the expeditions in enlarging the pie of redistribution. The new modus vivendi with the gazi warlords (and with formerly independent begs of gazi emirates who had been rendered Ottoman appointees) entailed their subordination but did not totally undermine their ability to take independent action or their access to booty and glory. Centralizing and fiscal policies were not abandoned, but neither were they pursued as aggressively as under Bayezid I.

Starting around 1440, strains emerged again between the level of Ottoman centralization and the empire-building project. A number of Hungarian-led "anti-Turkish" leagues undertook incursions that made the Ottomans feel on the brink of losing the Balkans; internal factional-ism rose to the fore between a "war party," headed by gazi warlords, and a "peace party," headed by representatives of a central administration that was still led by the Çandarli family. With the conquest of Constantinople, however, the young sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444-46, 1451-81), who rode on the tremendous prestige of that feat, eliminated the leaders of both factions as well as the significance of both types of forces in Ottoman politics. A newly conceived imperial project was set in motion that spelled the ultimate victory, in terms of the internal dynamics of Ottoman state building, of the centralist vision.

Identity and Influence in the History of Nations
The larger story of medieval Asia Minor, within which the early history of the Ottomans would have been but one of many analogous episodes had they not turned out to be the ones who wrote the concluding chapter, had its counterpart in Iberia. From the eleventh to the fifteenth century, in the two peninsulas at the two ends of the Mediterranean, there raged a long series of confrontations that were fought between people who considered themselves, or found their means of legitimation as, representatives of their respective religio-civilizational orientations, Islam and Christianity.

It should be pointed out that this grand dash of two world religions did not determine each and every action of each and every actor on this scene. Nor were Muslims and Christians constantly engaged, in their actions or thoughts, in a struggle against each other. Coexistence and symbiosis were possible and probably more common. Besides, even these provisos set the scene in terms of a match between two teams, that is, in terms of two dearly designated different people who lived either at peace or at war with each other. This overlooks the fact that many individuals or groups changed sides and identities. Through conversion or enslavement, one could over time "become a Turk," within limits set by social and ideological structures, as in the case of "becoming an American." Furthermore, the sides were at any given moment divided within themselves into hostile camps or polities that did not think twice about establishing alliances with camps or polities from the other side. Nonetheless, against these complex and shifting loyalties, a larger pattern over
those four centuries can be reconstructed as a competition for political hegemony between powers that saw themselves as members of different religio-civilizational orientations. The periods of fragmentation in the political life of both peninsulas in the medieval era are in fact referred to by the same term, muluk al-tava'if,[16] by Muslim historians (Spanish, taifas), who dearly saw the structural affinities. In Asia Minor,

— 20 —

the Muslims, whose own competition was won by the Ottomans, ended that struggle with the conquest of the last remnants of sovereign Christian power, Constantinople (1453) and Trebizond (1461), only slightly before the Catholic king of Spain captured the last stronghold of Muslim power in Iberia, namely, Granada (1492). The two victors, the Ottoman Empire and Spain (after passing into the hands of the Habsburgs), were soon to lock horns over what they would deem world supremacy, basically the old Roman world and its suburbs. Perhaps it was part of the same synchrony that Suleyman the Magnificent abandoned the use of luxury items and adopted a more pious orthodox image for the sultanate at around the same time that Charles V withdrew into a monastery. Maybe the emperors were just feeling the signs of strain that would become much more obvious in the public consciousness of their empires around the end of the sixteenth century when a decline and reform discourse appeared in both. Like the Anatolian case, the Iberian one has been an ideological quagmire of modern historiography. The best example of this can be seen in the trials and tribulations of Américo Castro (1885-1972), the Spanish historian, who had to suffer disfavor and unpopularity in his homeland for writing of the Arabo-Muslim past of the peninsula as part of the Spanish heritage.[17] This is not the place, nor the author, to discuss the nature of the Spanish heritage, but it is impossible to overlook the parallels in the historiographies that have been forged in the age of national consciousness and nation-state building. In that context, the meaning of medieval Muslim invasions has been a particularly problematic one to deal with among many nations of Eurasia.[18] It does not seem so far-fetched to imagine that long periods of coexistence, with both warlike and peaceful encounters (eight centuries in Spain, four centuries of instability in Anatolia followed by five centuries under relatively stable Ottoman rule), would shape peoples and cultures on either side in profound ways, and not just in the sense of developing a sense of enmity or in the mechanical sense of "influences" as cultural commodities taken from one side to the other. Taking one's commingling with the "other" seriously in the historical reconstruction of heritages, however, seems to demand too much of national historiographies. National historiographies (indeed modern historiography in general, to the extent that it functions as the history of nations) have tended to assume more or less sealed cultural identities of peoples (Turks, Greeks, Spaniards, Arabs, etc.) who have come into contact within the framework of a larger bipolar division of equally sealed civilizational identifies (East/West, Muslim/Christian, etc.). Spain was Spanish before the
Muslims and reverted to its "Spanishness" after expelling the invaders (after eight centuries!). Greece, Bulgaria, or any other post-Ottoman state did the same in terms of national history-writing, though the situation is not always as clear-cut as in Iberia, where systematic expulsions and forced conversions followed the reconquest. In the Balkans, as in India, it remains complex because of the intertwined existence of peoples who identify with different layers of a given country's past; so long as each layer remains exclusive of other layers in historical consciousness, such identification also has the potential of turning to exclusivism ("cleansing," to invoke the most notorious recent example) in reality. In terms of history-writing, all this implies that historicizing the identities of those peoples, and thus underlining their plasticity and multiplicity over time, is taken, as was the case for Castro with respect to "Spanish-ness," as questioning the essence of nationhood. That, I would argue, is precisely what needs to be done in understanding the Turkish invasions of and migrations into Asia Minor and in reconstructing the formation of the Ottoman state.

Most current historiography, however, tends to operate on the basis of a "lid model" whereby at least some empires (the oriental ones?) are conceived as lids dosing upon a set of ingredients (peoples) that are kept under but intact until the lid is toppled and those peoples, unchanged (unspoilt, as nationalists would like to see it), simply reenter the grand flow of history as what they once were. They may have experienced changes in terms of numbers and material realities but not in essence. Readers may also be familiar with this view from the recent example of Soviet dissolution, which was widely analyzed in terms of history beginning again for the peoples of the former USSR. But can one see the expression of Kirghiz or Belarus national identities, for instance, in terms of a reassertion? Were they not constructed to a large degree, in terms of identifying with a particularly delineated territory as homeland, for instance, during the Soviet era, which was a formative historical experience for all of them?

A recent publication that appeared in the most authoritative encyclopedia in the field of oriental studies takes us closer to our specific subject matter. In the lead essay to the entry on "Othmanli" (= Ottoman), "the subject peoples of the Balkans" are described as "for centuries peoples without history" until the nineteenth century.[19] Where, in this depiction, could a historian fit the Muslim Slavs and Albanians, for instance? Or, how does one deal with the movement, under Ottoman rule, of Orthodox Slavs to areas now contested in Bosnia?

The Ottoman state/identity was not a lid that dosed upon already formed national identities (of Arabs, Bulgarians, Turks, etc.) only to be toppled after a few centuries when those identities reasserted themselves. Some of these identities were formed to some extent, but they were reshaped (some might say, de-formed) under the aegis of, through the structures of, in response
or reaction to, the Ottoman Empire. This is not a question of Ottoman influence but of a long and formative historical experience that shaped various communities and peoples under Ottoman rule through their interaction with each other as well as with peoples and ideas from neighboring civilizations. So the establishment of Ottoman rule in southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe, even if one sees it in black-and-white terms — namely, as either a yoke or a blessing — did mean much more than a lapse in what would otherwise have been the natural flow of the history of a given set of nations. Ottoman rule is part of the history of various communities, some of whom were able (and some unable) to shape and imagine themselves into a nation in the modern era thanks to a "historical consciousness" of their own (real or imagined) pre-Ottoman identity on the one hand and to that long and formative historical experience mentioned above on the other.

Specific issues of policymaking often do not require recourse to a historical argument, but the deeper matrix of orientations in which policy is made is inextricably linked with issues of national, that is, historical, identity in the political culture of nation-states. "Who we are," at least in political discourse, is taken to be a major determinant of "how we should act." Such linkages ultimately bring history-writing to the political sphere since national identity is defined and redefined through a historical discourse. "Who we are" is a culmination of "who we have been." While this is valid for all nation-states to some degree or other, it is particularly pointed in some which have not resolved their identity questions as successfully as others; and this is valid for most, if not all, of the Ottoman successor states.

This is not to say that any such resolution is ever final; I do not mean that France, for instance, has defined its national identity in a decisive manner, that its historiography has comfortably removed itself from the sphere of politics, and that younger nation-states will eventually do the same. There is nothing to warrant such optimism. There are similar problems in the "mature" nation-states as well, and we are constantly reminded by the reactions in Europe and North America to the growth of the numbers of Muslims or blacks or freedom-or opportunity-seeking refugees from the Third and Second Worlds that these problems can easily become more acute in the West. The assertion of regional identities across Europe is another reminder of the fact that the relative homogeneity of modern European nation-states, which arguably served as models in much of world politics and historiography, disguises a multi-layered history. It now seems that that homogeneity is in part a cultural construction, built through not only historical exigencies and certain forms of exclusivism but also a linear narrative of the story of "our true nation, one united people across time."[20] There is no doubt, however, that the question of identity is particularly acute in Ottoman successor states, including Turkey, a relatively young nation-state, the historiographical (and thus also political) discourse of which has been the major ingredient of Ottoman studies in this century. The thrust of political ideologies runs just as deep in the historical consciousness of the other
post-Ottoman nation-states of the Balkans and the Middle East. But the Turkish case is the more significant one for our purposes because of its obvious, but not necessarily to-be-taken-for-granted, centrality in Ottoman studies.

Three major issues still make up the underlying currents of tension in different national interpretations of Ottoman state building, though versions of the near consensus reached among Turkish historians in the first half of this century are accepted by international scholarship at large.[21] These issues are not necessarily discussed any more — at any rate they do not inspire many original research projects — but one can still feel the tension generated by differences of opinion on them. First is the rather racially conceived question of numbers: how many Turks came to Asia Minor, how many Anatolian Christians converted, what is the ratio of "real" Turks to converts in the composition of the later "Turkish" society under the Ottomans? Although there was heated debate on this question in the earlier part of this century, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was resolved in favor of "real" Turks.[22] National historiographic discourses could hardly accommodate a different answer, whether one considers the Ottomans to be one's own or one's enemy. Thus, a nationalist Turkish and a nationalist Greek historian might easily agree that the Ottoman state was built by Turks, while the ethnic origins of a particularly favorable character such as an artist or a "good vezir" may be disputed.

Second is the issue of dislocation and violence caused by the migrations and the invasions; like the next question, it is one of respectability. There is a tendency on the one hand to portray them as sheer violence and, on the other, to see the migratory process as rather pacific. Here, most of the Turkish historians took the position that such disruption was minimal, while the nationalisms that defined themselves as liberation movements from the yoke of an alien people tended to emphasize the violence in the process that led to the rise of Ottoman power.[23] It is not only the desire to cater to the pacific values of the modern world that compels historians to magnify the level of violent power displayed by the other side or to reduce that displayed by their own. Some macho bravado is also involved here. Namely, it is also to portray defeat as due to the numerosness and violence of the enemy's military forces or to protect victory from being attributed to sheer numbers and brute power (rather than bravery, values, faith, tactics, etc.).

Whatever the motives, there are two main strategies here that can be mixed in varying degrees: to argue that the expansion was very or only minimally violent, or to argue that the rule of the conquerors or of the former regime was more tyrannical than the other and made violence legitimate. Thus Turkish historians, for instance, have gladly borrowed and chosen to focus on the modern European image of a "degenerate" Byzantium and of a rapacious feudalism before the Ottoman order: some violence may have been exerted but only for a good cause in the end.[24]

Third is the issue of influence whereby an otherwise hostile national tradition might recognize the good things in its foe only to then "demonstrate" that the good thing is actually of one's own but taken over by the other as an
"influence." Here the burning issue was, and to some extent still is, whether and how much the Ottomans (read Turks) were influenced by the Byzantines (read Greeks), though on this issue the "Turkish consensus" is most deeply respected in the international scholarly community. As we shall see in the next chapter, the creation of the Ottoman administrative apparatus has been particularly controversial in this regard, with some historians arguing that it was all based on Byzantine models and others that the Ottomans could find all they needed in their Turco-Muslim heritage. In terms of broader cultural exchange or "lifestyles," too, various sides of nationalist polemics have tended to see the influence of their side in, say, shared musical or culinary practices. The problem with both sides of this debate stems partly from their adherence to a static notion of cultural "goods," whether one conceives of them in the realm of state building or cooking. In other words, "influence" is understood as a creative party giving one of its own "goods" to an imitating, uncreative other — a notion that needs to be recast now that historians realize influence is not possible without interaction, without a choice by the allegedly passive receiver. And even then, common cultural traits are not necessarily reducible to influence.

— 25 —

The issue of influence in cultural history is also skewed by its being understood in terms of a sexual act conceived as an unequal relationship. The influencer is like the one who penetrates and is proud, and the influenced is like the one who is penetrated and thus put to shame. A superior culture is naturally one that has more to be proud of in this manner. If "we" were the first ones to come up with the discovery of this (say, the dessert called baklava) and the invention of that (say, the shadow puppet theater called Karagöz) and "our" cultural possessions then infiltrated other cultures and gave birth to offspring, then "our" culture must have been superior and dominant the way a male is over a female. If you have been influenced by others, on the other hand, you have acted like a "passive" partner in intercourse; you have been "inseminated."

These are admittedly the more extreme versions of positions that are held much more moderately, if made at all explicit, by scholars who have developed a remarkable sensitivity to such issues and prefer to leave them alone. I feel, however, that we must recognize these issues as underlying currents of much of the historiographies (and of the historical consciousnesses that shape the scholars who create the historiographies) on the four centuries of turmoil and construction in Anatolia that led to the building of a world empire. I think these issues cannot be resolved as they are conceived; if there is any hope of transcending them, it is possible only through reformulating them, not through burying them.

Compared to the historiography on the rise of the Ottoman state, discussed in detail in the next chapter, that on the emergence of Norman power in medieval France does not run into the same sorts of complications, though there are striking parallels in the basic issues raised by their story. Did the Normans constitute a blood-tie society? Did they continue Carolingian practices and
institutions or did they create their own?[25] These too are serious questions for the historian, but they lack the imbroglio of nationalist polemics, at least in a directly perceptible way. Had Normandy been a nation-state or a province with self-assertive Normans, the situation might have been different. Whereas, if in the questions posed above you were to replace Normans with early Ottomans, and Carolingian with Byzantine, you could have a whole range of settings for a politically charged discussion, from the corridors of a university to a coffeehouse in Istanbul or Thessaloniki. Charming as this may sound, there are drawbacks, as illustrated by the case of Petropoulos, who was persecuted under the Greek junta for, among other things, writing a book called Ho tourkikos kaphes ("Turkish coffee," which the junta ordered to be called "Greek coffee"). Similarly, under the Turkish junta of the early 1980s, an academician could suffer for writing about the presence of Armenian and other Christian fief-holders in the early Ottoman armies, whose existence is an undeniable fact. Such tensions may get more serious under military regimes but are not limited to them; even in "normal times," one can feel the heat generated by arguing whether Cyril and Methodius were Greek or Slavic, or by dealing with the ethnic origins of Sinan, that most accomplished of Ottoman architects who was recruited in the sixteenth century through a levy that was applied to non-Muslim subjects.

True, the majority of historians have scoffed at this sort of thing, but without directly tackling the assumption of a continuous national identity, a linear nationhood or national essence that underlies even their own nonchauvinistic historiography. If "we" (from the point of view of modern Turkish consciousness) or "the Turks" (from the point of view of non-Turkish historiography) have come on horseback from Inner Asia and established a state that replaced the Byzantine Empire of "the Greeks;" it is only human that to be "one of us" (or "one of the Turks") one needs to assume, or in some cases feels compelled to "prove," that one's ancestry derives from the steppe nomads. And if one is of the Greeks, then one "knows" that one's ancestors have been oppressed by the Turks. Fortunately, such assumptions or presumptions can usually be made relatively easily at the individual level, where one slips into the role of citizen-as-member-of-the-nation (unless one is from a self-conscious minority, in which case one is a member of another "we" in a similarly linear story). It must have been rather traumatic, however, for a republican descendant of Köse Mihal (Mikhalis the Beardless), one of the founding fathers of the Ottoman state, a Bithynian Christian who joined forces with Osman, converted, and started a minidynasty of raiders in the service of the House of Osman. The twentieth-century Turk, proud enough to take Gazimihal as his last name, at the same time felt compelled to write an article "proving" his glorious ancestor was also a Turk. In this fanciful account, Mihal is one of those Christianized Turks employed by the Byzantines who eventually chooses to join his brethren on the right side.[26]

The essentialist trap cannot be avoided unless we, the historians, problematize the use of "the Turks" (or any other ethnonym for that matter), systematically
historicize it and confront its plasticity, and study its different meanings over time and place. I certainly do not wish to

— 27 —

imply that being a Turk or a Muslim or a Christian did not matter; for many, it was all that mattered in the grand scheme of things in the long run of the thirteenth to nineteenth centuries. In fact, individuals changed their identities presumably not only because they could but also because it mattered. Nor do I wish to imply that it is meaningless to speak of ethnic or national identities (Turks or others), but these should not be — and this is particularly clear in the case of medieval Anatolia, where religio-political affiliations and thus identities were in rapid flux — conceptualized as an original stock and descendants going through a linear series of adventures in time and, along the way, dashing with other original stocks and descendants going through similarly linear series of adventures. Historians tend to overlook the fact that (America is not the only case where) one is not necessarily born into a people; one may also become of a people, within a socially constructed dialectic of inclusions and exclusions.

It is not the purpose of this book to disentangle these questions of identity and influence embedded in varying degrees in any historical writing on the Ottomans. My purpose here is basically to problematize them before dealing with one specific era when identities were in particularly rapid flux.

We must note, however, that the issue is not an intellectual abstraction for those who consider Asia Minor their homeland and grapple with its heritage in terms of their own identity. Having grown up in a village which seems to have enjoyed continuous settlement for five millennia and where sprang up the cult of one of the Turkish colonizer-dervishes in the thirteenth century, a republican Turkish archaeologist muses that studying "that village would be a contribution to our national history since it is one of the earliest Turkish villages established in Anatolia in the 13th century," but he adds that "the cultural past of a village which has lived intertwined with the ruins of the prehistorical and the antique ages, which has not rejected those, which has appropriated and used the cave cemeteries, which has carved on its tombstones figures inspired by the wall paintings of those caves and used such figures in its embroideries, starts undoubtedly with the earliest human settlements on these lands."[27] Despite this openness to continuity at one level, the distinction between the "we who came from yonder" and "they who were here" is maintained with surgical precision. Turkish colonizers are immediately taken as the main actors when the archeologist moves to the analysis of some tombstone carvings that replicate designs seen in antique objects in the same region: "When the Turkish colonizers encoun-

— 28 —
tered such tombstones, they acquired and maintained the tradition." There is not even a doubt expressed that the tombstones of the "Turkish era" may have been
carved by the very same people who had been producing the pre-Turkish stones, namely, by the locals who "became Turks." The liquidity and fluidity of identities in those centuries is hard to imagine in the national age. It was not difficult for a sixteenth-century Ottoman intellectual, however, to appreciate the plasticity of identities that had gone into the making of the neo-Rumis:

Those varied peoples and different types of Rumis living in the glorious days of the Ottoman dynasty, who are not [genetically] separate from those tribes of Turks and Tatars ..., are a select community and pure, pleasing people who, just as they are distinguished in the origins of their state, are singled out for their piety, cleanliness, and faith. Apart from this, most of the inhabitants of Rum are of confused ethnic origins. Among its notables there are few whose lineage does not go back to a convert to Islam ... either on their father or their mother's side, the genealogy is traced to a filthy infidel. It is as if two different species of fruitbearing tree mingled and mated, with leaves and fruits; and the fruit of this union was large and filled with liquid, like a princely Pearl. The best qualities of the progenitors were then manifested and gave distinction, either in physical beauty, or in spiritual wisdom.[28]

In that grand tableau, huge amounts of material — poetic, hagiographic, epigraphic, archeological — still await gathering and sifting. This is not the place to attempt such a tableau. It is the more modest ambition of this book to problematize the origins of the Ottoman state by engaging the historiography and thus hopefully opening early Ottoman history to wider debate. It is also my hope that some of the related questions will be taken up by future researchers to improve, alter, or disprove my suggestions.

— 29 —
Chapter 1
The Modems
If yon have nothing to tell us exert that one barbarian succeeded another on the banks of the Oxus and Jaxartes, what is that to us?
Voltaire, article on history, Encyclopédie

The Rise of the Ottoman State in Modern Historiography
Beginning in the fifteenth century, numerous historical accounts were composed, by Ottomans and others, that relate a series of events delineating the emergence and expansion of Ottoman power, but none of these would have passed Voltaire's test. From the point of view of modern historiography, they contain no explanation, no analysis of underlying causes or dynamics, and are only narratives of events in succession about successive dynasties and states. Naturally, a reader of Dumézil would be ready to trace implicit explanatory models in these sources, as literary or nonanalytical as they may seem, through an examination of their selection and ordering of events.[1] However, this would not change the fact that "the rise of the Ottoman state" was not problematized and explicit causal explanations were not sought until after the full impact of
positivist and historicist thought on Ottoman studies at the turn of this century. Ottoman histories from the earliest written works in the fifteenth century to the late imperial age tend to start off with Osman's genealogy.

—and 30—

and his dream against the backdrop of the physical and political turmoil caused by the Chingisids in western Asia. With Turks pouring into Asia Minor due to the onslaught of the Mongol armies and with Seljuk power disintegrating, a young warrior (son of so-and-so, son of so-and-so, etc.) has an auspicious dream that is read to imply the dreamer and his descendants are selected by God for rulership. There are various versions of this legend, and some attribute the dream to Ertogril, Osman's father, but they all precede Osman's bid for political power and indicate that it was endowed with divine sanction. To the chroniclers and their audience, pedigree and divine sanction dearly played a crucial role in the rise of Ottoman power. These are accompanied by such personal qualities as sincere faith, righteousness, valor, and leadership. Further, supplementary explanations could be woven into this model depending on the narrator's concerns. Just as genealogies could be reshaped or embellished through, say, remembrance of forgotten ancestors, divine blessing could easily accommodate some holy person who may be assigned intermediacy in its allocation or verification. If you wanted to make sure that you and yours got proper credit for their real or imagined contribution to Ottoman successes, you might include an episode or two to underline the nature of that contribution. In the vita of Haci Bektas, for instance, the patron saint of the Bektasi order of dervishes, rulership is again a question of divine selection whereby God's sanction is removed from the House of Seljuk and transferred to that of Ertogril. [2] However, the transfer does not take place through direct intervention by God. The news is broken by Haci, Bektas, who, thanks to his vilayet (proximity to God), has access to such divine secrets and power to intercede in the actual transmission of rulership. His blessing turns out to be another "factor" in the rise of Ottoman power.

In European sources, the question of origins again took up considerable space, but here the emphasis was on ethnicity or race rather than Osman's genealogy: are Turks indeed Trojans; or are they Scythians? What needed to be explained to European audiences was not so much the emergence of the Ottomans in particular but the arrival of the "Turkish menace" or "yoke" at large. Whether they were Trojans avenging Hector or Scythians out to destroy, or an Inner Asiatic people related to the Huns as it was later discovered, their superb military skills—a racial characteristic—would need to be underlined as well as the fact that they were now within the fold of Islam, thus armed with a "warlike religion." God's design, often in the form of a punishment for the sins of Christians, should not be neglected in this context. Against this background, it is easy to understand why Samuel John-
son thought so highly of Richard Knolles (1550?-1610) as to call him "the first of historians; even though the good doctor was quick to add that the historian was "unhappy ... in the choice of his subject: To explain the "beginning, progressus, and perpetuall felicity of this the Othoman Empire," Knolles referred to

such a rare unitie and agreement amongst them, as well in the manner of their Religion (if it be so to bee called) as in matters concerning their State (especially in all their enterprises to be taken in hand for the augmenting of their Empire) as that thereof they call themselves Islami, that is to say Men of one minde, or at peace amongst themselves; so that it is not to bee marvelled, if thereby they grow strong themselves, and dreadfull unto others.

Joyne unto this their courage, ... their frugalitie and temperatenesse in their dyer and other manner of living; their carefull observing of their antient Military Discipline; their cheerfull and almost incredible obedience unto their Princes and Sultans .... Whereunto may bee added the two strongest sin-ewes of every well governed Commonwealth; Reward propounded to the good, and Punishment threatened unto the offender; where the prize is for vertue and valour set up, and the way laid open for every common person, be he never so meanly borne, to aspire unto the greatest honours and preferments both of the Court and of the Field.[3]

Whatever the value of Knolles's explanations, however, they are dearly not targeted at the earlier phase of Ottoman history, or at the formative stages of the state, as such. This is also true of the more theoretical discourse on comparative political systems undertaken by various Renaissance European authors, such as Machiavelli and Jean Bodin, whose works must have been read by some of the authors of the abundant European historical literature on the Ottomans. It was in fact none other than Knolles who translated Bodin's De la legislation, ou Du gouvernement politique des empires into English just before writing his history of the Ottomans.[4] Like Knolles, the writers of comparative politics analyzed the strengths of the Ottoman system as it stood after the process of imperial construction but were not interested in that process itself. Nor is there anything specifically Ottoman in Knolles's account; all of the "factors" mentioned by him might apply to any of the Turco-Muslim polities the Ottomans competed with. Knolles was explaining the success not of the Ottomans in particular but of the "Turk" — a designation that was more or less synonymous with "Ottoman" and often also with "Muslim" among the Europeans of his age.

Besides, as impressive as Knolles's precociously analytical attitude may be, it is submerged in hundreds of pages of traditional histoire événementielle. This is also true for the most comprehensive and monumental narra-

— 32 —

tive of Ottoman history ever written, Die Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches by the Viennese historian Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall (1774-1856), who represents the culmination of that tradition.[5] And it is true, though there are more than glimpses of a new historiography here, even for Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940), the Rumanian medievalist, whose neglected history of the Ottoman Empire is, on the
one hand, a throwback to the mode of grand narrative with emphasis on politico-military events but, on the other, a product of the new Kulturgeschichte. After all, he had been goaded to the task by his mentor, Lamprecht, the German historian whose anti-Rankean genetic method was meant to investigate not "how it actually was" but "how it actually came to be" (wie es eigentlich geworden ist ). Not only was Iorga keen on underlining the significance of the Seljuk era as a formative background, but he also chose to include a nonnarrative chapter emphasizing "the military village life of the Turks" and the appeal of Ottoman administration to the Balkan peasantry by providing it protection, he argued, from seigniorial abuse.

It was not before the First World War, when the demise of the Ottoman state seemed imminent, that its emergence appeared as a specific question in historians' imagination. How was it that this state, now looking so weak and decrepit, so old-fashioned, still so oriental after many westernizing reforms, had once been so enormously successful? And the success, many realized, was not just in terms of expansion, which could be easily explained by militarism and violence. This state once ruled, without major unrest, over a huge population with a dizzying variety of religions, languages, and traditions. How could some "barbarians," still nomadic at the outset of their empire-building enterprise, create such a sophisticated, even if ultimately "despotic," polity? The Ottoman patriot or Turkish nationalist would want to demonstrate, with a different wording of course, that this was not surprising, but he or she would be well aware that the question was of utmost weight for one's dignity or possibly the nation's very existence in the context of a new world order that clipped non-European empires into nation-states; these were in principle to be formed by peoples who could demonstrate through their historical experience that they were mature enough to govern themselves.

H. A. Gibbons (1880-1934), an American teaching at Robert College (Istanbul) in the 1910s, was the first to problematize and devote a monograph to the origins of the Ottoman state. Pointing out that the earliest Ottoman sources — the basis for almost all speculation on the

---

33

— 33 —

...
One of his radically novel assertions was that Osman and his followers were pagan Turks living as nomadic pastoralists on the Byzantine frontier and pursuing successful predatory activities due to weakened defenses in that area. Converting to Islam at some stage of Osman's career, as the dream story implied according to Gibbons, these nomads were overtaken by a proselytizing spirit and forced many of their Christian neighbors to convert as well. The story of Osman's blessed reverie, Gibbons thought, may well have been a legend but it was meant to capture a particular moment in the young chieftain's real life, namely, his adoption of a new faith and of a politico-military career in its name. Taking another piece of evidence from that "mass of fiction" that he otherwise deemed Ottoman histories to be, Gibbons "calculated" that the "four hundred tents" of Osman's tribe must have been joined by so many converts that the new community increased "tenfold" by this process. A new "race" was born — that of the Osmanlis — out of the mixture of ex-pagan Turks and ex-Christian Greeks. The expansion of Osmanli (the Turkish form of "Ottoman") power was accompanied not so much by fresh elements from the East but by more and more "defections and conversions from among the Byzantine Greeks; so, the creative force of the Ottoman Empire must not be attributed to an Asiatic people but to European" elements.[11]

This was after all a time when a historian did not even feel the need to be apologetic for making remarks like the following: "The government and the ruling classes of the Ottoman Empire are negatively rather than positively evil. There is nothing inherently bad about the Osmanli. He is inert, and has thus failed to reach the standards set by the progress of civilization. He lacks ideals."[12] Shrug or sigh as one might upon reading such comments today, when cultural domination is asserted and practiced in much subtler ways, Gibbons's self-satisfied lack of sensitivity for the "natives" allowed him to be free of neurotic caution and to make some daring suggestions. Whatever the weaknesses of his specific arguments, and despite his exaggerations and racialization of the issue, he was not altogether off the mark in underlining the emergence of a new political community out of some combination of people from diverse ethnic and religions backgrounds. It may also shed quite a bit of light on the possibly humble origins and enterprising nature of the early Ottomans to see Osman as a "self-made man." And even Gibbons's ardent critics agreed that Ottoman expansion in the Balkans must be seen not as the outcome of a series of booty-seeking raids but as "part of a plan of settlement" accompanied by such raids.

For more than two decades following Gibbons's book, the foundation of the Ottoman state and the identity of its founders were hot topics. His theory enjoyed some recognition outside the world of Orientalists especially since it could be superimposed on the theory of some Byzantinists at the time that the flourishing of early Ottoman administrative institutions and practices was due, not to a Turco-Islamic, but to a Byzantine heritage. As Charles Diehl, a French Byzantinist, put it, "the Turks ... those rough warriors were neither administrators nor lawyers, and they understood little of political science.
Consequently they modelled many of their state institutions and much of their administrative organization upon what they found in Byzantium."[13] While underlining the long historical evolution of the Turks as a background to the Ottomans, Iorga also held that the latter, "conquérants malgré eux," were almost totally assimilated into Byzantine life except in their religion. The empire they went on to build retained an element, to use his felicitous phrase, of "Byzance après Byzance."[14]

Nevertheless, most scholars of Ottoman or oriental history were critical of Gibbons, while some notable cases like Babinger and Grousset were inclined to accept that Osman converted to Islam at a later stage of his chiefdom. These were no more than exceptions however. Giese, for instance, criticized Gibbons's theories and use of evidence, particularly the construction of an argument around the dream legend, and suggested a new catalyst to the Ottoman conquests: Osman's relations with, or rather support among, the ahis brotherhoods. These brotherhoods were the Anatolian version of the early Islamic futuwwa organizations, which comprised urban artisanal and mercantile milieux conforming to a quasi-chivalric, quasi-Sufi code of behavior and corporation.[15] Kramers took this suggestion a step further and argued that Osman was one of the leaders of the ahis from the Paphlagonian town of Osmancik — whence he supposedly drew his sobriquet.[16] Several prominent Orientalists such as Houtsma, Huart, Marquart, Massignon, and Mordtmann were eager to comment on issues related to Osman's ethnic or religious identity in those years. And identity — in a combination of ethnic, national, racial, and religious categories — was held to have a major explanatory value in historical understanding, especially in locating the rightful place of individuals and nations in the linear progression of civilization. While the minute differences of the arguments and speculations advanced by all these scholars need not be reproduced here in detail, it should be noted that a common underlying assumption characterized their positions and differentiated them from that of Gibbons; in one way or the other, they all tended to emphasize the "oriental" nature of the Ottomans and accepted the essentially Turco-Muslim identity of the founders of the state.

There was soon an attempt at synthesis by Langer and Blake, who breathed a new historiographic spirit into the debate by bringing in material and sociological factors, such as geography, changing trade patterns, and social organization of religious orders or artisanal associatations. Though unable to use the primary sources in Middle Eastern languages, the two coauthors anticipated many of the points and perspectives that were soon to be taken up by two of the most prominent specialists in the field: Köprülü and Wittek. While recognizing the significance of conversions from Christianity to Islam, they were cautious enough not to draw any specific demographic configurations from all this. Nor would they accept that Osman had been born pagan on such flimsy evidence, but they were convinced that "religion played a part, perhaps an important part, in the story of Ottoman expansion." The "elan of the early Ottoman conquerors;' they felt, could be explained by the presence of the dervishes around them.
Underlining the growth of trade and the proliferation of the ahi organizations as well, they reached the conclusion that "the first sultans had more than a mere horde of nomads to rely upon."[17]

The Köprülü-Witter Consolidation

The elaboration of that last point, as well as the most direct and detailed criticism of Gibbons's views, had to wait until 1934 when Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (1890-1966) Turkish scholar whose intellectual career spans the late Ottoman and early republican periods of imperial dissolution and nation building, delivered a series of lectures at the Sorbonne which were soon published as Les origines de l'empire ottoman.[18] Much more than a rebuttal of Gibbons's theories, this book contained a detailed discussion of methodology. Köprülü argued that the foundations of the Ottoman state could not be studied as an isolated Bithynian phenomenon, and that historians ought to concentrate not on detached politico-military incidents but on the social morphology, cultural traditions, and institutional structures of Anatolian Turks in general and of the late-thirteenth-century frontiers in particular. His primary conclusion after applying that method to a broad range of sources was that the material and cultural dynamics of Anatolian Turkish society were sufficiently developed to nurture the growth of a state like that of the Ottomans. A demographic push into western Anatolia in the latter part of the thirteenth century mobilized these dynamics. Even though various forces competed for control over these groups — and it is only here, in the last few pages of his book, that Köprülü turns his attention to the Ottomans specifically — Osman's beglik was favored due, primarily, to its strategic location and then to various other factors (to be discussed in chapter 3). In short, the Ottoman state was simply the culmination of certain dynamics, skills, and organizational principles that had been imported to or had developed in Anatolian Turkish society over more than two centuries. Osman just happened to be in the right place at the right time.

In the meantime, Paul Wittek (1894-1978), who had been to the Ottoman Empire as an officer of its Austrian ally during World War I and then moved on to a scholarly career, was working on the same period and asking similar questions. He published some of his findings in a 1934 monograph on the emergence and activities of another emirate, the Mentese.[19] Soon after Köprülü, Wittek outlined his own ideas on the rise of the Ottoman state in a series of lectures delivered at the University of London in 1937 and published in 1938.[20] There were some significant differences between the views of the two scholars; in fact Wittek's work was partially intended to be a critique of Köprülü, as we shall see below. Yet on one basic point they were in agreement: the rise of the Ottoman state had to be studied against the background of centuries of warfare, cultural transformation, acculturation, and settlement of Muslims and Turks in medieval Anatolia.

Köprülü and Wittek did not always see the same things in the Anatolian-Turkish background. Yet again they were in agreement on
another significant point: one had to distinguish between the hinterland and the frontiers in terms of both their social structure and their cultural characteristics. The two scholars also more or less concurred on the nature of this dichotomy; both of them found the hinterland to be composed of Persianate court circles and settled producers who essentially preferred peaceful relations (cohabitation) with the Byzantines or at least were not pleased to be in a state of continual hostilities, while the marches consisted of nomads, warriors, adventurers, and dervishes who were driven by their search for pasture, booty, glory, or religious vocation. Again, both of these scholars emphasized that frontier society allowed more room for heterodoxy, heterogeneity, and mobility. As to their dissimilarities, Köprülü and Wittek held divergent opinions on the issue of the "tribal factor" in early Ottoman state building. Neither of them understood tribal formations in the sense utilized by modern anthropologists, however. For both historians (and all the Ottomanists of the time) tribalism entailed consanguinity; that is, a tribe would in essence have to be composed of blood relations whose ancestry ought to be traceable to a common origin, at least in principle. Given that, Köprülü was ready to accept that the Ottomans hailed from a tribe belonging to the Kayi branch of the Oghuz Turks, as most of the sources maintained and as eventually became official Ottoman dogma. However, Wittek pointed out, the earliest reports about the ancestry of Osman and his tribe are from the fifteenth century, and more significantly, there are a good many divergences in the genealogies different sources provide for the Ottomans. On the basis of these discrepancies, Wittek concluded that the early Ottomans cannot have been tribally associated; otherwise, they would have a consistent genealogy to show for it. In the same vein, Mehmed II would have been unable to toy around with the idea of propagating a Comnenian lineage for his family. Even after Wittek's objections, Köprülü insisted on the validity of the Ottomans' Kayi identity, while at the same time maintaining that this was a secondary issue since, to him, the Kayi origins did not contribute anything specific to the rise of the state.

There was also a major difference of approach between the two scholars. Köprülü looked on the frontier society as a broad canvas composed of a variety of social forces (tribesfolk, warriors, dervishes, ahıs, emigré scholar-bureaucrats), all of whom made their own significant contribution to the state-building potential of the Turco-Muslim principalities. All this eventually came under the domination of some descendants of the Kayi tribe because the latter happened to be located in a region that circumstances favored. Wittek, on the other hand, focused his attention on one specific element within the uc (term for frontier in medieval sources, pl. ucat) society, the gaza milieu and its ethos, as being instrumental in the emergence of the principalities and ultimately of the Ottoman state, which overran the others. To him, the political history of the frontiers was made by bands of
gazis, warriors of the faith, who spread across the frontier areas as Seljuk power diminished and formed aspiring emirates, among which the band led by Osman Gazi carried the day because of its fortunate position. The earliest Ottoman sources, an inscription from 1337 and Ahmedi's chronicle, completed ca. 1410, both full of references to the House of Osman as gazis, confirmed in Wittek's opinion the significance of the gaza ethos for the early Ottoman thrust. These gazi bands may have drawn members from some tribes but were not composed of tribal groups as such; rather, they consisted of warrior-adventurers from various backgrounds. In relation to the Mentese emirate, for instance, he had argued that the "gazi pirates" who founded this stateling were "originally a mixture of Turks and indigenous elements from the neighborhood of Byzantine territory" who were soon joined by "a large number of Byzantine mariners ... owing to their unemployment."[21] To borrow more recent terminology, gazi bands were "inclusive" entities for Wittek, and tribes were not. Since he held that tribalism required consanguinity (which, he argued, later Ottoman genealogies were unable to establish anyway), and since the warrior bands whom he deemed responsible for the creation of the principalities were anything but consanguineous, he rejected the notion that a tribe could have been instrumental in the foundation of the Ottoman state. The cohesiveness of the political-military cadres of the emirates came from shared goals and faith, not blood.

The differences between Köprülü and Wittek were never explicitly discussed in later scholarship because the issue was encumbered by nationalistic or counternationalistic considerations. From that viewpoint, the role of Byzantine "dissidents" and converts in one of the major political achievements of Turco-Muslim civilization was obviously a highly charged issue. The Polemic against Western historiography, which often tended to show Turks as uncreative barbarians, should be an object of inquiry in itself as part of late Ottoman/early republican intellectual history. (And its intensity must be seen against the fact that Western historiography had been particularly aggressive in its attempt to barbarize and delegitimize the "Turkish" empire, with territories right within the European continent and lording it over Christian peoples.)

Köprülü,

---

from his youthful poetry to his postacademic career as a politician, was certainly part of that discourse as an outspoken nationalist (though his nationalism was different from the official version in many ways). Before his lectures on the rise of the Ottoman state, he had published what turned out to be a highly influential study criticizing then prevalent views with respect to Byzantine influences on Ottoman institutions, primarily in the administrative sphere.[22] Given all this, Köprülü's account of the Ottoman foundations, where he insisted on the presence of a lineage-based tribe as well as an ethnic stock and spoke against emphasizing the conversions, was very easy to read as nationalistic propaganda. And indeed his book is not free of blatant excesses. On the other hand, Köprülü's version of events lacked the convenience of a singular "motive force." Shaped under the influence of the Durkheimian tradition
in Turkish thought, Köprülü's account was distinctly akin to the new historiographic temperament of the Annales, the French historical journal, then only five years old. Rather than dealing with politico-military incidents and presenting a succession of events, Köprülü explicitly stated that he intended to view the rise of the Ottoman state on the basis of the morphology of Anatolian Turkish society "and the evolution of its religious, legal, economic, and artistic institutions more than its political and military events."[24] Even though his aim was partially to depict early Ottoman history as a continuation of late-Seljuk Anatolia, he shunned a chronologically ordered narrative. In his review of Köprülü's book in the newly launched Annales, Lucien Fevbre noted approvingly the former's "aversion to one-sided explanations" and did not fail to add that "having gone beyond the stage of narrative history, [Köprülü] produced a solid work of explanation and synthesis."[25]

Written by a man who disdained deterministic single-factor explanations, however, Köprülü's account seemed to lack focus from the viewpoint of traditional history-writing. In his preface to the Turkish edition of his book in 1959, Köprülü remarked somewhat defensively that some "respected Orientalists who have been occupied with the problem of the origins of the Ottoman Empire, although good philologists [read Wittek?], have not been able to go beyond a narrow and simplistic framework when they dealt with historical subjects because they could not escape from the influence of the mentality of narrative history.... The frequent attempts to explain by a single cause, that is from one aspect, any historical process which has come into existence under the influence of many different factors is nothing but the neglect of the complexity, that is, the reality of life."[26] Köprülü's sociocultural portrait of the fron-

— 40 —

...iers pointed to various factors that endowed the uc society with mobility and a potential for expansion and to various characteristics of the Ottomans that favored them in particular. The Kayi origins, for instance, were never assigned a causal or explanatory role, and the demographic push from the east was cited as only one of the elements that transformed frontier mobility into Ottoman expansion.

Whatever his historiographic sophistication, however, Köprülü was committed to an essentialist notion of nationhood even more strongly than the historians he opposed. If the Ottoman state was to be seen as a creation of Turks, these must be from the essence of Turkdom, not the newly Turkified. Thus he wrote: "Among the great men of the Ottoman state who won fame in the fourteenth century, and even the fifteenth century, there were very few Christian converts, like the family of Köse Mikhal for instance. Not only was the bureaucracy, which had been established according to Seljuk and Ilkhanid practices, composed entirely of Turkish elements, but those at the head of the government and army were almost invariably Turks. All the historical documents in our possession show this to be definitely the case."[27] Needless to say, this paragraph is not accompanied by any references, for how could it be? How does one show that the fourteenth-century bureaucrats were "entirely" Turkish? So few of them are known as individuals, and most of those appear in the historical record for the first
time. Furthermore, we should note the gender-specific designation of the subject of the inquiry: "great men of the Ottoman state." However one chooses to characterize their ethnic origins, some of those great men, Köprülü failed to note, were born to great women who were not of Turkish birth, like Nilüfer Hatun, the mother of Murad I.

As for lesser men and women, Köprülü seems to have been equally keen on maintaining the purity of as many as possible, absolving them of renegadism and probably also the Ottoman conquerors of forced conversion. Against the evidence, he argues: "According to Ottoman sources, Göynük, which was completely inhabited by Christians when Ibn Battuta passed through it, should have been Islamized toward the end of the same century, since Yıldırım Bayezid had people brought from there and from Torbali to establish the Muslim quarter that he founded in Constantinople. Even if this report were true, it would be more correct to explain it by the establishment of a new Turkish element there than by a general conversion. Logically one cannot easily accept that the Muslim quarter in Constantinople was simply settled by Greeks who had recently become Muslims."[28]

Later on, he even drops the cautious "almost invariably" and states with absolute certainty that "the Ottoman state was founded exclusively by Turks in the fourteenth century." And then he finally lets the cat out of the bag when he argues, quite logically, that "just as the fact that a significant number of the riders of the Byzantine Empire came from foreign elements is no proof that the Greeks lacked administrative ability, an analogous situation occurring in the Ottoman Empire cannot be used as proof that the Turks lacked administrative ability."[29]

The last point, namely, the "administrative ability" of a people, to be demonstrated to the "civilized world" in particular, was much more than a question of national pride, as was mentioned above. Such arguments resonated with one of the basic principles in the "new world order" between the two great wars: a people had a right to nationhood in a civilized world only if they could prove that they had in their historical experience what it takes to create a stable state and to govern in a civilized manner. That is one of the most important reasons why nation-states took up the construction of a past as avidly as they drew plans for industrialized modernity. New generations had to, as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk put it in a saying that is now inscribed on many public sites in Turkey, "be proud [of the nation's past achievements], work hard, and be confident [of the future]." Köprülü steered his own course dear of official history and of the so-called Turkish history thesis with its notorious, though fortunately short-lived, excesses like the "sun-language theory."[30] Naturally, however, he was a man of his times.

No perilous pitfall in logic seems to have trapped historians more than the genetic fallacy, perhaps because, by the nature of their profession, they are prone to evaluating the truth value of an assertion on the basis of its origins. It seems that the validity of Köprülü's account was suspect not necessarily because its contents were analyzed but merely because he was known to have
indulged in nationalist polemics and to have given in to notions of ethnic purity. At any rate, Wittek's theory obtained general recognition in the international scholarly community writing in the western European languages, while Köprülü's ideas, if indeed considered, were relegated to the status of the best-possible account of a nationalist historiography, albeit with due respect paid to his stature as a scholar. His works on medieval Turkish literary and religious history were used as indispensable sources, but it was Wittek's "gaza thesis" that became the definitive account of the origins of the Ottoman state for a large part of the scholarly world and, with the chivalresque imagery that it conjured, entered many popular treatments.

Still, to present Wittek's thesis as the consensus of the whole field, as some of his critics tend to, would be to overlook the scholarly community in Turkey and to some extent also the Balkans, where the Köprülü-Gibbons controversy continued to be important.[31] In Turkey, Köprülü's tribalist-ethnicist views as well as his emphasis on the Turco-Muslim origins of the Ottoman administrative apparatus came to enjoy nearly the status of dogma and were eventually taken in a more chauvinistic direction as they were increasingly stripped of his demographic and sociological concerns.[32] And there always were some, in Turkey and elsewhere, who developed alternative views, as we shall see below. By and large, however, the terms of debate as they were developed from the First to the Second World War constituted the larger canvas within which the rise of the Ottoman state was depicted until recently; Wittek's depiction in particular was copied and recopied until it was reduced to a mere sketch or a textbook orthodoxy in a large part of the world, while the same fate overtook Köprülü Turkey.

The opening of the Ottoman archives to scholars changed the course of Ottoman studies starting in the 1940s. Both the quantity and the quality of the archival materials, mostly hard data kept by a meticulous bureaucracy, coincided so well with the rising prestige of social and economic history worldwide that the question of Ottoman "origins," like questions of origins in general, started to look awfully dated, especially since it required all kinds of "drudgery" that a new historiography reacting to the nineteenth-century philological tradition felt it had better leave to old-fashioned historians.

There is one noteworthy exception to this generalization, however. In a book published in 1947, George G. Arnakis questioned the methodology and the conclusions of both Köprülü and Wittek.[33] In a review of that book, an eminent Byzantinist highlighted the main positions of these scholars while summarizing Arnakis's conclusions:

Gibbons' celebrated conclusion that the Ottoman Empire was essentially a creation of a European rather than of an Asiatic people receives endorsement. Köprülü opposite view that the Osmanlis were the very incarnation of every thing Moslem and Turkish is severely criticized as modern Turkish "ethnicism."... Wittek emphasizes Ghazi ideology rather than Turkish race, as Köprülü does; and indeed rejects the views of Houtsma... that the Osmanlis were part of the Kayi tribe of the Oghuzz branch of the Turks. Arnakis,
however, believes that the Iskendername of Ahmedi breathes a heroic spirit rather than a historic one, and that the references to the Ghazis in his poem and in the Brusa inscription do not mean what Wittek says they mean. He emphasizes that the sources indicate no Moslem fanaticism in the military activities of the early Osmanlis: their goal, Arnakis maintains, was not the spread of Islam or the destruction of Christianity but simply plunder. He further points out that the early Osmanlis made it easy for the Greeks to join them. In sum, Arnakis believes that all the students of the problem of Ottoman foundations since Gibbons have gone astray in their emphasis upon the primarily Islamic or essentially Turkish character of the first Osmanlis; that local conditions in Bithynia must be intensively studied before one can arrive at a fair picture.

This short passage, whatever its bias, succinctly encapsulates the different positions and issues involved. Methodologically, the central issue in studying the rise of the Ottoman state was whether one should focus one's attention on the local conditions in Bithynia or treat the early Ottomans as part of broader Islamic and Anatolian-Turkish traditions; the latter position would involve at least some use of fifteenth-century Ottoman sources which were dismissed by the former. Partially in tandem with one's position on that issue, one was then presumably led to put the emphasis either on Byzantine decay and the human resources that situation placed at the service of the early Ottomans or on the constructive capabilities of the Turco-Muslim heritage. It is difficult to see any but ideological reasons for treating these alternatives as mutually exclusive, but most of the scholars seem to have been keen on figuring out whether the Ottoman state was "essentially a creation of a European" or "of an Asiatic people" rather than on combining a narrow Bithynian viewpoint with the broader context of Turco-Islamic traditions. Wittek was somewhat more flexible than the others in that he attempted to mesh his account of the Ottomans as heirs to the gazi traditions with a portrait of Byzantine decay in Bithynia and with observations on defections of Byzantine subjects, but ultimately his singular reliance on "holy war ideology" did not leave much room for a serious consideration of the other factors.

In any case, there seems to be unanimity among these scholars in terms of their appreciation of the early Ottoman state, but the burning question was: whose achievement was it? Next to Köprülü's position cited above was Arnakis's assertion that with the conquest of Bursa, "the Osmanlis were now strengthened by the socially advanced townspeople. Making Brussa their capital, the Osmanlis... carried on reforms, and organized a model state. Their advance and rapid spread into Europe is largely due to the administrative experience and the civic traditions of the citizens of Brussa, Nicaea and Nicomedia." Obviously then, Ar-
nakis, like Gibbons, focused on Bithynia and on what he considered to be the "actions" of the early Ottomans rather than on the "fictions" of later generations, namely, the fifteenth-century chronicles. In terms of their specific conclusions, both of them emphasized the contributions of originally non-Islamic and non-Turkish elements to the rise of the Ottoman state, whereas Köprülü and Wittek stressed the role of Turco-Islamic traditions (understood more in a cultural than in an ethnic sense by the latter). In terms of their interpretation of the sources, Gibbons and Arnakis tended to dismiss Ottoman chronicles as later fabrications, whereas Köprülü and Wittek, though aware of their problematic nature, preferred to make use of them after applying what they considered to be rigorous means of textual analysis.

We can dearly identify two distinct lines of approach to early Ottoman history: the one followed by Gibbons and Arnakis and the other by Köprülü and Wittek. Many elements of the new critical discourse on the gaza thesis can be read as a rekindled interest, though not necessarily in the sense of a self-conscious intellectual legacy, in some arguments of the former approach. These lines should not be drawn too rigidly, however. Some of the differences between Köprülü and Wittek have already been noted. It is also to be underlined that Gibbons's emphasis on the proselytizing zeal of the Ottomans in the early days and their loss of ideals in the empire's latter phase is to some extent paralleled by Wittek's views on the gaza. And this role assigned to religious motives by both Gibbons and Wittek is precisely what Arnakis, as well as the new critics of the gaza thesis, refused to see in the emergence of the Ottoman state.

The Search for Alternatives

Before moving on to the gaza thesis and its dismantling, we ought not to overlook some important contributions made to the study of that particular period in the meantime, if only to indicate that Wittek's thesis was not compelling for many scholars in the field.

Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970), a Turcologist who held the office of premier in the short-lived republic of Bashkiria before its incorporation into the Soviet Union (1922) and who then migrated to Turkey, brought quite an unusual perspective to Turkish history thanks to his background and training. In his magnum opus on the general history of the Turks, written while he was in prison on charges of pan-Turanianism, and in other studies, he often emphasized the importance of the Ilkhanid legacy as well as non-Oguz, or eastern Turkish, elements as if he wanted to remind the western Turks, the heirs of the Ottoman tradition, of their non-Mediterranean cousins.[36] To the extent that the gaza ethos played a role, for instance, Togan argued that it was not the legacy of former Arab frontier traditions directly inherited by the Oguz Turks who settled in Anatolia as their new homeland. It was rather brought to western Anatolia at the turn of the fourteenth century by those Muslim Turks who were forced to migrate there from eastern Europe since their lands were lost to Islamdom when Prince Nogay of the Chingisid Altunorda, a Muslim, was defeated (1299) by Toktagu Khan, a
In addition to this newly imported enthusiasm (supported by the Ilkhanids) for the (re)conquest of lands for Islam, the internal weakness of Byzantium, and the lack of "Islamic fanaticism" among the early Ottomans that facilitated the incorporation of quasi-Islamic Turks and Mongols as well as renegades from Christianity, Togan cited the location of Osman's tribe right near the major Byzantine-Ilkhanid trade route as the factors that made it natural for Turkish warriors to conceive of expanding their power and building a state. The rest was good leadership, adoption of sound administrative practices (thanks primarily to the Ilkhanid legacy), support given to and received from ahihs and dervishes, and a well-regulated colonization policy after crossing to Rumelia.

The significance of commerce was to be considered from another perspective by Mustafa Akdag (1913-72), a Turkish historian who chose to focus on some references in the Ottoman chronicles concerning exchange between Osman's tribe and their Christian neighbors; from those, he developed a bold theory proposing the existence of a "Marmara-basin economy" that emerged as an integrated unit at the time of Ertogrul and Osman. The state that was created by them gave political expression to that economic reality and expanded along routes that linked the Marmara basin to other regional economies. This thesis never had a chance to gain any recognition, however, since it was soon demolished on the grounds of flimsy evidence and sloppy reasoning by a student of Köprülü, Halil İnalcık, who was to emerge as the leading Ottomanist of his generation and make his own contributions to various problems of early Ottoman history. Even though Akdag elaborated the same views in a later book, with a yet stronger emphasis on commerce, symbiosis, and rosy relations between Turks and Byzantines or Balkan peoples, his views were not supported by any new evidence that responded to former criticisms; the book failed to have an impact on professional historians though it was widely read by the public. Considering that its author suffered imprisonment for his leftist views after the military intervention of 1971, the book is rather a curious reminder of the fact that certain significant strands of the nationalist discourse such as the purely positive assessment of the Turkish conquests cut across both sides of the political spectrum in Turkey.

Speros Vryonis, a Greek-American (and a Byzantinist, as some reviewers noted, much to his resentment), published his monumental work on medieval Anatolia in 1971. It covered the period that saw the rise of the Ottoman state but was not directly concerned with that specific phenomenon. Vryonis rather traced the broad currents of demographic movement, nomadization, and religious and cultural change in Asia Minor that, over four centuries, transformed what was a Hellenic/Greek Orthodox peninsula into a predominantly Islamic one dominated by a Turcophone political elite. In the shortest summary of the set of conclusions he reached at the end of his exhaustive research, he wrote that "the Turkish success ultimately was a product of the dynamics of Byzantine decline and Turkmen (nomadic) demographic pressure." As for the role of frontier warriors in that process, whose absence in the book was noted by a reviewer,
Vryonis commented that "the Wittek thesis was of interest and stimulus some two generations ago, but only as a tool to stimulate further discussion. To accept it as an established fact and then to apply it here and there to different areas and periods is erroneous methodologically."[44]

To Ernst Werner, a Marxist-Leninist medievalist of the former East Germany, the first two centuries of Ottoman history represented the framing of a feudal system through the subjugation of pre- and antifeudal elements.[45] Though his conceptual framework is dated and forced, Werner was quite astute in focusing on social conflicts within and around the growing polity in detail as the dynamic that shaped political developments. He explicitly criticized Turkish historiography for its chauvinistic tendencies, including the tendency to overlook conflicts in Turco-Muslim society in general and among its warriors in particular.[46] Since he made only scanty use of the sources in Islamic languages and dung to a rigid Marxist-Leninist position with a rather facile application of the notion of class struggle,[47] his views were not seriously considered in the guildlike mainstream of Ottoman studies, which, despite the considerable impact of quasi-Marxian materialism beginning in the 1960s, stood on the western side of the cold war divide. Although Werner identifies Köprülü as "Kommunistenhasser und extremer Nationalist,"[48] his methodological position has an obvious affinity with that of the latter, the only Ottomanist of the earlier generation to have a serious interest in sociological history. In his Origins, Köprülü had underlined the importance of "research on the stratification of various elements which constituted Anatolian Turkish society in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, their Positions with respect to each other, their strengths and weaknesses, the causes of conflict and solidarity among them," but his agenda simply included too many other questions that he preferred to focus on.[49]

Whatever the merits of the insights they brought to the rise of the Ottoman state, these works had agendas that assigned higher priority to other matters. Thus, their comments on our specific theme remained by and large buried. Surveys (and syllabi?) of Ottoman, Islamic, and world history framed the activities of the state founders in terms of the gaza thesis. It should be obvious, however, that not all the scholars in the field were compelled by Wittek's gaza thesis even when it reigned supreme. Their works rather represent a continual, if not directly critical or widely influential, search for alternative explanations. Even if the gaza ethos was accepted to have played a role, there was an obvious urge to consider other factors, mostly social and economic, like trade, demographics, nomad-settled relations, as well as societal conflict, as the dynamics that produced an empire. In the beginning of the 1980s, İnalcık wrote a concise and masterly synthesis, to be discussed later, that brought many of these elements together with the gaza ethos.[50] It turned out to be not the last word on the subject, as one might have expected, but only the harbinger of a decade that saw a flurry of publications aiming to dismantle the gaza thesis altogether.

The Wittek Thesis and Its Critics
It is time now to go over the gaza thesis in more detail and then turn to its critics. As indicated above with respect to the methodological Position he shared with Köprülü, Wittek could not have formulated his thesis without assuming some sort of diachronic continuum in the gazi traditions of Anatolia, and of medieval Islam in general, reaching the early Ottomans, as well as some level of synchronic communication and similarity between the gazis in Bithynia and elsewhere in Anatolia. That is precisely why he prefaced his account of the rise of the Ottomans with a survey of the gazi traditions in Anatolia starting with

— 48 —

the Danismendids of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries. And that is also why he found the experiences of other emirates broadly contemporaneous with the Osmanli relevant for an understanding of the uniquely successful case of the latter.

The political and military leadership of the frontiers always belonged to the gazis, according to Wittek. Since the late eleventh century, Anatolian frontier areas were dominated by gazis, whose independent, sporadic, and unruly activities did not always conform to the stability-oriented Realpolitik of the Seljuk administration. There were frequent dashes between Seljuk authorities and the gazis, whose most notable representatives were the Danismendids in the twelfth century. In the early thirteenth century, there was a rapprochement between the gazis and the Seljuks, but the Mongol invasions brought this situation to an end.

In the second half of the thirteenth century, the western Anatolian marches were swollen not only by new influxes of nomadic groups and their holy men pushed by the Mongol invasions but also by "prominent Selçuks seeking refuge, leaders from dispersed armies, old gazis whose rapprochement with Konya had come to an end." The chronicles of that period are therefore filled with accounts of central armies undertaking campaigns against unruly ucat. Against the backdrop of the decay of Byzantine defenses in western Anatolia after the end of Lascarid rule from Nicaea, the revitalization of the marches from the Turkish side led to new political configurations, signified by the appearance of several small emirates. According to Wittek, nomadic Turks took part in the invasions, incursions, and emerging emirates, but they were subordinated to gazis, "those march-warriors who for generations had attacked and overrun the frontier... the leaders of the gazis became the princes of the emirates."[51] We have already seen that his detailed study of the Mentese emirate led Wittek to attribute the formation of this polity to the successful piratical expeditions of the gazis joined by "the seafaring inhabitants of the coastal districts" and "a large number of Byzantine mariners."

Similar small states came into existence in other parts of western Anatolia. Among these, one was founded by Osman's followers, who, like other gazi formations, had "adapted themselves to the civilization of the country which they attacked,' and this "made it all the easier for the Akritai [Byzantine border warriors] to join them in groups, and for forts and smaller towns to capitulate voluntarily." Also, these Ottomans "did everything to promote
desertion among their adversaries...

Driven by the gaza ethos, which blended a search for booty or pasture, political

― 49 ―

opportunism, and a religious motivation, all these small begliks aspired to enlarge their territory and authority. Mostly due to circumstantial reasons, the Ottomans were the most successful chiefdom to accomplish this goal even though they were one of the least significant at first. Located at the very outskirts of the unstable frontier area, however, they were the closest group to one of the, defensively speaking, weakest points of Byzantium and enjoyed a comparative advantage in exploiting the gaza ethos relative to other emirates that were not as strategically located or had become more established. Their early successes, in turn, provided the Ottomans with fresh sources of warriors (including converts), facilitating further growth. While Wittek's account dearly relied on an understanding of the gaza ethos that had many more nuances than merely a fervor for holy war, he was more categorical in his general statements, especially in drawing a distinction between the gazi and the "hochislamisch" tendencies. In a widely read article, he rather mechanistically applied his theory of an opposition between these two tendencies as the key to understanding Ottoman Political developments from Bayezid I to Mehmed II.[53] Such formulations and a general lack of concern with the details of his story led to a reductionist rendering of the whole gaza thesis that over time suffered what all accepted theses go through. It became a caricature of itself (an explanation by religious fanaticism) while enjoying wide recognition and recycling.[54] The relative consensus around the gaza thesis prevailed for nearly half a century. Some specialists continued the search for alternative or supplementary explanations, as I have already shown, but there was no lively debate producing new research and ideas (except for the issue of the Kayi genealogy that occupied Wittek and Köprüülü as well as some younger Turkish scholars for a while).[55] An undercurrent of dissatisfaction with that consensus and a revived interest in revisiting the problem of the Ottoman state's emergence were apparently building up, however, and they surfaced in the 1980s in the publications of an impressive number of scholars who, independently of each other, tackled Wittek's formulation.[56] The main thrust of the critique was to underline certain actions of the early Ottomans that were now deemed contradictory to the spirit of holy war and to argue therefore that they cannot have been motivated by the gaza ethos. Rather, the critics of the gaza thesis argue, what once were plain Political and/or material motives were adorned with higher ideals.

― 50 ―

in later sources written by ideologues serving the Ottoman dynasty. Was it the weariness of a generation of scholars who lived through the Vietnam War, refusing to accept that "war for an ideal" or "to spread one's 'superior'
values" could be anything more than rhetoric concocted by ideologues to legitimize actions "actually" fueled by ignoble motives? The more obvious weariness was with the idealistic assumptions of former generations of scholars steeped in philology, accompanied by the related and belated arrival of an interest among Ottomanists in the materialist end of the idealism-materialism debates.

It should also be noted that these discussions remained confined to Wittek. Köprülü's views were hardly discussed; Gibbons and Arnakis, hardly cited. Though it remains implicit, the position of the new critics in terms of the relationship of the early Ottomans to the rest of the frontier is in many ways a continuation of the Gibbons-Arnakis approach while the particular examination of the gaza thesis had already been elaborated by Arnakis.

Anthropological literature on tribes is the most obvious source of inspiration for Rudi Paul Lindner, who gave the most elaborate, systematic, and — by now — recognized critique of the gaza thesis. He is also the only one to develop an alternative theory. His basic argument rests on what he observes to be a contradiction between the "inclusive" nature of tribalism and the "exclusive" nature of the gaza ideology. Since he finds tribalism as it is defined by recent anthropological theory to be more representative of early Ottoman behavior and thus a likelier candidate as the motive force behind the emergence of the Ottoman state, he sets himself the task of disproving Wittek's gaza theory. In Wittek's time, Lindner somewhat generously observes, tribes were assumed to be consanguineous groups basically closed to strangers. Only on the basis of such a definition could Wittek have attempted to argue that the first Ottomans must have had some other principle of organization than a tribal one since they could not produce a consistent genealogy. Recent anthropological studies, on the other hand, demonstrate that a tribe is "a political organism whose membership [is] defined by shared interests (and, in medieval Eurasia, subordination to a chief)."[57] Tribes are now seen as inclusive bodies whose members might attempt to fabricate a common genealogy only after the formation of the tribe. Therefore, Lindner argues, the discrepancies that Wittek detected in various genealogies produced by fifteenth-century Ottoman writers do not disprove the tribal roots of the Ottoman state, as Wittek believed. On the contrary, such discrepancies prove that later Ottoman writers were trying to impose a fictional consanguinity on the founders of their state, who actually were from various groups of Turks and Byzantines coming together under the chieftainship of Osman thanks to the inclusive nature of tribalism. But if an inclusive tribalism was indeed the dominant factor in the rise of the Ottoman state, Lindner further argues, then the gaza theory must be dismissed because gaza as "an exclusive or adversary ideology" would have excluded Byzantines from joining Turks to form a tribe. "If fervor for the Holy War played an important role in this frontier area, then our pool would clearly exclude Byzantines, for they would have become the detested enemy of the faithful."[58]

According to Lindner, Wittek's evidence for the gaza theory consists of the
Bursa inscription of 1337 and Ahmedi's history. Like Arnakis, Lindner feels that both of these sources can be interpreted to reflect a later ideology of the settled Ottoman state rather than the "real" ethos of the early Ottomans. He proposes to eschew such "later ideological statements" and base his argument on the early Ottomans' deeds. If they were indeed warriors animated by the gazi ideology, Lindner suggests, the early Ottomans would not have
1. recruited Byzantines into their ranks,
2. fought against other Muslim forces,
3. exerted no pressure to convert or persecute Christians,
4. displayed moderation and an "interest in conciliation and mutual adaptability," or
5. allowed freedom for heterodoxy and pre-Islamic cults.

Furthermore, according to Lindner, contemporaneous Byzantine chroniclers of "the stature of Pachymeres, Gregoras, and Cantacuzenes" would have recorded religious animosity as a factor in the Ottoman drive if the Ottomans were indeed driven by such animosity. Jennings raises the same point about Byzantine sources, which we shall take up in the next chapter, but for him too the most obvious failure of the gazi thesis is its incompatibility with the behavior of the early Ottomans vis-à-vis their Christian subjects and neighbors. Káldy-Nagy likewise finds incongruities between a spirit of holy war and what he observes to be a loose attachment of the early Ottomans to their Islamic faith, as can be discerned in the continuance of pre-Islamic practices such as the use of Turkic names, their wars with other Muslims, and lack of a zeal to convert. Needless to say, in terms of the sources that refer to Osman and his — 52 —
descendants as gazis, both Jennings and Káldy-Nagy feel that we are faced with later ideological adornments. Jennings, however, makes the additional argument that the "1337 inscription" was in fact produced much later during a repair, when the original building date of 1337 was maintained in a new formulation that included the reference to Orhan and his father as gazis.

Even though the reopening of discussion on a theory that has enjoyed supremacy for nearly half a century is certainly to be welcomed, this line of argumentation against the gazi thesis contains many flaws. Most importantly, it is based on an essentialism that leads Wittek's critics to assume, even more rigidly than earlier Orientalists, the existence of a "true Islam" whose standards "true gazis" are then supposed to conform to. In this view, gazis are expected to be orthodox Muslims driven by religious zeal, relentlessly fighting against and forcibly converting infidels. Thus, as alien as they may deem Wittek's philological tradition and his philosophical idealism, all of these authors are firmly steeped in Orientalist perceptions of Islam which privilege the canonical as the truly Islamic and hold suspect anything that diverges from the canonical. In fact, they go further than earlier Orientalists, not only in assuming that there ought to be such a thing as a "true gaza spirit" to be defined without reference to any particular historical context but also in excluding those who engaged in uncanonical practices from the Muslim umma (the universal community of believers in Islam) altogether. Wittek and Köprülü at
least recognized an intermediate category of heterodox Islam, in which they placed (not necessarily with analytical rigor as we shall see in later chapters) what they believed to be the uncanonical practices of Turco-Muslim tribes and warriors of the medieval Anatolian frontiers. The critics of the gaza thesis, on the other hand, are ready to take on more-inquisitorial roles and to pass sentences or moral judgments on the early Ottomans for not being Muslim enough.\[59\]

After mentioning the participation of Christian forces of Balkan vassals in Ottoman campaigns, even against Muslim foes, Jennings writes that "using Christian soldiers along with Muslim ones on campaign violates almost everyone's standard of a holy war, and leading Christian soldiers against Muslim ones is reprehensible." Or again, "it is hard to imagine how any Muslims who operated in those ways could be esteemed as gazis by Muslims who have any profound knowledge of their own faith."\[60\] But all of the later Ottoman authors, who were to some extent aware of these particular ways in which the early Ottomans oper-

Among the "reasons for hypothesizing that Ertugrul and his sons were only loosely attached to Islam," Káldy-Nagy refers (among other things, which he treats less systematically) to the fact that all of the family members and associated warriors of the generations of Ertogril and Osman have Turkic names.\[61\] Naming practices and changes in that sphere are certainly relevant for understanding the cultural orientation of the people involved, and the clear reversal of preference from Turkic to Arabic-Muslim names needs to be noted and understood, but it is not necessarily a criterion to gauge the depth of a person's "religious commitment" as Káldy-Nagy argues. There are many reasons why Mamluk rulers of Egypt, for instance, kept their Turkic names, and lack of religious commitment can hardly be one of them.\[62\]

In this respect, the most radical position is taken by Lindner, who is nearly ready to act like an Inquisitor and excommunicate the early Ottomans. Considering some examples of what he considers to be pre-Islamic beliefs and attitudes among the early Ottomans, for instance, he concludes that they may have been "crusaders for shamanism rather than for Islam." On another occasion, after citing some unorthodox beliefs or practices of early Ottomans to disprove once again the existence of "single-minded Muslim zeal," he decides to "leave aside the interesting possibility that Osman and his comrades were holy warriors in another just cause, that of shamanism."\[63\] But those early Ottomans, if they were crusaders of anything, must surely be allowed to have been crusaders of what they thought to be Islam. Some of their beliefs may have been contradictory to an assumed essence of Islam, but there is nothing we can do about the fact that the people of the marches, including the early Ottomans, chose to retain several of their "shamanistic" notions or, rather, to redefine them within a syncretistic understanding of Islam. A similar convergence of "heterodoxy" and gazi spirit is observed in many other frontier circumstances; it is noted, for
instance, to have existed during the emergence of the Safavids as a political power as well.[64] This is the historical reality of the marches to be explained; it cannot be dismissed as a contradiction on the basis of an ahistorical definition of gaza as what it ought to have been.

The conduct of Geyikli Baba, for instance, a dervish of early Ottoman Bithynia, may have appeared un-Islamic to a hyperorthodox scholar but there is no doubt that Geyikli Baba considered himself a Muslim and was thus recognized by many others. Taskoprizade, an eminent Sunni scholar of the sixteenth century, was probably much more conscious of the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy than his fourteenth-century Ottoman forebears and much more stringent in the application of relevant criteria, but he does not question Geyikli Baba's belief when respectfully recording the latter's "miraculous deeds."[65] It is well known that many Sunni and 'Alevi Turks still believe in similar legends and tell them to their children as part of a religious upbringing; naturally, that does not render these parents "shamanist educators."

In fact, there is a serious problem with this use of "shamanism." First, in lumping together all that seems to be a "survival" from pre-Islamic Turkic beliefs under the category of shamanism, Lindner is simply following the precedent of Köprülü and other earlier Turcologists. But now that the comparative study of religious has advanced to a much more rigorous understanding of shamanism and particularly in the light of Lindner's own concern with discarding sedentary dispositions in dealing with nomads, it would be much more appropriate to take the early Ottomans' unorthodox beliefs and practices seriously. What does "ritual human sacrifice," assuming that some Ottomans indeed practiced it, as Vryonis and Lindner argue, or belief in the execution of posthumous deeds by holy figures have to do with shamanism?[66] Second, even if the early Ottoman practices contained some traces of shamanism, that would not make them shamans, let alone warriors of shamanism. Lindner's comments on the "interesting possibility" of early Ottoman "shamanism" appear like a reformulation of Gibbons's thesis: that Osman was not a Muslim until a later stage of his career. That position naturally requires more evidence than pointing to some examples of lingering pre-Islamic practices.

Besides, there is an obvious contradiction in the line of argumentation followed by Wittek's critics. If the later chroniclers are characterized as ideologues who attempt to whitewash the pagan founders of the state from a Sunni point of view, how can one explain their inclusion of these "un-Islamic" legends in their narratives? 'Asikpasazade (ca. 1400-90; hereafter abbreviated Apz), for instance, perhaps the best known of these chroniclers, does not merely record such incidents but tells us that he can personally assure us of their truth. If the deeds of the early Ottomans, because of their "pagan" characteristics, were contradictory to Apz's notion of Islam, why does he not suppress them or record them merely as traditions? On the contrary, he emphasizes his own belief in those legends. Was he a "shamanist" as well? In late-fifteenth-century Istanbul, where he wrote?
My point here is not to save the reputation of Osman and his family or to establish that they were "good Muslims" or even to make sure that they are recognized as Muslims from the very beginning of their political career. One may still construct an argument about the conversion of Osman in his later career, but that argument needs to be constructed rather than hinted at. I will refer to some evidence in chapter 3 that might in fact be used for such an argument, though I personally feel it would be farfetched. Nor do I wish to disregard the fact that some, perhaps most, of the early Ottoman practices may have been unorthodox, but this is no reason to maintain that their attachment to Islam must have been too loose or not sincere enough for them to be steeped in the gaza ethos. For what does the gaza ethos have to do with "correct Islam" and why should a warrior of the faith be expected to conform to it?

In this context, we should note that the observations of Lindner and others about the attitudes of the early Ottomans toward their religion or neighbors are not based on the discovery of new evidence. Wittek, and possibly all the writers on early Ottoman history, were aware of the conciliatory attitude and unorthodox practices among the early Ottomans as well as their struggles with other Muslim emirs. Except for Arnakis, however, they did not perceive these facts to be contradictory to the gazi spirit. As we have already seen, Arnakis had as early as 1947 raised both of the major points of objection to Wittek: that the Bursa inscription and Ahmedi's chronicle could be dismissed as later ideology, and that there was a contradiction between the gaza spirit and the non-adversarial attitude of the early Ottomans toward their Byzantine neighbors and toward pre-Islamic cults.[67]

Why should the actions of the gazis be expected to be guided by religious animosity, fervor, and the upholding of "untarnished Islam," however? Wittek's description of the gazi milieu and their ethos was based on what he held to be historical facts and not on an a priori definition of gaza. Namely, it was not a canonical but a historical definition that took into consideration the descriptions by medieval Islamic authors, writing much earlier than the Ottoman chroniclers, of a particular social type called gazi and associated with the frontier regions of Islam. The standard depiction of the gazi as a social type was derived from W. Barthold, the Russian Turcologist, whose work was closely followed in this regard by both Köprülü and Wittek.[68] According to Barthold's Turkestan (which quickly established itself as the classic treatment of the history of central Asia and eastern Iran between the seventh and thirteenth centuries), ever since the early reports in Islamic sources on the gazis of Khorasan from the tenth to eleventh centuries, we are faced with...

"restless elements" that "offered their services wherever a holy war was in progress and wherever booty might be expected."[69] Writing about an incident in
which some "three hundred men who had been engaged in theft and robbery" were collected and executed by the ruler of Samarqand in the eleventh century, Barthold adds that these measures were "taken against that class of the population from which at another epoch the so-called 'volunteers' were drawn."[70]

The gazis appear as one manifestation of the still ambiguous social phenomenon of quasi-corporate male organizations in medieval Islamic history. Just like the ‘ayyarun (lit., scoundrels), a word used by some medieval Muslim authors interchangeably with the word gaziyan, the gazis represented potential troublemakers from the point of view of established states, which attempted with only partial success to channel the energies of these social forces toward targets other than the present order. Gaziyan was the corporate name given to such associations (though the level of cohesion or organization is not precisely known) that functioned in the frontier areas obviously because there they would be able to undertake ghazwa (raids) into the dar al-harb (abode of war).[71]

From the point of view of the central authorities, it was one way of keeping undesirable elements away from the regular flow of settled life, while it is only natural that in the religion-based worldview of the times such raiders would be ready to see and to present themselves as fighting for a religious cause. The gazis, then, were viewed by Barthold and by many Orientalists who relied on his work, not necessarily as the result of a compulsion to fight for religion, but as a socially unstable element finding itself a niche, a legitimization, and a chance for mobility through military activity in the frontier regions sanctioned and rendered meaningful within the framework of a higher cause.

Even then, such legitimization on the basis of religion was not necessarily suited to the ideals of the Islamic central states. Unorthodox, syncretistic, or even heretical ideas did find more-fertile ground in the unstable frontier areas, where the authority of central governments and their versions of Islam could hardly be enforced. Moreover, as Wittek often pointed out, a similar sociocultural situation pervaded the other side of the "border." In the Anatolian case, the gazis and the akritai had for centuries been living in closer proximity to each other, mentally as well as geographically, than to the central authorities.

To argue against this definition, one would need to reinterpret the sources that describe the activities of the gazis. The critics of the gazi thesis, on the other hand, assume that modern lexicographic definitions of gaza provide us with sufficient criteria to determine who was a gazi and who was not. "Fervor for the Holy War" (and this would be an incomplete definition even for a canonical work, as we shall see in the next chapter) is a sufficient definition for them in describing the ethos of a social phenomenon that manifested itself in as wide a geographic expanse as from Khorasan to the Balkans and as long a temporal stretch as from the tenth to at least the sixteenth century. This attitude is no less ahistorical than defining the bourgeoisie as "town dwellers" and then trying to determine anyone's relation to
the bourgeoisie simply by studying his or her postal address. In short, as defined by the critics of the gaza thesis, gazis are not historical entities but straw men relentlessly fighting for their lofty, untarnished ideals. It is not surprising that such men are to be found not as a real factor in early Ottoman history but simply as an ideological creation of later Ottoman historiography. The characteristics of social groups can be inferred not from a lexicographic definition of their titles, however, but from an interpretation of the sources describing their activities, relations to other social groups, and cultural characteristics as manifested in particular historical contexts. It is to those sources that we shall next turn to see how gaza and related notions were conceptualized by those who called themselves gazi and their supporters. It is surprising that no one, among either those who accept or those who reject the role of the gaza ethos in the construction of the Ottoman Empire, has yet attempted to investigate the nature of that ethos as a historical phenomenon on the basis of a close analysis of the sources narrating the deeds of the gazis. That is precisely what I will attempt to do in the next chapter. Before doing that, however, we should point out another major problem with the critique of the gaza thesis as it has been raised, namely, a confusion between a "motive force" and a "sufficient cause." Clearly, these are two different kinds of explanatory principles. Otherwise, all gazi principalities would be expected to form world empires. "If the ghazi spirit was so powerful among the Danishmendlis and Ottomans, why did this same zeal for the Holy War lead the Ottomans to success, while the Danishmendlis were somehow unable to defeat their enemies and even disappeared from power and influence in Anatolia after less than a century." Lindner asks: "if the ghazi spirit is to be the motive force that we have taken it to be, how could it lead to such discordant results?"[72] The question would have been valid only if the gazi spirit, or any other suggested motive force(s), had been presented as a sufficient cause to establish a world empire. However, Ottomanist scholars in search of the forces which propelled a small principality into a superpower, including Wittek, have always been eager to consider the specific circumstances which made the balance tip Osman's way, such as the peculiar advantage of the geographic location of his initial power base.

A further comment needs to be made in relation to "causality" and cultural history. Cultural or intellectual history does not necessarily entail implicit causal assumptions. Through the delineation of an ethos or ideology in the sources relating to a certain milieu or class, one can identify the nature of that class, its interests, demands, and relations to other social groups. This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the actions of the members of that class were "fueled" by their "ideas"; one merely understands them better through an examination of their ideas. In this approach, cultural history is only an epistemological path and not a causal statement. The failure to appreciate properly the cultural traditions of the frontier society stems from a mechanistic attitude to cultural history, or from confusing an epistemological itinerary with an ontological one.
Obviously the gaza thesis was much more flexible than its critics made it out to be. It could be incorporated, as Inalcik did in his article mentioned above, into a matrix of factors that included material ones even if Wittek himself seemed reluctant to do so. After an outline of the migrations of Turcoman tribes to western Anatolia that created a "great demographic potential and a heightened Holy War ideology," Inalcik writes that a thrust by this explosive frontier society... was accomplished in the following stages: 1) it began with the seasonal movements of the Turcoman nomadic groups into the Byzantine coastal plains; 2) it was intensified by the organization of small raiding groups under ghazi leaders, mostly of tribal origin, for booty raids or for employment as mercenaries; 3) it continued with the emergence of successful leaders capable of bringing together under their clientship local chiefs to conquer and then establish beyliks (principalities)...; 4) with the involvement of these ghazi-beyliks, with their definite political and economic aims, in the regional struggle for supremacy in the Aegean and in the Balkans. He still refers to gazi bands but calls them "ghazi-mercenary bands," for whom, due to "the generally rising prices of slaves... enslavement of the neighborhood 'infidels' became a most profitable business as well as a 'pious' act."[73] This was an account that tried to maintain a balance, or rather to argue for an interdependency, between the material and ideo-

— 59 —

logical factors whereby the "Holy War ideology, as much as the success of the actual raids, reinforced ties within the [gazi-mercenary] band to produce a cohesive social group centered around the leader."[74] On that basis, we can proceed to our tour of the medieval Anatolian sources that have a direct bearing on the ethos of the frontier warriors and the early Ottomans.

— 60 —

Chapter 2

The Sources

There is not one incontrovertibly authentic written document from Osman's days as a beg.[1] And that is only appropriate for a chief who, when asked by a dervish for a document to confirm the granting of a village as freehold, is reported to have replied: "You ask me for a piece of paper as if I [knew how to ] write. Here, I have a sword left from my forefathers. Let me give that to you. And I will also give you a cup. Let them both remain in your hands. And let them [who come after you] preserve these tokens. And if God Almighty endorses my bid for this service [of rulership], let my descendants observe that token and certify it." Relating this legend in the late fifteenth century, the chronicler Apz, himself a dervish, hastens to add that the sword is still in the hands of the holy man's offspring and that it is visited by every new ruler. We have, unfortunately, no extant sword that qualifies or any reliable records of its
existence.[2] The only pieces of writing that survive from the days of Osman are not on paper but on coins.[3] There is not much that one can infer from their terse formulae about the ideology of the early Ottomans. As insignificant as his polity may have been, Osman had obviously found the moment opportune to make the significant political statement of sovereignty that is implied in the striking of coins in one's own name. These findings should also put to rest the disbelief in Ertogrul as a real historical character since he is, at least on one of the coins, referred to as Osman's father. Otherwise, but for the fact that they were issued by a Muslim ruler, they do not reveal much about the political culture of the little beglik.

Yet we certainly do not need to wait until the time- and scholarship-worn inscription of 1337 for some glimpses into the self-image of the early Ottomans. A revealing piece of evidence on early Ottoman political culture is an endowment deed from 1324.[4] Two aspects of this document indicate that already by this early date, the budding beglik had been touched by the so-called higher Islamic, or Persianate, ruling traditions. The deed is composed in Persian, and the first appointee as the administrator of the endowment is identified as a manumitted eunuch of Orhan's. Yet the true value of the document in this consideration of the history of notions concerning "war for the faith" lies in the fact that Orhan, in whose name the deed is issued, and his recently deceased father, Osman, are both mentioned with their epithets: Suca`uddin and Fehruddin, respectively ("Champion of the Faith" and "Glory of the Faith"). These epithets prove well beyond doubt that the Ottomans had adopted Islamic nomenclature compatible with the rest of Anatolian Muslim society more than a decade before the Bursa inscription. It is also impossible that Orhan would not be aware of the meaning of Suca`uddin when his entourage included people who could produce a canonically impeccable endowment deed in Persian.

In this world of dizzying physical mobility — crisscrossed by overlapping networks of nomads and seminomads, raiders, volunteers on the way to join military adventurers, slaves of various backgrounds, wandering dervishes, monks and churchmen trying to keep in touch with their flock, displaced peasants and townspeople seeking refuge, disquieted souls seeking cure and consolation at sacred sites, Muslim schoolmen seeking patronage, and the inevitable risk-driven merchants of late medieval Eurasia — it is not at all surprising that information traveled. So did lore and ideas, fashions and codes, of course. The title that Orhan had adopted, "the champion of the faith," was a highly popular one in western Anatolia among other begs of his generation; the Ottomans obviously were up-to-date on the frontier vogue.[5] It is simply impossible to consider that they would have been unaware of or untouched by cultural elements that the whole region was heavily immersed in. In fact, communication between the proto-Ottomans and their not-so-immediate neighbors can be established in the very earliest datable record of Osman's activities. Pachymeres (d. ca. 1310), the Byzantine chronicler, writes that Osman was joined by warriors from the Meander region, in addition to some from relatively nearby Paphlagonia, in
his first confrontation with Byzantine imperial forces in 1301 (or 1302).[6]

— 62 —

Gaza and Gazis in the Frontier Narratives of Medieval Anatolia
The cultural life of the frontiers was dearly dominated by oral traditions, especially "historical" narratives that represented the frontier society's perceptions of its own ideals and achievements. Some written works were produced in the mini-courts of the principalities during the fourteenth century; these were not historical in nature but mostly translations or compilations in the Islamic religious sciences. Some begs undoubtedly commissioned such works in order to be comme il faut or to acquire prestige through courtly patronage. Building up their sphere of authority, some of the begs probably felt a practical need for having access to authoritative formulations of the tenets of Islam. There must also have been a pious concern with being correct or better informed about the faith one claimed to champion. As for non-religious learning, interest was displayed in the practical sciences of medicine and astronomy and in Persian literary classics. Many works in these categories were copied or recast in Turkish in the fourteenth century.[7]

From the evidence of extant sources, it seems that the people of the frontiers did not write their histories, with some exceptions to be discussed below, until the fifteenth century. They rather told what purported to be historical narratives woven around legendary warriors and dervishes. Two interrelated, sometimes even indistinguishable, types of narrative played a prominent role in formulating the historical consciousness of the people of the frontiers: warrior epics and hagiographies. If we are to understand the ideals and the motives of uc society, to grasp how they read meaning into their actions, how they conceptualized "war for the faith" and related notions, these are dearly the sources we must turn to. The following brief discussion of the sources, neither an encyclopedic survey nor an exhaustive analysis of a particular group, is meant only to highlight some of the relevant points in that regard.

Before turning to the narratives that claimed to portray the lives and deeds of frontier warriors of post-Mantzikert Anatolia, however, it must be noted that they were produced and told within milieux that were conscious of earlier layers of frontier traditions. The gests of various Arab warriors, deriving from early Islamic history or the ebb and flow of the Arabo-Byzantine frontiers, continued to be enjoyed by Muslim Anatolians even after the Turkish speakers gained predominance. These were not national epics but epics of a struggle between two religio-

civilizational orientations, the Muslim side of which was dominated once by Arabic speakers and later by Turkish speakers. That earlier layer included the military exploits of Muhammad , the Prophet, as embodied in works of magazi and tales of Hamza and ‘Ali , the uncle and the son-in-law of the Prophet, respectively. Various other tales of Arab and Persian lore also enjoyed
popularity, such as the `Antarname (the exploits of a Bedouin hero) and Ebamuslimname (the life of Abu Muslim, who as a historical character played a central role in the transfer of power from the Umayyads to the Abbasids).[8] It is impossible to determine when Turkish renderings of such epics started to circulate, but over time translations appeared in writing. Thematic and narratological continuities indicate that some of the later epics simply reworked parts of the earlier ones for new contexts and audiences.

In fact, a keen consciousness of a continuum in the frontier traditions is evidenced by later works that explicitly refer to earlier ones. The Danismendname , for instance, which is set in immediate post-Mantzikert Anatolia and recorded first in the mid-thirteenth century, starts out by telling us of the abandonment of gaza activity since the glory days of Seyyid Battal Gazi, a legendary Arab warrior, as recorded in legends about him, before it moves on to the story of the rekindling of the gaza spirit by Danismend Gazi. The story of Seyyid Battal Gazi itself includes characters from the vita of Abu Muslim, such as the latter's comrade and brother-in-law Mizrab , who also turns out to be Danismend's grandfather, thus appearing in all three narratives.[9] The Saltukname , which consists of lore compiled in the 1470s concerning the figure of a dervish-warrior, Sari Saltuk , who seems to have lived in the thirteenth century, begins likewise with references to the earlier layers of the gaza traditions, in this case to both Seyyid Battal Gazi and Danismend Gazi.[10] The consciousness of the legacy of earlier gazis and the urge to situate later gazis within the framework of that legacy find a more poetic formulation in the image of `Askar , the horse of Hamza , the uncle of the Prophet and the protagonist of a cycle of extremely popular narratives called Hamzaname . This holy horse, who enjoys a miraculously long life, serves, after Hamza , both Seyyid Battal Gazi and Sari Saltuk . Around the beginning of the Sari Saltuk narrative, he sees "his ancestor" Seyyid Battal in a dream and is instructed as follows: "My dear [literally, "the comer of my liver"]! Go on and make your some [huruc ] .... Go to the bla-bla cave; there you will find `Askar , the horse I used to ride. And also take the war equipment... all the arms of Lord Hamza are there."[11] Later layers of gaza lore were aware not only of different stages in the long history of the "struggle for the faith" but also of its different geographical settings. Whereas Seyyid Battal Gazi had been based in Malatya in eastern Anatolia, the scene of gaza had moved westward and northward under Melik Danismend , and even farther west and into the Balkans with Sari Saltuk . And because what constituted the frontier was changing, the conditions of frontier warfare, life, and cultural activity at the time of the Arab conquerors must have been different from those of the Danismendids , which must have been different from those of the late-thirteenth-century frontier in western Anatolia. As frontier areas and powers changed, so did frontier culture. The earlier narratives that survived must have been constantly remolded, through oral retelling and transmission, before they came to be recast in writing. The transmission of these narratives over time, place, milieux, and media
presents many problems that have not yet been dealt with. The currently rather
sharp boundaries that exist in Turkish studies between historical and
literary-historical scholarship must be crossed in order to deal with some
important questions that arise from the existence of this intricately
interrelated body of narratives. No serious consideration, for instance, has yet
been given to the scholarship on the interface between orality and literacy as
developed by anthropologists and European medievalists. There are also more
straightforward tasks, such as delineating the paths and mechanisms of
transmission or analyzing and comparing different aspects of these narratives in
terms of motifs, strategies, concepts, cosmology, geographic consciousness,
degrees of "realism," casts of mythical beings (e.g., the witchlike cazu ), or
topographies of legendary sites.
Even if the abovementioned legendary-historical and pseudohistorical narratives
make up a reasonable body to be studied on its own, they were shaped within a
cultural environment that produced various other kinds of works and recognized
various other modes of expression. Ultimately, works dealing with the vitae of
frontier warriors and dervishes need to be evaluated within the context of that
larger cultural universe. It would be very important to know, for instance, when
written works of `aka'id (articles of faith) arrived in frontier areas, or to
examine the differences between the earlier and the later works of that kind.
What appears to be the earliest such work from the neighborhood of the early
Ottomans has a fascinating section on gaza, for instance.[12] In the emerging
little "courts" of the emirs, literary and scholarly works were produced in the
mode of courtly traditions. These works, their authors or translators, remind us
that we must also consider the nature of the con-

— 65 —

continued relationship between the frontier areas and the political centers, since
a sharp, dean break can never be expected to have separated the two realms.
It would take us too far afield to deal with these problems here. Being aware of
them, however, does not imply that we should consider the legendary vitae of
warriors and dervishes irrelevant for an understanding of the cultural life of
western Anatolia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, an area that did
not produce a large body of historical texts of its own. The gaza ethos,
whatever lore it relied on, had permeated that part of the peninsula by the time
of Osman's chieftaincy. Besides, the point in what follows is not to argue that
Osman and his entourage built a state because they thought in a particular way
but rather to demonstrate that certain attitudes that are seen to be
contradictory to the gaza spirit by some modern scholars are very much a part of
that spirit according to works produced to uphold the notion of gaza and to
glorify the legacies of its various champions in Anatolian history.
It can be safely assumed that the people of the western Anatolian marches were
exposed to at least some of the oral lore of earlier frontier struggles as
embodied in the legends concerning Abu Muslim, Seyyid Battal Gazi, and Melik
Danismend . The center of the cult of Battal Gazi, for instance, was his shrine
"discovered" in the twelfth century near Eskisehir , not far from and connected
to a main route to Sögüt, Osman's base of power around the end of the next
century. We must also note, however, that we do not have access to that lore except in later written versions. This is also the case with the lore concerning post-Arab and post-Seljuk frontier heroes such as Sari Saltuk and Umur Beg, as con-mined in the Saltukname and the Dusturname. In each instance of recording, the particular circumstances of the moment must have determined, to some extent, the shape in which we now read those narratives. It seems that as long as the frontiers were "in operation" as true frontiers, no one cared to put their "history" into writing. Whenever the central states believed they had reined in the centrifugal energies of the marches, however (or when the frontiers were "closed," to put it in terms of the American experience), they were keen to patronize the recording of frontier lore, both appropriating and taming once-rival traditions.

The overarching theme in all these narratives is the services rendered by particular protagonists and their entourages in expanding the abode of Islam and/or gaining converts. Even in these idealizing depictions, however, the arsenal of the gazis goes well beyond weapons and exclusionistic zeal. The work of a gazi is not as simple as confronting the infidels with a choice between "Islam or the sword." Even though these works were produced to portray the achievements of gazis to audiences who had to be interested in correctness, that correctness obviously did not imply erasing all traces of latitudinarianism and of cooperation with the infidels.

The Danismendname, for instance, was first written down for `Izzeddin (Keyka'us II, d. 1279) of the Seljuks of Rum, at a time of reconciliation between that branch of the ruling house and the subdued march warriors, who had once, especially when the Danismend family was at its prime, represented a serious challenge to Seljuk supremacy.[13] In the first half of the thirteenth century, however, the Seljuks of Rum were consolidating their rule. A crucial part of that policy seems to have been pursuing centralization while gaining control over, but also support among, those elements that represented the frontier energies. While the policy failed in the long run, individual Seljuk figures, whether through personal qualities or prevailing circumstances, came indeed to be revered by Türkmen tribes and dervishes and to find a respectable place in the historical consciousness of the people of the frontiers. The two most noteworthy examples of such figures are `Ala'eddin Keykubad (r. 1220-37) and his grandson `Izzeddin; and it does not seem coincidental that the former patronized the cult of Seyyid Battal Gazi (as well as the cults of a number of dervishes) and the latter was the one for whom the Danismendname was cast in writing.[14]

Despite its self-conscious religio-political correctness, however, the work is not free of elements that might be considered suspect from the point of view of orthodoxy, at least if it were to be rigidly conceived. Melik Danismend, for instance, the relentless warrior of the good cause, is not above bending rules as he forgives apostates who had not only reneged on their former affirmation of Islam but had even started raiding Muslims.[15] Even in this highly stylized and idealized depiction of gaza, then, the good name of a gazi is not diminished for
engaging in Realpolitik. As depicted in a later episode, the drawbacks of rigidity could be all too apparent to the Muslim warriors through its consequences. According to this account, the people of the town of Sisiya converted to Islam, but they converted "out of the fear of the sword." The governor whom Danismend left in charge of the town "was extremely devout, a solid [or, rigid] religious scholar, and made the people of Sisiya pray all five times

---

every day whether it was necessary or not. If one of them were not to come to the mosque [to pray with the congregation at the regular hours], he would be reprimanded. The hypocrites remained helpless."[16] When the town was besieged by the infidels, however, the governor paid dearly for this attitude. He gathered an army of the townsmen ten thousand strong, but "there were only about two thousand Muslims, while the other eight thousand were hypocrites." The latter switched sides during the confrontation, and all the Muslims, including the governor, were killed. On the one hand, this is a story of treachery that prepares the ground for the unfolding of the gazis' inevitable revenge; it could be read as a lesson on the dangers of putting too much trust in converts. On the other hand, it can also serve as a lesson on the hazards of too much orthodoxy. The narrator seems to have wanted his audience not to miss that reading by inserting the phrase underlined above: praying five times a day is of course incumbent upon all adult Muslims according to Sunni orthodoxy.

The most important element of Melik Danismend's vita for our concerns here must be the hope of inclusion it offers to the Christians of Anatolia upon conversion to Islam. The same motif is central to the Battalname, where the best friend, the warrior companion, of Seyyid Battal Gaza happens to be his former foe on the Byzantine side.[17] And if the Battalname provides a matrix for the joint ventures of an Arab and a Greek warrior, the Danismendname goes further in that its warrior heroes come from different sides not only of religious and ethnic but also of gender boundaries. Melik Danismend is joined in the beginning of the narrative by Artuhi (an Armenian?) and Artuhi's beloved Efroimiya (a Greek?), who recognize the military as well as religious and moral superiority of Melik Danismend and convert. The two are so quickly absorbed into the whirlwind of gaza that they do not even find time to change their names as they fight alongside the melik for the rest of his exploits. One of the most celebrated gaza narratives thus presents its audience with an eloquent surprise, namely, the seemingly incongruous image of a woman named Efroimiya, even after she has become Muslim, leading raids on horseback or engaging in chivalric one-to-one combat in the name of Islam. In one of their first joint ventures, for instance, all three heroes take their ablutions, pray, and dine together, and Efroimiya stands guard while the other two sleep. This does not prevent her, however, from being the first to ride into the field the next day and challenge the enemy, led by her own father, to send somebody for combat. That infidel "made three attacks but could not succeed. It was Efroimiya's
turn. Grabbing her lance, she attacked the infidel; he collapsed, then stood up again in order to attack Efromiya, but she struck such a blow with the sword that his head dropped on the ground." Thereupon, twenty infidels attack her at once, but "Efromiya severed the heads of all twenty."[18] In all this and similar activities for the rest of the book, there is no mention of her covering herself or staying away from the company of males who are not of her immediate family, which would include Melik Danismend and even, for a while, Artuhi, since they are married scandalously late in the narrative.

In the highly idealized world of the Danismend name cooperation and inclusion are predicated on conversion. Some other gaza epics, however, display a readiness to be more flexible. Stuck in the middle of the cycle of narratives that make up the Book of Dede Korkut is a story that is set in the northeastern Anatolian marches, around the Byzantine kingdom of Trebizond.[19] The narrative starts out with Kan Turali, "a dare-devil young man," looking for a bride who "before I reach the bloody infidels' land must already have got there and brought me back some heads." (The quest for power often goes hand in hand with desire as represented in the quest for the beloved in these narratives.) After this tough talk, however, he falls for the daughter of the tekvur (Byzantine lord or ruler) of Trebizond and works diligently to defeat three mighty beasts to win her hand. When he duly destroys those monsters, the tekvur says: "By God, the moment my eye saw this young man my soul loved him." Yet he goes back on his word and with six hundred of his men attacks the two lovers feasting in the "borderland." The young couple fight off the enemy but then turn against each other since Kan Turali has difficulty accepting the fact that his life is saved by a woman. The hot-headed young man soon gives up, however, when she shoots an arrow that sends "the lice in his hair scuttling down to his feet." All Kan Turali can do now is to claim, somewhat disingenuously, that he was "testing" her. Then they embrace, give "each other their sweet mouths and kiss," and finally gallop to their wedding banquet, which is enlivened by Dede Korkut's music and stories recounting "the adventures of the gallant fighters of the Faith."

If there is any real hero in this story, it is not Kan Turali, whose hotheaded male warrior ethos is noticeably mocked, but Princess Saljan, and nowhere is it stated explicitly that she converted to Islam. As for her love of the gallant gazi, it has, at least in the beginning, nothing to do with who he is or what he represents; we read (and the audiences of the numerous oral renderings must have heard) that when she saw him, "she went weak at the knees, her cat miaowed, she slavered like a sick calf ..."

[and] said, 'If only God Most High would put mercy into my father's heart, if only he would fix a bride-price and give me to this man!'"

Behind the cheerleading for gaza, the story of Kan Turali contains an object lesson on the complex realities of relations with the infidels in a frontier environment and provides some entertainment at the expense of zealous warriors. This may have been particularly timely in the midfourteenth century when the son
of an Akkoyunlu chief named Turali married the daughter of Emperor Alexios III Comenos of Trebizond. The two powers had been locked in a struggle that the Akkoyunlu saw in a religious coloring, but this did not render such a union impossible, and it led to reciprocal visits to the respective realms and further intermarriages. It would be too simplistic, and unfair to the subtlety of Dede Korkut or whoever the storyteller might be, to see this narrative as merely a distorted rendering of "real" events surrounding this or another particular marriage. But an ancient epic seems to have been customized to address late medieval Anatolian realities, to assign them meaning within a flexible understanding of the gaza ideology. If gaza were to be understood as zealously as it was by Kan Turali at the beginning of the story, the narrator seems to suggest, one is bound to go through many surprises; but as the warrior attunes himself to the realities, he still ends up a winner, and so does his side.

The Dusturname, completed in 1465, takes us much closer to the Ottomans in both time and geography. Embedded in a largely unoriginal history of Islamic states, its core is an original epic that relates, with much more historical specificity than the works so far mentioned, the exploits of Aydinoglu Umur Beg (d. 1348). The House of Aydin went through various phases of cooperation and competition with that of Osman until Umur Begs descendants were subdued and their lands annexed in 1425. The Ottomans of the next generation could be generous in recognizing his achievements and might even benefit from patronizing Umur Beg's cult, which continued strong among the sailors of the Aegean for many centuries. Much harassed by European navies until both channels of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were secured, the Ottoman state was busily engaged in building a navy under Mehmed the Conqueror.

The Dusturname was commissioned by Mahmud Pasa (d. 1474), Mehmed's longest-serving grand vezir, and it must have undergone some changes, perhaps making it more conformable to political and/or religions orthodoxy, in the hands of its compiler/editor, Enveri. Yet Enveri's own source for the epic, possibly an oral rendering of the story of Umur Begs deeds originally told by one of his fellow-mariner gazis, is full of surprises. The internecine struggle between two gazi leaders, Umur and Sasa, is recorded without inhibition: Sasa Beg is on one page praised as a gazi who led pioneering raids into the Aegean region but is blamed on the next for having cooperated with the Christians against Umur Beg.

If this example were to be dismissed because ultimately it condemns Sasa Begs cooperation with the Christians (but the title of gazi is not taken away from him), we can note the further incident in the Dusturname of the favors shown to Umur Beg by the baroness of Bodonitsa. In fact, such help (and love?) offered by Byzantine women who are incited in their dreams to fall for warriors of Islam seems to have been a fantasy of the gazis, and such narratives may well have served to attract adventuresome young men into the armies or to keep them there. A similar legend is related in an Ottoman chronicle about Gazi Rahman, one of Osman's fellow warriors, and a Byzantine woman who allegedly helped the Ottomans take possession of the Aydos fortress.

Even more striking is the nature of the relationship between the "usurper"
emperor Kantakouzenos (1341-55) and Aydinoglu Umur Beg as it is reported again in the Dusturnu. After a meeting where the emperor asks the gazi not to destroy his empire and the latter tells the Byzantine ruler not to be sad, our source reports: "They talked, wished each other well, and became brothers."[26] So serious is Umur Beg about this brotherhood that he turns down Kantakouzenos's offer of his daughter's hand as if marrying her would constitute incest: "The tekvur is my brother, his daughter my daughter; our religion does not permit this sort of thing."[27] He does not budge even later when the beautiful princess practically throws herself at his feet and says: "take me, and let me be your slave."[28] He hides his face in his hands to conceal his sorrow, but a gazi must observe a code of conduct; he cannot do certain things once a brotherly relationship is established even if that brother is the ruler of the infidels.

My intention here is not to provide more evidence of cooperation between Anatolian Muslim warriors and Byzantines, the prevalence of which is beyond doubt. The point is rather to show that the literature produced by or among the gazis to glorify their deeds did not find it contradictory to present their gazi protagonists in cooperation with Christians. If such was the gazi mentality, why should we define it to have been otherwise?

We should not, on the other hand, assume that because the gazis were able to embrace the infidels, they would proudly have all such embraces announced and recorded. Their lack of inhibition regarding cooperation with the infidels was certainly not boundless and should not be romanticized. There were times when the gazis would sooner forget any alliances they may have made with their Christian neighbors. Orhan's wedding to the daughter of a local Bithynian ruler, traditionally dated to ca. 1299, is merrily reported in Ottoman chronicles, but there is total silence concerning his marriage with the daughter of Kantakouzenos (the princess Umur Beg had turned down). Orhan's marriage was part of a relatively protracted period of cooperation between the Ottomans and the Kantakouzenos faction in the Byzantine Empire that turned out to be a turning point in Ottoman expansion toward southeastern Europe; and that whole period represents a lacuna in Ottoman histories, which prefer to present a very different scenario of the early military achievements in Thrace, as we shall see below. The Dusturnu, on the other hand, chronicling the story of a long defunct polity, is not inhibited in dealing with the pact between Kantakouzenos and the House of Aydin.[29]

It is not always easy to distinguish between these warrior epics and hagiographies of holy men, just as it is at times difficult to differentiate a warrior from a dervish or vice versa. These difficulties are particularly manifest in the vita of Sari Saltuk, who seems to have crossed the line between the two vocations with particular ease. The Saltukname was compiled by Ebu'l-hayr-i Rumi, who traveled extensively to collect oral traditions concerning Sari Saltuk, a legendary figure of the thirteenth century, on behalf of Prince Cem (d. 1495). Completed ca. 1480, the book doubtlessly contains a good deal of earlier material. This work is even
more "pagan" than the other epics so far mentioned in terms of the presence of various elements of pre-Islamic lore; there is even a brief episode with a flying prayer-rug. Even more importantly, there are numerous instances where Saltuk gains converts among Byzantines by a display of empathy toward their Christian culture. He participates in numerous battles slaying infidels, but he can also stand by the altar in the Church of Hagia Sophia, when Constantinople is still Byzantine of course, and recite the Bible with such emotion that the Orthodox congregation dissolves into tears.

These holy figures are in fact trained for such cross-cultural exercises. Both Melik Danismend and Saltuk, according to their hagiographers, were taught in their youth the "four books and seventy-two languages."
[30] And what is the main purpose of Saltuk's activities? To gain converts, to expand the hold of Islam over ever-more hearts and lands. Like the Europeans in the New World who "insinuated[d] themselves into the

— 72 —

preexisting political, religious, even psychic, structures of the natives... to turn those structures to their advantage", the Muslim conquerors [of not just Asia Minor] were well aware that if one wanted to achieve victory over a rival or alternative system of meanings and values, one needed to enter into that system, turn it into "a manipulable fiction," and thus subvert and appropriate it.[31] Empathy, conciliation, and improvisation can be seen in some measure as a proselytizer's tools of trade. We should be cautious, however, about reducing the ideological rivalry and exchange to semiotic gamesmanship in the service of power. Positivist cynicism may prevent us from seeing that exchange with and absorption of other truths may have been the main concern of many actors involved who might still believe in the superiority of their own side and wish to achieve its supremacy, though not necessarily in an exclusivistic sense. Obviously, then, the people of the marches did not see a contradiction between striving to expand their faith and engaging in conciliatory (not necessarily insincere) gestures toward members of the other faith. One insight gained from the hagiographies of dervishes like Sari Saltuk is that an atmosphere of "tolerance" and symbiosis (of some departure from orthodoxy), or "improvisation" in Greenblatt's vocabulary, does not preclude a desire to gain converts.[32] In fact, is it not more intelligent to be conciliatory, whenever possible, in gaining the hearts and minds of others? Why deny this insight to the people of the marches, who had been faced for centuries with the dilemma of "the other faith"? Very probably, they were acutely aware of the wonders syncretism could work, and that is precisely the insight reflected in these hagiographies, which, like the warrior epics, operate on the basis of a dualism of us against them while recognizing that the boundaries of those two spheres are constantly being redrawn. For the self-confident proselytizer, after all, the world is not divided into "us" and "them" but into "us" and "those who are not yet us" or "those who may someday be among us."

Why should we suppose that the gazis or dervishes would wish to repel the Byzantine peasants when they could appeal to them? At any rate, the Saltukname provides ample proof that a call for conversion coexisted with latitudinarian
attitudes or gestures. Not that such syncretism was mischievously planned by a secret organization of gazis and dervishes who held a conference and decided that this would be the better "tactic." No one ever theorized it, either. It appears to have been a shared insight deriving from the cumulative experiences gained through the fusion of Islamic elements with pre-Islamic beliefs of the Turks on the one hand and Anatolian Christianity on the other.

---

In fact, to expect the call for conversion from representatives of "untarnished Islam" rather than from other elements would be to misread Islamic history on the basis of an ahistorical assumption. It was rarely if ever the ulema and the courtiers in Baghdad or Konya who set themselves the task of actively gaining converts. It was rather the largely unorthodox dervishes of the marches in southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe who did so. A comparison between the hagiographies stemming from different Anatolian orders reveals that the antinomian orders are almost the only ones whose self-portrayal in their own hagiographies reflects a proselytizing mentality, whereas the literature of the orthodox orders does not seem as concerned with conversions.[33] We should recognize here that it is in fact extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish orthodoxy and heterodoxy in those regions or among those segments of the population that were not dominated by such structures of authority as could define and enforce a "correct" set of beliefs and practices in the mode of learned Islam. For one thing, central states themselves are concerned with orthodoxy or engaged in correcting others in varying degrees. Recognition of limits to authority in a particular administrative structure, pragmatism, and custom and tradition, which can be as imposing as orthodoxy, are some of the major determinants of state behavior in this regard. Looking at the heightened concern of governments with imposing orthodoxy from the turn of the sixteenth century, one can appreciate how little need the Turco-Muslim polities of western Asia felt to be rigorously correct until the rise of the (Sunni) Ottoman-(Shi'ī) Safavid rivalry. There was even less room for learned definitions and scholarly rigor among those circles that were physically and/or socioculturally on the margins of institutionalized Islam, though they may have been more sincere in their faith and more aggressive in its promotion. The best illustration of these blurred boundaries comes from a hagiography produced in a milieu that is of particular relevance for the early Ottomans Menakibii'l-kudsiye, written in 1358/59 by Elvan Çelebi, relates episodes in the life of Baba Ilyas, the leader of a Türkmen tribal movement against Seljuk authority that was suppressed after a series of bloody confrontations in 1240-41, and of some of his descendants and disciples.[34] Like the Dusturname, it is relatively less legendary; that is, it is somewhat more precise with respect to the historicity of its protagonists as well as the sites and dates of the events that mark their activities compared to the epic cycle of the Battalname, Danismendname, and Saltukname narratives. The author himself is a great-grandson of Baba

67
Ilyas, who was of the Vefa’i order but whose followers came to be better known as Baba'is.

The relations of Osman's political community with its neighbors in both the immediate environment of Bithynia and the broader context of western Anatolian frontiers will be dealt with in the next chapter, but we must note here that the few dervishes whose presence can be ascertained in early-fourteenth-century Bithynia and who had some connection to Osman and Orhan were of these Vefa’i-Baba’i circles. One of the key characters of Osman's early alliance, Ede Bali, is in fact mentioned by name as a disciple of Baba Ilyas or of one of his descendants.

Elvan Çelebi presents the Baba'is as extremely successful proselytizers. Not only did they guide their flock among Türkmen tribes, but they also were able to gain hearts and minds among pagan Mongols as well as Christian and Jewish Anatolians. When writing of the passing away of his father, `Asik Pasa, Elvan Çelebi cannot find a better image than "Armenians, Jews, and Christians" crying and asking, "where is our sheikh?"[35] Were all these mourners converts?[36] Maybe. Perhaps Elvan Çelebi does not make it explicit in order to emphasize their backgrounds. But possibly he washes to indicate that `Asik Pasa's influence had spread over all non-Muslims. This was certainly not impossible. Haci Bektas, a disciple of Baba Ilyas, was revered as Saint Charalambos by some Christians; and Elvan Çelebi himself was to be identified by a sixteenth-century German traveler, presumably on the basis of reports he heard from local Christians around Çelebi's shrine, as a friend of Saint George.[37]

Strikingly, such saint-sharing by Muslims and Christians was not limited to dervishly figures but could even include holy warriors, namely, gazis. The Greek inhabitants of Gianitsa (Ottoman: Yenice Vardar) down to this century displayed reverence for "Gazi Baba," that is, Evrenos Gazi, who conquered the area from his base in that township, where his mausoleum is situated.[38] And when `Abdulhamid II's (r. 1876-1909) agents went to Sögüt in the late nineteenth century in the process of reviving the legacy of the "founding fathers" who hailed from that sleepy little town, they were surprised that some of the local Christians venerated Ertogrul's tomb.[39]

To go back to the Baba'is and the Menakibu'l-kudsiye, it is dear that at least some of the Baba’i figures were engaged in proselytization that was both militant and open to syncretism — a combination with proven appeal to Türkmen nomads. But what kind of an Islam were they spreading? Now, Baba Ilyas is best known for his political role as the leader of a Türkmen tribal revolt. Perhaps struck by the indubitable and militant Shi’ism of Türkmen tribes in Safavid-contested Anatolia of the sixteenth century and of one giant post-Baba’i order that crystallized around the legacy of Haci Bektas, a disciple of Baba Ilyas, many scholars have attributed extremist Shi'i views also to Baba'is and all sorts of other dervishes and their followers among the tribesfolk in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. From the point of view of
Ottoman central authorities in the sixteenth century, Safavid-inspired Shi'ism converged with Türkmen tribes and the Bektasi order, but teleologically inclined modern scholarship has written its religious history backward from this. Various elements of the earlier tribal beliefs have been identified as heterodox — be they the so-called survivals of shamanism, the alleged influences of batini esotericism, or 'Alid sympathies — and that heterodoxy then seen to be packaged within an extremist Shi'ism.[40] Köprülü wrote, for instance, that "the Islam of these Türkmen... was a syncrétisme resulting from the mixture of the old pagan traditions of the early Turks, a simple and popular form of extremist Shi'ism — with a veneer of Sufism — and certain local customs."[41] The most recent student of the movement is ready to cast doubt on the Shi'ism of the Baba'is but reiterates the views on batini influences, extremism, and heterodoxy.[42] A revisionist view has attempted to turn this all around and has argued that the Baba'is, as well as various other figures of Anatolian history who were portrayed as Shi'is by Köprülü and Gölpinarli, were "actually" orthodox and Sunni.[43]

Elvan Çelebi's family hagiography provides evidence in both directions. There are, on the one hand, motifs that fall beyond the purview of Sunni orthodoxy and are part of the later 'Alevi/Shi'i worldview. On the other hand, one of Baba Ilyas's sons is named 'Ömer and a disciple 'Osman, names that a Shi'i cannot be expected to honor.[44] The alleged adoption of Shi'ism by one of the western Anatolian principalities is also suspect. There is indeed a treaty signed "in the name of Muhammad, 'Ali, Zeynel'abidin, Hasan, and Huseyin" by Aydinoglu Hizir Beg in 1349. But the House of Aydin could hardly have been Shi'i with one of its princes named 'Osman (Hizir Beg's uncle) and with strong links to the Mevlevi order.[45] Perhaps Hizir Beg represented a particular case within the family like Oljaitu of the Ilkhanids, but even then more evidence is needed than a list of names that are perhaps more significant in the Shi'i tradition but are certainly also revered by Sunnis.

Turkish nationalist-secularist ideology and Orientalist images of the warlike but tolerant Inner Asian nomad have led to the depiction of nonsectarianism as a national trait among Turks in the Muslim orbit. But

— 76 —

Sultan Selim and Shah Isma'îl should be sufficient proof that Turks are as capable of sectarianism as anyone else. The latter's Türkmen followers may look wildly antinomian from an orthodox Sunni point of view, but they demonstrate that nomadic tribesfolk are not above turning to violence for their own "correct" path. To the extent that nonsectarianism applies to earlier Turco-Muslim polities, it ought to be seen as a product of historical circumstances that made such sectarianism meaningless or pragmatically undesirable until the sixteenth century. The religious picture of Anatolia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries appears much more complex than the neat categorizations of a simple Sunni/Shi'i dichotomy would allow. In this context, even if one were able to identify some particular item of faith as heterodox, this would not necessarily imply "Shi'i" as it is usually assumed; questions of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, even if they
are meaningful, should not be formulated along the lines of a Sunni/Shi'i sectarianism. On the other hand, it seems equally misleading to see "heterodoxy" in any act or sign of belief which runs counter to the established norms of a learned orthodoxy. No such orthodoxy was yet established from the point of view of our protagonists, at least not with any dear-cut boundaries for them to stay within or to step outside. Maybe the religious history of Anatolian and Balkan Muslims living in the frontier areas of the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries should be conceptualized in part in terms of a "metadoxy," a state of being beyond doxies, a combination of being doxy-naive and not being doxy-minded, as well as the absence of a state that was interested in rigorously defining and strictly enforcing an orthodoxy. None of the frontier powers seem to have had that kind of an interest. It was much later that a debate emerged among Ottoman scholars and statesmen with respect to the correctness of some of the practices of their ancestors.

Wherever they stood with respect to the "right" kind of religiosity, warrior chieftains of the principalities neighboring Bithynia were not ridded with self-doubt as to what they stood for. A cursory glance at the epigraphic and titulary evidence left from these emirates reveals that they had heartily adopted the championship of the faith and related principles like gazi. Already settled in western Anatolia in the 1270s, a beg of the Germiyan family was called Husameddin, or "Sword of the Faith." Another member of the same family fell captive to the Mamluks in the Battle of Elbistan (eastern Anatolia) in 1277; he was called Sihabeddin (Flame of the Faith) Gazi.[46] Muzaffereddin Yavvak Arslan (Victor-of-the-Faith Fearsome Lion, d. 1291) of the Cobanoglu family in Kastamonu is addressed as nasirii'l-guzat (helper of the gazis) in a book completed in 1285-86 and dedicated to him.[47] One of the gazis he "helped" as the beg of the begs of the uc may well have been Osman Beg, who was based in the vicinity; in any case, a fellow warrior of Osman's in his first recorded battle was one of Yavvak Arslan's sons.[48] In Kütahya, the House of Germiyan's eventual seat of power where they played the role of suzerain over the other principalities for a while, an inscription from 1314 informs us that a medrese was built by an Umur Beg who bore the epithet Mubarizeddin, the "Combatant of the Faith."[49] The same epithet was donned by Aydinoglu Mehmed Beg, who had been sent to the Aegean region as a commander in the Germiyan forces. After falling out with Sasa Beg, a fellow warrior who was the actual conqueror of Birgi, Mehmed Beg took over that town, where he established his own dominion and built a mosque in 1312. The inscription of that mosque identifies him as a gazi in the path of God (el-gazi fi sebilillah).[50] When Mevlana Celaeddin Rumi's grandson, 'Arif Çelebi, traveled from Konya to the frontier regions to establish his spiritual authority between 1312 and 1319, he referred to the same beg as the lord of the gazis. To the north of Bithynia, a certain Gazi Çelebi ruled Sinop until his death in 1322, when his daughter replaced him.[51] These self-styled champions of the faith may have left a good deal to be desired in terms of conforming to the standards of some of the faithful: an enraged
'Arif Çelebi, the Mevlevi, released his extraordinary powers to blow away the tents in the camp of the Germiyanid beg, who busied himself with slaves while the Koran was being recited.[52] Ibn Battuta, the Moroccan traveler, was scandalized by the higher respect shown to a Jewish physician than to Muslim scholars in Aydinoglu's court in Birgi.[53] Still, the learned men evidently did not consider that the begs ought to be stripped of their rifles for such suspect behavior. After all, the rifle of gazi had appeared in far stranger places than next to the name of Aydinoglu Mehmed Beg or the 1337 inscription in allegedly preideological Ottoman Bursa. Melik Mugiseddin (Succorer of the Faith) Togrilsah (d. 1225), "son of the Seljuk Kilij Arslan II, who largely built the awesome walls of Bayburt in 1213 and... who had the misfortune of being prisoner and sort of vassal of first a Cilician Armenian king and then a Trapezuntine emperor, and whose son was baptised to marry a Georgian queen, evidently allowed (or even sponsored) the building of a surviving Orthodox church within his new citadel on whose walls he is still proclaimed a gazi."[54] None of these sources is directly related to the Ottomans. Neither the...
as they came out into the political arena with a bid for regional power, would be unaware of the language and code of the frontiers or that they would not couch their claims within those terms. Whether the early Ottomans belonged in that category or not, there dearly were warriors in Anatolia, as in many other regions of the medieval Islamic world, who claimed to be gazi[s fighting in the name of Islam. In the next chapter, we shall look at them more closely as a part of the historical reality of medieval Anatolia, as social types in a particular historical context. Here we must continue with our exploration of what gaza meant. What kind of a struggle did those warriors and their supporters imagine they were involved in?

With respect to gaza, the first thing to be noted is that it is not synonymous with jihad even though all the scholars mentioned in the previous chapter use the two terms interchangeably or use one English term, "holy war," for both as if there were no appreciable difference. But there dearly was such a difference in both the popular imagination and in canonical works.[55] Whether one takes the position of a learned Muslim or a narrator of frontier lore, who may not have had a rigorous training (and his audience, I presume), these terms are not to be collapsed into one. The word "jihad" is rarely used in the frontier narratives analyzed above or in the early Ottoman chronicles to be analyzed below; the sources dearly maintained a distinction. Recent studies have pointed out that jihad should not be understood as incessant warfare to expand the abode of Islam or a mentality that recognizes a permanent state of war.[56] The assumption of perpetual hostility between the abode of Islam and the abode of war (which could better be translated as the abode of infidelity) and thus of a duty upon all Muslims to undertake incessant warfare upon non-Muslim lands is not valid. Such a view would be nothing more than a crude caricature of both the learned/centralist circles' notion and that of the frontier milieux. Accommodation was not necessarily outside the pale of Islamic "international law." It cannot be said that the frontier (and its conception of gaza or jihad) was inherently more or less accommodationist than the central powers; conflict arose between the two on this matter because the needs of warfare and accommodation did not always coincide in the two loci of decision making. By and large, however, the central powers were accommodationist more for historical reasons than for a priori ethical-political principles differing from those of the frontier. Furthermore, jihad is defined by most canonical sources as a war undertaken when the world of Islam or the peace of the umma is threatened. There is thus a defensive quality to it, which became more pronounced during the nineteenth century when colonialist European encroachments were met with movements in the name not of gaza but of jihad. Still, the discussion about jihad as an offensive or defensive war overlooks the fact that, at least in terms of military logic, it is not always easy to distinguish between the two. What about a "preemptive strike"? Is it offensive or defensive? Or, how should one deal with the dictum that "the best defense is offense"? Can offense be seen as a defensive
strategy?[57] In a world where any self-respecting polity of some scale could make claims to "world rule," does it make sense to expect people to operate with the concepts of defense and aggression as defined in a world of nation-states in "eternal" homelands with "inviolable" boundaries? Therefore, in the context of medieval Anatolian frontiers, a discussion of jihad as an offensive or defensive undertaking would be to some extent academic.

Nevertheless, a difference between jihad and gaza was maintained whereby the latter term implied irregular raiding activity whose ultimate goal was (or at least the warriors and their supporters could imagine that it was) the expansion of the power of Islam. Gaza, after all, had the original sense only of a "predatory raid" or "excursion into foreign territory."[58] It is not at all certain when the word acquired an exclusively religious connotation or whether this semantic transformation was complete by the fourteenth century. Even then, gaza was a lesser category than jihad. Canonical works describe it as a lesser farz (religious duty); that is, contributing to it was not incumbent upon everyone in the Muslim community as was the case with jihad. The recently discovered codebook of fourteenth-century western Anatolia reveals that the same understanding prevailed in that environment.[59]

The much more striking point that emerges from that codebook, however, is that gaza, even when defined legalistically, did not preclude certain practices that some modern scholars prohibit to the warriors of the faith. While delineating the rules for the distribution of the pot deriving from gaza, this treatise with no inhibitions mentions the "share of the infidels" in case the latter have contributed to the acquisition of booty.

Naturally, the day-to-day business of the frontiers could not be expected to conform to most standards laid down in such codebooks even if the codes themselves were well known and had some pragmatism built into them. In fact, that must be the reason why works like this were produced; who would need codebooks if all the codes were internalized and applied? The actual behavior of the gaza-minded must be a combination of canonical codes that they were familiar with (not necessarily accurately, and primarily through oral transmission), emulation of examples known to them personally or through gazi lore, and various other considerations arising from the particular circumstances of the moment as well as shared norms of conduct such as honor and glory. These different elements may have contradicted one another at times, and a successful leader would probably be the one who would find

the most appropriate resolution to such conflicts without ending up in failure or giving rise to questions of illegitimacy vis-à-vis his authority.

It is difficult to imagine any ideological complex without potentially and, at times, actually conflicting norms. Is there not always a tension between principles of "individual freedoms" and "law and order," for instance, in modern
societies imbued with the ethos of democracy? Medieval societies likewise upheld values that could turn against one another but could also be balanced, at least temporarily or among certain segments of the population, through the enforcement of some authoritative resolution, complicated negotiations between different interests, some consensus on priorities, or similar means. Even if it may have been a major force in the ideological matrix of medieval western Asian and eastern European frontier regions, the "championing of one's faith" could never function as the sole concern of historical actors in that stage or as a single-minded zeal.

This is as true for non-Muslims as it is for Muslims. In fact, significant parallels can be found in the nature of the concerns and code of behavior displayed by the warriors of the two sides, as evidenced in, for instance, the Byzantine legend of Digenis Akritas, the borderland warrior, which allows us a glimpse into the frontier ethos of the "other side." One very important reason for such parallels is, as many scholars have pointed out, the fact that the sociocultural formations on both sides developed their traditions during many centuries of close contact and intensive exchange, which does not preclude the role of violence.[60] The role of shifting boundaries, loyalties, and identities should also be underlined here. At any given moment, some of the populace on either side of the frontier, warriors and others, would have been recent arrivals — converts, slaves, or recently subjugated people — who were steeped in the cultural traditions of the other side but were now in a position to contribute, voluntarily or forcibly, to this one. Given all this, it is not surprising that a student of Byzantine cultural life finds in her inspiring study of the Digenis Akritas legend a "measure of understanding" intensified by "the long existence of the frontier zone .... [T]he frontier Byzantine differed from the rest. For, as has already been observed by other scholars, the Byzantine-Arab [or Byzantine-Turkish] frontier regions were different in character from the territories behind them, developing specific cultural, social, economic traits."[61]

Like the Muslim gazi epics, the tale of the Byzantine frontier lord presents a dualistic universe of "us" and "them" defined in religious terms. However, the line between the two warring worlds is more re-markable for the ease with which one can cross it than for its rigidity. And Digenis Akritas is certainly not ashamed that his father was once a Muslim, who, like the Trebizondine princess in the story of Kan Turali, switched sides not out of piety but love, and that his grandparents were Paulician heretics.[62]

Indeed, the very name of the hero, Digenis (Two-Blooded), is a constant reminder of his background, just like the names of Artuhi and Efremiya in the Danismendname. Rather than suppressing the inclusivism of the political communities they glorify, both the Christian and the Muslim holy warrior epics thus underline the possibility of inclusion and the fluidity of identities in those frontier conditions.

The motif of the protagonist's mixed origins in these rich texts can certainly not be reduced to a "sign" of ethnic mixture. The ambiguity of the hero's
origins might well serve as a metaphor for all kinds of social ambiguities other than or in addition to an ethnic one, which has been the sole focus in literalist readings of historicist folklore.[63] That the soiled and the sacred, the two faces of what lies beyond the normal, are related to one another must be obvious to readers of Mary Douglas, the anthropologist, or of La dame aux camélias, the novel; hence the attributes of impurity and ambiguity can express sacredness embodied in a Digenis or in Danismend's companions. While the preceding interpretation of the frontier legends is not meant to provide the only or the most privileged reading, I would still maintain that the selection of ethnic fluidity as a meaningful and popular metaphor for social ambiguity in medieval Anatolia cannot have been totally arbitrary.

In addition to the plasticity of identities in frontier environments, we must note the possibility of cooperative ventures by people of different identities at any given moment even if those identities may be seen to be engaged in a conflict in a larger setting. In fact, contrary to modern scholars' arguments as to the incompatibility of the gaza spirit and cooperation with or toleration of infidels, the congruity of these two allegedly disharmonious attitudes appears to be a topos in frontier literature which reveals an essential point concerning the gaza spirit: it is, among other things, an attempt to gain hearts and minds; it is always possible that the pure-hearted infidel will join your fold. He or she is not necessarily an enemy to the bitter end.

Numerous examples of such collaboration — real or metaphorical or both — occur in gaza narratives. I have already mentioned the case of Köse Mihal and Osman as well as the one of Umur Beg and Kantakouzenos. Wittek, too, explicitly noted the possibility of cooperative under-

— 83 —

takings, such as the one between a certain Nicetas the Greek and a Saladinus ca. 1278 on the Carla coast.[64] Even in gazavatnames produced much more self-consciously and knowledgeably in later orthodox environments, to develop a friendly relation with an infidel was not frowned upon. In the gests of Hayreddin Pasa (Barbarossa), grand admiral of Suleyman the Magnificent, for instance, the gazi seaman captures a large number of Christian ships and their captains, including the renowned Captain Ferando. When he sees that the brave infidel is wounded, the pasha orders that "a building in the palace complex [of Algiers] be vacated and reserved for Ferando and that surgeons visit him and serve him all day" until he is cured.[65]

A late-seventeenth-century novella of the Mediterranean corsairs shows how exigencies could render the transition from Christian-Muslim cooperation to the championing of Muslim faith abrupt yet relatively unproblematic.[66] The author tells us that he and some other Muslims were captured by Christian corsairs while traveling from Alexandria to Istanbul. In a most surprising narrative twist, the warden of the corsair ship turns out to be the protagonist of the story; he delivers the Muslims from captivity and leads them, along with some of his "infidel" shipmates, to glorious and gainful adventures on the seas. As a group, the Christian sailors, including the warden, are referred to as "dirty infidels"; the world is divided into "us" and "them" in a confrontational
dualism based on religious identity. Yet this does not preclude the possibility of friendship and cooperation with individuals from "the other world." It is always possible that those individuals will eventually join you and fight for the same cause, just as the warden declares himself Muslim more than halfway through the novella. And the author has no qualms about using the word gaza for the joint undertakings of the Christian and (freed) Muslim shipmates, including himself, under the chieftainship of the warden-captain as gaza even before the latter's conversion.

This is only to be expected from proselytizing faiths, and is not surprising among Muslims, who did not need to be theologians to know one of the basic tenets of their faith, namely, that all human beings are born Muslim since it is the natural religion. (Only thus could the kul system flourish to the extent that it did. Through this system, thousands of non-Muslims from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century were enslaved or recruited, converted to Islam, and trained to function as kuls, or servants, of the House of Osman in the military and administrative cadres of the Ottoman state, including the highest positions. You could

— 84 —

indeed trust these ex-infidels because once shown the true path of Islam, which accords with the innermost nature, the fitra, of every human being, they would follow it in accordance with their natural tendency.)

It would be wrong to see only cold-blooded calculation toward future gains in those acts of cooperation. As implied by Barbarossa's gests, there must indeed have been those who appreciated the valor or scruples or skills or connections or humor or beauty or plain human warmth of others even if they were on the wrong side. Even the literature that was produced after the total and brutal rupture which followed the intense violence of the Anatolian war between Greeks and Turks in this century had room for complex relationships of hostility and affection, repression and solidarity, between the two peoples.[67]

One should, on the other hand, not forget that they fought bloody wars after all. Complex relations developed, symbiosis and cooperation were possible, but over the long run people's behavior was, at least in part, shaped by or attuned to an either/or struggle. The two sides of the frontier had over the centuries molded overlapping planes of social and cultural interaction and lived, in certain respects, in more proximity to one another than to certain elements within their "own" societies. The frontier was a "veritable melting pot of religions, races, and cultures."[68] But in countering this kind of nonexclusivist vision to the nationalistic exclusivist depiction of medieval Anatolia,[69] one should not get carried away and forget that there were indeed two sides that fought one another on the basis of identification with this or that side. In an article that successfully delineates the biases of sources written from the point of view of sedentary peoples, Keith Hopwood, for instance, seems to nearly suggest that our perception of a pattern of conflict between the two peoples and their "lifestyles" derives solely from the misperceptions and skewed reportage of urban-biased historians of Rome, Byzantium, etc.: "the conflict between pastoralist and sedentary farmer is a
construct of a settled civilization and... in many places accommodation between nomad and farmer is mutually profitable."[70] Accommodation and symbiosis were possible and occurred much more often than historians have so far recognized; identities changed, inclusivism was common, and heterogeneity was not frowned upon. Still, hostilities and exclusions were, or could be, part of the same environment, and one should be careful not to romanticize, whatever the weight of inclusivism in frontier realities or narratives.

Beyond inclusivism, a "code of honour serves in Digenes as a kind of lingua franca for the frontier peoples" as it does in the earliest recorded narratives about Osman.[71] In these traditions, which portray him as a
gazi, Osman enjoyed friendly relations with his Christian neighbor, the lord of Bilecik, until the latter plotted against him. In another version, the rupture occurred because the Christian lord treated Osman with arrogance. If the gazi identity mandated indiscriminate warfare against the infidel, Osman would not have needed an excuse to attack the Christians; but it is only when they act dishonorably that this gazi takes action against his Byzantine neighbors. Osman was thus driven to undertake military action not because of any automatic compulsion to finish off the unbelievers but because of a breach of confidence or etiquette.

It is also noteworthy that, to take the most legendary, the most "Osmanname"-like, early sections in those chronicles, his hostility seems to be directed primarily toward the "Tatars" rather than toward Bithynian Christians, just as Digenis's main enemies apparently are the "apelatai" rather than the Muslims.[72] And this higher hostility did reappear at least once more, at the time of Timur's invasion. According to the contemporary historian Ibn `Arabshah, who knew both Timurid and Ottoman traditions from within, Bayezid asked Timur to "not leave the Tatars in this country, for they are material for wickedness and crime .... and they are more harmful to the Muslims and their countries than the Christians themselves."[73]

Recognizing the role of honor and etiquette enables us to understand that being a gazi means that one fights not necessarily for a particular set of beliefs but for one's side, which defines itself through its upholding, perhaps ignorantly, of a religious identity that claims, perhaps inaccurately, to be based on a set of beliefs and rituals. Once one has chosen a side, it goes without saying that one's side has the right beliefs; when one is fighting, one is not necessarily, and probably not very often, thinking of one's belief system. To the extent that system has permeated one's values and practices (and whether these are orthodox or not is not always a meaningful question), one is embedded in it anyway. The rest can be a question of honor (one does not want to let one's side down in that category) or worldly gain (why should it not be your side that enjoys the bounty of God?) or a combination of these and many other considerations.

Whether championing one's faith or protecting one's honor, or both, a frontier warrior or even a dervish could, without contradicting himself, seek and enjoy material benefits so long as he had his priorities straight. Had gaza been the kind of puritanical struggle implied in a literal reading of the notion of holy
war, it would also conceivably conflict with the pursuit, display, and positive evaluation of wealth. But in the Anatolian-Muslim frontier narratives, as in the story of Digenis’ where "honour is conceived of as going hand in hand with wealth/nobility" and "wealth/nobility is an ingredient of both male and female honour,"[74] material prosperity is not frowned upon.

In the codebook mentioned above, gaza is in fact listed as the most desirable means, but as one means, of "gaining one's livelihood."[75] The need to share gaza booty with cooperating infidels is mentioned in the same source in conjunction with their military services as well as with their assistance in locating the hidden goods of other infidels.[76] And the gazi narratives are full of joy and pride with respect to the booty amassed as a result of the raids, whether they are conducted in all-Muslim armies or not. Some bragging about or ostentatious display of the booty could even be commendable since evidently it might encourage others to join the good fight. It might also be one way of demonstrating the successes bestowed on the warriors of Islam and of discouraging the infidels, who would thus confront what seems to have been the strongest practical argument for the supremacy of Islam: if the Muslim faith did not represent the correct path, would God have allowed Muslims to succeed like this?[77]

Neither warriors nor schoolmen and dervishes upholding the gaza ideal apparently saw anything wrong in being explicit about the material dimension of warfare. There is an account, for instance, of a strikingly explicit bargaining episode between Orhan Gazi and his manumitted slave Lala Sahin Pasa, who says he would fulfill a particular military assignment only if all the booty were left to him. Orhan accepts Sahin's terms but then regrets his decision, and when the ex-slave commander turns out to be successful, reneges on his promise. In the court of law, however, Taceddin-i Kurdi, notwithstanding the fact that he is related to Orhan, enforces the earlier deal that had been struck. The mid-sixteenth-century scholar Taskoprizade, who relates the possibly apocryphal anecdote, may have intended primarily to moralize about the responsibilities of jurists and to remind his readers of the superiority of law over even the highest secular authority.[78] What interests us here, however, is the fact that he relates the incident without any hint of disapproval vis-à-vis the bargain itself. He does not seem to have felt that the reputation of Orhan or that of Lala Sahin as gazis is at stake.

It was not unbecoming even for a dervish to savor material returns from gaza. Apz, the dervish-chronicler of the fifteenth century who accompanied many exploits among the warriors of the faith and personally engaged in some of the fighting, boasts of the slaves and other objects that fell to his lot. Moreover, it is not only wealth derived from the pursuit of gaza that one could enjoy with an easy conscience. Ottoman
chronicles relate that another prominent figure in the Bithynian frontier at the time of Osman was a certain Sheikh Ede Bali, who "displayed many miraculous deeds and was the pivot of the people's faith. He was known as a dervish, but dervishness was in his esoteric being. He had plenty of worldly belongings and livestock."[79] This rancher-dervish may have been a fictive character, but the fictionalizing chroniclers of the early Ottoman gaza exploits had so much respect for the character that they made him the father-in-law of Osman Gazi.

Thus another pair of seemingly contradictory values could peacefully coexist in the frontier: on the one hand, living one's life according to high ideals that may demand self-sacrifice; and on the other, the pursuit of wealth and glory. As long as one knew when and where to give priority to the right drive, and as long as one knew how to dispose of wealth (through charity, hospitality, gift giving, appropriate ostentatious display, etc.), wealth was not just acceptable but even incumbent upon anyone who wanted to achieve prominence and good repute as a champion of the faith.

In order to enjoy one's riches without embarrassment, however, one had to be dear about one's priorities. Erie Bali, for instance, was rich but "his guesthouse would never be vacant."[80] On the other hand, even charitable distribution could be suspect if accompanied by the wrong kind of secondary motives. Some were sharp enough to note, for instance, that generosity could be a morally hollow gesture, a means to a self-serving end. Such a perception led to rivalry between two community leaders in Arab Malatya, the ultimate frontier town at the time of the Byzantine-Arab struggles: "`Abd-al-Wahhab . . . wrote to Abu-Ja`far stating that he ['Abd-al-Wahhab] gave food to the people, but al-Hasan distributed many times more, his aim being to contend with him for superiority in beneficence."[81] The traveler Ibn Battuta cherished the competitive hospitality that he observed in Anatolia in the 1330s, but one can only imagine that some host manqué might have read similarly ulterior motives into the beneficence of those who snatched the guest.

If even charity could be equivocal, pursuit of material returns most certainly could be. There were times when the appetite for bounty looked excessive and the zeal for the faith wanting. Only a few days before the conquest of Constantinople, for instance, the ultimate goal of Muslim gazis for centuries, Aksemseddin, the Sufi mentor of Mehmed II, was obviously frustrated by the failed attempts to conclude the protracted siege and wrote a letter to the sultan which reveals how piercing leaders of gaza could be in conceptualizing their ventures. "You know well," the dervish writes of the Ottoman soldiers, "that fewer than a few among

— 88 —

them are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of God, but as soon as they see booty they are ready to walk into fire for the sake of this world."[82]  

We have seen, however, that as long as one could maintain a balance between the two concerns, which must have been easier when gaza brought quick and plentiful returns, one need not be shy about the appeal of bounty. Engaged in battle and plunder on his way from Delhi to Kashmir, Timur was invited by his commanders to
rest and not take the risk of being personally involved in physical confrontation. He is reported to have replied "that the War for the Faith had two supreme advantages. One was that it gave the warrior eternal merit, a guarantee of Paradise immediately in the world to come. The other was that it also gained for the warrior the treasures of the present world. As Timur hoped to enjoy both advantages, so he intended to justify his claims to them."[83] We may be skeptical about the sincerity of Timur or any other individual or even the majority of those engaged in gaza, but as an ideological construct it dearly recognized the role of the pursuit of riches as a legitimate incentive among the warriors. It all depended on how one went about acquiring it and how one disposed of it.

Among the different ways of bringing potentially contradictory goals to some modus vivendi is the distinction made between the short and the long terms. Thus you may in the short term compromise so that you gain allies and are stronger in the long term, or you may for the moment have to fight against a coreligionist in order to gain the victory for your faith in the long run. There is no reason to assume that gazis or their supporters would be unable to order and legitimize their affairs on the basis of such elementary prioritizing and strategizing. If read in this light, the violent struggles between Muslim principalities do not necessarily contradict their self-identification with the gaza ethos. If those other fellows were foolish or misguided enough to block your way, the way of the true gazi, surely you would want to eliminate such obstacles for the sake of continuing your mission. Thus it is not at all surprising to observe that Muslim sources, at least ostensibly upholding the ideals of gaza, deal with intra-Muslim conflicts without inhibition.[84] Ibn `Arabshah , for instance, the Arab scholar-historian who spent many years in the Ottoman realm in the early fifteenth century, calls Bayezid I a "stalwart champion of the faith" and on the same page recounts the fact that that sultan "subdued the whole kingdom of Kara-man" and those of Mentese and Saruhan and other Muslim emirates before telling us that he also subdued "all the realms of the Christians from the borders of the Balkan mountains to the kingdoms of Erzinjan."[85] The historian obviously does not see any contradiction here, nor

— 89 —

does he expect his readers to do so. That gazi states could turn some of their aggressive energies to each other should indeed be expected because competitions can be particularly bitter among those with shared values.[86]

To summarize, the culture of Anatolian Muslim frontier society allowed the coexistence of religious syncretism and militancy, adventurism and idealism. In this, one side of the frontier simply paralleled the other, and the Anatolian frontier experience of Muslims and Christians as a whole paralleled the Iberian one. The Ottomans had social and cultural ties to the rest of the ucat so that they, too, shared its ethos. Naturally, none of this proves that the rise of the Ottoman state was due to that ethos. The main argument up to this point has been the impossibility of reconstructing the nature of frontier culture without considering its own products and that such an analysis will contradict some modern expectations of the gazis. The cultural character of the frontier
warriors, tribes, and holy men can be discussed only on the basis of the sources emanating from that milieu, and the cultural life of the early Ottomans cannot be expected to be distinct from that broader framework. Before turning specifically to Ottoman sources, we ought to consider briefly the argument based on the observation that "gaza" does not appear in the pertinent Byzantine sources. It is indeed the case that Moravcsik's survey of Turkish onomastics and vocabulary in Byzantine sources reveals no mention of the words "gaza" or "gazi" with respect to the early Ottomans, but the same sources fail to mention these words altogether. In other words, Byzantine authors are stingy with the title of "gazi" not merely with respect to Osman and Orhan but even when referring to several other warlords who were incontestably steeped in the gaza ideology, such as the Aydinoglu family.[87] Clearly, then, this is a point the sources were ignorant of or chose to remain silent about. Or perhaps Byzantine authors, like some modern ones, had a conception of nomads that had no room for cumbersome ideological trappings. At any rate, in the case of Kantakouzenos, who is writing in the 1360s, well after the alleged importation of the gaza ideology ca. 1337, the reasons of the oversight can be conjectured. His failure to mention the gaza implies not that he was unaware of it but probably that he preferred to underplay the Islamic aspect of the Ottomans with whom he chose to ally himself several times and whose ruler was, after all, his son-in-law. And on one occasion when a Byzantine source does in fact attribute a Turkish attack to a sense of antagonism, Lindner is merely dismissive: "What Acropolites terms irreconcilable hatred was in fact nomadic necessity."[88]

One of the rare Byzantine sources to relay firsthand observations on early Ottoman cultural life is the captivity memoir of Gregory Palamas (d. 1359), a Byzantine theologian and mystic. Here further evidence can be found for Ottoman moderation,[89] but this needs to be contextualized. Palamas was a captive in Ottoman Bithynia in 1354. If earlier in the reign of Orhan the Ottomans adopted a policy of zeal following an influx of religious scholars from the East, ought we not to expect to find signs of zeal rather than moderation in Palamas's account of Ottoman discourse? Palamas participates in at least two debates — once in the sultan's court with some "xiónai" and once, due to his own curiosity, with a schoolman.[90] It is exactly in those circles that one would expect zealot representatives of the concept of gaza to dominate if, as argued, gaza as fervor for the extinction of the infidels became a state ideology after the middle of Orhan's reign through importation by learned courtiers or men of religion. In the court of the beg who called himself "the champion of the faith" on a document of 1324, and "gazi, son of gazi," on an inscription of 1337, Palamas rather entered a discussion where his opponents ended their comments by saying that "the time will come when we will be in accord with each other." Had Palamas come to the court of Orhan's grandson in the 1390s, he might have been baffled to observe an even more eclectic religious culture, since there he would in all likelihood have met Ellisaeus, a Jewish philosopher, and his pupil Plethon, who was later to be persecuted by Byzantine authorities as an advocate

— 90 —
of pagan Hellenism.\[91\] The influence of foreigners, non-Muslims, and representatives of unorthodox Islam is visible in the Ottoman court for quite some time, at least until the earlier part of Suleyman the Magnificent's reign. Thereafter orthodoxy took hold much more strongly, but even then the inclusivism of the Ottoman elite was never fully abandoned, while its dimensions and nature kept changing. Some of the Polish and Hungarian refugees of 1848 converted and rose to the rank of pasha in the Ottoman administration.

The Chronicles of the Home of Osman and Their Flavor: Onion or Garlic?

Given the preceding discussion, we can see that the Otto-roans never became gazi if the ahistorical definition analyzed above is to be applied, but it is obvious that, at least beginning sometime in the

— 91 —

fourteenth century, they considered not only their forefathers to be gazis but also themselves. And the concept of gaza never disappeared from the ideology of the Ottoman state or of its Turco-Muslim subjects; the leader of the Turkish forces fighting against the Allied occupation and the Greek invasion in 1919-22 was popularly called Gazi Mustafa Kemal. Did Ottoman behavior not change over time? It certainly did, with respect to religious orthodoxy, conduct in warfare, treatment of non-Muslims, and all sorts of important matters. It would thus seem inappropriate to conceptualize gaza by assuming, like Wittek and his critics, that it was one and the same notion of "war for the faith" from its earliest emergence (in the dating, causes, and consequences of which Wittek and his critics would disagree) to the end of the empire (when it was finally abandoned, with disastrous consequences for the Ottoman state according to Wittek). Another way of looking at it would be to observe that the conception of gaza underwent transformation in Ottoman thought. Even this formulation is misleading, however, because it might be read as a linear evolution from a unified core concept. A much more appropriate understanding of gaza and of the whole legacy of warfare and conquest in medieval Anatolia has to be based on the realization that they were contested and constructed by different historical agents in different ways.

As reflected in its oral and written lore, hagiographies and epics, the Turco-Muslim society of medieval Anatolia evidently put a high premium on the championship of gaza — a complex notion and code of conduct that cannot be reduced to a relentless zeal on the part of ideologically correct Muslims. It would also be simplistic to assume that being a gazi meant the same thing(s) to everyone or that its meaning(s) did not change over time. Any aspiring individual could don the title of gazi, since there does not seem to have been a formalization of the kind that would define the French chevaliers or the Ottoman sipahis (prebendal cavalry), but to be called a gazi by others implied recognized achievements often accompanied by entitlements.\[92\] As symbolic capital that could turn a title into (political and economic) entitlement, the championship of the faith naturally constituted a contested resource. Competition raged not only over present spoils and possibilities but also, more and more as the champions of the faith kept achieving, over past achievements. That is, gazis, gazi-dervishes, and their followers or clients laid competitive
claim to the glorious deeds of the past in the name of themselves, their kin, their patron, or their solidarity group. That a particular area or town, for instance, had once been gained for one's side would be

— 92 —

obvious, but who exactly captured its fortress or the hearts of its inhabitants? Even if the mediate hero of a military or spiritual conquest was known, one could ask whether he or she was acting under a higher authority. In some cases, the answers were clear. But in others, there were apparently several conflicting reports or enough obscurities for differing claims to be advanced. Worse yet, the situation may be unclear even when it happens, since different participants may have differing notions of their contribution. To some extent, the discrepancies in the historical sources written down during the Ottoman era can be read as traces of such competition for the appropriation of past accomplishments.

As some of the small gazi-mercenary bands or Sufi orders expanded their sphere of influence, they also enlarged their claims over the past at the expense of those who were now diminished. This contest over the appropriation of the symbolic capital embedded in public recognition as a gazi implied that the meaning of gaza might also be construed differently by different people or parties according to their backgrounds and needs. Particularly as the nature of the polities changed dramatically with the establishment of sedentary bureaucratic practices and principles, some aspects of the earlier conceptions of gaza looked increasingly primitive and possibly also dangerous if any other sociopolitical forces claimed to represent it.

The dervishes who were in control of the Seyyid (Battal) Gazi shrine in the mid-sixteenth century, for instance, were unacceptable to the Ottoman state, which now was conscious of its role as the defender of Sunni orthodoxy. Clearly, neither the military-administrative nor the religio-scholarly branches of the state would want to give the impression or even think to themselves that they had abandoned the gaza spirit, but they could and did charge the dervishes of the Seyyid Gazi shrine with deviation from purity of the faith. The latter, on the other hand, could claim that they were there because of certain privileges that had been given to their spiritual forebears by earlier and purer gazis. This should not necessarily be read as the preservation of an Ur ideology from which the increasingly sedentary and bureaucratic Ottoman power apparatus diverged. It is more likely that both groups had redefined themselves since the thirteenth century and that both had refashioned the legacy of Seyyid Gazi and the meaning of gaza from their own perspectives. The seventeenth-century dervishes of the Seyyid Gazi shrine were Shi'i Bektasis, for instance, but there is no such evidence for those of the thirteenth century. In any case, when Pir Sultan Abdal (fl. second half of sixteenth century?), arguably the best-known voice of kizilbas anti-
Ottomanism, wrote of the imminent arrival of the Safavid shah to deliver the Türkmen tribes from the hands of the House of Osman, he described the forces of the shah as the "real gazis."[94] It cannot be taken for granted, however, that the gazi-dervishes who gathered around the cult of Seyyid Gaza or the tribal populations that switched their allegiance to the Safavids represented the original and "real" gaza ethos while the Ottomans degenerated it. Obviously at least two different modes existed in the sixteenth century, but both of them were, in different ways and degrees, variants of the earlier spirit(s). The mutations were configured during the tension-ridden process of Ottoman state building, which does not seem to have been accompanied by a concern with history-writing in its first century.

There are no known historical accounts of Ottoman exploits by the Ottomans before the fifteenth century. But this must be seen as part of a broader phenomenon: the blooming of a literate historical imagination among the representatives of post-Seljuk frontier energies had to await the fifteenth century.

The earliest written rendering of an Anatolian Turkish narrative of a "historical" nature seems to have been Danismendname, composed in 1245, but no copies are known of that original version. The earliest extant works written in Anatolian in Turkish on any topic are, in addition to the mystical poetry of Yunus Emre, a few thirteenth-century poems by a couple of lesser-known poets such as Dehhanı and some verses penned as curious experiments by Sultan Veled, Rumi's son, at the turn of the fourteenth century. The rest of that century saw primarily translations of romances or ethical and medical works (mostly from Persian) as well as works of Islamic law and rites (mostly from Arabic). There were also original works produced in Anatolian Turkish, such as 'Asik Pasa's mystical masterpiece, the Garibname, in which the author felt compelled to defend his use of Turkish, but few of these can be considered historical in nature. If it were not for Gülsehri's brief vita of Ahi Evren and the Menakbib'in-kudsiyye, one would not be able to point to any works written in Turkish before the fifteenth century dealing with contemporary historical events and circumstances.[95] Even in Persian and Arabic, not much historical writing (even including hagiographies and epics) was undertaken in post-Seljuk Rum in the fourteenth century.[96] But dearly, events were told and cast into oral narratives, which seem to have awaited the Timurid shock to be rendered into writing.[97]

A versified chronicle of the Ottomans appended to an Alexander romance by Ahmedi, who had an earlier attachment to the House of Ger-
dominant Ottoman state in the latter part of the fourteenth century. Timur even divided what might be called the "core lands" of the Ottoman family among Bayezid's sons. Ottoman historical consciousness was probably moving toward literary expression already under Bayezid, when the polity started to outgrow its frontier identity and to acquire, much more systematically and self-consciously than before, modes of governing and ideologies associated with the nonfrontier civilization. The earliest redaction of Ahmedi's chronicle seems to have been written before the 1396 Battle of Nicopolis (Nigbolu). [98] It may be around those years that his brother, Hamzavi, composed a collection of tales of Hamza from the existing lore about that hero of Islam, the uncle of the Prophet.[99]

Whatever the precise dating of these early attempts turns out to be, there can be no doubt that historical writing came into its own among Turcophone Anatolians in the fifteenth century. In addition to the sizable body of literature on the Ottomans themselves, to which we shall turn our attention shortly, many "classics" of the long adventure that saw Muslims settle in and then overpower Asia Minor — the vitae of Sari Saltuk and Haci Bektas, the gests of Seyyid Battal Gaza and Gazi Umur Beg — were written down in this century. The history of the Seljuks was rendered into Turkish for the first time by Yazicizade, who appended to his largely translated work some original material on the principalities and the Oguz traditions.[100] He even referred to the main epic of the Oguz people, the tales of Dede Korkut, which also was given its written version at around the same time, in a separate book that included ancient Inner Asian lore along with the somewhat more "historical" gaza adventures of the Türkmen in northeastern Anatolia.[101] All of these works were written under different circumstances of course; not all were produced for the Ottomans or even in the Ottoman realm. The Akkoyunlu dynasty, too, the main rivals of the Ottomans in the east between the heyday of the Karamanids and the rise of the Safavids, had their story written down under Uzun Hasan (r. 1466-78).[102] More-focused studies of patronage and composition are needed to assess the meanings and interrelationships of these works. It should be clear, however, that the impressive historiographic output of the Ottomans in the fifteenth century must be seen in the larger context of transformations in the historical consciousness of Turco-Muslim Anatolians.

These transformations were undoubtedly related to the maturing identification of Turks, "real" or newly made, with the history and geography of the region as it was refashioned in the late medieval era. There were also claims to be made, rivalries to be sorted out, and hegemonies to be confirmed and legitimized. All this must also be related, on the one hand, to the transition from oral to written culture in certain circles and, on the other, to a series of complex ideological experiments in response to unprecedented political problems starting with an identity and confidence crisis following the Timurid debacle. Numerous signs point to the emergence of a new historical consciousness among the Ottomans as the dust began to settle after Timur's violent intrusion and the
ensuing internecine wars among Bayezid's sons. There was not only a heightened awareness of the need to understand what went well and what went wrong before Timur but also the fact that his descendants continued to treat the Ottomans as vassals, forcing the latter to represent themselves in a new mode. It may not have been necessary for Murad I (r. 1362-89) and Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) to account for the way they eliminated their rival siblings, but by the time Mehmed I reached the throne in 1413, the rules of the game had changed. At least two written accounts were produced to teleologically chronicle the internecine strife among Bayezid's sons as an ultimately felicitous tale that ended with the fairest conclusion, the victory of the best prince of course. One of these two accounts remains anonymous; it is known to us not as an independent work but as one embedded in later works.[103] The other one, like Ahmedi's work, is a distinctly historical chapter in a larger text of a legendary nature, a Halilname, written in 1414 by 'Abdu'l-vasi Çelebi.[104] Yet the ultimate manifestation of Ottoman historical consciousness in that post-Timurid juncture may well be that Mehmed I spent some of his precious resources to build a mosque in Sogut, the small and by then politically insignificant town where Ertogrul was believed to have settled down.[105] The legitimacy of the Ottoman enterprise was ultimately based on its own adventure, its own dedication to gaza generation after generation since Ertogrul.

The new historiographic output was not necessarily produced directly under the patronage of the House of Osman; nor was it uncritical of the Ottoman enterprise. In trying to understand the Timurid rupture, some authors, even if they were loyal to the reemerging Ottoman state, were apparently ready to question certain developments, especially what they apparently felt to be departures from the "purity" of the earlier generations. The two major ingredients of the later fifteenth-century output were in all likelihood composed in the years following the Battle of Ankara. A certain Yahsi Fakih, the son of Orhan's imam, sat down to write his memoirs in those years. His menakib (tales), too, survive only embedded in a later work (the chronicle of Apz). Another collection of early Ottoman and related historical traditions was composed by 1422; it constitutes the common source of Apz, Uruç, and several anonymous chronicles that came into being in the latter decades of the same century. Those later chronicles constitute the largest body of historical information, and misinformation, about early Ottoman history; their proper evaluation is one of the most important tasks for historians of Ottoman state building.

Other historical works, relatively independent of this set of interrelated chronicles, were produced in the same century. Yaciçizade's history of the Seljuks, written in the 1430s, also contained a short account of Osman's begship and, even more importantly, a major and influential attempt to use Oguzid political traditions to legitimize Ottoman rule. In this version, Ertogrul descends from the glorious Kayi branch of the children of Oguz Han. Sukrullah, who wrote his universal history in Persian in 1457, seconded that. A grand vezir of Mehmed II, Karamani Mehmed Pasa (d. 1481), composed another example of this
relatively more "establishment" view of the Ottoman adventure in Arabic. To these must be added another relatively independent set of works: annalistic calendars (takvim) that were apparently produced by a variety of Anatolian astrologers and/or dervishes, only some of whom were connected to the Ottomans.

While the Timurids were receding into distant memory in the second part of the century, more-immediate concerns, about various elements of Mehmed's imperial project, emerged and were incorporated in later chronicles that include a critical voice (Apz, Uruç, and the anonymous ones mentioned above). The three decades from the conquest of Constantinople to the victories of Kilia-Akkirman in 1484 witnessed the most intensive phase in the development of the Ottoman political technology that we now call the classical Ottoman system. The best-known aspect of this process has been described as the graduation from a frontier principality to an empire, with accompanying changes in the institutional and ideological spheres. Like any major political transformation, this process was not free of strain and strife. Some of the losers appeared as soon as the day after the grand conquest, when Çandarli Halil, grandson of the scion of this vezirial dynasty, was arrested and soon executed. His rivals did not end up as winners either. Two prominent frontier war-lords, leaders of the anti-Çandarli party, were also executed in a couple of years. There was obviously much resentment, from various corners, toward Mehmed II's systematic pursuit of an "imperial project," starting with the establishment of Constantinople as the new capital. Much of that resentment found expression in the chronicles and coalesced with the critique against the earlier centralization-cum-imperialization drive attributed to Bayezid I. But the most sweeping transformation and the broadest-based uproar came toward the end of Mehmed's reign when he confiscated more than a thousand villages that were held, as freehold or endowment, by descendants of early colonizers, mostly dervishes. We shall deal with Mehmed's imperial policy and its losers again in the next chapter, but here it must be noted that the most substantive body of early Ottoman historical output — the chronicles of the House of Osman — was produced by those who lived through that era. Most of these authors were evidently dervishes or close enough to the gazi-dervish milieux to have been touched, either personally or through their patrons, by those policies.

When Bayezid II replaced his father in 1481, he faced not only the challenge of his younger brother but also the fury of the uprooted. Bayezid made no compromises with his brother, whom he forced into tragic exile and, allegedly, arranged to be poisoned, but he was forced to appease the losers of Mehmed's confiscation drive by rerecognizing their entitlements to earlier privileges. After the elimination of Cem's challenge and the reprivatization of lands, Bayezid undertook a campaign into the realm of the infidels and also proved himself not wanting in the spirit of gaza. It was upon his return from that campaign in 1484 that he ordered the recording of what thus far had been mostly oral traditions about the founding fathers. Most of the critical chronicles were
published after that juncture, in a context that was ready to hear those voices, when Bayezid was searching for the right dose of appeasement after his father’s harsh centralism, and still hoping to tame cults that had not yet become fully anti-Ottoman by patronizing them (e.g., Haci Bektas).

All of these works and the rising number of hagiographic works, which included their own version of the history of the conquests, must be read with another aspect of fifteenth-century ideological developments in the Ottoman world in mind. From the early fifteenth to the early sixteenth century, the House of Osman and the order of Haci

— 98 —

Bektas achieved supremacy in their respective spheres while also developing a historical vision of themselves that confirmed, explained, and legitimized that supremacy. In other words, two organizations laid a claim to the energies that had made possible what was by then a dear victory of Islam over Eastern Christendom: the Ottoman state and the Bektasi order. These two by no means monopolized all former accomplishments but were able to present themselves in paramount position with respect to the other forces. The two large institutional umbrellas seem to have started this adventure in some harmony and cooperation but ended up as the two opposing poles of Ottoman religio-political culture; in the sixteenth century, the Bektasi order emerged as the main representative of anti-Ottomanism and as the rallying point for various religious and religio-political movements that found themselves on the wrong side of the dogma battles.

It is neither possible nor desirable to present an exhaustive survey of early Ottoman historiography here.[108] My purpose is basically to deal with selected problems in order to assess the usefulness of fifteenth-century Ottoman historical consciousness, shaped in large part by the ideological and political currents mentioned above, for understanding earlier Ottoman realities. From the brief sketch just given, it should be clear that by the time the majorchronicles (of Apz and others) were composed, there were many different layers of oral and written historical traditions. To envision them only as layers of a linear progression would be misleading, however, since they also included competing or at least mutually incompatible accounts representing different politico-ideological positions. Since Gibbons, a strand of scholarship has tended to lump these sources into a relatively undifferentiated mass of unreliable information, while another strand, dominant in Turkey, has simply followed the old line of raiding them and the calendars for raw data.[109] Lindner, for instance, is all too ready to treat the fifteenth-century chroniclers as a homogeneous block: court historians. "To the eye of a medieval historian their smooth, clean surface shines with the light of Einhard's life of Charlemagne .... To be a chronicler at court was also to be an amanuensis, of course." The only reliable information in these "court chronicles" about the Ottoman past, according to Lindner, is provided by "the incongruous, the unexpected statement," which may reveal "an older tradition truer to past life than to present ideology .... It took the entire fifteenth century for the Ottoman orthodoxy to emerge. ... Passages which conflict with that orthodoxy
should a fortiori reflect an earlier memory."[110]

In this version, then, Ottoman historiography, if not all Ottoman cultural history, is reduced to the evolution of "state ideology." The early Ottomans adopted "tribalism," which possibly converged with shamanism parading as Islam. Then came learned Muslims from the East, who convinced the rulers of the suitability of orthodox Islam and of the gaza ideology, thus erasing the memories of the "tribalist" past. By the end of the fifteenth century, court histories were commissioned to glorify the founders of the state as gazis (who they never were).[111] Due to accidents or sloppy editing, however, some remnants of earlier and truer memories crept into these accounts. And those are the only parts of late-fifteenth-century chronicles that can be assumed to reflect early Ottoman realities.

The specific image Lindner chooses for Ottoman historiography is that of an onion. The core of the onion in his account is Osman's "tribalism." Layer upon layer has accumulated to conceal this core so that by the end of the fifteenth century, we are faced with a fully ripened onion. Accidents, mistakes, and crudities give us glimpses of the earlier, deeper layers, however. Such an accident, for instance, was Apz's illness as a very young man that confined him to the home of Yahsi Fakih, the son of Orhan's imam. Apz states that during that sojourn at Yahsi Fakih's house, he saw some menakib written by the latter; these tales he incorporated into his history.

For a long time, it was believed that the traditions Apz received from Yahsi Fakih must be sought in those passages of his chronicle that are common to other chronicles. V. L. Ménage, whose exemplary studies are the building blocks of all discussion on early Ottoman historiography, has demonstrated, however, that Yahsi Fakih's menakib must rather be traced to the sections that are unique to Apz.[112] On this basis, Lindner argues that those unique passages in Apz "represent a layer of the Ottoman historiographical onion considerably closer to the core than the other versions."[113] Apz is believed to have had accidental access to some information. When he later sat down to produce his chronicle for the court, that information was included within his chronicle through his simple-mindedness or oversight. "Not contaminated by Apz's preferences," those passages are closer to truth because they are earlier.

It is not necessarily the case, however, that the closer in time a source is to certain historical events, the more reliable it is, particularly if a policy of ideological purification is believed to have started in between that source and those events. If a significant ideological shift occurred during Orhan's reign with the intention of sanitizing the reality about his ancestors, the chieftain's imam would be the least trustworthy source for

recovering that reality. If the attempt at ideological purification was so successful as to obliterate all alternative accounts, later sources would not be
any more useful of course. But to establish such a dominance, one first has to
assume the existence of competing views and trace their interrelations. There is
no room for such an analysis in the schema of a unidirectional, step-by-step
development of ideology that does not take into consideration the complexity of
eyearly Ottoman social structure and the tensions within it.
Moreover, to liken Apz to Einhard is unjustified and problematic because the
former is not a court historian. Though he does sing the praises of many
achievements of the Ottoman enterprise, his chronicle is also informed by a
critical streak that he shares, in varying degrees, with Uruç and the anonymous
chroniclers. Taken altogether and treated systematically, Apz's criticisms
consistently reflect the worldview of a certain milieu which, particularly after
the conquest of Constantinople and the adoption of the imperial project, stood
outside and in some opposition to the Ottoman court, or at least the dominant
centralist position upheld by most sultans and statesmen of the classical age.
Apz's personal and ideological connections to the gazi milieu have long ago been
identified.[114] It may well have been true that Apz decided to publish his
chronicle due to Bayezid's demand after 1484 to have the deeds of his ancestors
collected and told. This does not predicate either an ideological homogeneity or
an official character in the chronicles. Apz and the writers of the anonymous
chronicles may have modified the final versions of their books to some extent to
protect themselves from possible danger; they were also probably influenced to a
significant extent by the official ideology emerging throughout the fifteenth
century. Such compliances and convergences do not undermine their distinct
position, however. The specific criticisms in these chronicles consistently
reflect the views of the frontier warriors as opposed to the emerging central
state. Compare the accounts of the establishment of the pençik system (whereby
the Treasury's right to one-fifth of the gaza booty was extended to include
slaves), the objections to Bayezid I's lifestyle, the murdering of Haci Ilbegi,
the application of a new monetary system by Çandarlı Halil Pasa, and the
policies of Mehmed the Conqueror in terms of property rights and rents after the
conquest of Constantinople. All of these cannot be dismissed as slips or as a
mere show of righteousness.
And why should it be thought accidental that Apz had access to Yahsi Fakih's
chronicle and decided to rely on these traditions in his own book? Does he not
openly state his source rather than try to conceal it?

— 101 —
In fact this passage and many others interspersed in his chronicle that tell us
of his friends and acquaintances who often serve him as oral sources provide the
reader with many precious dues about Apz's social network.
Growing up in a village of Amasya during the turbulent years of the Interregnum
(1402-13) when a century's worth of Ottoman acquisitions seemed to be up for
grabs, Apz apparently had a knack for being where the action was. In his teens,
he tagged along with the army of Prince Mehmed, the eventual winner. The young
dervish found himself on the winning side probably for no other reason than that
they were both based in the same area. While the forces of the future sultan
were proceeding to what proved to be the final showdown with the only other
surviving contender to the throne in 1413, however, Apz fell ill on the way and had to stay behind.
Whatever disappointment this turn of fate led to must have been alleviated by the fact that he thus became a guest of an old man by the name of Yahsi Fakih. Why would the young dervish stay in the house of the fakih? But then, isn't it only to be expected that Yahsi Fakih, the son of Orhan's imam and a man of letters, would know of the family of 'Asik Pasa and Elvan Çelebi, Apz's great-grandfather and grandfather, respectively? There is every reason to assume Apz felt comfortable in the sociocultural milieu he was born into. He chose to include Yahsi Fakih's menakib in his chronicle not merely because he happened to have access to them (in that sense, it is true that our own access to the fakih's narrative is partly due to an accident) but also because they made sense to him. The menakib he inherited from the fakih were skillfully woven into Apz's later fifteenth-century compilation because he wished to do so. A quick look at some of the later developments in his life will help us understand his preferences and his own approach to gaza.
Back again in his (overbearingly?) revered ancestors' community in Mecidözü, Amasya, a young man in his twenties with no irresistible calling for a studious intellectual or mystical vocation if we are to judge by his later career and chronicle, Apz was offered an exciting adventure by Mihaloglu Mehmed Beg in 1422. The warrior-lord from the illustrious line of Osman's companion Mihal had just been released from imprisonment in Tokat, where he had been confined due to his earlier alliance with the wrong prince. On his way to join Murad II's campaign against Mustafa (the Imposter), the renowned beg of the marches visited the monastery and offered to take along his young namesake, Apz Mehmed, from another illustrious family of those legendary days. Here

— 102 —
we already have a telling case of gazi-dervish "networking." The young dervish seems to have taken to this opportunity like Marlow in Conrad's Heart of Darkness but with none of the latter's gloom. (Nor is Mihaloglu, the warrior, a Kurtz.) Like others of the gazi-dervish milieu as reflected in their literature, Apz appears to have been free of concern for any dark recesses in his soul; rather, he cheerfully undertook his journey to participate in this saga played out around the theme of spreading the light of Islam, which also promised material gain and a good time.[115]
In his new life, he came into contact with various other gazis and dervishes, who also make up most of the oral sources he cites in his history, and participated in many raids and campaigns, which he relates with relish. A difference can be noted in this regard between Apz and Nesri, who wrote only slightly later but from a different perspective as a man from a different social and educational background. A member of the ulema, whose oral sources and thus presumably social connections are mostly from the ulema, Nesri aimed at bringing together different Ottoman historiographic traditions that flowed more or less independently of each other up to his time, as has been demonstrated by the meticulous source criticism of Ménage. Nesri had in front of him one set of traditions running through Apz (including YF),[116] and the anonymous chronicles
(including the "common source" and the anonymous account of the Interregnum), a
second set tying together Ahmedi, Sukrullah, Karamani Mehmed Pasa, and some
other samples of "courtly" historiography, and a third set reflected in the
annalistic calendars. Until Nesri, we can talk of at least three different
historiographic rings that were bound to each other but kept their distinct
identity. (If one were to consider the historical arguments of hagiographic
works, a curious example of which will be analyzed at the end of this chapter,
one could identify even further traditions; however, these did not figure in the
eventual synthesis reached by the Ottoman establishment after Nesri). And
within each one of these sets, say between Apz and the anonymous chronicles,
systematic differences can be found that provide the specific character of each
work. To maintain Lindner’s alimentary imagery, "garlic" is a more apt metaphor
for certain aspects of early Ottoman historiography than "onion" because it
recognizes a plurality of voices without assigning any of them, even the
earliest, the monopoly over a "core reality." Or rather, like many Mediterranean
dishes, both garlic and onion can be appropriate in the reconstruction of
Ottoman historiography since there is also room for a layered approach in
understanding the interrelationships of some of the texts that, in part, display
a linear development.

— 103 —

A good example of the mixed flavor is provided by Wittek's masterly comparison
of Apz's and Nesri's respective treatments of a particular gazi legend: the
taking of the Aydos castle.[117] So close are the two passages that the one in
Nesri at first appears like a verbatim borrowing from Apz. A minute comparison
and analysis of seemingly minor discrepancies reveals, however, that Apz's
version of the tale bristles with an insider's understanding of the gazi
mentality, at least of its early-fifteenth-century version, which he cannot but
have grown deeply familiar with since he participated in so many gaza
undertakings in the entourage of renowned gazis. In this account, all the images
and nuances convey authenticity. Nesri's version, on the other hand, reveals a
predictable lack of appreciation of such traditions. In Wittek's words, "Apz's
story commends itself as a genuine document of the earliest Ottoman times by the
lack of any anachronism."[118] Although Apz was transmitting a tradition he had
obtained from another source, possibly Yahsi Fakih, he was able to capture the
mentality of his source while Nesri was not. This difference occurred, not
because he was closer in time to the events than Nesri, who wrote only a decade
or so after Apz, but dearly because they were from two different social worlds.
We are not dealing with different stages of a unidirectional development here
but with alternative (though somewhat overlapping) ways of looking at the past,
and present. There is no more telling example of the differences between these
two historians than the way they conclude the tale about the Aydos castle. Apz
boldly announces: "Hey friends, of everything in this story which I have written
down, by God, I have obtained full knowledge. From this knowledge I wrote. Do
not think I wrote out of [my own] imagination." Nesri of the ulema, on the other
hand, totally omits this self-confident assertion and cautiously remarks: "But
He knows best."
Ottoman historical writing of the fifteenth century can be neither taken for
granted nor dismissed in terms of its relevance for understanding the historical
reality of the earlier century; a critical reading based on systematic suspicion
can uncover significant truths underneath the seeming distortions. The problem
is a wholesale, undifferentiated characterization of the Ottoman chronicles.
Different versions need to be understood on their own terms; without looking for
a one-to-one-correspondence between textual variations and ideological
orientations, one can still search for patterns identifying distinct traditions
before determining their value.
A good example of systematic doubt is shown by Lindner himself when he deals
with the way Osman came to power. On the basis of a

— 104 —
comparison of different Ottoman sources, he concludes that Osman was elected to
office in keeping with tribal traditions, which is crucial to his theory. Why,
then, dismiss other traditions without reasoned argument? He asserts, for
instance, that the story concerning the institution of the market tax (bac) for
the first time upon Osman's capture of Karacahisar is "anachronistic" without
any argument. There does not seem to be any obvious reason to dismiss this
tradition offhand, deriving from Yahsi Fakih in all likelihood, other than the
fact that Lindner wants to attribute any ulema influence on the Ottoman polity
to a later period. Particularly if one were to accept Lindner's own argument
that the Ottomans captured Karacahisar from the Germiyanids and not from the
Byzantines, it is reasonable to assume that Osman was merely faced with the
continuation of a local tax. If the Germiyanid rulers of Karacahisar exacted bac,
the same source of income would naturally be offered to the city's new ruler.
Several other traditions about the capture of Karacahisar provide further
evidence for Lindner's argument that that city was taken not from the infidels
but from the Germiyanids. It is there that Osman is suddenly bombarded with
choices he has to make in relation to established Islamic administrative
practices as opposed to the loose conditions of the ucat. It is in Karacahisar,
we read in the YF-Apz narrative, that the hutbe (Friday sermon) was read for the
first time in Osman's name, that a kadi (judge) and a subasi (police prefect)
were appointed, and that bac was applied, upon the demand of those who came from
"Germiyan and other provinces."[119] Whether all this indeed happened in
Karacahisar cannot be ascertained, but after capturing a few towns like it,
Osman was probably approached by several sheikhs, fakihs, kadis, priests, and
scribes who confronted him with such matters and offered their services.
Many other examples can be cited of scholars systematically analyzing specific
historical traditions in the fifteenth-century chronicles and delineating
meaningful patterns that have some bearing on early Ottoman realities and/or
ideological developments. In addition to Wittek's study of the Aydos castle
legend and Inalcik's analyses of the chroniclers' criticisms of Mehmed II's
policy after the conquest of Constantinople, one can note Irène
Beldiceanu-Steinherr's treatment of the first conquests in Thrace, to be
discussed below. Ménage's comparison of the different versions of the "dream"
that led to the foundation of the state in Ottoman legend, Zachariadou's
comparison of Byzantine and Ottoman accounts of Orphan's alliance with Kantakouzenos, and Lefort and Foss's explorations of the chronicles on the basis of Bithynian archeology are other examples.[120] The detailed analyses of Yerasimos, who compares the

— 105 —
different versions of the Ottoman genealogy and of the legends about Hagia Sophia, also succeed in shedding significant light on the ideological programs of different chroniclers.[121]

The Case of Osman and His Uncle
While the Ottoman chronicle tradition should be treated with extreme caution, we cannot forget that it contains some of the precious few things we have on early Ottoman history. Rather than dismissing it, we ought to venture boldly into the wrinkled space of its textual intricacies, compare variants in detail, focus on choice of stories, words, and even spelling if promising, and try to ascertain what if anything these may reveal of early Ottoman realities. This is a road filled with traps and there are bound to be dead ends and wrong paths taken. And most of what one can say in the end will remain hypothetical. But isn't giving up on this task even less rewarding?

Take the fascinating case of Osman's competition with his uncle Dündar, for instance. It is related by Nesri, but missing in all of the known earlier chronicles, that after Ertogrul's death, some wanted Osman and others Dündar to be the new beg. Realizing that Osman had strong support, the uncle gave up and accepted his nephew's chieftainship.[122] The reconciliation seems to have been superficial because in a later episode we read that Osman, annoyed by the patronizing attitude of the (Christian) lord of Bilecik, wanted to seize him, but Dündar argued that they already had enough enemies and could not afford to make any more. Osman interpreted this response, Nesri writes, as his uncle's wish to undermine the young man's political bid (literally, his "coming out," huruc). So he shot his uncle down with an arrow and killed him.[123]

Where does Nesri get these pieces of information about Osman and Dündar which are not to be found in any of the earlier sources known to us? Could he have made them up? To make the post-Mehmed II practice of fratricide seem more palatable? This is not impossible, but a much more likely explanation is that Nesri had access to some early traditions which the chroniclers chose to edit out of their texts.[124] Besides, why would Nesri, if he were fictionalizing to legitimate fratricide, not have Osman kill his brother Gündüz, especially in the episode when the two disagree, just like Osman and Dündar, on the course of action to be taken vis-à-vis their neighbors? Furthermore, writing slightly later than Nesri and using his chronicle, Ibn Kemal relates not only Nesri's version of this story but also another one with the same ending.[125]

— 106 —
There were dearly "Osman and Dündar" stories that did not make it into the texts of Apz, Uruç, and the anonymous chroniclers. Whether the stories were true or
not, it is not surprising that the narrators of those particular texts would choose to censor episodes concerning dynastic strife resolved through murder in the family (deflected parricide?). To sustain the logic of their argument, or the moral of their tale, Apz, Uruç, and the compilers of the anonymous chronicles would simply need to omit Dündar's case, because their narratives are structured around a rupture in the moral uprightness of the Ottoman enterprise in the reign of Bayezid I (1389-1402): all evil deviations from the purity and sincerity of early frontier years are to be located after that juncture, all those nasty developments toward the construction of an imperial political system and its ideology. The case is the same with fratricide, which the anonymous chroniclers and Uruç explicitly cite as an evil that was not practiced, so they claim, in the early generations. Just after reporting Orhan's peaceful agreement with his brother 'Ala'eddin upon their father's death, these sources add: "brothers consulted each other then; they did not kill one another."[126] Curiously, this passage is omitted in the YF-Apz narrative, which also omits reports, found in some other chronicles, about the murder of Haci Ilbegi, to be discussed below. It is unlikely that Yahsi Fakih had not heard these gruesome stories, whether they were true or not. He may have found them unbelievable or chosen not to write them down, or perhaps Apz excluded such passages from his edition.[127] It must have been Apz's choice, for instance, to omit the antifratricide editorial recorded in the anonymous chronicles and Uruç, because it is presumably from the common source. Did Apz omit this passage because he knew better, namely, because he had read about Osman and Dündar in the menakib of Yahsi Fakih? In any case, the anonymous chroniclers and Uruç are in general more consistent in erasing all memory of familial strife in the early generations before Bayezid. They also omit the passage, related by Apz and preserved by Nesri, of Osman's disagreement with his brother Gündüz. Uruç is in fact so cautious that he makes Osman's two brothers die before Ertogril's demise, that is, before Osman has any political claims, so that he cannot be imputed.[128] In the anonymous texts, the brothers are named but nothing is said of their deaths.

As for Dündar, he is mentioned before Nesri only in Bayath Mahmudoglu Hasan's Cami Cem-Ayin.[129] Bayath writes that Ertogril's father had four sons: two of them took their clans eastward when their father drowned in the Euphrates; the other two, Ertogril and Dündar, came to

— 107 —

Anatolia. Dündar is not mentioned again in this work, which leaves some room for speculation but no more than that. How could that vile deed be imputed to the glorious founding father in a work written for Prince Cem, the loser of a violent struggle for the throne and the prime target of fratricidal designs entertained by the victorious brother? Apz, Uruç, and the authors of the anonymous chronicles as well as Ahmediz assign only three sons to Ertogril's father; none of them is named Dündar. (Sukrullah and Karamanli Mehmed simply do not refer to any brother of Ertogril.

Is it coincidental that the policy defended by Dündar is the very one Ertogril is claimed in some sources to have maintained during his chieftainship? A
pattern emerges here that must be related to conscious editorial adjustments. In the narratives that have traces of disagreement within the family, very strongly in Nesri and faintly in Apz, the political orientation of the little principality or tribe changes dramatically with Osman: under Ertogril, coexistence with the Christian neighbors and tension with the House of Germiyan; under Osman, continued strife with the House of Germiyan but the main thrust of the raids eventually turning against Christian neighbors. In the chronicles that erase Dündar, the anonymous ones and Uruç in particular, gaza activity starts already under Ertogril only to be intensified under Osman — no change of policy, no conflict, no rivalry. Thus, it may well be worthwhile to look for consistency in the editorial policies of these texts. They do not seem to be haphazard aggregations of data that are somehow lumped together because the compiler happened to have access to them. The compilers chose what to include and exclude, and there is a certain logic to those choices because there is a moral or an argument of the tale that changes according to the editor.

There is an episode concerning Osman's disagreement with family members also in the vita of Haci Bektas, the earliest version of which seems to have been composed in the fifteenth century. Here, Dündar and Gündüz are collapsed into one character. Gündüz appears as Osman's uncle, who becomes the beg of the district of Sultanoni upon Ertogril's death. He arrests his nephew in the name of the Seljuk sultan because Osman, after coming of age, undertakes raids against Bithynian Christians despite the sultan's ban on raiding activity due to a treaty with Byzantium. On the way to prison, Osman is received by Haci Bektas and given the good news of future rulership. Later he is released and appointed beg of the same district. Gündüz is not mentioned again. There is an echo here of a historical tradition concerning familial conflict —

and of the same policy differences between the two generations mentioned above, but no murder.

If Osman had an made, then, and a violent conflict with him due to incompatible ambitions and differences of policy, this was by and large suppressed in the known examples of early Ottoman historiography. Until the grand synthesis of Nesri, only the author of the Haci Bektas stories mentions a brother who survived Ertogril. He also describes a policy difference between the uncle and the nephew that leads to tension, but it is apparently resolved without any violence by Osman against family members. Why should he need to resort to murder if he already had the blessings of Haci Bektas, the Superveli? Some other sources, from the second half of the fifteenth century, when fratricide was codified but still opposed in some vocal circles along with several other imperial policies, not only erase all memories of friction within the family in the early generations, even the presence of an made or potentially rival brothers, but also explicitly absolve Osman of such "evil" action. For Nesri and Ibn Kemal, fratricide was not an absolute evil any more but an accepted part of political life for its Perceived relative merit over the alternative of protracted civil war and/or fragmentation. These two historians
therefore not only were uninhibited about recording Osman's murder of his own uncle but also knew better than to editorialize against fratricide when they wrote about Ornhan and `Ala'eddin. Ibn Kemal in fact attributes to Osman the same reasoning that is advanced in Mehmed II's code to legitimize the legislation of fratricide: "saying that damage to an individual is preferable to damage to the public, he shot and killed ... his uncle Dündar, who entertained ambitions to chieftainship."[132] In short, the stubborn old man got what he deserved; why should one fuss about it?

Given all this, one is tempted to conclude that the later authors may well be telling a truth that is suppressed by earlier authors due to their narrative priorities. With respect to the historicity of Dündar, there seems to be further confirmation in a piece of "hard" evidence found in the archives. In the land survey of the district of Hudavendigar (including Sogut >) from A.H. 928/A.D. 1521, a plot is identified as land once held and then endowed by a certain Dündar Beg.[133] There is certainly room for caution here since no information is given about this person other than his name and title. But then, the plot of land happens to be in the village of Köprühisar, in the vicinity of which, Nesri specifically points out, Osman's mađbe was buried.

Obviously, later sources cannot be treated as mere derivatives. A care-

— 109 —

ful scrutiny of how a later compiler edits, what he or she chooses to maintain, omit, or change of the material available to him or her, reveals a good deal about the literary, political, and ideological proclivities of the editor and hopefully glimpses of the sources at the editor's disposal. Furthermore, later sources may provide information from earlier ones now lost to us. It is dear that Nesri (d. ca. 1520), Leunclavius (1533?-93), Muneccimbasi (d. 1702), to take a few examples from different periods, had access to works that we have not yet been able to locate or to as yet unidentified manuscript versions of works we know from other, variant copies. Until the recent discovery of the Menakibu'l-kudsiyye, containing the stories of Baba Ilyas and his descendants, Uruç was our only source for some fascinating information on the Baba'i Revolt, which took place more than two centuries before he wrote. Nesri may have read Dündar's story in some written source which may or may not eventually be discovered. Or perhaps he heard it told by a raconteur. In either case, his account of it two centuries after the fact seems to relate a reliable report about a crucial incident in Osman's political career.[134]

Clearly, the task of the historian is not as easy as using the early or tardy appearance of sources as the criterion of their reliability. Nor is there a clear-cut single path of ideological evolution whereby the meaning of these rich texts can be ascertained by wholesale characterizations.

Gaza: An Ideology of Schoolmen?

The dismissal of the chroniclers' tradition creates yet another serious problem. Those who refuse to assign the gaza principle any role in early Ottoman history write it off as a later ideological construct, but even so the question remains: whose construct is it? Lindner, again the most systematic of the critics of the gaza thesis, confronts this question and claims that the gaza ideology that is
reflected in the 1337 inscription is due to the Muslim scholars who "began to
gather in the Ottoman domains" in the reign of Orhan. "In the earliest days the
most visible representatives of Islam were dervishes, but soon thereafter more
orthodox figures emigrated from the east in order to serve, and be served by,
the Ottomans ... to the secure revenues accruing from the settled administration
of the Ottoman future they added the gift of an orthodox heroic past.... The
gaza became a useful convention for interpreting, to orthodox and sedentary
audiences, the formative years of the dynasty."[135] No doubt an influx of
Muslim schoolmen to Ottoman domains occurred during the rule of Orhan, or even
as early as that of Osman, as the

— 110 —

traditions concerning the conquest of Karacahisar imply. However, no sources
link these schoolmen specifically to the gaza ideology, though undoubtedly they
were well aware of the concept and upheld their own version of it.
On the contrary, one exceptionally poignant line of criticism encountered in
early Ottoman chronicles representing the gazi point of view is the one raised
against the danismends (schoolmen) and the ulema who came to the Ottoman domains
from the cultural centers. These sources accuse such groups of introducing many
novelties and leading the rulers astray from their original path. The tenor of
this criticism is nowhere as sharp as in the anonymous chronicles and, to a
lesser extent, in Apz's text, namely, in the sources that can be the most
closely associated with the gazi-dervish milieu. If the Muslim schoolmen coming
from the east were the innovators and propagators of the gaza ideology, why are
the books reflecting that gaza ideology vehemently critical of them? The truth
of the matter is that the more orthodox figures who emigrated from the east were
rivals of the dervishes, who were "the most visible representatives of Islam"
and of the struggle for the faith, as these were understood in the early years
of the Ottomans. Furthermore, it would be unfair to another, often neglected,
social group to restrict the representatives of religious life in early Ottoman
history to the dervishes. Looking at fifteenth- and sixteenth-century land
surveys conducted in the areas of early Ottoman conquests, which meticulously
record the grants and endowments made by the previous generations, it is clear
that a large group of fakihs, apparently not as sophisticated as the ulema in
terms of their educational background and administrative expertise, enjoyed the
support of early Ottoman chiefs and warriors in return for religio-juridical
services.[136] This group, too, would obviously have much to lose with the
ascendancy of the medrese-trained scholar-bureaucrats, the ulema.
The ties of the dervishes to the gazi milieu are attested to in the
hagiographies and the gazi lore analyzed above; copious evidence of the ties of
both dervishes (naturally, of some orders) and fakihs to the early Ottoman
chiefs and warriors can be found in the land surveys. No wonder that the most
lively and sympathetic accounts of early Ottoman gaza traditions were maintained
among the later representatives of these milieux. The anonymous chronicles and
the YF-Apz narrative are imbued with a nostalgia for those early years when
their ruler, as these sources would have it, had not yet been seduced by the
ulema and the courtiers into adopting the habits of sedentary, bureaucratic
Two aspects of this criticism must be emphasized: it represents a consistent argument against the development of a centralized administrative apparatus, and there is a certain logic to the distribution of the critical passages in different chronicles. One of the most important lines of censure is directed against the Çandarli family, of ulema background, that nearly monopolized the top juridical and administrative offices in the Ottoman state from the midfourteenth to the midfifteenth century. While Çandarlis bear the brunt of the chroniclers' attacks, the rest of the ulema is not spared; not even the Ottoman family remains untouched. A few passages need to be cited to gauge the tenor of that critique, raised by authors who champion the cause of gaza, against particular developments in the Ottoman enterprise as brought about by the schoolmen who came from the cultural centers:

At that time [the reign of Murad I (1362-89)] ... the rulers [padishah ] were not greedy. Whatever came into their hands they gave away again, and they did not know what a treasury was. But when [Çandarli] Hayreddin Pasha came to the Gate [of government] greedy scholars became the companions of the rulers. They began by displaying piety and then went on to issue rulings. "He who is a ruler must have a treasury," they said.... Whatever oppression and corruption there is in this country is due to scholars.... [They] commit adultery and pederasty, lend money on interest, and make no difference between permitted and forbidden.... Until Vulkoglu's daughter came to him, Yildirim Khan did not know what drinking parties were. He did not drink and held no carouses. In the times of Osman, Orkhan Ghazi, and Murad, wine was not drunk. At that time there were ulema who made their words effective. At that time the Sultans were ashamed before the ulema.... When the Persians and the Karamanlis became the companions of the rulers of the house of Osman, these princes commited all kinds of sins.... Until then nothing was known of keeping account books. The practice of accumulating money and storing it in a treasury comes from them.... When [Çandarli] 'Ali Pasha ... became vizier, sin and wickedness increased.... The house of Osman was a sturdy people, but these outsiders came to them and introduced all kinds of tricks. In short, members of the Çandarli family, along with other schoolmen, are blamed for the introduction of such "evil" practices as the establishment of a treasury and of regular bookkeeping procedures since they "had no thought of the end and did not remember that they would have to leave it all behind them." The institutionalization spearheaded by the Çandarli, then, is presented as a denial of the profound truth that informed and guided the founding fathers of the frontiers: the world's transitoriness. One could legitimately enjoy the bounty of booty, as we saw above, but only if one knew where and when to give of one's self to higher
principles. Such sacrifices were made by the earlier generations, the chroniclers imply, because worldly accumulation was not their main concern; they knew they were merely mortal human beings.[140] This juxtaposition serves to explain the major problem of early Ottoman historical consciousness: Bayezid's defeat to Timur. Having been steered by cunning ulema toward a new political orientation that abandoned the frontier spirit, he could not maintain the realm of his ancestors, the glorious gazis.

The chroniclers were clear about the fact that the conflict of political orientations was not a matter only of abstract principles. The structures and practices introduced by the schoolmen are also decried in terms of their concretely negative effects on those good old frontier folk. Çandarlı `Ali Pasa, for instance, "gathered pretty boys around himself and called them pages [icoglan]. When he had misused them for a while, he let them go and gave them posts. Before that time there were the old-timers who were the heads of families; these held all the posts; they were not sent away and not dismissed, and their positions were not given to others."[141] Some of the "old-timer" gazi and beg families were thus being reduced to dismissable appointees as a centralized state started to take shape; but they had started to lose ground against the centralizing orientation already in the former generation.

Among the nefarious innovations of Kara Halil, the patriarch of the Çandarlı family, was a tax that was dearly aimed at skimming the gaza booty of the frontier warriors. The idea for this tax is said to have come from a certain Kara Rüstem, a "Karamanian Turk," namely, an outsider to the world of the frontiers, who was one of those who "filled the world with all kinds of cunning tricks." The only "cunning trick" that is reported about this Rüstem is that he suggests to Çandarlı Kara Halil, who was serving as the kadi`asker (judge of the affairs of the military-administrative class) at the time, that one-fifth (hums) of the slaves captured in the raids, like other kinds of booty, ought to be taken by the state treasury. Çandarlı finds the suggestion sound in terms of the religious law and relays the message to Murad I, who adopts this ihdas (novelty). That, of course, is the beginning of a new army under the direct control of the House of Osman, yeñi çeri (Janissary), that was evidently staffed at first through this tax called pencik (one-fifth).

The tax is obviously exacted from the gazis and possibly as a punishment for their independent actions in Rumelia when the Gelibolu link was severed. It is significant that Kara Rüstem is appointed to collect the

— 113 —
tax in Gelibolu, the transit port of the massive war booty from Rumelia into Anatolia. Naturally, he cannot have functioned as a pencik emini (supervisor of the "fifth") there between 1366 and 1376, when that port city was lost to the Ottomans. It is almost certain, therefore, that Rüstem oversaw the collection of that levy only after the recapture of that city in 1376/77, when Muted I reasserted his power over the gazis in Rumelia, who seem to have followed a semiautonomous course of action during the previous decade, as we shall discuss later. At any rate, the tax was imposed on the gazis by the bureaucratic central state guided by scholars emigrating from the east, and it is dearly the
resentment of the gazi circles that we find reflected in the chronicles. It is certainly sometime during the fourteenth century that the sedentary administrative traditions of classical Islam began to enjoy influence and then gain ascendancy in the Ottoman state. Islamic and Anatolian cultural history shows us, however, that gaza had never been a consistently dominant political value for sedentary Islamic states; in fact, the raiders of the frontiers were shunned and even degraded (as `ayyarun, "scoundrels," for instance) by the learned schoolmen and courtiers, representatives of classical Islamic traditions. How can we suppose that migrants from this milieu brought the gaza ideology to the Ottoman domains? Furthermore, the recorded actions of these schoolmen contradicted the interests of the frontier warriors and drew criticism from the spokesmen of the latter group.

This is not to say that the Muslim schoolmen opposed the gaza ideology. How could they at a time when the Ottoman family were enlisting the gazis of other principalities (especially renowned figures of the Karasi emirate, who held the area right across the channel from Gelibolu) for an even more vigorous expansion in the Balkans? The imported or appropriated gazis from other principalities who became affiliated with the Osmanli enterprise during Orhan's reign must have bolstered the gaza ethos at that time.

The medrese-educated intellectuals serving the Ottomans did not oppose the gaza ideology but interpreted it differently; they gave it an orthodox coloring somewhat removed from the frontier traditions. In their version of Ottoman history, which retains a fascination with the quaint charm of the early Ottomans' naivety but omits most of the blatantly critical passages, the natural conclusion of earlier successes is the centralized Ottoman state with its sophisticated administrative apparatus. The thread binding the narratives written in the gazi-derbish-fakih mode, on the other hand, is the increasing alienation of the Ottoman ruler from the world of the earlier and egalitarian frontier society in favor of a sultanic rule. It is hard not to recognize the underlying sense of moral decline, or the waning of `asabiyya (group solidarity), as Ibn Khaldun would have said, in the anonymous chronicles and in Apz.[142] The family of Osman, the center of these narratives (which are, after all, called Chronicles of the House of Osman), retains its purity up to a certain point — for three generations, to be exact — namely, until Bayezid I. Notably, cooperating with Christian Bithynians does not tarnish this purity, but their fall from the innocent world of struggle and solidarity is marked by the influx of the ulema.

Ménage summarizes the nature of the latter's resented influence: "in the good old days honest ghazis were not pestered by the central government; there was no penilk (= khums, one of the basic prescriptions of Islam) to tax private enterprise; there were no laws compelling the surrender of an earlier sound currency for a debased new one; and there were no nasty ic-oghlans (everyone knows how they won favor) coming out of the Palace to lord it over free-born Turks."[143] Obviously, all these practices were typical of or acceptable within the sedentary states of classical Islam, but they contradicted the norms and
demands of frontier warriors. Hence, these criticisms are to be found not in Sukrullah or Ibn Kemal but in the anonymous chronicles and Apz. The sources that are critical of this transformation in Ottoman political life cannot possibly be classified as court chronicles; nor can the championing of the gaza principle in early Ottoman history be presented as a construct of orthodox schoolmen.

Altrihistorie in the Fifteenth Century: The Vita of Seyyid 'Ali Sultan and Tales of Haci Ilbegi

The best sampler of the garlic flavor must be the differing accounts of the gazis' achievements in different "historical" narratives. That is, some of the sources leave no doubt that they present us with alternative accounts that cannot be treated as different layers of one tradition. For example, even the harshest of the anonymous chronicles seems tame when compared to one particular source that, ironically, has no direct criticism to make of the House of Osman. The challenge to Ottoman historiography here is through an unabashed "altèrhistoire" that distributes the credit for the conquest of Thrace, one of the most glorious feats of the fourteenth-century gazis of western Asia Minor, in a shockingly different manner from all the other known chronicles.

A detailed analysis of the Vita of Seyyid 'Ali Sultan, an enigmatic source among the fifteenth-century flurry of frontier narratives, would be inappropriate here. Given the fact that it seems to be trying to defend one of its protagonists against defamation and his followers against loss of some of their rights, it was most likely written during Mehmed II's expropriation drive or soon afterward when the names and rights of the losers were being restored by Mehmed's son.

The most curious aspect of this work is its radical departure from the accepted story line of the conquest of Thrace. Here, too, the House of Osman is the royal family, and in fact the Ottoman ruler is a higher political authority than the protagonists, but the role of the other gazis is much grander than in any of the chronicles of the House of Osman. The real heroes of the work are Seyyid 'Ali Sultan, also called Kizil Deli, and his companions, who leave their home in Khorasan for the land of Rum after the appearance of the Prophet to Seyyid 'Ali in a dream. Seyyid 'Ali and company are perfect combinations of warrior and dervish; their military role is more pronounced than that of many other holy figures who represent a similar combination, even more than Sari Saltuk. The work was clearly produced after the Kizil Dell cult (near Dimetoka, now Dhidhimoteichon, in Greek Thrace) had been incorporated into the Bektasiyye, because our protagonists pay a homage-visit to Haci Bektas as soon as they arrive in Rum. Once the latter blesses them and assigns them to specific ranks (i.e., formats the Khorasanian raw material into a Rumi configuration), they join the Ottoman sultan, who happens to be on the Anatolian side of the Dardanelles pondering ways of sending his forces across the channel into Rumelia.

Suleyman Papa, an Ottoman prince who is the champion of the earliest conquests in Thrace according to Ottoman historiography, is among the forces that successfully undertake the crossing, but he is not the leader. His death, a
major story in Ottoman chronicles, is reported here without much significance attached to it; nor does it imply anything in terms of the future of the venture. More strikingly, it is not followed by the replacement of Suleyman Pasa by his brother, later Murad I, as in the other chronicles, which thus convey an image of a seamless Ottoman leadership in the Thracian conquests.[146] Emir Sultan, another major figure of the Ottoman chronicles and the son-in-law of Bayezid I, appears in this vita but in a much lesser capacity.[147] He comes to Anatolia in the company of Seyyid `Ali and is appointed the standard-bearer of the latter's army by Haci Bektas. While moving from victory to victory in Thrace, the conquerors fall upon a town where they cannot find any water to perform their ablutions. Emir

— 116 —
Sultan, seemingly unhappy with his rank or the amount of recognition he is getting, hastens to strike his stick on the ground, and a spring emerges. One might expect the other gazi-dervishes to be pleased with this performance, but peer recognition should not be taken for granted among this competitive lot despite their mystical-heroic vocation. Seyyid `Ali first reprimands Emir Sultan for his "hastiness" (tizlik) (i.e., for showing off) when there are so many others with power and then bumps him off with a lethal glance. After burying the deceased next to the water source he had discovered, the dervish-conquerors move on to new adventures.[148]

It has been proposed by Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr that Seyyid `Ali (alias Kizil Deli) may well be Haci Ilbegi, the leading figure among the Karasi warriors who joined the Ottoman forces upon the incorporation of their principality by Orhan Beg, which occurred in several stages beginning in the 1330s.[149] While Ottoman historiography has by and large represented the inclusion of the Karasi gazis as a fraternal integration of like-minded warriors who were happy to serve the struggle for the faith under Ottoman leadership, there are several indications that the relationship was not so smooth. The Karasi, after all, not only were the only ones to adopt the title of khan in that frontier environment but also must have had no mean claim to the championship of gaza, since they derived their descent from Danismend Gazi. Additionally, some of the Karasi warriors incorporated by the Ottomans, namely Haci Ilbegi and company, apparently also had claims to a Seljuk lineage.[150] Whether such claims were ever accepted by their neighbors or even their own subjects is not dear, but it hints at the nature of the Karasi self-image.

Given all this, it is not surprising to find laconic but distinct traces of discord between these warriors and the Ottoman ruler. Some of the anonymous chronicles, after reporting the pro-Ottoman version of the victory of 1371 against Serbian forces by the Meriç (Maritsa) River, relate a variant in which it is a superhuman effort by Ilbegi that defeats the Serbs while the Ottoman army is still asleep. Some of these chronicles also relate that Ilbegi was executed under the orders of Murad I, and by a kul to boot, while most of the chronicles prefer to omit the formers demise altogether. Whatever the precise nature of his death, it is curious that later Ottoman cadastral surveys include no freehold or endowment in the name of a conqueror like Ilbegi. It may well be
a pro-Ottoman counterattack on his reputation that created another version of Ilbegi's biography in which he is a Cain-like figure who murders his own brother because the latter gave the family lands to Orhan. The people of Bergama hate Ilbegi so much, however, that they capture him and cede the town to Orhan anyway; Ilbegi dies after two painful years in prison.[151]

Like the Osman and Dündar stories mentioned above, a body of tales of Haci Ilbegi was obviously in circulation, and it may be related to the construction of the Kizil Deli cult.[152] From my point of view here, it does not matter at all whether Ilbegi indeed did all that is attributed to him, whether he was executed or not, or whether he is to be identified with Seyyid `Ali, which seems highly probable. It is certain that there once were variant accounts of his life and deeds that are not reconcilable with one another. The general thrust of these stories and the incidents reported in the hagiography of Kizil Deli, whether the two are related or not, indicate that the credit for some of the major gaza feats in Thrace was contested by the Ottomans and other warriors. It may be more important to note this variance than to discover who was right. We shall turn to the history of these events again in the next chapter, but whatever their relationship to historical reality, that very conflict over the appropriation of the past, both immediate and remote, was dearly a part of early Ottoman realities and must once have resonated with meaning to actual tensions. It is not surprising that variant accounts of the capture of Thrace represent a major line of tension in our sources about early Ottoman history. The transplantation of the frontier energies and of gazi activity across the channel, along with the ensuing conquests of Thracian towns leading into the Balkans, constitutes one of the most significant successes of the Anatolian gazis, and it can be argued that it ultimately sealed the fate of Byzantium or at least confirmed Turco-Muslim presence in southeastern Europe. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, the few decades after the crossing into Rumelia were particularly tension-ridden. During this period, the emerging Ottoman state, like so many others that had sprung up in similar conditions, faced the abyss of fragmentation. The House of Osman proved much more successful, however, than any of its forerunners or competitors in establishing its supremacy over its former gazi allies and neighbors, who were gradually but systematically rendered into commanders and fief-holders and their actions and duties regulated by the dictates of a centralized sultanic state. It is not surprising that if history remembers them, it is basically through their services to the development of the Ottoman state.
Do not cultivate a vineyard, you'll be bound.
Do not cultivate grains, you'll be ground.
Pull the camel, herd the sheep.
A day will come, you'll be crowned.

The poem was recorded by an ethnographer in the earlier part of this century among the seminomads who survived in the hills of the Bithynian Olympus where Osman's tribe once roamed. Maybe the thirteenth-century tribesfolk did not know this particular quatrain, but its lesson was certainly not lost on them. While they roamed rather than settling down to agriculture, "a day came," and a certain Osman, who seems to have been a leading member of the tribe's leading house (or rather, tent), imagined that he could carve a body politic under his leadership, that he could be Osman Beg. He decided to seize that opportune moment and never looked back.

Determining the auspicious "day" to assert one's will over a tribe in such a way as to make explicit its political nature was a matter of sensing the opportune moment and seizing it.[1] As implied by the term used in premodern Islamic sources for the making of a political bid, huruc (com-
there was no reason to assume that it would be accomplished by the Ottomans. Why were they able to harness the frontier dynamism and the gaza ethos, as well as the mixed cultural heritage they all shared to some extent, more successfully than the rival polities? Or rather, what were the factors that enabled the Ottomans to eventually do better than the other statelings and even the Seljuk state?

Insofar as the gaza ethos played a role, it must be remembered that the Ottomans were not the only ones who could claim to be fighting in the path of God. A similar point can be made about "tribalism" or any other notion, concept, ethos, principle, ideology, or institution that one can neither show nor logically expect to be uniquely Ottoman. In other words, the investigation of the rise of Ottoman Power must always proceed comparatively.

Furthermore, the question must be continually reformulated with respect to the different stages in the development of Ottoman power.

— 120 —

The empire was not built by 1337, the year the Bursa inscription went up, which has been pegged as marking the supersession of tribalism by the gaza ideology. Even if a phenomenon like inclusivist tribalism looms large in the earliest Ottoman success, how are we to explain the rest of Ottoman state building? The question of the "cause(s) of Ottoman success" cannot be expected to yield a unitary answer for the whole period one needs to consider. It must be raised and reraised in, say, 1300 or 1330 or 1360 or 1410. The answers in each case might differ, at least in terms of the emphases one needs to place on different factors.

An ideological commitment to gaza was in all likelihood common to all these periods, but its character and intensity kept changing, just as inclusivism was never fully abandoned by the Ottomans but was constantly redefined. It may be more significant that in all these phases there were warriors who wanted to see and present themselves as representatives of that ideological complex of heroism, honor, and striving in the name of Islam. As we shall analyze in this chapter, however, their standing within the principality and their relationship to the House of Osman also kept changing, as did those of other social forces like the dervishes. The social and political configuration as a whole kept changing while power, shared and contested in varying degrees at any given moment, was gradually concentrated in the hands of an administration serving a dynasty. This chapter will focus on the general dynamics of that change and its important phases in order to understand the rise of the Ottoman state as a process rather than as a mechanical relationship between a particular cause and an outcome.

Many scholars have noted that the location of Osman's beglik provided it with a unique advantage, which will be reconsidered below, in the earlier stages of its development. But it was not just a matter of the circumstances in which the Ottomans happened to find themselves. They also acted upon those circumstances in certain ways and forged their destiny. In this respect, the Ottoman practice of unigeniture, for instance — of keeping their territories intact in each succession under the full control of a single heir — stands out as a significant
difference from the other principalities, which allowed for fragmentation by recognizing the rights of the different heirs according to Turco-Mongol tradition. This was just one of the means whereby the Ottomans pursued a centralizing logic and protected the expanding realm under their grip from fragmentation much more consistently than any other polity that existed in those four frontier centuries of Anatolia. The other, and much more complicated, story is of the way the Ottoman state builders manipulated, often with success, a constantly shifting matrix of alliances and tensions with other sociopolitical forces. This was a process consisting of a series of carefully selected exclusions as well as inclusions, improvisations as well as continuities. To put it comparatively, the earlier or contemporaneous Turco-Mongol and Turco-Muslim polities in the region were unable to resolve the tensions between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies as effectively as did the Ottomans.

All the principalities were heirs to the political culture of Seljuk Anatolia, which Köprülü deems so important in Ottoman state building, but the Ottomans were much more experimental in reshaping it to need, much more creative in their bricolage of different traditions, be they Turkic, Islamic, or Byzantine. A comparison made by a historian of art between the architecture of the early Ottomans and that of their longest-lasting rivals, the Karamanids, can also be read in terms of its relevance to the political plane:

The Ottoman architect delved into the basic principles of architecture and concentrated his energies on problems of space, form and structure. The Karamanid architect, on the other hand, was unable to graduate from the frame of medieval Seljuk architecture ... and looked for monumentality in surface plasticity. And this attitude prevented Karamanid architecture from going any further than being a continuation of Seljuk architecture, or further than preserving a tradition instead of creating something original as the culmination of a conscious development.[2]

This chapter attempts to retrace some of the significant steps in the path of Ottoman state building. As a narrative, it is a highly selective one that does not aim to cover all the events in early Ottoman history that even this author happens to know. My goal is rather to follow the trajectory of the Ottomans' centralizing thrust, which supplemented the expansion but was carried out at the expense, whenever necessary, of the forces that were included in the expansionary process. Along the way, I will point to their selective use of several strategies to bring about or dissolve a network of alliances to consolidate and expand power while maintaining dynastic control over it. While this process kept producing tensions, the Ottoman success was in overcoming those tensions, real or potential conflicts, and eventually developing a vision of a centralized state, shaping it according to circumstances, and maintaining their drive toward it.
Strategizing for Alliances and Conflicts: The Early Beglik

The Ottoman historical tradition maintains, with some exceptions, that the tribe that later represented the core of Osman's earliest base of power came to Asia Minor in his grandfather's generation in the wake of the Chingisid conquests in central Asia. This makes chronological and historical sense, but otherwise the details of their story, including the identity of the grandfather, are too mythological to be taken for granted. Most importantly, it is also unclear when and how they ended up in Bithynia, at the very edge of Turco-Muslim Anatolia. This is important because it could tell us what, if any, ties they had to any political structures in the established centers and what their status was in that march environment, surrounded by Christians, by other Turkish and "Tatar" tribes, and, toward the northeast, east, and south, by some begliks recognized by Seljuk and/or Ilkhanid authority.

That they hailed from the Kayi branch of the Oguz confederacy seems to be a creative "rediscovery" in the genealogical concoction of the fifteenth century. It is missing not only in Ahmedi but also, and more importantly, in the YF-Apz narrative, which gives its own version of an elaborate genealogical family tree going back to Noah. If there was a particularly significant claim to Kayi lineage, it is hard to imagine that Yahsi Fakih would not have heard of it. This in fact does not contradict Yazici, who gives the earliest written reference to the Kayi in the 1430s but also adds that the traditions of the Oguz, presumably including the "true lineage" of Ertogrul's tribe, had been all but forgotten in his day. So they had to be re-remembered. Sukrullah, writing somewhat later, tells us that it took a trip to the Karakoyunlu court in 1449, where he was sent as the Ottoman ambassador, to learn about the Ottoman family's descent from Oguz and Kayi. And despite Köprülü's disclaimer to the effect that Kayi lineage was not particularly prestigious and hence not worth forgery, the political stakes are obvious in both cases. At least Yazici, thought that "so long as there are descendants of Kayi, rulership belongs to nobody else"; and Sukrullah was presented with this evidence as proof of kinship between the Ottomans and the Karakoyunlu at a time when the two states were considering alliance against the Akkoyunlu.

On the other hand, despite the skepticism surrounding the historicity of some of the names that appear in later chronicles in the late thirteenth century, especially Osman's father, Ertogrul, and father-in-law, Ede Bali, there is sufficient evidence to take these traditions seriously. Ede Bali's case will be considered below; as for Ertogrul, we have already noted the coin on which Osman struck his father's name. There seem to be good reasons to consider the historicity of even Ertogrul's brother Dündar, as we discussed in the last chapter. The more important question is, what kinds of activities did Ertogrul, Dündar, and their tribe engage in other than nomadic pastoralism?

With respect to this issue, the Ottoman sources dearly diverge. While some of
the chronicles attribute gaza raids and some military success to Ertogril, others portray that generation as militarily and politically inactive, at least after they came to Bithynia. The YF-Apz narrative, for instance, states that at the time of Ertogril, after the tribe moved to Bithynia, "there was no fighting and warfare, they just moved between the summer and winter pastures."[6] About Samsa Cavus, who came to the region with Ertogril, we read that "he got along with the infidels of Mudurnu."[7] The story of the conflict between Osman and his uncle (analyzed in the previous chapter) also suggests a change in the policy of the tribe. It seems from all this that a public and competitive political bid was not made until Osman. The circumstances that propelled the tribe to active participation in the political life of the frontiers, and thus ultimately to historical record, may well have come about in the 1290s as Togan suggests.[8]

At least so much is certain: the tribe enjoyed a fundamental upswing in the level of its military success and visible political claims under Osman's leadership so that it was the name of Osman and not that of any of his forefathers which ultimately defined the polity. We do not know by what name the tribe was known before his "coming our"; according to a nineteenth-century tradition, which smacks of invention, Ertogril's tribe may have had the impersonal and rather lackluster name of Karakeçili (Of the Black Goat).[9] Whatever Ertogril and his "Karakeçili" may have accomplished, they were not visible enough to appear in the sources of the literate cultures around them. But as Osmanli (namely, "those who follow Osman"), the tribe and the polity went a long way.

If there is any point at which it would make sense to replace secular notions of heroism (alp -hood in medieval Turkic cultures) with gaza, this would be the time. But even before that, it seems improbable that Ertogril's generation would be unfamiliar with the notion of gaza. In any case, the main rivalry of Ertogril seems to have been with the House of Germiyan, and it continued into the early part of Osman's beglik. We have already seen that being a gazi was never understood to involve indiscriminate warfare against infidels and that it could involve warfare against coreligionists. If a unique passage in the Oxford Anonymous manuscript is accurate, Ertogril's tribe was given pastureland around Sogut when the neighboring area that later ended up as the land of Germiyan was still part of "the abode of war," namely, before the Kütahya area was conquered and the House of Germiyan had been settled in the western Phrygian uc.[10] Thus, Ertogril's tribe may have seen its earlier freedom of movement threatened by the arrival of the relatively more powerful Germiyan and resented it. It is well known that the Germiyan played the role of an "elder brother" in those frontier areas until at least the early fourteenth century. Tensions between Osman's tribe and the House of Germiyan must also be due to the fact that the latter served the Seljuks in the suppression of the 1239-41 revolt led by the Baba'i dervishes, many of whom, such as Ede Bali, fled to Bithynia, where they eventually forged close ties with the proto-Ottomans.
Still another mystery surrounds the early years and identity of Osman. In the earliest Byzantine sources referring to him, his name is spelled with a (Image not available.) as Atouman or Atman. Considering that the Arabic name ‘Uthman and its Turkish variant ‘Osman are regularly rendered with a q or (Image not available.) or (Image not available) in the Greek sources, some scholars have concluded that the founder of the Ottoman beglik did have a Turkish name at first, perhaps At(a)man, and that it was later changed to ‘Osman .[11] Curiously, one of the earliest Arabic sources to mention his name, the geographical work of al-‘Umari from the 1330s, also spells it with (Image not available) in one of two occurrences (but "correctly" in another mention).[12] And there is an echo of this "other name" in a later Turkish source, the hagiography of Haci Bektas Veli , written in the fifteenth century.[13] One does not need to revive Gibbons's theory of Osman's conversion to Islam from paganism to consider this name change possible and relevant. Turkish names were, as they are now, commonly given to children born Muslim, and this practice, though diminished, did not disappear within the Ottoman family very quickly; the name of Ertogrul was given to the eldest son of Bayezid I ca. 1376 and that of Oguz to a son of Prince Cem in the second half of the fifteenth century. Orhan's imam, to choose an example from the class of religious functionaries, called his son Yahsi . Namely, being born with a Turkish name certainly did not imply being born non-Muslim.[14] If Osman was called Atman, however, and adopted a similar but more prestigious Arabic name later on, this could point to an important turning point in the self-identity or political ideology of the early Ottomans, probably an intensification of their claims to representing the struggle for the faith sometime after the huruc of Ertogrul's son.

The fragmentary nature of Bithynia's political landscape at the time can hardly be exaggerated. The dynamics of political life in the area seem to have been shaped by units as small as villages, small towns, nomadic tribes (with no sizable confederative articulation), and dervish or monastic religions communities and attached estates. These small units fashioned their political destinies mostly within the matrix of local dynamics, usually with minimal and sporadic intervention by the authorities of established political centers. Many decisions and preparations concerning war and peace, alliance and conflict, were apparently made locally by the leaders of those communities. Even the long siege of Bursa, one of the most important towns in Bithynia, was suffered by its inhabitants with no significant involvement on the part of the imperial government in Constantinople.[15] This political wilderness is one of the important reasons why the notion of "frontiers" is applicable to western Anatolia at this time. However, the area was not free from all interference by the larger authorities in political centers. Not only did they have real muscle, which they occasionally used in these regions, but perhaps more importantly they also maintained significant control over mechanisms of legitimation that were part of the political language of the frontiers. Thus, the autonomy of small frontier powers should not be exaggerated. Whatever their levels of physical and/or mental distance, the
Byzantines and the Mongols, and even the Seljuks, maintained some authority over the frontiers. Even if that authority was not able to have its representatives there all the time, even if it was obliged to comply with some cases of fait accompli, it was needed at least as a referent to provide some credibility to one's claims. With respect to the Turco-Muslim side of the western Anatolian frontier in the final decades of the thirteenth century, one can speak of multiple layers of authority: (1) the Mongol ilkhanate and its governors, (2) the Seljuk sultanate, (3) the Mamluk sultanate (mostly in the south and the southwest), (4) occasional Seljuk princes who were physically present in the frontiers but whose eyes were set on the sultanate after establishing a power base for themselves, (5) begs of the uc, who were appointees or at least nominally approved by the Mongols or the Seljuks, (6) begs of tribes, who may also have been begs of the uc as defined in the previous category, (7) holy figures with a following, and (8) upstarts who aspired to, and some of whom did, become begs. Given the complexity and fluidity of the frontier regions, it would be a mistake to present the "Turco-Muslim side" as a self-enclosed entity, or a "national team," as it were. The Byzantine emperor, too, was not without direct influence among both Muslims and Christians if we consider the case of 'Ali Amourios (to be discussed below) or the presence of various local Christian lords and communities of monks. Not all of the powers representing the established political centers of the region were present with the same force at any given moment; it is not only their capability but also their interest that ebbed and flowed. The relations between these layers kept changing as claims and ambitions dashed or coincided to shuffle different powers into allied or hostile camps.

Osman apparently displayed considerable political acumen in that environment where alliances could and did cut across religious, ethnic, and tribal lines; symbiotic relations developed between nomadic and settled communities. The YF-Apz narrative relates stories of Osman's neighborly relations with the Christian chiefs of towns and villages, and there is no reason to assume that these were fictionalized in the fifteenth century. When he hears his brother propose that they ought to bum and destroy the area around them, Osman is said to have replied: "If we destroy these areas, our own town of Karacahisar cannot prosper. What needs to be done is to maintain mudara (feigned) friendship with our neighbors." It is also related that Osman's tribe, on its way to summer pastures, deposited some of their belongings for safekeeping at the fortress of Bilecik and on their return sent its tekvur, as a token of their appreciation, "cheese and buttercream in animal skins as well as fine carpets and kilims." The nature of these gift items also illustrates the nature of the symbiosis that could develop between the pastoralists and the agriculturalists or townsmen due to the different items produced by each. Commercial exchange was another facet of this symbiosis; soon after taking charge of his first urban possession, Osman is said to have set up a town market that would bring together infidels of the surrounding areas and Muslims of the Ottoman and Germiyan begliks.[16]
Insofar as the gaza ethos is concerned, we have seen in the last chapter that it was intimately tied to a code of honor. Old camaraderies, favors, promises, and bonds carried a certain weight. Surely they could be broken, but the breaking of bonds needed to be given meaning within that code. The supporters of Osman preferred to tell the story of Osman's attack on the tekvur of Bilecik, his former ally, as something that occurred only after Osman had heard that the tekvur was about to play a trick on him. On the other hand, there is no reason to expect that some of those friendships did not continue. Alexios Philanthropenos was so respected by the Turks that they were willing to drop the 1323 siege of Philadelphia "remembering the kindness and valor he had displayed in 1295."[17]

The most-acclaimed warriors of such frontier conditions have always been those who could, while upholding their own cause with courage and determination, display statesmanly compassion and magnanimity toward the enemy. Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin) is probably the best-known example of a medieval warrior who elegantly combined these two, seemingly contradictory, qualities.[18]

As neighborly or chivalric as Osman's relations with other Bithynians may have been, some of those relations eventually turned sour as he set out to expand his domain. Maybe some tension was always inherent in such relationships, not just between Muslim and Christian but also between coreligionists. Different pieces of the Bithynian puzzle may well have been living with an awareness of the temporary nature of the post-Lascarid arrangement. The conversation that leads to Osman's argument against his brothers suggestion of burning and destroying starts with Osman's question as to the best methods of gathering soldiers and conquering lands. At least one of those neighbors was to become a permanent addition to Osman's political community, however. Mihal , the headman of the village of Harmankaya, apparently joined Osman's exploits quite early in the latter's career.[19] It is not dear when he converted to Islam, but some sources write of the resentment felt by some gazis of this "infidel" among them who had been participating in and apparently enjoying the benefits of their raids. While this may seem odd to some modern scholars, we have seen in the last chapter that even the canonical sources on "war for the faith" did not dismiss such cooperation offhand. In any case, Mihal did convert after a point, and his descendants, known as the Sons of Mihal or the House of Mihal (Mihalogullari or Al-i Mihal ), enjoyed the foremost rank among the gazis in Ottoman service, though their relationship to the House of Osman was not always free of tension. It has been pointed out that Osman's relation to Mihal , from a relatively equal partnership to vassalage to full incorporation in a new hierarchical structure, can be seen as the beginning of a particularly noteworthy pattern in "Ottoman methods of conquest."[20]

The picture of Osman's rivals would be incomplete without considering another "ethnic group" in post-Mongol Anatolia. Although some of them eventually became assimilated (or some left for central Asia with Timur after 1402), certain people called Tatar are distinguished from the Türkmen of the ucat and appear as foes of the Ottomans. These seem to be the non-Oguz Turks and Mongols who were,
or had been, associated with the Chingisid polity. Many of them had moved to the western

— 128 —
Anatolian frontiers and made up pieces of the intricate ethnopolitical puzzle there. Some, perhaps most, of them were pagan. In any case, the little band of Ertogrul and Osman apparently engaged in confrontations with the Çavdar Tatars in the land of the Germiyan in addition to competing with the House of Germiyan itself. Though the Ottoman chronicles do not refer to him, Cakü Beg of Göynük, mentioned in al-`Umari, must have been one of these Mongol/Tatar foes.[21] In fact, surmising from some Ottoman traditions, this rivalry with the Tatars and the Germiyan was higher in the early Ottoman agenda than the one with local Christians. The Christians may have been easier to cooperate with or subjugate and assimilate compared to the Tatars, who must have had more formidable military skills and possibly also strong political claims among Turco-Mongol tribes. In the early fifteenth century when Timur came into the area, the Tatars — still a distinct group and still not at ease with Ottoman supremacy — switched over to the side of the world conqueror, who sent them messages like the following to steal away their, evidently fickle, allegiance to Bayezid: "we have the same ancestors ... you are therefore truly a shoot from my stock ... your last king was Artana who died in the Faith and the greatest king in the realms of Rum was your least servant ... why should you be slaves of a man who is a son of slaves set free by Al-i Saljuk?"[22] The defeated and imprisoned Bayezid is reported to have beseeched Timur to "not leave the Tatars in this country, for they are material for wickedness and crime.... and they are more harmful to the Muslims and their countries than the Christians themselves."[23] It is impossible to determine the extent to which Osman acted with a long-term strategy. He may well have been following his predatory instincts and acting on the spur of the moment. But he cannot have missed the potential implications for the future of the family ties he knotted for himself and his son. One of his marriages was to the daughter of a sheikh who is said to have been at the head of a prosperous community of dervishes and pastoralists in the frontier. Since Sheikh Ede Bali and the wedding of his daughter to Osman appear at the end of the undoubtedly apocryphal dream story, and the two stories are narratologically closely linked to one another, the veracity of the marriage has been doubted as well.[24] That a certain Sheikh Ede Bali indeed lived in western Asia Minor in the first half of the fourteenth century can no longer be doubted because he is mentioned in Elvan Çelebi's hagiographical work, written in 1358/59.[25] The affiliation of the sheikh with the Vefa'i-Baba'i mystical

— 129 —
order in this source tallies perfectly with our information from other sources concerning the presence of representatives of that order around the early Ottomans. Geographically, Bithynia makes good sense for Baba'is to have chosen
to settle in, since they were pushed in that direction by Seljuk forces during the slaughter that followed the Baba'i Revolt of 1239-41. Finally, the Ottoman ties to the Baba'i, especially if strengthened by a wedding alliance with the family of a leading sheikh of that order, would seem to be part of the explanation for their hostile relations with the House of Germiyan. The latter had, after all, been rewarded by the Seljuks for their services in the repression of the Baba'i uprising.

Apz, who relates the liaison between the families of Osman and Ede Bali on the authority of one of the sheikh's descendants, also reports that Ede Bali had kinship ties through marriage to two other notable families: that of Çndarlı Halil and that of Taceddin-i Kurdi, well-known scholars who are among the early arrivals from areas with more-established educational institutions to enter Ottoman service. Even if a fifteenth-century chronicler, for some odd reason, were to make up such an intricate web of marital associations connecting three prominent families with many living descendants, it is hard to imagine how it could be accepted when such claims implied entitlements to so many resources. Later archival sources once again lend some credence to the assertions of Ede Bali's family: not only do land surveys identify various plots in Sogut as Osman's endowments to the sheikh, but also a document refers to him specifically as Osman's father-in-law.[26]

It can only be conjectured that marrying his son Orhan to the daughter of the tekvur of Yarhisar was likewise tied, at least partly, to political strategy. The legendary account of the way Osman crashed the wedding ceremony between the same bride and the tekvur of Bilecik, a friend up to that point, and carried her off suggests that part of the plan may have been to prevent an alliance between the two tekvurs.

Marriage strategies were built into the political gamesmanship in which Osman exerted himself with increasing success, which no doubt was partly due to some military undertakings. Of these we know nothing with certainty until the Battle of Bapheus, Osman's triumphant confrontation with a Byzantine force in 1301 (or 1302), which is the first datable incident in his life. Pachymeres, the chronicler who relates this event, adds that Osman enticed "many Turks" from the Meander region and from Paphlagonia to join his forces.[27] There is no reason to assume that all those warriors became permanent additions to Ottoman forces. Some of the begs were from neighboring polities that had their own identities, claims, and possibly rivalries with the Ottomans, at least for a while. Among the troops that defeated the Byzantine army in Bapheus, Pachymeres mentions a certain `Ali Amourios, who has been identified as a member of the Cobanoglu family, which held the most prominent position in the Paphlagonian uc in the thirteenth century. Three years later that coalition between Osman and `Ali had broken up since the latter "appeared willing to pass into Byzantine service, asking for the area near the Sangarios from Andronikos II."[28]

Of the nameless volunteers in Bapheus, some well-rewarded ones might have stayed on and become "Osmanlı," but others, either at periods of Ottoman inactivity or because their expectations were not met, might have joined another chief if he
was getting ready for what promised to be a lucrative raid, which often entailed sending out the news with the hope of luring volunteers. There must have been a good deal of warrior sharing or, to put it more competitively, body snatching among chieftaincies with ill-defined boundaries and only rudimentary structures of authority other than tribal ones, whatever tribalism implied in the early fourteenth century. As late as the 1330s, beglik forces consisted to a large extent of "swing warriors," who were ready to respond to calls of gaza by different chiefs.[29]

Despite such fluctuations, both Osman's following and his ability to attract volunteers at moments of raiding activity must have grown. Still, the budding beglik was so small in the 1310s that the Mevlevi order, when it sent out emissaries to make "spiritual vassals" of gazi begs of the frontiers, did not bother with the Ottomans. For quite some time, they were not the foremost representatives of frontier energy. This arguably helped the Ottoman emirate to construct its political traditions and institutions more gradually and solidly than some of the others — and much less conspicuously, for it was not touched by the wrath of the Ilkhanids, who, in the 1310s and 1320s, sent their governor to the western Anatolian frontiers in order to subdue the begs assuming too much autonomy. Rashid al-Din, the Persian chronicler of the Ilkhanids, and even Aksarayi, who personally participated in central state operations to subdue the frontier begs, do not refer to Osman among the various warlords they name.[30]

For quite some time, he and his son fought only local battles while the House of Aydin, for instance, faced off against various international forces in the Aegean area.

This relative inconspicuousness must have been yet another advantage of the location of Osman's base of power. There was also the fact that Sogut happened to be both an easily defended hill site and a town right by the major road that skirted the hill and extended from Constantinople to Konya.[31] This might not have mattered at other times, but the political fragmentation in the region had rendered small units much more significant than before. Above all, however, the first and foremost advantage, as noted by various scholars, turned out to be the proto-Ottomans' position at the very edge of the frontier. Their initial confrontations may have been with the Geriniyanid and Tatar tribes, but when they turned their attention to the towns of Byzantine Bithynia, no other polity could rival their military-strategic and sociopolitical position as neighbor-insiders. And in the competitive world of the marches, nothing succeeded like success. The little enterprise headed by Osman and sons achieved a series of lucrative raids and conquests of small Bithynian towns, and their success lured not only other warriors but also dervishes and scholar-scribes into their midst.

According to Yahsi Fakih, news of another Ottoman achievement spread and lured another kind of population into Osman's domains: "the justice and generosity" of the early Ottomans, relates Apz, probably on the authority of the son of Orhan's imam, lured fleeing peasants of the conquered territories back to their villages. "Their means turned out to be better than at the time of infidel rule

— 131 —
so that even people of other lands started to arrive."[32] Modern scholars who
write about Turkish conquests as a kind of "liberation movement" that spread
justice, equity, and tax breaks to Muslims and non-Muslims are generally and to
a large extent accurately perceived as engaging in chauvinistic apologetics. But
how are we to interpret this assertion by a late medieval historian? He too may
be propagandizing of course but even propaganda reflects a certain concern with
the principles embedded in it. The theme of the conquerors' interest in the lot
of the subjugated people in fact runs through many frontier narratives. In some
of the anonymous chronicles, the Ottoman administration of the fifteenth century
is bluntly criticized for not taxing its non-Muslim subjects as fairly and
mildly as it used to. This concern for fiscal moderation is corroborated by the
Ottoman law codes to the extent that these later sources shed light on the
earlier practices. The preamble to the 1530 law code of Bayburt, for instance,
sets the whole code in a comparative perspective by pointing out that the people
of the area were unable to bear the burden of the previous laws of (Akkoynulu
Uzun) Hasan. Thus, "some exactions have been cancelled and some reduced" under
the new regime of the Ottomans, who realize that the well-being of their
subjects is "the reason of the longevity of the state and of order in the
realm."[33] The early Ottomans apparently faced a

— 132 —

competitive situation in terms of fiscal moderation, too; at least one of their
rivals, Umur Beg of Aydin, proudly announced in an inscription in Denizli that
he had abolished a local tax. [34]

This should not be surprising, however; nor can it be equated with modern
apologetics. There were pragmatic considerations here as the wording of the law
code itself makes dear: relative leniency and equity could ease the tensions
between rulers and subjects, especially when such rule was quite young and
possibly precarious. Moreover, decades of political instability and nomad and
raider activity had devastated a good part of the countryside in Anatolia and
also led to depopulation; any enterprise that looked forward to a serious
political future would want to have producing, tax-paying subjects in its
domains. The dislocation of the agrarian population was caused to a large extent
by Turkish tribal movement, raiding, and colonization, but if any of those
tribes or raiders were to settle down to rule, their priorities would naturally
need to be redefined.

In this context, it is worth reconsidering the dream narrative, which, from Apz
through Hammer, Gibbons, his critics, and Lindner, has somehow figured in all
accounts of early Ottoman history. At least since Hammer, these historians have
also been aware that similar dream legends adorn the foundation narratives of
many other states. To a hyper-rationalist sensibility, this implies that the
story ought to be dismissed altogether or understood merely as a device for
satisfying the "psychological needs of the population" in the sense of massaging
their superstitious piety (and fooling them?) into submission. [35] If one is
not satisfied with the underlying assumption of pure and simple gullibility,
however, one might profit from Roy Mottahedeh's brilliant suggestion, on the
basis of examples from medieval Islamic history, that such dream narratives can
also be seen to embody a compact of sovereignty. [36] Osman, like many other warriors in the region, must indeed have dreamt of rulership, in the nonspecific sense of dreaming. At some point after his emergence, he or his descendants advanced the story of the dream to give his political bid the sanction of a divine compact, but the consensus on the veracity of the dream, as in all compacts, implied not only that the House of Osman's power should be accepted because it had divine sanction but also that the House of Osman had some obligations in return. Did the dream not include a promise (and a vow?) of security and prosperity for the subjects? In a way, then, the dream narrative served as one method of working toward a political consensus.

If the dream legend can be read as a compact, the interpreter (Ede — 133 —
Bali or `Abdu`aziz or Haci Bektas) can be seen as the notary of its contractual character. He is the one who verifies it and provides it with legitimacy in the public sphere. This is not different from the role that is said to have been given to a sheikh at each accession when he girded the new ruler with a sword and thereby, I would add, notarized the transfer of power and reconfirmed the compact. [37] Unfortunately, the early history of that ritual, eventually a sphere of contestation between different Sufi orders just like the identity of the interpreter of Osman's dream, is shrouded in mystery. It is not even dear that such a ritual did in fact take place in the fourteenth century. As for the dream legend itself, it must have been elaborated, at least as we have it, after the emergence of a sedentary preference among the Ottomans since it dearly offers a particularly sedentary vision of the future under their rule, as Lindner has insightfully pointed out in analyzing its manifest content.

Whatever the role of fiscal moderation in rendering Ottoman rule acceptable or tolerable, this must have been buttressed by the security that would come to an area under some stable rule, be it Ottoman or otherwise, after protracted turmoil, caused by Ottomans or others. In the case of northwestern Anatolia, the peasants of the area were so frustrated that they were ready to follow the rebellion of a pseudo-Lachanes in 1294. All this was certainly facilitated by the decline in the direct interest of Byzantine central government in that area.[38] As the empire's political attention in the post-Lascarid period mined toward the west, Bithynia lost some of its significance and its defenses were neglected. The disappointment of imperial subjects of the area was probably compounded, as Lindner points out, by the fact that they had enjoyed a high level of security and stability under Lascarid role from Nicaea. From the point of view of the Ottomans, however, this "backwater" status of Bithynia at the time turned out to be advantageous not just bemuse of the weak defensive system they encountered but also became they could expand and build without attracting too much attention from the larger powers. In this neglected area whose Christian inhabitants seem to have been disenchanted with their imperial government, there would also be a better chance of gaining former Byzantine subjects to the Ottoman side or at least of having them become reigned to, if not welcome, the establishment of Ottoman power.

The point about Byzantine neglect of Bithynian defenses should not be
exaggerated, however. In fact, the nature of the interest shown by
Constantinople once again underscores the advantageous position of

Osman's chiefdom. Michael Palaeologus devoted some attention to the region in
1280-81: in addition to leading an expedition there, he repaired some
fortresses, built new ones, and took measures to render the banks of the
Sangarius inaccessible to the Turkish forces that had to cross the river to raid
Bithynian settlements. Andronicus II spent nearly three years there between 1290
and 1293. These efforts were not in vain in terms of blocking Turkish attacks in
the area that had been the most vulnerable, namely, directly to the west of the
Sangarius. The area around Tarsius (Tersiye/Terzi Yeri), which lay along the
favorite invasion route over the bridge of Justinian, had witnessed the most
intense raider action in the immediate post-Lascarid era. Had this situation
continued, a chieftaincy based in Paphlagonia could have gained the upper hand.
The Byzantine fortifications were eventually captured, of course, but not from
crossing the river. To that extent, imperial policies had been successful. The
Ottomans, based as they were in a more southerly, and originally less prominent,
location compared to the forces of Paphlagonia, moved "along the river from the
south, rendering the fortresses obsolete."[39]

The initial Ottoman move up along the river and westward into Bithynia occurred
in the few years following the Battle of Bapheus when they started to make a
name for themselves outside the area and to attract aspiring warriors. Only with
hindsight does that expansion seem so crucial. In the first two decades of the
fourteenth century, looking at western Anatolian frontiers overall, the scene of
action in the Aegean area must have been much more glamorous, especially since
Ottoman encroachments into Byzantine territory apparently suffered a lull
between 1307 and 1307.[40] No matter what the Ottomans had achieved in the first
decades of the fourteenth century, they could not yet measure up to the emirates
of Aydin and Mentese . And no matter how many warriors, dervishes, and scholars
Osman attracted to his growing community, some of the other begliks did better.
According to figures provided by al-`Umari , which must be based on the
realities of the 1320s, there were begliks that could muster larger forces than
could the House of Osman. Already by 1312, the House of Aydin had built an
architectural complex centered on an Ulu Cami, a cathedral mosque, indicating
lofty claims and abundant funds on a scale that the Ottomans were unable to
match until the 1330s.[41]

To the extent that the presence of the begliks was a constant challenge to the
Byzantine Empire, it would take no more than a few decades for the Ottoman one
to emerge as the main thrust of that challenge. In his

— 135 —
depiction of the principalities in the frontiers of western Anatolia, the Arab
geographer al-`Umari would single out the Ottomans as constantly engaged in
warfare with Byzantium and often the effective side. When Ibn Battuta toured the
emirates of the region in the 1330s, he described Orhan as "the superior of all the Türkmen emirs in terms of land, army, and wealth."[42] It ought to be remembered, however, that the Arab traveler was in the area before Umur Beg of Aydın (r. 1334-48) undertook his most daring and lucrative raids, which seem to have made him the most illustrious gazi leader for a while and propelled him to play a role in the factional struggles of Byzantine imperial government. Orhan came into this scene somewhat later, but once he did, he made full use of the advantages offered by the position and the internal political strength of his emirate mentioned by the two Arab authors who described it. However, all the strategic advantages and circumstantial opportunities would not have meant anything had the Ottomans not acted upon them with some vision, though this vision was probably redefined and sharpened along the way. It is not possible to say much with certainty here for the period when Osman was beg, but obviously his hold over the tribe continued while the tribe itself kept changing. Marriage alliances were struck with at least two important neighbors, an influential dervish and a Christian tekvur. Another tekvur from a neighboring village joined the warriors under Osman's command and eventually convened to Islam. Aspiring youths were invited from different parts of Anatolia to join in military undertakings and some were undoubtedly incorporated. Raids also produced slaves, some of whom became trusted members of the chieftainship, as in the case of Balabancik, who is said to have been assigned important duties in the siege of Bursa. It is also reported, though there is no way of verifying this for the earliest periods, that gentle treatment of subjects lured peasants from other areas (or those who had fled?) to settle in the lands under Osman's control. Later archival documents contain records of donations of land or revenue made by Osman to dervishes and, in larger numbers, to fakihs, who seem to have served as imam-judges but were overshadowed by the better-educated kadis later in the fourteenth century.[43]

There were hostilities with some of the neighbors such as the menacing House of Germiyan and Tatar tribes in the vicinity. And some of the other relations could not be maintained on neighborly terms, as symbiotic as they once may have been, when political aspirations led to raids and more serious military undertakings like sieges and conquests of fortified towns. In all these ventures, Osman and his warriors acted with good tactical and strategic sense that eventually led them to take control over Bithynia. Halil İnalcık has recently demonstrated that Osman's conquests show a clear military logic.[44]

By the mid-1320s the Ottomans had a complex enough military-administrative structure to have struck coins in their own name, to assign offices to slaves and eunuchs, to establish waqfs, to issue written documents (in Persian), and to gain possession of as important a city as Bursa. But the most important breakthrough for the chieftaincy in those years may well be that it survived Osman's death without a loss to the integrity of the polity. There may have been some angry voices and some objections, but for all we know, Orhan replaced his father with the realm intact. Since Orhan was not the only son, why were Osman's
domains not divided among the heirs? If the Ottomans had followed Turco-Mongol practice, as the other begliks around them did, Orhan could still have been the commander-in-chief over the other brothers and their combined forces, but the brothers would have their own designated functions and domains. This, of course, is the practice followed by the Chingisids and the Anatolian Seljuks, the two greater political traditions the begliks knew something about.\footnote{45}

According to the Ottoman chronicler tradition, Orhan offered the chieftainship to his brother `Ala'eddin, but the latter preferred the life of a dervish while occasionally playing the role of an advisor. Even if this story is taken at face value, it fails to account for a number of other brothers of Orhan who are named in the 1324 waqf deed but never mentioned in the chronicles.\footnote{46} In any case, Orhan's inheritance does not seem to have been contested, and Osman's patrimony was not divided. It would not be meaningful to look for an "Ottoman policy of succession" on the basis of one case, especially one that is so full of obscurities. Furthermore, a systematic study of the succession patterns in the other begliks remains to be conducted before a detailed comparison can be made, but none of them was as successful as the Ottomans in preventing the fissiparous dynamics of inter-generational transition over the long run. Unigeniture in one generation is not unheard of in those emirates, yet eventually they all gave birch to splinter polities whereas the Ottomans came up with unigeniture again and again, even though it was systematized only with Mehmed II's codification of fratricide.

Ottoman practices in this respect seem to have struck contemporaneous observers, too, as unusual. As we discussed in the last chapter, most of the fifteenth-century chroniclers claim that, at least starting with Bayezid I, fratricide had become the norm, which they dearly see as a deviation from some better, older practice. The YF-Apz narrative also finds something remarkable about Orhan's accession: it is related here that Osman, while he was still alive, deliberately gave the reins to Orhan so that the young man would be accepted during his father's lifetime, which implies that Osman intended to leave no room for challenges to his son's inheritance of the Osmanli tribe and lands.\footnote{47} Apz may be fictionalizing Osman's designs, but dearly the fifteenth-century historian found something peculiar in the Ottoman practice of unigeniture and set out to explain it. It is in fact more likely that this passage comes directly from Yahsi Fakih, the son of Orhan's imam, whom we can expect to have been well informed on this matter. In any case, it is certain that the Ottoman practice had already started to look odd in the beginning of the fifteenth century; Shahruh, son of Timur and heir to a polity that claimed to be the supreme representative of the Chingisid political tradition, scolded Mehmed I, whom the Timurids treated as their vassal. The latter, in an uninhibited avowal of Ottoman uniqueness, responded that "the Ottoman sultans from the beginning have made experience their guide and refused to accept partnership in government."\footnote{48}

Coincidences may have played a role here, such as `Ala'eddin's alleged disinterest in worldly power, but it is difficult to account for so many
successive cases of unigeniture as merely a series of flukes. Besides, Mehmed Çelebi seems to have done his historical homework in arguing that the Ottomans did not seem to have ever taken warmly to the idea of sharing; Orhan's brotherly suggestion to Ala'eddin is reported to have been not that they share the realm but that the latter be the "shepherd." In each generation, this reluctance to divide the realm manifested itself: with Murad I (r. 1362-89) and Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) both decisively eliminating the challenges raised by their brothers and/or sons; with none of the princes during the Interregnum (1402-13) pursuing any other goal than seizing control over an undivided realm; with Murad II (r. 1421-51) again having to deal with contenders from the family in an all-out struggle; and with Mehmed II (r. 1451-81) finally legislating fratricide as the culmination of a centralist logic whose goal was to eliminate all tendencies toward fragmentation. The struggle between Mehmed II's sons led to Prince Cem's unusual suggestion of sharing the realm, but by then he had lost the struggle and his brother would have none of it. Looking at Ottoman succession practices over the long run, it is dear that they continued, until the seventeenth century, the Inner Asian tradition of giving each heir a sphere of influence within the family dominions and a chance for future rulership, but adapted that tradition to their own vision of a strong central government. An appanage was no more than a princely fief; once one of the princes reached the throne to replace their father, the others would be dispossessed and, after Orhan at least, eliminated. No "net-eponymous" dynasty emerged out of Osman's clan. Over the long run, the Ottomans proved to be better students of history than their competitors, not just in the policy of succession but also in the way they dealt with other real and potential challenges to centralization of power, as we shall see next.

Into the Limelight and the Rise of Tensions

If the Ottomans had grown relatively removed from the limelight of "international politics," they found the opportunity to catch up when Byzantine factionalism pulled them into a wider orbit and took them across the Sea of Marmara into Thrace. Among the Turco-Muslim principalities of western Anatolia, it was the House of Aydin whose support was first sought by Kantakouzenos, one of the main contenders to the imperial title. Eventually, two other principalities, flanking the southern side of the Sea of Marmara, became deeply involved in the factional strife of the empire. These were the chiefdom of Orhan to the southeast and that of the Karasi to the southwest of Marmara facing Thrace.

Very little is known about the history of the Karasi emirate.[49] The Ottoman chronicles are particularly muddled in those sections that cover the relations between these two neighboring rivals. One thing is certain, however, and of major significance for early Ottoman history: the Karasi had a group of particularly accomplished and renowned warriors who could teach the Ottomans a thing or two about crossing over into Thrace, which presented premium raiding territory. Once Orhan eliminated the House of Karasi and annexed its realm, those warriors passed into his service and provided valuable military leadership
in transplanting gazi activity across the Dardanelles, which was initially made possible by the invitation of Kantakouzenos, who needed the Turkish warriors against his foes.

Having incorporated those mighty warriors, however, the Ottomans also took on a serious potential challenge to their control over gazi activity. It is impossible to date several important "internal" political developments in the Ottoman principality with precision in the four-

— 139 —

teenth century, but that potential challenge seems to have turned into a real one in the 1360s and 1370s, possibly related to the loss of Gelibolu to Amadeo of Savoy. For a decade when one of the major links between the two peninsulas (Anatolia and Thrace) was severed, some of the gazis of Thrace apparently entertained notions of independence from Ottoman control even if they were originally commissioned by the Ottomans. This was part of the rules of the game after all; the House of Aydin, too, had established itself as an autonomous principality in a region where they had originally been sent in the name of the House of Germiyan.

The most prominent among these independent-minded warriors was a certain Haci Ilbegi, one of the former Karasi warriors. Perhaps he was the conqueror who was later identified as Seyyid `Ali Sultan, the protagonist of the hagiography analyzed in the last chapter.[50] It seems highly likely that the central figure of that (later) Bektasi cult was built around, or conflated with, a warrior who had strong claims to taking the credit for moving gazi activity into Thrace. Even if that is not the case, it is obvious on the basis of Ottoman sources that Haci Ilbegi was credited by some with the crucial victory over Serbian forces in 1371. And it is also stated in those chronicles, though some prefer to omit the relevant passage, that Haci Ilbegi was killed by a commander loyal to Murad I, Orhan's son. Maybe none of this is true; still, these reports indicate that there were some who questioned Ottoman claims to being in charge of the frontiers. Namely, the centrifugal tendencies had risen to the fore in the 1370s, and the Ottomans were facing the kind of crisis that had led in many other states in the region to the emergence of splinter polities headed by successful warlords.

The Ottomans withstood that challenge, however, partly by coopting other warlords and by taking swift and violent measures, none of which could be effectively carried out had they not been developing a sophisticated ruling apparatus. And it is certainly not coincidental that the Ottomans invented the cornerstone of their centralizing political technology in that conjuncture, during or right after the crisis of the 1370s. Observing the loosening of the bonds that had held the warriors together when the head of the House of Osman was one of them, now that the Ottoman beg was turning into a sultan, the budding state created a new army, yeñi çeri, that consisted of youths from slave backgrounds so that their sole loyalty would be to the sultan.

We have already seen that the institutional complexity of Osman's principality emerged quite early. Or, to state it more cautiously, those elements that eventually provided it with institutional complexity were
present earlier than depicted in the frontier narratives, which describe an
egalitarian, institutionally naive enterprise until the arrival of the Çandarli
family. They conveniently omit, for instance, the existence of vezirs (perhaps
three) before Çandarli Kara Halil .[51] Starting with Halil , three generations
of this family monopolized top offices in the administration and played a major
role in the building of sophisticated structures of governing that buttressed
the centralizing tendency of the Ottoman polity, much to the resentment of the
gazis and their supporters. The sources that voice that resentment, given their
ideological position and narrative strategies, tend to associate the "beginning"
of all evils and tensions with the Çandarli and with Bayezid I, as we saw in the
last chapter.
Despite their hypercritical reception, or outright rejection, of these sources,
many modem scholars seem to have fallen for the image of a pristine community
before the arrival of those nasty sophisticates. Particularly those who argue
against the gaza thesis fail to appreciate how early in its formation the
Ottoman polity had contact with its relatively sophisticated neighbors and came
under the influence of sedentary administrative traditions in both the
Perso-Islamic and the Byzantine modes.
Sedentarization, which entailed eventual alienation from nomadic ways and from
nomads themselves, was only one aspect of this transformation, and the nomads
were only one of the elements to be adversely affected by it. That is a
relatively better known part of early Ottoman history and will not concern us
here. A more comprehensive view of the emergence and trajectory of Ottoman power
is gained by looking at it as a coalition of various forces, some of which were
eventually driven to drop out of the enterprise or subdued or marginalized. In
other words, it was a history of shifting alliances and conflicts among various
social forces which themselves were undergoing rapid transformation while
constantly negotiating their position within the polity.
Indeed, if anything characterized medieval Anatolian frontiers, and possibly all
frontiers, it was mobility and fluidity. The Ottoman success was due to the fact
that they harnessed that mobility to their own ends while shaping and taming it
to conform to their stability-seeking, centralizing vision. Of course there were
limits on both set by natural and social parameters, but still one could move
from place to place, allegiance to allegiance, and identity to identity with an
ease and acceptability hard to even imagine in more-settled societies. People
not only crossed from one side of the frontier to the other but also moved from

one faith to another and from one ethnic identity (which usually also meant from
one name) to another with frequency. All this commotion had a solemn cosmic
significance in the minds of the actors because it was, or one could
occasionally and selectively remember it to be, played out in the name of a much
larger struggle between two competing transcendental visions: Islam and
Christianity. The Danismendname, as we saw in the last chapter, captured the urgency of this in two of its major characters for whom the crossing occurred in such haste, after a sudden flash of enlightenment, that neither one of them had time to change his or her name, overtaken by the joy of having found the right side and too eager to join the fight for its supremacy. The sociopolitical order created by these frontier conditions developed a general reluctance to recognize an aristocracy, a freezing of inheritable distinction in specific lineages, even after settling down. A system like the devshirme, whereby children of non-Muslim peasant families were recruited, "Ottomanized," and then brought to the highest positions of government, could be conceivable only in a state born of those frontier conditions. The potentialities of mobility and fluidity found their ultimate representation and congealed into "awe-inspiring centrality" (i.e., charisma) in the persons of the babas, religions mystical leaders of the tribal and (newly settled?) peasant populations, who could change into birds or, slipping into things more ferocious, lions or whatever they wished to be and fly or roar over vast spaces unleashing their arsenal of alchemical weaponry. The most illustrious example is of course the Haci Bektas of later legend, who was sent from Khorasan to Anatolia in the form of a dove and turned out to be the baba of babas. The Ottomans also relied on the services of many of these babas and cultivated and patronized them in the earlier stages of their state building. Eventually, however, the more established and urbane Sufi orders were preferred by the Ottoman state while some of the earlier allies became opponents. The Safavids were able to gain followers among not only the tribes but also some of the closely related groups of dervishes who were ready to adopt Shi'ism. The ahidands, on the other hand, the guild-like quasi-Sufi associations of men in urban areas, including the small towns around and later within the Ottoman principality, lost their once considerable autonomy as they were turned into guilds much more strictly controlled by the government. Another social group that suffered from the centralization of power in the growing Ottoman polity and the eventual adoption of an imperial

— 142 —

mode of administrative and intellectual life was that of the frontier warriors, led by the begs of the uc. Given the paucity of sources, it is impossible to pinpoint precisely the early tensions that manifested themselves between the House of Osman and its allies and warriors. Such tensions are naturally built into any political structure, and the example of 'Ali Amourios from the first few years of the fourteenth century again comes to mind as an early falling out between Osman and one of his fellow warriors. Some of Osman's early allies were his Bithynian Christian neighbors, many of whom found themselves incorporated if not eliminated. As the power of Osman and Orhan grew and as their principality began to acquire the characteristics of a sedentary administration, there must have been gazis and others within that principality who felt left out. That there was opposition among the neighboring warriors is dear from the rivalries the Ottomans faced. A much deeper, structural tension emerged among the gazis, who were accustomed to seeing themselves as partners of the begs of the House of
Osman. Their resentment goes at least as far back as the third quarter of the fourteenth century when the Ottoman ruler not only appropriated their independently conquered areas in Thrace but also imposed a tax on their most important booty: slaves. The reign of Murad I (1362-89) represents a major turning point in the process of outgrowing the petty chiefdom of the frontier that the Ottoman principality had been until the middle of the century. The creation of two offices in particular signal that major developments toward statehood were under way.

Murad was the one who appointed a kadi’asker for the first time.[52] This signifies that by then social stratification had crystallized to such a degree that it necessitated the recognition of a distinction between the `askeri (military-administrative) class and the rest of the society. While the creation of this new position could also be attributed to the belated arrival of the influence of traditions from previously established administrative centers (or, more specifically, of Seljuk institutions), the two explanations are not mutually exclusive.[53] The arrival and acceptance of a particular institution could only be possible when it made sense, when the development of the accepting society required or at least could comfortably accommodate that change. Through the appointment of a special judge for the `askeri class, Murad took an important step in the delineation of boundaries around the ruling class vis-à-vis the people (as well as himself?).

It is again under Murad I that some warriors are appointed to be uc begleri (lords of the frontier) for the first time in the Ottoman principality.[54] This is significant first in terms of the sociopolitical differentiation it implies between a self-conscious central power and frontier warriors whose role is defined vis-à-vis and by the center. It is an announcement of the fact that the military-political elite was no longer a band of more or less equal warriors and of its corollary that the beg from the Ottoman family was claiming to be more than primus inter pares. That Murad I is reported to have been harsh enough to personally execute those pashas and begs who committed acts of disobedience against him but mellow toward those who showed due obedience and that he was the first to be given the lofty title of hunkar , or sultan, appear as more than idiosyncratic character traits in this context.[55] In fact, this character portrait drawn of Murad reads like an encapsulation of the most basic elements of his reigns political history, which might be summarized as the elaboration of a sultanic attitude to governing. The appointment of begs of the frontiers also indicates the emergence of a schizoid mental topography in Ottoman political imagination in the same old pattern that divides the land between a core area (iç il ?) and an uc.

Although the crisis of the 1370s was overcome, its legacy seems to have survived, and not only in the form of a cult built around its main protagonist. Thanks to Orhan Saik Gökyay's masterful demonstration, we now know that Sheikh Bedreddin , the "heretical" leader of perhaps the most significant, albeit failed, revolutionary movement in Ottoman history (1416), was the son of not the kadi but the gazi of Simavna.[56] This fits in nicely with the reports that
Bedreddin's father was a companion of Haci Ilbegi. At any rate, Sheikh Bedreddin, the son of a gazi and the daughter of the Byzantine commander whose fortress he had captured, did not advocate forced conversion or brutal repression of the Christians but a utopian synthesis of different faiths, among other things, and he and his lieutenants managed to gather thousands of Muslims and Christians willing to fight against the Ottoman army. Bedreddin's message lacked single-minded, adversarial proselytizing zeal not despite but because he came from a gazi milieu.

This cooperative and syncretistic spirit is reminiscent of the earliest days of Ottoman power in Bithynia. It was inspired and led by a sheikh who was the son of a gazi; furthermore, one of his father's comrades was an even more illustrious gazi who may have become, or whose legacy was fused with that of, a venerated saint of a "heterodox" syncretistic sect. Opposition to Ottoman central power now converged with attitudes that the government was learning to define as heterodoxy and became a guiding force among certain segments of the frontier warriors and dervishes as well as the nomads.

Not all gazis turned rebels or heretics, of course. Just as not all dervishes embraced heterodoxy and not all tribes ran to the Safavid cause when it presented itself as a political, religious, and cultural option from the second half of the fifteenth century onward. We cannot expect such complex social groups to act en masse. At least the tripartite division of modern political taxonomy — radical, moderate, and conservative — could be applied to the social categories under consideration in terms of their political attitudes, and all three modes are undoubtedly present at any given time in some measure. Not all heirs of the Baba'i-Vefa'i tradition went through the radicalization that eventually prevailed among the followers of the cult of Haci Bektas; some, like Apz, came closer to an emerging Ottoman orthodoxy along Sunni lines. The cult of Ede Bali, too, seems to have remained outside the Bektasi sphere of influence that subsumed various other cults built around holy figures of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At certain conjunctures when the relative position and power of a social group are undergoing a major qualitative change, radical action is likely to appear preferable to larger segments of that group, or at least those who prefer radical action are likely to become more visible and confrontational, as seems to have been the case in Thrace around 1370.

Unlike Haci Ilbegi or Bedreddin's father and their followers, many "moderate" or "accommodationist" gazis continued their activities in the Balkans, but there was no doubt that they were doing so in the service of the Ottoman state, unlike the early days of relative autonomy. Still, whenever the opportunity presented itself or the circumstances demanded, some gazis opposed the Ottoman state. The important thing is that the gazis are discernible as a specific social group with its own lifestyle, alliances, and conflicts.

Were the gazis who supported the Ottoman family stupid? A relatively centralized state could provide security. It could also render future campaigns more profitable. Thus, to accept tolerable levels of subordination could naturally be a reasonable choice for some of the warriors. What constituted "tolerable"
levels must have changed over time and was most certainly measured differently by different warriors according to circumstances and personal inclinations. Starting from a conception that brought together various elements of the social and cultural reality of the ucat — booty seekers, metadox dervishes, leaders of nomadic tribes (defined as inclusive entities), recently converted ex-Christians, all of them perceiving and legitimizing their struggle with reference to a higher cause whenever appropriate — the gaza spirit gradually was subjected to a more orthodox interpretation

— 145 —

after the taste of the emerging settled Sunni administrators. This is by no means to be seen as an absolute change. Even after the transformation, it never incorporated notions of forced conversion or noncooperation with Christian neighbors or abstinence from armed conflict with other Muslim begs. Inalcik has demonstrated that what happened between Osman and Köse Mihal appears as a recurrent structural feature of Ottoman methods of conquest at least through the fifteenth century.[57] By the end of that century, heirs to early gazi traditions had dearly fallen out of the Ottoman mainstream. While Apz and the writers of the anonymous chronicles adopted a voice that claimed to champion the more or less authentic continuation of the initial gaza traditions, representatives of the new religions or courtly bureaucracies invoked the gaza in their own "alien" conception, unable to capture the souls of those who saw themselves heirs to earlier traditions. It is worth remembering in this context that the Safavids gained the allegiance of tribes and dervishes not only by religious propaganda but also by championing the "real gaza."

With respect to the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, the significance of colonization and settlement that accompanied military victories has been pointed out. This may well be the most important factor to point out, but again it is one of many factors, including chance (as in the earthquake that destroyed the Gelibolu fortress). The fragmentary nature of political power in the Balkans and the related problem of the two churches certainly mattered. Since Iorga, many historians have emphasized that the Ottomans reduced the fiscal burden of the Balkan peasantry, who had long suffered rapacious petty lords. More important than the amount of the tax burden may be the systematic and consistent nature of Ottoman administration after uncertainty and chaos. The Ottomans themselves no doubt contributed to that uncertainty and chaos for a while, but when they established their power, one could expect consistency and order. With so many "decisive" battles that sealed Ottoman presence in the Balkans (Sirpsindigi, 1371; Kosovo, 1389; Varna, 1444; Second Kosovo, 1448), one also would like to know much more about Ottoman military strategies and use of technology since these undoubtedly played an important role in our story. Detailed studies are needed, from techniques of cannon casting to allocation of firearms. There is no doubt, however, that after the suppression of the Bedreddin Revolt, Turco-Muslim presence in the Balkans finally became equivalent to an Ottoman presence. There were still some cases of serious insurgency but only as claims to local autonomy or as bids by various, not all of them real, Ottoman princes, of whom the Byzantines and the
Venetians seem to have had a nearly endless arsenal. While these challengers were released one after the other like Hollywood sequels, their audience share kept diminishing after Mustafa "the Impostor," Murad II's uncle, was eliminated in 1422.

A distinct group of uc begleri is delineated by Inalcik in his study of the Ottoman political factions in the 1430s and 1440s.[58] At that time, they appear as the leading members of the "war party" that stood once again in opposition to the Çandarli family, who led the party that stood for accommodation with the imperial government of Byzantium. This was probably the last time the frontier warlords played a meaningful role in strategic decisions affecting the general direction of Ottoman policy; and they appeared to have won the upper hand with the abdication of Murad II and the first enthronement of Mehmed II in 1444 — a precarious victory that was reversed within two years by a Çandarli-instigated revolt of the kul army. The centralizing logic of the Ottoman state had reached such a maturity by that time that even though Mehmed II's second enthronement in 1451 brought along a more aggressive policy toward Byzantium and the conquest of Istanbul, the fulfillment of these gazi dreams did not lead to a permanent strengthening of the frontier lords in the Ottoman political system. Just as Çandarli Halil was murdered by the Conqueror soon after the conquest, some of the leaders of the "war party" from among the uc begleri were put to death soon thereafter.

Perhaps more significant is the Conqueror's highly symbolic act of abolishing an ancient frontier custom. It is reported in Apz and some of the later chronicles that since the time of Osman (and it does not matter whether the custom was really established at that time) the Ottoman rulers would respectfully stand up at the sound of martial music as a sign of readiness for gaza. As the conqueror of Constantinople, however — namely, having achieved the ultimate goal of Anatolian frontier culture — the young sultan apparently perceived himself to have surpassed that culture and its primitive etiquette; he is reported to have abandoned the practice of standing up.[59]

How could Mehmed II have continued to obey the terms of vassalage implied by the ceremony of standing up in respect when martial music was played? Just as the Abbasid caliph or the Seljuk sultan would send tabl ve `alem (drums and banner) to their vassals, Mehmed himself was now in a position to dispatch those insignia to lesser powers ready to recognize the Ottoman dynasty as their superior. In less than two centuries the Ottomans had transformed themselves, at least in their histori-
who was no less than a descendant of the House of Chingis under the overlordship of the House of Osman.[60]

Even though the century following the conquest of Constantinople may appear to have continued to be a glorious time for the Balkan gazis as one reads the gests (gazavatnames) recording their deeds, it was a passing glory and was enjoyed only at the cost of increasing subservience to the central state. In 1457, for instance, when Mehmed II ordered a final assault on and capture of the Belgrade fortress, the frontier warriors of the Balkans protested. "If Belgrade is conquered," they said, according to Apz, "we will have to plow the land."[61] These gazis were obviously aware of where the central state's policy was leading. Even though they undertook numerous exploits and obtained substantial booty in the next few decades, they were increasingly reduced to provincial fief-holders, that is, agriculturalists, losing the last traces of their ancestors' status as mobile and independent frontier warriors. Just as with the nomads, the frontier warriors' activities were controlled and regularized, and they were tied to designated pieces of land in accordance with the administrative logic of the classical Ottoman order.

Unfortunately, the rich cultural traditions and considerable literary as well as architectural patronage of the gazi milieu have not been sufficiently studied, crippling our understanding of some very significant developments involving the gazi circles in the fifteenth century.[62] Why did Prince Cem (1459-95) commission the collection of gazi lore built around the vita of Sari Saltuk? His interest in things Turkish at a moment of an increasing turn to cosmopolitanism in Ottoman cultural life does not seem coincidental if we remember also that he named one of his sons Oguz. By that time, it was rare for members of the Ottoman family to receive Turkic names, and a symbolically charged name like Oguz stands out in particular.[63]

In the Saltukname compiled for Prince Cem, various passages suggest that the book is intended to serve as a rapprochement between the Ottoman family, or that particular prince, and the gazi circles. It is reported here, for instance, that for four years the gazis of Rum struck coins and had the hutbe (Friday sermon) read in Saltuk's name — ultimate symbols of sovereignty, reflecting an audacious resistance to accepting Ottoman hegemony. Saltuk himself, however, is said to have disapproved of such action, accepted the superior right of the House of Osman in these matters, and invited all the gazis to gather around Osman's family. Saltukname suggests that at the time of its composition, ca. 1474, the gazis felt they were not getting a fair return for their services.

Once again, the conquest of Constantinople and the making of that city into the capital, the seat of power, constitute the crucial moment in this regard became they represent the crystallization of a political vision that marginalizes the gazis. Much before the conquest, according to the narrative, which is written after Edirne lost its role as the capital, Saltuk visits that region and warns the Muslim rulers of the future:

Whoever wishes to conquer [all of] the land of Rum, must be stationed in
Endriyye. And whoever wishes to destroy the infidels and the enemy, should remain in Edirne since it is the hearth of the gazis. There is no better place for gaza than that. This world is like a ring; Rumelia is the seal of the ring and the middle of that seal is Endriyye. Whoever has this [land of] Rum like a seal on his finger, the center [could also be read as "the capital"] of his ring should be this site. It is the inner sanctum of [the land of] Rum.

The holy man also prophesies that a sultan named Mehmed will appear and conquer Constantinople; that city will eventually be destroyed due to "corruption, adultery, sodomy, and tyranny," but not Edirne "unless Muslims give up gaza."[64] Later, during the siege of the Byzantine capital, Sari Saltuk appears to Mehmed II in a dream and gives him the keys to the city but urges the young sultan to keep these keys in Edirne and never to neglect the latter city since it is the "ancient and holy abode of the gazis."[65]

Do we not find here an expression of the gazis' dismay at the ascendancy of a kapikulu -dominated central administration in Istanbul? The compiler of the Saltukname also reports that Cem promised to reside in Edirne, the "abode of gazis," if he became sultan. For the gazis, this was a promise of a change of policy that would restore their honor and power. For Cem, it defined his clientele in his future bid for the sultanate.[66] The opposition to Cem in his later struggle (1481-82) for the throne indeed came from some key grandees and the kapikulu army, who favored and managed to enthrone Bayezid. Thereafter, the ascendancy of a kul-based administration was sealed, and the gazis never again played as significant a role in guiding the Ottoman polity. The resentment of the pro-Edirne party may have lived on for a while; it is probably not coincidental that in the succession struggles (1511-12) of the next generation one particular historian, Ruhi of Edirne, criticized Selim, the candidate of the kul soldiery and the eventual winner.[67]

The moving of the capital away from Istanbul, however, retained its symbolic charge in Ottoman political history until the final days of the empire. When `Osman II (r. 1618-22) wanted to curb the power of the kul army, he threatened to move the capital to another city, rumored to be Bursa, Edirne, or Damascus. Then in 1703, the Janissaries (together with the guilds and the ulema of Istanbul) walked in revolt to Edirne, where Sultan Mustafa II (r. 1695-1703) had been residing for years intending to reestablish it as the Ottoman capital according to rumors; after Mustafa II was forced to abdicate, the newly chosen Sultan Ahmed III (r. 1703-30) was taken back to Istanbul only after he promised that he would not leave it. In the 1810s, it is reported, Mahmud II (r. 1808-38) would threaten the Janissaries that if they did not restrain their excesses, he would take his family and move out of Istanbul. And finally, the choice of Ankara as the capital of the Turkish republic needs no further comment as the symbol of an ultimate rupture from the Ottoman political order. These incidents do not have anything to do with the gazi circles; it would be an anachronism to talk of the frontier warriors as a political force after the sixteenth century. Yet the thread binding these incidents, from Cem's promise to reside in Edirne to the choice of Ankara as the capital of the Turkish republic,
whose establishment spelled the end of the Ottoman dynastic regime, is clear: in the "long durée" of Ottoman political history, the political tension of "Istanbul versus another city" represented a symbolically potent axis that defined different sociopolitical interests, preferences, and visions. In the Saltukname, we find the first occurrence of this axis (in the form of Istanbul versus Edirne), along whose lines a meaningful opposition to the central state can be identified.

In the fifteenth century, this opposition came from the gazi circles of Rumelia because the definitive consolidation of Ottoman imperial policies after the conquest of Istanbul represented the final blow to their autonomy, which had been eroding since at least the 1370s. Some of the authors of that era who had been steeped in the gazi milieu and were able to understand their plight managed to convey their sense of resentment in an interconnected corpus of narratives, the Tevarih-i Al-i`Osman, which enables us to follow the history of the Ottoman dynasty as the increasing alienation of the ruler from the mores, customs, and lifestyle of an idealized frontier society of a bygone era.

It would not be realistic to attempt an exhaustive account of the precise nature of the gazis' role in early Ottoman history and of their relations with other social groups such as the dervishes, the nomads, or the kapikulus. The main aim here has been to demonstrate the possibility of speaking of a gazi milieu in medieval Anatolia. The gazis are discernible as a specific social group during the first two centuries of Ottoman history. Whatever the significance of the role they played in the emergence of the Ottoman state, they were not imaginary creations of the Ottoman ulema as relentless fighters against the infidels. They represented a specific segment of the medieval Anatolian frontier society with their own customs and lore, interests and alliances, within a coalition that had so much success that it eventually devoured some of its members.

Like so many other elements of that coalition, such as the pastoralist tribes and the eventually heterodox dervishes, the gazis, too, represented a concrete social group which was eventually left out of the ruling stratum as an imperial, centralized polity emerged under the leadership of the House of Osman, who had once been one of their kind, one of the gazi begs. An illustrative example of this change is the case of Mahaloglu `Ali Beg, sixteenth-century heir to a long and illustrious line of frontier lords, descendants of one of Osman's renowned fellow warriors, who was told to curtail his gaza activity according to the decisions of the Sublime Porte. Whereas a raid used to be a matter of local or regional proportions and of basically personal gain for a gazi in terms of its immediate consequences, it had by then become a matter in the realm of international Realpolitik. So, when Suleyman the Magnificent struck a peace treaty with the Habsburgs and intended to keep it, Mihaloglu was ordered to refrain from conducting raids into their territory. What that meant for the gazi is captured in a witty simile by Nihali, a kadi and a poet who was known as the Ca’fer of Galata because of his indulgence in wine, which often took him to the pubs in that part of Istanbul: "To give `Ali Beg [a commanders position in an
uc and to forbid him to operate it is like giving me the judgeship of Galata and
telling me not to drink."[68]

— 151 —

Epilogue
The Creation of an Imperial Political Technology and Ideology

They say that Murad had a dream one night, which he then related and all the
Turks believed it to be prophetic: he saw a man dressed in white garments,
like a prophet, who took the ring that his son was wearing on his middle
finger and transferred it to the second finger; then he took it off and put it
on the third; after he had passed the ring to all five fingers, he threw it
away and he vanished. Murad summoned his hodzas and diviners and asked them to
interpret this dream for him. They said: "Undoubtedly, the meaning is that
only five kings from your line will reign; then another dynasty will take over
the kingdom." Because of this dream it was decided that no members of the old,
noble families, i.e., the Turahanoglu, the Mihaloglu, or the Evrenos, would be
appointed beglerbegs or viziers and that they should be restricted to the
office of the standard-bearer of the akinci, i.e., the horsemen who owe
military service and receive no salary when they form the vanguard during
campaigns. There is another family of this kind, called Malkoçoğlu. These
standard bearers are under the command of the beglerbeg. All these families
had hoped to reign but, because of Murad's dream, they were deprived of their
former considerable authority.[1]

Tension between state building and frontier activity that could generate
alternative or spin-off enterprises had proven to be a structural weakness of
many medieval Turco-Muslim political formations throughout southwestern Asia.
Rival members of a ruling family or successful warriors who may have been a part
of the original conquest activity, or even governors of outlying provinces,
could and did establish their own, often short-lived, dynasties that would
either replace an existing dynasty or, more often, snatch an autonomous realm
from its grip. Frontier regions that allowed ambitious rivals to build
alternative foci of power,

— 152 —

legitimacy, and political alliances were laboratories for such experiments and
catalyzed the dynamics of fragmentation. Warriors may have been united under the
dream of conquest (in the name of the faith) but their dreams diverged when it
came to the distribution of power after the conquest. It was the peculiar
success of the House of Osman to pursue its own dream of absolute power to the
exclusion or subjugation of other dreamers.

With the conquest of the Byzantine capital in 1453, the inveterate dream and the
most cherished goal of numerous medieval Muslim polities in the shifting
frontier regions of southwestern Asia, dominated first by Arabs and later by
Turks, was realized. Ironically, this achievement also spelled the definitive
end of the frontier areas (the ucat) as assembly plants of new political
enterprises and of the Ottoman polity as a frontier principality. The most succinct expression of that transformation may be Mehmed the Conqueror's decision not to stand up at the sound of martial music, as he well knew his ancestors used to. He was thus abandoning one of the hallowed traditions of earlier Ottomans as frontier warriors, who would show their respect for the call to gaza through this practice. This was not an abandonment of the devotion to the principle of gaza, since martial music as a reminder of the Ottoman duty to struggle for the faith would still be regularly played at the gates of the palace; it was rather the expression of a fundamental change in the relationship of the House of Osman and of the Ottoman state to that principle and its representatives. Being a gazi was not the primary component of the Ottoman ruler's multiple identity anymore; he was first and foremost a sultan, a khan, and a caesar, "the ruler of the two seas and the two continents," as Mehmed the Conqueror called himself on the inscription at the gate of his new palace in his new capital.

The making of Constantinople into a Muslim city was an ideal shared by Muslim warriors and their followers for centuries, but making it into the capital of the state or making it into the kind of capital envisioned by Mehmed II was by no means the intention of all the conquerors. Mehmed's throne city was part of a political project that was vehemently opposed in some circles. The project involved building a highly centralized imperial administrative apparatus that was to serve under the House of Osman, which took pride in its gazi past but which now defined itself in a new fashion. The process of centralization can be traced back to earlier Ottoman history of course, but now it was given its most systematic and radical formulation. Hierarchies of power in Ottoman political society were sharply delineated, and frontier warriors defini-

— 153 —

tively subjugated, along with several other groups whose forerunners had been partners in the early Ottoman enterprise, to the domination of the central administration.

The process of centralization was not linear, because the nature of the political configuration that was emerging through conquest was always contested. It was one of the dynamics of earlier Ottoman history and turned out to be the dominant one in determining the shape of the state that was built at the end of that competitive process.

The century following the conquest of Constantinople witnessed not only further conquests to expand the empire as territory but also institutional developments that consolidated the empire as state. Codification, the creation of impersonal bureaucratic procedures, the increased reliance on slave-servants as administrators, and the institution of a state-controlled scholarly hierarchy were the most important elements in the process of consolidation that brought centralized absolutism to its apex (within limits set by various constraints, of course). These were paralleled by the creation of an Ottoman imperial idiom in architecture, poetry, and historiography. Both the institutional and the cultural parameters that were set and finetuned around the mid sixteenth century were considered the classical expressions of the Ottoman political technology
and ideology by later generations, as the empire entered a phase of
decentralization towards the end of that century.
It was also in the sixteenth century that people began to realize, or began to
deal with an earlier realization, that some of the ways of the earlier Ottomans
did not exactly conform to the norms of orthodox Islam as understood by its
learned representatives serving the Sunni state. Two glaring transgressions
among institutionalized practices were the establishment of pious endowments
with cash (cash waqf) and the recruitment of the children of non-Muslim subjects
for service as kuls of the Sublime Porte (devshirme). The former implied regular
returns for money, or in other words interest, while the latter implied forced
conversion of populations that should have been free of such interference
according to the covenant known as the dhimma that the Ottomans otherwise
upheld. The devshirme, as a crucial ingredient of the Ottoman administrative
apparatus in the classical age, does not seem to have invited more than minimal
debate. Cash waqf, on the other hand, turned out to be the subject of intense
controversy and divisiveness among the religious and legal scholars, as the
Ottoman state was trying to find the right dose of flexibility without stepping
outside orthodoxy. Even those who allowed cash endowment to continue were aware
that it was not

— 154 —
practiced elsewhere in the Muslim world but was born under the peculiar
circumstances of a frontier environment.
Then, too, some voices were raised against certain holy figures of an earlier
era whom frontier folk and march principalities had idealized without much
concern for their orthodoxy. Sari Saltuk , for instance, was characterized as a
Christian ascetic by Ebussu’ud Efendi (d. 1574), Suleyman's Grand Mufti, and
legends about Ahi Evren were ridiculed by Munir Efendi of Belgrade (fl. early
17th century), who wanted artisans to follow an ideologically correct line. The
shrine of Seyyid Gazi, and the order of Haci Bektas , were now seen to have
fallen into the hands of heretics. In the end, neither the cash waqf nor the
cults of these figures were suppressed, which is due, to some extent, to the
relative lack of rigidity in Ottoman orthodoxy and also to the insufficiency of
the technologies of control available to a pre-modern state. Still, the waqf and
the cults were rendered questionable, circumscribed, and, especially in the case
of cults, marginalized vis-à-vis the political classes.
Just as fellow warriors and allied social forces of the frontier era had to be
subjugated or eliminated in order to establish the supremacy of Ottoman power,
so their legacy had to be tamed or suppressed or marginalized in order to
consolidate that power. The Ottoman state, like any of its counterparts, was
constructed not only in reality but also, thanks in part to historians, in the
imagination of people.

— 155 —
Abbreviations
Notes

Preface


3. It seems rather appropriate that the villain's name brings to mind Jorge Luis Borges (although Eco may have been initially unaware that this character would turn out to be the murderer, as he claimed in his Postscript to the Name of the Rose, trans. W. Weaver [San Diego, 1984], 28), the most antihistorical and anti-narrative of postmodern authors.


6. Halil Berktay, Cumhuriyet Ideolojisi * ve Fuat Küprülü (Istanbul, 1983); idem, "The 'Other' Feudalism: A Critique of Twentieth Century Turkish Historiography and Its Particularisation of Ottoman Society" (Ph.D. diss., University of Birmingham, 1990); Martin Strohmeier, Seldschukische Geschichte

The translations by Gary Leiser in part serve a similar end of stocktaking, especially since they are enlarged with annotations, additional footnotes, and introductions, even though the introductions are not critical: A History of the Seljuks: Ibrahim * Kafesoglu's * Interpretation and the Resulting Controversy (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1988); M. F. Küprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire (Albany, 1992); idem, Some Observations on the Influence of Byzantine Institutions on Ottoman Institutions (Ankara, 1993); and idem, Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Salt Lake City, 1993). For works on the gaza thesis, see n. 56 in chapter I below. Hereafter, the simplified spelling of "gaza" will be used.

Introduction
1. Albert Hourani, "How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?" IJMES 23 (1991):130. The name of the eponym of the dynasty will hereafter be spelled in its simplified form of "Osman," primarily for the sake of practicality. It is, moreover, uncertain that his given name was 'Osman * , from the Arabic 'Uthman * , as will be argued in chapter 3.
2. This usage does not appear in European languages but was common in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish.
3. Both the politico-military and the religio-cultural history of those four centuries is given magisterial treatment in Speros Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley, 1971).
5. Ibid. For a general survey of Seljuk history (as well as the histories of other Turco-Muslim polities and populations) in Anatolia, see idem, La Turquie préottomane (Istanbul, 1988); also see Osman Turan, Selçuklu zamanında Türkiye (Istanbul, 1971). The Seljuks of Rum * are seen within the larger context of Seljuk history in the Middle East in idem, Selçuklu Tarihi ve Türk-Islam * Medeniyeti, 4th enl. ed. (Istanbul, 1993), and in Gary Leiser, trans. and ed., A History of the Seljuks: Ibrahim Kafesoglu's * Interpretation and the Resulting Controversy.
6. For the background, causes, and unfolding of the rebellion, see Ahmet Yasar * Ocak, Babaîler Isyani * (Istanbul, 1980).
8. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300-1415) (Venice, 1983). On the international fair, see

10. 'Asikpasazade * , ed. Giese, 9-10. The translation is a modified version of the one given by Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia (Bloomington, 1983), 37.
12. The passage appears in the only historical work that can be called an official chronicle under Mehmed * , and it was written in Greek: Michael Kritovoulos, History of Mehmed the Conqueror, trans. C. T. Riggs (Princeton, 1954), 1981-82.
16. The term is used in the historiography of Muslim cultures to denote cases like that of "the petty kings who ruled the tribes of western Asia after the death of Alexander the Great" (definition given by J. W. Redhouse, A Turkish and English Lexicon [Istanbul, 1890], s.v.).
18. The case of India, invaded and then ruled in large part by Muslim conquerors in its "medieval" history, obviously presents many parallels to both Anatolia and Iberia. See, for instance, the inflammatory title of a scholarly article by A. L. Srivastava: "A Survey of India's Resistance to Medieval Invaders from the North-West: Causes of Eventual Hindu Defeat," Journal of Indian History 43 (1965):349-68.
20. National historiographic projects, European or otherwise, eliminated more than ethnic diversity of course. Cultural and social diversity of all kinds could be marginalized or "otherized" and deemed to lie beyond "us." See, for
instance, Herman Leibovics, True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). In fact, it is not always possible to distinguish ethnic and cultural diversity; the term "ethnic" is only awkwardly applied to prenational societies. On national history as linear narrative, see Homi K. Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration (London and New York, 1990).

21. Though this is not the place to discuss this issue in detail, I should note that some of my comments here are based on the observation that the history of most of the world seems to be written in two spheres, the national and the international, that do not always communicate well with each other. Individual historians may in fact produce different kinds of histories for these different spheres. At any rate, for the history of many nations there are two different consensuses, if not more. Only some non-Western nations have had their national version internationally recognized, even then with many differences. Besides, for every nationalist proposition that achieves international recognition, objections are bound to be raised by "hostile" nationalist traditions. Hence, there is never full international recognition, but if scholars and institutions of the Western world accept a proposition, that proposition becomes the dominant, thus "international," position at large.

22. The process of Islamization, which implied Turkification over the long run in Anatolia and, to a lesser extent, in the Balkans, must naturally be studied against the background of migrations and conversions. On both of those issues, we lack statistical information, which is a serious obstacle to dealing (if this is at all desirable) with the numerical dimensions of the ethnoreligious concoction. Some have tried nonetheless. Osman Turan estimates that since Turkish immigration was constant and conversion to Islam was not mandatory, ethnic Turks out-numbered Islamized Christians in a ratio of 70:30. See his "L'islamisation dans la Turquie du moyen âge," SI 10 (1959):137-52, where these numbers are not even tentatively substantiated. Mükrimin Halil Yinanç provides another daring estimate that there were more than 1,080,000 Türkmen tribesfolk in Asia Minor at the end of the thirteenth century on the basis of highly dubious, general figures given in medieval narrative sources. See his Türkiye Tarihi Selçuklular Devri, vol. 1, Anadolu'nun Fethi (Istanbul, 1944), 174-76. For a serious study at the micro level, see H. Lowry, Trabzon Sehrinin * Islamlasma * ve Turklesmesi * , 1461-1583 (Istanbul, [1981?]). Recent developments in genetic research have facilitated the return of racially oriented investigation and may, alas, address the issue at hand.

23. For a discussion of the main differences of opinion, see N. Todorov, The Balkan City, 1400-1900 (Seattle, 1983), 13 ff., who portrays the generally accepted (non-Turkish) view as follows:

[T]he destructive force of invasion turned numerous areas of the Balkans into a desert for a prolonged period, and ... the local population, routed by the invader, exterminated and taken into slavery, declined to the extent that all the more fertile plains became populated by the Turks. On the Turkish side, see, for instance, M. Akdag * , Türkiye'nin Iktisadi * ve Ictimai * Tarihi, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1974):

It is dear from both Byzantine and Turkish sources that Turks and the people of Byzantium intermingled with no animosity of either religious or national nature, and procured their mutual needs from one another. (1:463)

Anatolian Christians, who suffered much poverty under Byzantine rule and on the
eve of the Mantzikert victory, benefited from the economic vitality and prosperity that came about when these lands passed to the Turks. Villages, towns, and cities became more populous and prosperous. Even if it were true that Christians left their places and homes out of fear during Turkish conquests and fled here and there, this can be considered only for limited strata of the rich and for some of the ecclesiastical class. (1:473)

Another version of this argument has been to emphasize that Turkish conquests were for a cause; thus Ö. L. Barkan mentions the "compelling power of the Turkish sword that represented a new cause" (trans. H. Berktay, in his "The 'Other' Feudalism," 15).

24. For late Ottoman views on Byzantine history, see the articles by M. Ursinus, cited above in Preface, n. 6.


Chapter 1 The Modems

1. See, for instance, Georges Dumézil, The Destiny of a King, trans. A. Hiltebeitel (Chicago, 1973): "a literary work does not have to set forth a theory: it is the hearers or the readers task to perceive the providential design which has arranged the events in the order in which the work presents them and with the results it describes. Yet it is the design that justifies these events and results, and gives them a meaning" (p. 115).

2. Though the compositional history of this extremely important text is still unclear, the episode about Osman is common, with some differences that do not matter for this discussion, to both the versified and the prose version, which were put into writing in the fifteenth century. For the version in verse, see Manzüm Haci Bektas * Velî Velâyetnâmesi (Ilk * Velâyetnâme), ed. Bedri Noyan (Aydin, 1986), 261-80 of text. For the one in prose, see Vilâyet-nâme: Manâkib-i Hünkâr Haci Bektas-i * Velî, ed. and trans. into modern Turkish by Abdülbaki Gölpinarlı (Istanbul, 1958), 71-75.

3. Richard Knolles, The General Historie of the Turkes (London, [1610?]); see "The Author's Induction to the Christian Reader." Samuel Johnson is cited by E. F. Gibbon, whose own opinion of Knolles is not so positive: "Yet I much doubt whether a partial and verbose compilation from Latin writers, thirteen hundred folio pages of speeches and baffles, can either instruct or amuse an enlightened age, which requires from the historian some tincture of philosophy and criticism." The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 7 vols., ed. J. B. Bury (London, 1914), 7:25-26 n. 66.

4. Knolles entitled his English translation The Six Bookes of a Commonweale. The French original came out in 1576, the English translation in 1603.


7. To begin his analytical chapter (Geschichte, 1:456) Iorga wrote, for instance:

Um die Entwicklung des osmanischen Reiches zu verstehen, um sich von den Ursachen des schwachen christlichen Verteidigung, der grossen Anzahl der Renegaten, der Bereitwilligkeit so vieler christlicher Völker, der türkischen "Joch" auf sich zu nehmen, von der ausserordentlichen Seltenheit der Aufstände — gab doch eine einmal eroberte Stadt niemals Zeichen der Unzufriedenheit mit ihrem Lose, und während all der grossen Kriegszüge der Franken und Ungarn schloss sich unter dem Zeichen des Kreuzes kommenden Gästen nirgend ein irgendwie beträchtlicheres Kontingent einheimischer Bauern an, um am heiligen Werke der "Befreiung" teilzunehmen — , um sich von all dem Rechenschaft zu geben, ist es erforderlich, sich die wahren Eigenschaften der Osmanen und ihr wirkliches Leben klarzumachen.

11. Todorov rightly points out the genealogy of this view, from Hammer through Iorga to Grousset, though it had never been expressed so strongly. See Balkan City, 46.
12. Gibbons, Foundation, 75. Gibbons was not any milder on "degenerate" Byzantines approaching the end of their empire. He continued on the same page: "But when we compare the early Osmanlis with the Byzantines ... it is the Osmanlis who must be pronounced the fittest. They were fresh, enthusiastic, uncontaminated, energetic. They had ideals; they had a goal."
14. N. Iorga, Byzance après Byzance: Continuation del' "Histoire de la vie byzantine" (Bucharest, 1935). Also see his Histoire de la vie byzantine (Bucharest, 1934), 3:159-60. All this is tied, naturally, to the claim that the Ottomans did not have the requisite "forms of life" (Lebensformen or formes de vie in the languages used by Iorga, key concepts in his understanding of history) for the establishment of an empire. See idem, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches (Gotha, 1908), 1:264.
21. Wittek, Mentesche , 35.
23. The introduction of Durkheimian sociology is attributed to Ziya Gökalp, the sociologist who was the mentor of a whole generation of nationalists in the early twentieth century. As a student of "Gökalp's disciple, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü," Halil Inalcik * is conscious of this legacy; see his "Impact of the Annales School on Ottoman Studies and New Findings," Review 1(1978):69-70. Inalcik * has also written a more detailed assessment of Gökalp's sociology: "Sosyal Degisme * , Gökalp ve Toynbee," Türk Kültürü 3/31 (May 1965):421-33.
26. Köprülü, Origins, xxiii. Here I had to change the translator's "had" to "have" because it is a more accurate rendering of the tense in the original Turkish sentence (" mislardir * " and not "mislardi * ") and thus of the likelihood that there is an implicit critique of Wittek here, always appreciated as a good philologist even by his critics. Köprülü had already raised the same criticism against Wittek's "monocausal" explanation more directly in "Osmanli Imparatorlugunun * Etnik Mensei * Meseleleri," Belleten 7(1943):285-86.
28. Ibid., 86-87.
29. Ibid., 87-88.
30. The sun-language theory claimed, on the basis of a heliocentric view of the origin and nature of human languages, that Turkish was the Ur-language from which all civilized languages derived. See Busra * Ersanli Behar, İktidar * ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Olusumu * (1929-1937) (Istanbul, 1992), 175-81.
31. While it may be accurate to state that "the greatest single influence on modem perceptions of early Ottoman history has been the work of the scholar Paul Wittek," it is misleading to add that Wittek's gaza thesis "appealed to everyone: Turkish nationalists can see Wittek's gazis, or Holy Warriors, as the embodiment of Turkish-Islamic heroism" (Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 12-13). There was a good deal of shared ground between Wittek and Köprülü; in addition to what
has been mentioned, we should note that Köprülü, along with many other Turkish scholars before and after Wittek, accepted that there were gazis in medieval Anatolia and that Osman and some of his followers and descendants belonged in that category. But this is surely not the same thing as subscribing to the gaza thesis. While some of his articles were translated, Wittek's book was not published in Turkish until 1971 (translated by Güzin Yalter and first published as Beiheft to I. * H. Danismend's * Izahli * Osmanli Tarihi Kronolojisi, and then as fascicule no. 1 in Bati Dillerinde Osmanli Tarihleri [Istanbul, 1971], 3-52). An earlier translation by Fahriye Arik is cited in Uzuncarsili * , Osmanli Tarihi, vol. 1 (Ankara, 1947), 97-98, but it remained unpublished. Arik herself was not convinced by Wittek and wrote an article to prove (but it ultimately turned out to be wrong) that a symbol on Orhan's * coins was the tribal sign of the Kayi. As for Uzuncarsili * , arguably the most widely read historian of republican Turkey, and always more comfortable as a chronicler, he did not overtly subscribe to any thesis. To the extent one can discern an explanatory model in his works, he is closer to Köprülü not only because he accepts the Kayi tribal origins but also because he emphasizes the role of the ahis * , the dervishes, and early institutionalization based on Turco-Muslim models. Most importantly, the notion of descent-based tribalism reigned supreme in Turkey, and this alone should caution the historiographer against universalizing Wittek's appeal. Also see n. 67 below. As in the case of Togan (see n. 38 below), many Turkish scholars were uncomfortable with implications of religious fanaticism. A Russian translation of Köprülü's book appeared in 1939 (Moscow). A Serbo-Croatian translation, with a laudatory introduction by Nedim Filipovic * , was published before the Turkish edition: porjeklo Osmanske Carevine (Sarajevo, 1955).

32. Aydin Taneri would argue, for instance, that Mevlana * Celaluddin * Rumi * is not only Turkish but a Turkish nationalist; see his Mevlânâ Âilesinde Türk Milleti ve Devleti Fikri (Ankara, 1987).


35. Arnakis, Hoi protoi othomanoi, 246.


37. Ibid., 333-35. In the same work (341), he also delineated what he interpreted to be Kipchak (as opposed to Oguz * ) influences in early Ottoman usages. Togan also engaged in an exchange with Köprülü which may be called the second Kayi controversy: Köprülü still insisted that Osman's ancestry was from the Kayi branch of the Oguz * Turks while Togan raised the possibility that it may have been from the eastern Turkish Kay.

38. Ibid., 317-51. On the religiosity of the early Ottomans, Togan writes: "Since their level of civilization was incomparably lower than, say, the begs of Kastamonu or Germiyan, they were detached from Islamic fanaticism, though they were Muslim" (336-37).

41. See, for instance, the citations from Akdag * in the Introduction, n. 21, above.
43. Vryonis, "The Decline" 278.
44. Ibid., 262-63.
46. Also see Werner's "Panturkismus und einige Tendenzen moderner türkischer Historiographie," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 13(1965):1342-54. In solidarity with Marxist historians of Balkan socialist republics, Werner's main objection was to the position that the Ottoman expansion brought all sorts of benefits to the Balkan peoples.
47. For a more recent defense of his position and of G.D.R. historiography against "bourgeois" medievalists, see Werner's "Einleitung" (with Matschke) and "Ökonomische mad soziale Strukturen im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert," in Ideologic und Gesellschaft im hohen und späten Mittelalter, ed. E. Werner and K.-P. Matschke (Berlin, 1988).
48. Werner, Geburt, 18. After the Second World War, Köprüü abandoned his scholarly career and entered political life as one of the founders of the Democratic Party. In the early 1950s, when the cold war raged strong, he served as minister of foreign affairs in Turkey's staunchly pro-American government.
49. Köprüülü, Origins, 24. I changed Leiser's "antipathy" to "conflict." The Turkish version has ziddiyet . Emphases are mine.
51. Wittek, The Rise , 34.
52. Ibid., 42.
54. See, for instance, Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca and London, 1986): "These Anatolian Turkish tribesmen were stamped with a strikingly militant culture (ghazi fanaticism), an Islamic equivalent of the Crusaders," (106), or Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State London, 1979): "ghazi outlook — a militant, crusading Muslim faith that rejected any accommodation with the Infidel" (362).
55. I certainly do not wish to imply that no original contributions were made to the study of the period. In addition to various relevant works on late Byzantine history, which we cannot attempt to summarize here, some solid new research was produced on individual principalities, such as the monographs by I. * H. Uzuncarsili * , H. Akin, Y. Yücel, N. Varlik, and Ç. Uluçay and B. Flemming's study of Hamidili and Teke. Of great value in illuminating not only the activities of the other begliks but also the early Ottomans is the impressive body of studies produced by E. Zachariadou, who combined Muslim, Byzantine, and
Latin sources for important discoveries. (See the Selected Bibliography under these names.) This research was not generated directly by the debate concerning the rise of the Ottoman state, however.

For research and debate on the Kayı, see Köprüli's introduction to the Turkish edition of his work (pp. xxv-xxvi in the English translation).


57. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, 2. For further elaboration of this point, see also his "What Was a Nomadic Tribe?" Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1982, 689-711. For a critique of Lindner's understanding of tribalism, see Richard Tapper, "Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East," TSF, 48-73.

58. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, 2.

59. The predilection to pass inquisitorial judgment on Muslims who display certain tendencies that are considered uncanonical can also be observed, as Muhsin Mahdi points out, among the historians of thought who are ready to place medieval Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sina* (Avicenna) outside the community of believers. See his "Orientalism and the Study of Islamic Philosophy" Journal of Islamic Studies 1(1990):73-98.

60. Jennings, "Some Thoughts" 155, 153.

61. Káldy-Nagy, "Holy Wary 470. See also p. 469 for the same point made with respect to earlier Turkish warlords such as Artuk* (d. 1091).

62. It seems more appropriate to read the change in naming practices as a question of identity rather than one of sincerity, reflecting a deemphasis on the Turkic traditions in the self-definition of the early Ottomans as formulated by M. Kunt, "Siyasal Tarih, 1300-1600," in Türkiye Tarihi, ed. S. Aksin* (Istanbul, 1987-88), 2:36-37.

63. R. P. Lindner, "Stimulus and Justification in Early Ottoman History; Greek Orthodox Theological Review 27(1982):216.


66. On human sacrifice, see Vryonis, "Evidence of Human Sacrifice among Early
Ottoman Turks," Journal of Asian History 5(1971):140-46. For an assessment of
the applicability of shamanism to our case, see I. Kafesoglu, Eski Türk
Dini (Ankara, 1980) and the unpublished M.A. thesis of A. Karamustafa (McGill
University, 1981). For a survey of the anthropological critique of the reading
of unorthodox practices as survivals, see C. Stewart, Demons and the Devil
(Princeton, 1991), 5-12.

67. In arguing for the Köprüülü-inspired tribal origins of the Ottoman state as
opposed to Wittek's gazi thesis, some Turkish scholars, too, felt gazis would
have to have been devout Muslims. Faruk Demirtas, "Osmanlı Devrinde
Anadolu'da Kayılar," Belleten 12(1948): "Had the early Ottomans been a society
composed of gazis, as a European scholar claims, they would have taken devout
Muslim names as opposed to the national names most of them bore" (602).

The original in Russian appeared in 1900 and an English edition in 1928.

69. Ibid., 215.

70. Ibid., 312.

71. In the first half of this century, Orientalists were much more certain that
corporate organizations existed in medieval Islam and that gazis were part of
that phenomenon. Barthold, for instance, speaks of "the guild of warriors for
the Faith" (ibid., 214-15).

72. Lindner, "Stimulus; 219. Naturally, the same question could have been raised
with regard to tribalism. If it was the motive force, as Lindner suggests, were
the Ottomans the only group in Anatolia to "go tribal"? If so, that requires
some historical explanation of Osman's unique method. If not, why were the
others unable to succeed? Due to greater success enjoyed by Osman as a
chieftain? But then the same point could be made within the framework of the
gaza thesis. If, on the other hand, there are reasons for tribalism to work more
successfully in Bithynia than elsewhere, the same can be said for gaza.

73. Inalcı, "The Question of the Emergence," 74-75.

74. Ibid., 76.

Chapter 2 The Sources

1. There are, however, four documents attributed to Osman's chieftainship. The
first three, from later sources, are clearly apocryphal. For references and
discussion, see Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Recherches sur les actes des règles
des sultans Osman, Orkhan et Murad I (Munich, 1967), 59-77. The fourth one,
despite some traces of having been later touched up, as Taeschner and Wittek
pointed out, seems to contain an authentic kernel of an endowment deed issued in
1323 by Aspurça Hatun, one of Orhan's wives (ibid., 78-82).

2. Apz, ed. Giese, 10-11. The attribution of illiteracy, though not at all
unbelievable in the case of Osman, could also be read as a topos used to
underline the role of divine inspiration in the deeds of a holy warrior. On the
inconsistent and vague role of the sword in later accession rituals, see F. W.
Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, ed. Margaret M. Hasluck

3. An undated coin was discovered by Ibrahim Artuk; see his "Osmanlı
Beyliginin Kurucusu Osman Gâziye Ait Sikke," in Social and Economic History of
has more recently referred to one issued in 1299 in Sogut; see his "A Silver
5. There were at least four other begs with the title of Suca`eddin * in Anatolia in that generation: another Orhan *, this one from the House of Mentese *, who has an inscription in Milas dated 1330 (Uzuncarsili *, AB , 73); Yahsi * Han * bin Karasi, emir of Bergama (ibid., 99); Inanc * Beg of Ladik, whose name and tide appear on an inscription of 1335 (ibid., 56); and a certain Ugurlu * (?) in central Anatolia, mentioned in Al-'Umari's * Bericht über Anatolien in seinem Werke "Masalik * al-absar * fi * mamalik * al-amsar * ," ed. F. Taeschner (Leipzig, 1929 ), 31.
6. Cited in Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, "Pachymeres on the 'Amourioi' of Kastamounu," BMGS 3(1977):57-70. Inalcik * argues ("Osman * Ghazi's * Siege of Nicaea and the Baffle of Bapheus," OE ) that "it is not plausible that Turcomans from such a distant region as the Meander came to join 'Osman *" (80) and that those volunteers must have come from the nearer area of Afyonkarahisar. This does not change my argument in terms of communication among Türkmens from different principalities.
7. Several histories of Turkish literature concentrate only on works produced in Turkish, but for a more comprehensive look at works produced in thirteenth-and fourteenth-century Anatolia in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, see the lists in Uzuncarsili * , AB, 259-62 and 209-23, including discussion of the authors and the patrons. Monographs on individual begliks also have useful sections on intellectual life. The most informative and substantive discussion of the literary scene, accompanied by analyses of individual works, is by Alessio Bombaci: La Turchia dall'epoca preottomana al XV secolo, part 1 of A. Bombaci and S. Shaw, L'impero ottomano (Turin, 1981). Also see relevant chapters in C. Cahen, La Turquie préottomane (Istanbul, 1988).
11. Saltukname *, ed. Akalin, 1:5. For the Hamzaname * cycle in Turkish, see Lütfi Sezen, Halk Edebiyatinda Hamzanâmeler (Ankara, 1991); on `Askar *, see
Note that the horse is of even more remote origins; before Hamza *, it served Ishak *, son of Ibrahim * (Abraham).

12. This unique manuscript is in the collection of Sinasi * Tekin, who has published two articles on it: one introducing the work and the other providing the text as well as an analysis of the section on gaza. See, respectively, his "XIVinci Yüzyila Ait Bir İm-i * Hâl: Risaletu'l-Islam * ," WZKM 76(1986): 279-92; and "XIV. Yüzyilda Yazilmis * Gazilik Tarikasi 'Gaziligin Yollari' Adli Bir Eski Anadolu Türkçesi Metni ve Gazâ/Cihâd Kavramlari Hakkinda," JTS 13(1989):109-204.

13. For the history of different textual renderings of the epic, see Mélikoff, introduction to La geste de Melik Danismend * .

14. The same point about 'Izzeddin's * patronage of the epic is made by Cahen, La Turquie préottomane, 335. The site of Seyyid Battal's * burial appeared in a dream to Ummuhan * Hatun *, 'Ala'eddin's * mother, according to later legend. Al-Harawi *, the Arab traveler who visited the area in 1173, mentions the shrine of Battal * in that "strange frontier town"; Guide des lieux des pèlerinages, ed. and trans. J. Sourdel-Thomine (Damascus, 1952-57).


16. Ibid., 197. The emphasis is mine.

17. Next to the tomb attributed to Seyyid Battal * Gazi is one where his beloved, known as kral kizi (the king's daughter), is said to be buried.

18. Ibid., 42.


20. This was, of course, not the only marriage between Turkish and Christian ruling houses in medieval Anatolia, but the first (of eleven) between the Comneni and the Türkmen of that region, as mentioned in A. Bryer, "Greek Historians on the Turks: The Case of the First Byzantine-Ottoman Marriage" in The Writing of History in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Richard William Southern, ed. R. H. C. Davis and J. M. Wallace-Hadrill (Oxford, 1981), 471-93, which is about the Ottoman prince Orhan's * marriage to the daughter of Kantakouzenos in 1346. Citing an unpublished M.A. thesis by G. E. Rakintzakis (University of Birmingham, 1975), Bryer writes that "between 1297 and 1461, thirty-four or more Byzantine, Trapezuntine, and Serbian princesses married (in order) Mongol khans and ilhans, Turkish emirs, and Türkmen begs" (481).


22. When the Ottoman armada sailed into the Aegean in 1470, a Venetian observer reported that "the sea looked like a forest" (cited in Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 201). As late as in the seventeenth century, Ottoman sailors of the Aegean Sea are said to have sworn "for the sake of Umur Gazi." See Tuncer Baykara, Aydinoglu * Gazi Umur Bey (Ankara, 1990), 47.

23. Ibid., 46-48. Had Osman been defeated by the Germiyan or Orhan * by the Karasi, this is how their Bithynian exploits might have appeared in a Germiyan or Karasi chronicle,

24. According to a variant of this story, recorded in Anatolia in the 1930s, it was Sofia, another Byzantine lady, who gave the keys of the Birgi fortress to Umur Beg; see Himmet Akin, Aydinogullari * Tarihi Hakkinda Bir Arastirma *, 2d
26. Dusturname*, 84-85: "gorisup * esenlesup * qardas * olur."
27. Ibid., 106.
28. Ibid., 107. According to Gregoras, the Byzantine chronicler (cited in Bryer, "Greek Historians" 477), Kantakouzenos had strong brotherly feelings for Umur Beg so that the two were like Orestes and Pylades.
29. For a comparison of the Ottoman chronicles and the Dusturname* with regard to this episode, see E. Zachariadou, "Yahshi Fakih and His Menakib," forthcoming in the proceedings of the Turkish Historical Association Congress held in 1989.
30. According to Islamic prophetology, revelations to four prophets — David, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad* — were given written form; the "four books" thus subsume the scriptures of all of the Abrahamic religions. "Seventy-two" is a standard number for "ail" the peoples or languages. In the later and more "historical" vita of the sailor-gazi Hayreddin* (Barbarossa, d. 1546), too, one of the protagonists is distinguished by knowing foreign tongues, among which Greek is particularly emphasized: Il "Gazavat-i * Hayreddin * Paşa" di Seyyid Murad*, ed. Aldo Gallotta (Naples, 1983), 121-v. Because he knew other languages and because he was such a good conversationalist, "wherever Öruç Re'is* [the elder brother of Hayreddin* Barbarossa] went, old and young infidels gathered around him and conversed with him? The modern Turkish publication, not a scholarly edition but based on some manuscripts not used by Gallotta, mentions that Öruç knew "all languages." See Barbaros Hayreddin Pasanin* Hatiralari, ed. E. Duzdag* (Istanbul, 1973), 1:65.
31. The citations are from Stephen J. Greenblatt's "Improvisation and Power" in Literature and Society, ed. E. Said (Baltimore, 1980), 57-99. Even though the author of this brilliant article is cautious enough to note that this kind of empathy is not exclusively a Western mode, he still states (61) that it is characteristically Western and "greatly strengthened from the Renaissance onward." A student of Islamic history like myself would want to further relativize and qualify these remarks. Throughout the medieval era, it was precisely through rendering the Christian and Jewish (and all kinds of other) truths into "ideological constructs ... that bear a certain structural resemblance to one's own set of beliefs" (62) that Muslims were so successful in spreading the rule and the message of Islam.
35. Ibid., line 1546.
36. This is how Ocak reads this passage; see his "Ihtidalarda * Heterodoks Seyh * ve Dervislerin * Rolü," 38.
37. On Haci* Bektas* as Saint Charalambos, see Vryonis, Decline of Medieval
Hellenism, 372; on Elvan * Çelebi as a friend of Saint George, see Hans Dernschwam, Tagebuch, ed. F. Babinger (Leipzig, 1923), 203.


40. Osman Turan, for instance, writes of "Shi'i Türkmen sheikhs like Haci * Bektas * and Buzagi Baba," two thirteenth-century holy figures; see his article in Köprülü Ar从来没 * , p. 542. It is quite typical still for a student of religious history to write that Sheikh Bedreddin * "prit contact avec des Turkmènes chi`ites et il commença à enseigner des idées batinites" (M. S. Yazicioglu * , Le Kalâm et son role dans la société turco-ottomane aux XVe et XVIe siècles [Ankara, 1990], 259). Yazicioglu * is following Uzuncarsili *, whose encyclopedic works on Ottoman history are among the many authoritative texts that have rendered such characterizations routine. The most influential authorities, however, have been Köprülü and Gölpinarlı. The Baba'is * have also made it as Shi'i into Moojan Momen's An Introduction to Shi`i Islam (New Haven, 1985); see pp. 97, 103. For a thoughtful consideration of this issue, see C. Cahen, "Le problème du Shi'isme dans l'Asie Mineure turque préottomane," in Le Shi'isme imâmite (Paris, 1970).

41. Köprülü, Origins, 103. Also see this depiction of the thirteenth century in Köprülü's "Anadolu Selçukluları Tarihinin Yerli Kaynaklar," Belleten 7(1943): 379-458: "this was a time when anti-Sunni Sufi brotherhoods and doctrines were rapidly spreading in Anatolia, especially among the nomadic tribes and peasants" (Gary Leiser, trans., The Seljuks of Anatolia: Their History and Culture according to Local Muslim Sources [Salt Lake City, 1992], 53).


43. See the works of Mikail Bayram, for instance, who argues that Baba Ilyas *, Haci * Bektas *, Ahi * Evren, and other "Sunni" leaders of the "Sunni" Türkmen population were portrayed as heretical and Shi'i by their enemies, the pro-Mongol collaborators and Mevlevis *. Esad Cosan * argues that Haci * Bektas * was Sunni and not a Baba'i * ; see the introduction to Makalat *, ed. Cosan * (Ankara, [1983?]), esp. pp. xxxvi-xxxviii). Needless to say, these revisions must be seen within the context of current ideological tensions in Turkey; Cosan * himself is a sheikh of the Naksibendi *. On the other side, it has been customary to see Haci * Bektas * as a Shi'i since at least Köprülü's influential article "Anadolu'da Islamiyet *," Darulfunun * Edebiyat * Fakültesi Mecmu`asi * 2(1922). The politicization of these issues should be obvious from the fact that the manuscript on the basis of which Köprülü claimed that Haci * Bektas * was a Twelver Shi'i (Cosan * misleadingly presents this as Köprülü's sole evidence)
was in the General Directorate of the Police! Cosan's * publication was immediately countered by a facsimile edition by the Bektasi-`Alevi * circles: Makaalât ve Müslümanlık, ed. Mehmet Yaman (Istanbul, 1985). Both the publisher's preface and the editor's long introduction are implicit polemics against Cosan's * views.

44. It should be noted in this context that Sheikh Abu'l-Wafa' * (Tac * al-'Arifin *, d. 1101 or 1107), from whom Baba Ilyas's * spiritual descent is traced, was Sunni according to his hagiography but not so rigid as not to be well disposed toward 'Alevis * or tolerate Kurds who neglected their religions obligations. See Alya Krupp, Studien zum Menagybname * des Abu l-Wafa' * Tag * al-'Arifin *, part I: Das historische Leben des Abu l-Wafa' * Tag * al-Arifin * (Munich, 1976), 54-55.

45. For a more detailed discussion, see Akin, Aydinogullari *, 53-54.


47. Yasar * Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri Hakkinda Arastirmalar * I: Coban-ogullari * Beyligi *, Candar-ogullari * Beyligi *, Mesaliki'ul-ebsera Gore Anadolu Beylikleri, 2d ed. rev. (Ankara, 1991), 43. The same beg is called, among other things, kahirul-kefere * (the Subduer of the Infidels) in an inscription stone that stands on a medrese erected by his command but finished after his death in 1328-29 (ibid., 152). As Yücel suggests (42), he may indeed be the model for a certain beg called Muzaffereddin * in the Saltukname * to whom various struggles against the infidels from his base in Kastamonu are attributed.

48. See Zachariadou, "Pachymeres on the 'Amourioi' of Kastamonu."


50. Akin, Aydinogullari *, 105.


55. The differences go much farther than those indicated by Serif * Mardin in the introduction to his Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (Albany, 1989). See the comparisons made by S * . Tekin on the basis of several canonical works in his introduction to "XIV. Yüzyilda Yazilmis * Gazilik Tarikasi."

56. See the books by IL Peters and the ones edited by J.T. Johnson and J. Kelsay in the bibliography.

57. For instances of such ambivalence from pre-Islamic Arabia and from Byzantium, see E Donner, "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War; in Johnson and Kelsay, eds., Just War and Jihad, 35 and 38-39.

58. See "Ghaza *," EI, new ed., s.v.

59. See Tekin, ed., "XIV. Yüzyilda Yazilmis * Gazilik Tarikasi." This source also reminds us that it would be wrong to present the political culture of the frontiers in contrast or in no relation to that of areas under more central
control. While they may have evolved under peculiar circumstances and developed their own peculiar cultural modes, the frontiers were not absolutely divorced from other traditions.


62. Another parallel between the two narratives, noted by G. Lewis (The Book of Dede Korkut, n. 81 on p. 204), is that the young warriors, after winning the hands of their companions, create some tension with the in-laws since they refuse to be wed without seeing their own parents.

63. The point has been made and successfully applied to the Akritic cycle by Michael Herzfeld, "Social Borderers: Themes of Conflict and Ambiguity in Greek Folk Song" BMGS 6(1980):61-80.

64. Wittek, Mentesche, 46.


69. For references to Greek and Armenian nationalist readings of the Digenis legend that naturally run counter to the thrust of my argument here, see ibid., 54, n.77. One could easily find similarly nationalist readings of the Turco-Mnslim legends.

70. Keith Hopwood, "Türkmen, Bandits and Nomads: Problems and Perceptions," in Proceedings of CIEPO Sixth Symposium: Cambridge ... 1984, ed. J.-L. Bacqué-Grannmont and E. van Donzel (Istanbul, 1987), 30. The second part of the sentence is accurate but it does not justify the implication in the first part, namely, that "the conflict between pastoralist and sedentary farmer" has no basis in reality (which is the way the word "construct" seems to be used). Why cannot both be valid, but in varying degrees in different time, and places? In any case, Hopwood is certainly right in underlining the bias of historiography toward focusing only or primarily on conflict and in indicating that "[m]ore work like that of Prof. Bryer on Byzantino-Turkic relations in the Empire of Trebizond [citing Anthony Bryer's "The Pontic Exception" DOP 29(1975)] needs to be done to elucidate the integrative features of the Türkmen conquest" (30). Hopwood himself cautions against overlooking conflict and exaggerating complementarity in a more recent article: "Nomads or Bandits? The Pastoralist/Sedentarist Interface in Anatolia" Byzantinische Forschungen 16(1991):179-94.
71. Galatariotou, "Structural Oppositions" For a balanced discussion of raiding economy, the claim of operating for the sake of one's faith, and an honor code all working together in another environment, see C. W. Bracewell, The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic (Ithaca, 1992).

72. "The enemy thus in Digenes is not the Arab for the Byzantine, nor the Byzantine for the Arab. The people whom Digenes consistently puts down are coloured neither by race nor by creed, but by their contempt for the unwritten rules of the code of honour. Such is Digenes' conflict with the apelatai. The apelarai are the main villains of the story" (Galatariotou, "Structural Oppositions," 48). On who the apelatai may have been, see ibid.


76. See section edited by Tekin in "XIV. Yüzyılda Yazılmış * Gazilik Tarikası," 162. This situation was not necessarily hypothetical. Pachymeres, the Byzantine chronicler, for instance, writes that some of the Byzantine soldiers in the district of Nicaea served the Turks as guides when their tax exemptions were abolished by the emperor after the seat of government moved back to Constantinople (cited in Inalcik * , "Siege of Nicaea," OE, 79). Notwithstanding its negative moral connotation, the fact that mudara * (feigned peace) was a legally sanctioned category of behavior vis-à-vis infidels must have provided Muslim frontier warriors with some flexibility even when they needed or wanted to be canonically correct. On this notion, see H. J. Kissling, Rechtsproblematiken in den christlich-muslimischen Beziehungen, vorab im Zeitalter der Türkenkriege (Graz, 1974). Moreover, this was not the only relevant category; on istimalet * (conciliatory policy), see Inalcik * , "Methods of Conquest"

77. For the efficacy of this argument, see Vryonis, Decline of Medieval Hellenism, 435. Based on a critical survey of some late Byzantine hagiographies, Zachariadou concludes (in a paper delivered at Princeton University in 1987) that churchmen were wary of this sentiment because it was gaining currency and leading many Christians to convert to Islam.

78. Taskoprizade * , Al-Saka`ik * , 28-29.


80. Ibid.


82. Topkapi Palace Archives, E. 5584.


84. The same point has already been made by Ménage in "The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography; in The Historians of the Middle East, ed. B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (London, 1962): "The fact that many campaigns are directed against Muslim states is irrelevant, for these fellow-Muslims are regarded as hindering the ghaza * " (177-78).
86. See S. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, 1990), 206-12.
87. See G. Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica, 2 vols., 2d ed. rev. (Berlin, 1958), 2:108-9. This is Lindner's reference for his argument that "when chroniclers of the stature of ... Pachymeres, John Cantacuzenus, and Nicetas Gregoras know nothing of such a zeal animating their enemies, it is reasonable to doubt its existence: See his Nomads and Ottomans, 6. The same argument is made by Jennings, "Some Thoughts; 158-59.
88. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, 14.
89. Eva de Vries-Van der Welden argues that this is a misreading of Palamas's account, which, she feels, reflects mutual animosity and hatred rather than moderation; see the chapter on Palamas in her L'élite byzantine devant l'avance turque à l'époque de la guerre civile de 1341 à 1354 (Amsterdam, 1989). Indeed, it is worth mentioning that she disagrees with the whole scholarly tradition treated in this book since she feels that there was not much (any?) room for moderation, tolerance, and conciliation in the attitudes of the Turks in medieval Anatolia.
90. For Palamas's captivity, see Anna Philippidis-Braat, "La captivité de Palamas chez les Turcs: Dossier et commentaire," Travaux et Mémoires 7 (1979):109-221. It is still not clear who the xiónai are in Palamas's account. Earlier propositions for reading hoca or ahi seem far-fetched, as Michel Balivet rightly argues in his "Byzantins judïsants et Juifs islamisés: Des 'kühhân' (kâhin) aux 'xiónai' (xiónios)," Byzantion 52 (1982):24-59, but his suggestion of kahin * is not fully satisfactory either since it relies on a misinterpretation of Turkish phonology (the second vowel of kahin * is not dropped in the accusative: namely, the accusative of burun is burn-u , as Balivet Points out, but that of kahin * is kahin-i * since the first vowel is a long one). For the xiónai problem, also see Philippidis-Braat, 214-18.
92. The world of the gazis does not seem to have been totally devoid of formalization either. Objects often reported to have been sent by higher authorities in the caliphate or sultanate apparently symbolized some formal ties of vassalage; also, various caps are mentioned as markers of distinction between different kinds of affiliation, including spiritual ones (as in the case of the House of Aydin and the Mevleviyye). Nevertheless, there is no indication that inclusion in gazi bands or the adoption of such a title was predicated upon any particular ritual. Wittek, along with many other scholars of his generation, would have the gazis organize their lives, relations, and ceremonies much more formally and uniformly than I see it. See his The Rise, 37-40. This is in part
related to assumptions about a far-reaching, often underground, network of various "heterodox" associations in the medieval Middle East: guilds, futuwwa, batini * esotericists. The most elaborate depiction of that alleged network and tight organization can be found in the works of Louis Massignon, and it is dear in his case that the historian's imagination was partly shaped by the reality and phobia of international communism. See, for instance, his "La futuwwa ou la pacte d'honneur artisanale chez les travailleurs musulmanes," La Nouvelle Clio, 1952. The works of Taeschner, whose identification of futuwwa as "Islamisches Ordensrittertum" was highly influential on Wittek and many others; see C. Cahen, "Futuwwa," EI , new ed., s.v.


94. "Al yesil * giyinmis * gerçek * gazili / Ali nesli güzel imam geliyor." (Accompanied by the real gazis dressed in red and green / the beautiful imam from the line of `Ali * is coming). C. Öztelli, ed., Bektasi * Gülleri (Istanbul, 1985), 202. This and various other poems in this collection (and in others) that sing the praises of gazis like Seyyid Battal * > Gazi (p. 263) or of `Ali's * "gaza" should also remind us that gaza is not a specifically Ottoman or a necessarily Sunni ideology. The Safavids, too, fought as gazis, especially in the earlier stages of their enterprise. The poems of Shah Isma`il * (alias Hata'i * ) frequently invoke the three social forces that also appear in the sources of late-Seljuk and post-Seljuk Anatolia: the ahi * , the abdal * , the gazi. See Il Canzoniere di Sah * Isma`il * Hata'i * , ed. Tourkhan Gandjei (Naples, 1959), passim. In the case of Anatolia, Apz added a fourth and even more enigmatic category: the bacis (sisters).

95. Ein Mesnevi Gülschehris auf Achi Evran, ed. F. Taeschner (Hamburg, 1930). The 1360 recasting of the Danismendname * by `Arif * `Ali * must also be mentioned here as a fourteenth-century frontier narrative, even though it deals with a relatively remote period. As for the hagiographies of several thirteenth-and fourteenth-century figures, such as those of Haci * Bektas *, Sari * Saltuk *, and Seyyid Harun *, it must be noted that those were recorded much later.

96. One was completed just before the end of the century, in 1398. It was written for Kadi * Burhaneddin *, a medrese-educated scholar-statesman who ruled in Sivas as a representative of the Ilkhanid-Seljuk tradition and not as a frontier warrior. This Persian chronicle is quite polished and informative on political events in fourteenth-century Anatolia but is dearly not a frontier narrative of conquest and proselytization. See Bazm u razm, ed. E M. Köprülü (Istanbul, 1928). Its author, `Abdul`aziz *, had been brought from the court of Baghdad. Another Persian chronicle, a (600-couplet) Shahnama * of the House of Karaman as a sequel to Dehhani's * Shahnama * of the Seljuks (of Rum * ?), was allegedly written by Yarcani * for Karamanoglu * `Ala'eddin * Beg, who held power in the latter part of the same century. Neither of these two Shahnamas * is extant; instead we have a Turkish chronicle written by Sikari * in the
beginning of the sixteenth century which cites the other two and claims to be in part a Turkish prose translation of Yarcani's work. See Sikari'nin Karaman-ogullari Tarihi, ed. M. Koman (Konya, 1940), 8-9. On this source, also see Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, 145-47. There is very little that can be added to Köprülü's survey of early Anatolian sources in his "Anadolu Selçuklu Tarihinin Yerli Kaynakları"; now also see the English translation of this work with updated references: The Seljuks of Anatolia, trans. Gary Leiser. For a more recent survey of relevant hagiographic works (in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish) from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, see A. Y. Ocak, Kültür Tarihi Kaynagı Olarak Menâkibnâmeler (Ankara, 1992), 46-59.

97. Obviously, the issue of literacy must also be considered in this discussion, but given our present state of knowledge on the matter, not much can be said. The number of medreses was slowly growing in the fourteenth century, and there was increased demand for scribal services. But the sites where one could acquire literacy skills and obtain some education were not limited to formally designated schools. Dervish lodges and homes must also have offered such possibilities; Apz, for instance, in all likelihood obtained his education in the lodge. Naturally, the history of early Ottoman literacy involves much more than the possibilities for education within the early Ottoman world since we are also dealing with many migrants and converts who offered skills acquired elsewhere. For early Ottoman medreses starting with the first one (established ca. 1331), see M. Bilge, İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri (Istanbul, 1984).


99. On Hamzavi, see Franz Babinger, Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke (Leipzig, 1927). To the same author is attributed an early chronicle of which no copies have ever been identified and to which no date can presently be assigned.

100. Selçukname, TSK, R. 1390. Professor Sinasi Tekin of Harvard University is currently preparing a critical edition of this text through a comparison of the cited manuscript with other extant copies. I am grateful to him for enabling me to make use of his early draft.

101. It is not known when exactly the tales of Dede Korkut were written down, but it was not earlier than the fifteenth century. Based on the fact that the author is buttering up both Akkoyunlu and Ottoman rulers, it has been suggested that the composition belongs to someone living in the undefined borderlands between the two states during the reign of Uzun Hasan (1466-78). See Boratav, 100 Soruda Türk Halkedebiyati (Istanbul, 1969), 46-47. G. Lewis, on the other hand, dates the composition "fairly early in the 15th century at least" (The Book of Dede Korkut, 16-19). In addition to questions concerning the time the stories can be traced back to, or when they were composed in the shape we have them (which is what G. Lewis is asking and which could have been accomplished orally), we must ask when a decision was made to render the composition in written form. In this respect, the reference to the Ottomans is more significant than Lewis considers. On the other hand, the seemingly interpolated paragraph about Korkut Ata and his prophecy concerning Ottoman glory in the Book of Dede Korkut appears also in Yazıcızade's * history of the Seljuks, written ca. 1436; see G. Lewis, n. 140. Also see Bryer, "Hah Turali Rides Again."

102. Abü Bakr Tihrani-İsfahani, Kitab-i Diyarbakriyya (in Persian), 2 vols., ed. N. Lugal and F. Sümer (Ankara, 1962-64). This work must also be seen
in a continuum with the fourteenth-century Persian chronicles of the Karamanids and of Kadi Burhaneddin *, who were, in many ways, more faithful to Seljuk traditions than the Ottomans ever were.

103. This anonymous work is reproduced, apparently verbatim, in the Oxford Anonymous manuscript and (from the latter) in the Cihannuma * of Nesri *. See Inalcik *, "Rise of Ottoman Historiography" and Ménage, "Beginnings:

105. E. H. Ayverdi, Osmanli Mi'mârîsinde Çelebi ve II. Sultan Murad Devri, 806-855 (1403-1451) (Istanbul, 1972), 195-96. It is possible that he was simply enlarging or restoring (was it perhaps destroyed by Timur's forces?) a mosque built earlier by Orhan *, but Ertogrul * was after all Orhan's * grandfather and the principality was small enough for Sogut * to be meaningful at that time. Mehmed * I's interest in Sogut * was the only occasion when Osman's descendants mined their attention to that little hometown of theirs in Anatolia until the eighteenth century.


107. On the "imperial project" and its critique as embodied in Popular legends about the history of Constantinople and of the Hagia Sophia, see S. Yerasimos, La fondation de Constantinople et de Sainte-Sophie dans les traditions turques (Paris, 1990). Though my own understanding of the interrelationships of the fifteenth-century chronicles is somewhat different from that of Yerasimos, I agree with his general argument.

108. The articles by Inalcik * and Ménage in Historians of the Middle East, ed. B. Lewis and E M. Holt (London, 1962), are indispensable beginnings for any work on early Ottoman historiography. While they deal primarily with the interrelationships of the early texts, these articles also contain many pointers about the politico-ideological context in which the chronicles must be understood. Also see Inalcik *, Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar (Ankara, 1954); and idem, "Mehmed * I," and "Murad * II," IA * , s.v. On the incorporation of various antinomian movements into the Bektasiyya *, see Irene Melikoff, Sur les traces du Soufisme turc (Istanbul, 1992); and Ahmet Karamustafa, God's Unruly Friends (Salt Lake City, 1994).

109. Naturally, not all scholars fit into this neat bipolar schema, which nonetheless remains a useful and valid one for our discussion. Exceptions will be mentioned in what follows.

110. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, 19.

111. This view of fifteenth-century Ottoman historiography, with the exception of the notion of tribalism, is shared by Gibbons, Arnakis, Káldy-Nagy, Jennings, Imber, and, to a large extent, Lindner.


113. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, 22.

114. Inalcik *, Fatih Devri; and idem, "The Policy of Mehmed II towards the

115. The unmitigated joy of the frontier warriors in the early Ottoman era, not very different from a similar ethos reflected in the Viking sagas, is brilliantly captured by Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, the classic[zing Turkish poet from the mm of this century: "Bin atlı akinlarda çocuklar gibi sendik * / Bin atlı o gün dev gibi bir orduyu yendik" (We were happy like children in those raids with one thousand horsemen / We defeated a giant army that day with one thousand horsemen). This should not be taken to imply that there was an indiscriminate appreciation of warfare and that there were no anti-war sentiments. But the raiders apparently felt that as long as fighting was bound to occur, one might as well have one's heart in it. On anti-war poetry in Anatolian Turkish, see İlhan * Basgoz * , Folklor şi azıları (İstanbul, 1986), 81.

116. Hereafter, the Yahsi * Fakih * menakib * will be abbreviated YF.

117. Wittek, "The Taking of the Aydos Castle."

118. Ibid. It may of course be questioned whether Apz indeed reflected the mentality of "the earliest Ottoman times" here, but at least it is clear that he was quite close to the spirit of other frontier lore, such as that analyzed in the earlier part of this chapter.

119. In this unique episode in Apz's chronicle, which in all likelihood comes from YF, it is suggested to Osman that he obtain permission from the Seljuk sultan, but Osman finds the Osmanlis' mission of gaza a sufficient cause to sanction the reading of the hutbe * in his own name. Here we dearly have the use of the gaza as a legitimizing principle in opposition to claims (of the Timurids and their protégés in Asia Minor?) that the Ottomans were upstarts who needed the suzerainty of a legitimate central power.


121. Yerasimos, La fondation de Constantinople et de Sainte-Sophie.


124. In one of Nesri's * known sources, the Oxford Anonymous (hereafter abbreviated OA), there is a passage on Osman's election, "evidently taken from Yaziji-oghlu" (V. L. Ménage, Nesrhis * History of the Ottomans [London, 1964], 13). While relating some interesting and seemingly authentic tribal traditions concerning the electoral process, Yaziczade * does not mention Dündar or any other rivals. The whole section on Osman after his election, where his rivalries with family members may have been recorded, is missing in the extant manuscript. If there is a family fight in the missing part of this source, it is unlikely to have been with Dündar since the OA does not mention any brothers of Ertogril. This source is now published, but its editors (who have not used Ménage's work) have maintained the older mistaken identification with Ruhi-i * Edrenevi * : "Rûhi Tarîhi," ed. H. E. Cengiz and Y. Yücel, Belgeler 14-18 (1989-92):359-472. Thus the editors have also "completed" the text by filling in the missing section on Osman from a copy of the chronicle of Ruhi *.

126. Anonymous, ed. Giese, 14. The episode is set in the context of Osman's death. Orhan * offers the chieftainship to his brother 'Ala'eddin * , who has no such claims but a few useful administrative reforms to suggest.

127. It is even conceivable, as argued once by Wittek and seconded by Inalcik *, that there may have been a fuller version of Apz than the redactions, editions, and copies we now have; see Inalcik *, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography," 154.


131. Such conflicts between the dictates of interstate relations (Byzantine, Mongol, Seljuk) and local conditions of the frontiers were apparently common. For an interesting case having to do with a neighbor of Osman, see E. Zachariadou, "Pachymeres on the 'Amourioi' of Kastamonu."

132. Ibn * Kemal * , Tevarihi * Al-i * 'Osman * , 1:129: "ba'zi * ravi * eydür 'Osman * Beg 'amusi Dündar'i, ki basinda * serdarlik * sevdasi * var idi, bu seferde helak * itdi ... zarar-i * 'ammdan * ise zarar-i * hass * yegdür ... diyü urdi öldürdü." *


134. The "realism" of this investigation, the primary purpose of which has been to see whether these stories about Ertogril's * and Osman's generations may have been partially based on real events even if they come from later sources, is not meant to preclude a symbolic reading of those historical traditions. I have already cited Sahlins's observation that the real and the symbolic are not mutually exclusive. Just like the Romans once again, the Ottomans seem to have historicized certain mythical structures to such an extent that these Romans of the Muslim world appear almost free of myths: Ottoman histories are, upon a straightforward reading, not legend-filled Shahnames * but much more realistic accounts of historical incidents. Still, readers of Dumézil will possibly wonder whether it is not the ancient motif of the tripartite ideology that both Ertogril * and Osman, leaders of the two successive generations of state builders, had two brothers in most of the family chronicles. The murder of an uncle, moreover, may be just the kind of sinful act those readers have come to expect of young warriors destined to become kings.

135. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, 6-7. In terms of the mistaken characterization of gaza as an ideology with particular resonance among "orthodox and sedentary audiences," we should recall the invoking of the same principle by the early Safavids to appeal to the increasingly unorthodox nomadic population of Anatolia and Azerbaijan.

136. See archival sources published in Barkan and Meriçli, eds., Hüdavendigâr Livasi Tahrir Defterleri. The relevant earlier publication by Barkan, "Osmanli
Imparatorlugunda * Bir İskan * ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Vakıflar ve Temlikler," Vakıflar Dergisi 2(1942):279-386, selected primarily documents related to dervishes and ahis *, excluding many that dealt with the fakihs *. It seems, on the basis of the later publication, that in the generations of Osman and Orhan *, more land was given to fakihs * than to either dervishes or ahis *. Though "fakih * " literally means a jurisconsult, it implied more of an imam (as prayer leader) than a juridical figure in the context of western Anatolia in the late-thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but looking at the example of Tursun Fakih * some of these figures, possibly those who had a more impressive education, may also have played a consultative role in legal-administrative matters. On the "fakih"s *, also see Köprülü, Islam in Anatolia, 28.

137. It would be too much of a digression to discuss the second point in detail here. That discussion must await the future publication of the "YF menakib * " that I have edited experimentally through a comparison of the chronicle of Apz with the anonymous ones, basically following the lead given by Ménage a long time ago. A similar experiment was recently published in Greek translation by E. Zachariadon (Athens, 1992). My basic point is that the critical passages are used by the compilers of the different chronicles not randomly but within the framework of a conscious editorial policy.

138. The use of this word indicates that here the blame is placed squarely on the Ottoman rulers, not on the ruling elite in general.


140. The YF-Apz narrative, for instance, describes the meager inheritance left by Osman Beg with great admiration: Apz, ed. Giese, 34.

141. Anonymous, Tevarih * , in Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, trans. B. Lewis, 142.

142. See Ernest Gellner's discussion of the relevance of the Ibn Khaldunian * paradigm in dealing with the Ottoman experiment in his "Flux and Reflux in the Faith of Men," in his Muslim Society (Cambridge, 1980), 73-77; and idem, "Tribalism and the State in the Middle East," in TSF, 109-26. It is true that in terms of its longevity, the Ottoman Empire does not conform to that paradigm, but a closer look reveals that Ottoman history is beset with the general rhythm of tribal-societies-turned-empire-builders as described by Ibn Khaldun * ; and later Ottoman intellectuals, once they discovered Ibn Khaldun *, appreciated the relevance of his theory as addressing a phenomenon much more universal than the Arabian and North African states that he took as the basis of his theorizing. See Cornell Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters," Journal of Asian and African Studies 18(1983):198-220. The longevity can be explained within that paradigm (as an exception that ultimately confirms the rule) by the bold initiative of the House of Osman in creating an unprecedentedly sophisticated system of an artificial but cohesive household (the kapikullart *, often erroneously translated as "the sultan's slaves") just when the tribal/warrior solidarity, or 'asabiyya *, was waning. For Ibn Khaldun's * views on the "slave soldier" phenomenon, see David Ayalon, "Mamlukiyyat * ," Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and
Islam 2(1980):340-49. Ibn Khaldun's brief narrative on the first century of the Ottomans does not contain any reflection on their institutional peculiarities or any fresh analytical insights. But then, Ottoman peculiarities were not that obvious when the Arab historian wrote and, to the extent they were, systematic information on the subject could hardly have been available to him. The relevant passage from his world history (not the famous Muqaddimah, which is a theoretical work) is translated on pp. 161-64. in C. Huart, "Les origines de l'empire ottoman," Journal des Savants, n.s., 15(1917):157-66. Another Arab historian, Ibn Hajar (1372-1449), writes that he heard it said a number of times by none other than Ibn Khaldun that "there was no one to fear with regard to Egypt but the Sons of Osman"; see Sevkiye Inalcik, "Ibn Hacer'de Osmanililara Dair Haberler," Ankara Üniversitesi Dil Tarih Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi 6 (1948):356 (or p. 351 of her trans.).


145. It is surprising, however, that Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) is mentioned as the ruler of the time, since the Thracian adventures of the Turco-Muslim frontier warriors, including the Ottomans, dearly started under Bayezid's grandfather. To the extent one can discern "historical" events in this source, a good many are known to have occurred before even Bayezid's father reached rulership. The hagiographer must have "slipped" here because he or she cites a document ( berat ) to prove that the rights of the assaulted protagonist over his property had been legitimized by the Ottomans themselves; and that document was apparently a deed issued by Bayezid *. Later archival sources indeed refer to a title deed given by that sultan to Kizil Deli (or the sheikh of the shrine complex named after him?) in 1400/1401; see Tayyib Gökbilgin, XV-XVI. Asırlarda Edirne ve Pasa Livası: Vakıflar — Mülkler — Mukataalar (İstanbul, 1952), 183. I also had the good fortune to hear Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr's presentation on Ottoman archival documents concerning that endowment in a symposium on the Via Egnatia, held at the University of Crete, Rethymnon, in January 1994; the proceedings are forthcoming.

146. There are differences between the versions of the anonymous chronicles and of the YF-Apz narrative, but I will disregard them to highlight the comparison with the tales of Kizil Deli.

147. Much more is known about the "historical" Emir Sultan (d. 1429) than about Seyyid ‘Ali and others in his entourage. The former evidently did take part in Ottoman campaigns. A Byzantine account of the 1422 siege of
Constantinople relates that he was there along with 500 dervishes. See Ioannes Cananus, De Constantinopolis Obsidione, ed. and trans. E. Pinto (Messina, 1977). According to later legends, he was the one who miraculously caused the departure of Timur's troops from Bursa and who girded sultans with swords upon accession or when departing for a campaign. See C. Baysun, "Emir * Sultan *," IA, s.v. 148. Cezbi *, Velayetname *, 18-19. (The manuscript is assigned not folio but page numbers by a modern hand.)

149. See her works cited in n. 144, above.

150. See the vita of Seyh * Bedreddin * by his grandson Halil * bin Ismai‘il *. According to this work, Seyh * Bedreddin's * grandfather 'Abdul‘aziz * and Haci * Ilbegi * were related. However, while the former was of "Seljuk descent" ( Selcuk * nesli ) (F. Babinger, ed., Die Vita [ menaqibname ] * des Schejch Bedr ed-din * Mahmud *, gen. Ibn Qadi * Samauna [Leipzig, 1943], 5), the latter was not, since he was "the seed of a son-in-law" ( gürgen tohumi *) (6).

151. This curious tale is reported in Dimitrie Cantemir's early eighteenth-century history of the Ottoman Empire: Osmanli Tarihi, 3 vols., trans. Özdemir Cobanoglu * (Ankara, 1979), 1:29-30. It is hard to imagine that such a story would be made up in the eighteenth century; Cantemir must have had access to some oral or written tradition. It is also noteworthy that Seyh * Bedreddin's * grandson, writing in the early sixteenth century and sanitizing his grandfather's story to forge a rapprochement with the Ottomans, uses a particularly offensive expression, "seed of a son-in-law," to underline that Ilbegi * was "not of Seljuk descent." The Timurids, too, could be seen as the "seed of a son-in-law" since Timur was no more than a son-in-law ( gürgen ) to the Chingisids, the real bearers of legitimacy.

152. The shrine in Dimetoka, a city conquered by Ilbegi * according to almost all accounts, was widely known as one of the four or five most-respected cultic sites of the Bektasi * order in the sixteenth century. A poem by Pir * Sultan * Abdal * refers to various episodes in the vita analyzed above, indicating that the Kizil * Deli lore had been elaborated and was in wide circulation by the latter part of the sixteenth century. The motifs of crossing to Gelibolu and being the commander of forty holy warriors are repeated in the poems of this Bektasi * poet and later ones. See Öztelli, ed., Bektasi * Gülleri, 121-22, and passim.
suspect, as will be discussed below. And even if this were true, different dam
of Kayi ancestry could have arrived in Anatolia at different times. Köprülü also
claims that "older written sources" support his position, but he does not name
those sources; a chronicle, for instance, states that "Ertogrul * left Turkistan
* with 340 men of his and came to Rum * along with the Seljuks" (Cengiz and
Yücel, eds., "Rûhî Tarihi," 375).

4. This section of the Selçukname * is edited in A. S. Levend, Tüurk Dilinole
Gelisme * ve Sadelesme * Sahfaları (Ankara, 1949), 18. A coin issued in the name
of Orhan * in 1327 contains a symbol that some scholars were inclined to read as
the stamp of the Kayi tribe (see Uzuncarsili * , Osmanli Tarihi, 1:125), but
this has been shown to be a misreading. The Kayi symbol appears on Ottoman coins
only during the reign of Murad * II (1421-51), that is, in Yazicizade's *
lifetime, when the Kayi lineage had been re-remembered. See F. Sümer, Oguzlar *
(Türkmenler): Tarihleri-Boy Teskilati-Destanlari * , 3d enl. ed. (Istanbul,
1980), 220.

5. Sukrullah * , Behcetu't-tevarih * , trans. N. Atsiz in idem, Osmanli
Tarihlari (Istanbul, 1947), 51. On the political implications of the Oguz *
genealogy, see Barbara Flemming, "Political Genealogies in the Sixteenth
Century," JOS 7-8(1988):123-37; and, Aldo Gallotta, "Il mito oguzo e le origini
dello stato ottomano: Una riconsiderazione," OE, 41-59. For an original
interpretation of the genealogies that include the Biblical-Koranic figures
Japheth or Esau as the ancestors of the Ottomans, see S. Yerasimos, La fondation
de Constantinople. No matter what Ottoman claims were to a distinguished
degree, they do not seem to have been taken seriously, at least by their
rivals. Timur's derisive letters to Bayezid I are well known. A Karamanid
chronicle refers to the House of Osman as " bi-`asl * " (lacking a proper
lineage, or, upstart); see Sikarînin * Karaman Ogullari * Tarihi, ed. M. Koman
(Konya, 1946), passim. For a number of different, some rather wild, theories
proposed in sixteenth-century sources, mostly outside the Ottoman empire, see
Köprülü, "Osmanli Imparatorlugu'num * Etnik Mensei * Meseleleri."
the majority of the Karakeçili were Sunni, there were some `Alevi * clans:
10. OA, 376: "Germiyan * ili henüz daru'l-harb * idi." Earlier cited in Ménage, 
Neshri's * History, 71. According to Uzuncarsili * and Varlik, the Germiyan were 
not settled there at least until the 1240s.
İkinci * Türk Tarih Kongresi: Istanbul 1937 (Istanbul, 1943), 493-98; Richard 
Hartmann, Zur Wiedergabe türkischer Namen und Wörter in den byzantinischen 
Quellen, Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 
Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur, und Kunst, no. 6 (Berlin, 1952), 6. For other 
theories, from the earlier part of this century, concerning Osman's name, see 
Langer and Blake, "The Rise of the Ottoman Turks," 496 n. 65.
12. F. Taeschner, ed., Al-Umari's Bericht über Anatolien 22, line 5: "'Uthman * "; 41, line 18: "Taman * ." For a list of "misspelled" Anatolian geographical 
and personal names in this work and their "corrections," see I * . H. Konyali, 
13. Cited in M. H. Yinanç, "Ertugrul * Gâzî," IA * , s.v. Yinanç reads the name 
as "Utman." Also see the verses cited in Latin-letter transcription (from the 
same manuscript?) in Gazimihal, "Mihalogullari * ", 128, with the name read as 
"At-man." Osman must have had another (an earlier?) name, whatever the precise 
form it took, according to Jean Deny and Adrian Emi as well: see Deny, 
"L'Osmanli moderne et le Türk de Turquie," in Philologicae Turcicae Fundamenta, 
vol. 1 (Wiesbaden, 1963), 182-239; Erzi, "Osmanli Devletinin Kurucusunun Ismi * 
Meselesi," Türkiyat Mecmuası 7-8 (1940-42):323-26. Given that such an impressive 
array of scholars, independently of each other, reached similar conclusions, it 
is surprising that Osman's change of name is not taken into account in 
treatments of his life. It is curious that the title hetman given to the 
chieftains of Zaporozhian Cossacks (seventeenth century) derives etymologically 
from the Turkish word ataman; see Omeljan Pritsak, "Das erste 
türkisch-ukrainische Bündnis (1648)," Orients 6(1953):268. This particular 
Turkish word for a leader is not attested in medieval Anatolia; Louis Bazin, 
however, makes a very good effort to demonstrate that it is plausible for ataman 
to have been of ancient usage as a title; see his "Antiquité méconnue du titre 
It should also be noted that Osman's name is misspelled even on his own coin, 
but in a different fashion. It has the Arabic tha' * in the middle but the 
"'alif" is omitted, thus forcing the reader to a shortening of the second 
syllable, which is a long one in the Arabic original.
14. As we saw in chapter 1 with respect to the arguments made by Demirtas * and 
Káldy-Nagy, some scholars feel that giving a Turkish name to one's child does 
imply being less of a Muslim. Among the "reasons for hypothesizing that 
Ertughrul and his sons were only loosely attached to Islam," Káldy-Nagy writes 
that "Ertughrul himself, his two brothers, ... and his two sons ... had old 
Turkic, i.e., non-Muslim names." After noting that Osman's original name must 
have been "Ataman," he adds: "The appropriate question here, then, is: to what 
extent was Osman — though no longer a pagan — actually imbued with the spirit of 
Islam when he gave the name Orkhan ... to several [sic] of his sons ...?" ("Holy 
War," 470).
15. Andronicus III is reported to have designed a plan to help the besieged
Bursans but it was not carried out. See A. E. Laiou Constantinople and the Latins (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 292-93.

16. Apz, 14-15; Osman's discussion with his brother is on p. 16.

17. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 292.

18. In the case of Salah * al-Din *, too, there has been concern among scholars to determine the extent to which he was driven by sincere faith or plain ambition. See H. A. R. Gibb, "The Achievement of Saladin," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 35(1952):46-60.

19. On Mihal *, see Ayverdi, Osmanli Mi'mârîsinin Ilk * Devri, 5 n. 3 (the site of Harman Kaya, reported to be his original base), and 150-51 (alleged tomb and ancestors).


21. Göynük was totally Christian when Ibn Battuta * passed through it in 1333.

22. Ibn `Arabshah *, Tamerlane, trans. Sanders, 178. See ibid., 177, on their numbers, strength, wealth, and huge herds. The "king of Artana" (or Eretna) was appointed governor by the Ilkhanids just before the dissolution of their power. Thereafter, he ruled his own principality, styling himself "sultan" in central and eastern Anatolia until his death in 1352.

23. Ibid., 201. This "treachery" may be why Yahsi * Fakih *, possibly writing in the post-1402 circumstances, is particularly keen on presenting them as villains.

24. Imber, "Dynastic Myth; n. 1, accuses Inalcik * of being so credulous as to take the wedding story seriously.

25. Elvan * Çelebi, Menakibu'l-kudsiyye *, 169. The editors identify (p. lxxvi) the Sheikh Bali who appears just a few lines earlier as another person. But the name could be a shorter version of Ede Bali, just as Ede Sheikh is used in some later documents. In other words, the consecutive lines about Bali and Ede Bali may refer to the same person. If so, the information given in the lines concerning Sheikh Bali's wealth tallies perfectly with Apz's apologetic report about Ede Bali as a rich herd-owner "whose dervishliness was in his esoteric being." The Turkish translation of the Burhan-i * Kati` * (a celebrated Persian dictionary) indicates that "ede" was used for "elder brother" in the Maras * region in the eighteenth century ( Tarama Sozlugu *, 8 vols. [Ankara, 1963-77], 3:1384). If it had the same meaning and functioned as a title in fourteenth-century western Anatolia, it could easily have been dropped when one wanted to refer to the sheikh by his name (Bali) only.

26. The document (from A.H. 985, in Basbakanlik * Arsivi *, Mühimme Defterleri 31, p. 237) cannot be conclusive evidence, however, since it is possible that the scribe was too gullible or that this information was accepted dogma by that time. On the other hand, it is worth noting that Apz writes that he received all this information orally from Mahmud *, Ede Bali's son, and the land surveys give the names of Ede Bali's descendants in this order: his son Mahmud *, Mahmud's * son Mehmed *, Mehmed's * sons Mahmud * and Pasa *. Barkan and Meriçli, eds., Hüdavendigâr, 282-83. The YF-Apz narrative also refers to a certain Ahi * Hasan * as Ede Bali's nephew (Ape, ed. Giese, 14). Along with some other evidence of the same nature, this has been taken by Giese as the basis of his argument that Osman and Ede Bali were leading members of the ahi * associations that Ibn Battuta * encountered in almost every town he visited in Anatolia; see his "Das Problem der Enstehung des osmanischen Reiches." Even
though Giese's theory is farfetched, it is clear on the basis of the documents edited by Barkan and Meriçli that several grants were made to ahis* by the begs of the fourteenth century, including those of the Ottoman family. The precise contribution of the ahis* to the Ottoman enterprise remains to be assessed but it cannot be ignored. Many of these documents were already known and used by E. H. Ayverdi, Osmanlı Mi'mârisinin İlk* Devri, 8.

Zachariadou, "Pachymeres on the 'Amourioi' of Kastamonu."

Ibid., 70.


Ibid., 70.

See Togan, Umumî Türk Tarihi'ne Giriş*, 323.

1. The geographical setting of Sogut* is exhaustively analyzed by Clive Foss, unpublished paper. I am grateful to the author for enabling me to make use of this important study. The location alongside a major highway should also be seen in terms of the larger picture of thriving commerce in and around Asia Minor, as mentioned above in the Introduction. In general, the specific material conditions on the ground — not the main concern of this book — in Bithynia as compared to other parts of the peninsula should be studied much more carefully in order to assess the advantages and potential of different principalities. To what extent did different agricultural activities continue? What kind and level of an interface between pastoralist and agrarian activities can be observed in different parts of Asia Minor? Foss makes an exemplary attempt, in the same unpublished paper, to draw some answers to such questions from a late thirteenth-century endowment deed, for instance. Many other documents of the same sort need to be analyzed, and Byzantine sources brought into the picture. On the ebb and flow as well as the changing nature of productive activity in medieval Anatolia, also see Hendy, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy. Akdag's* Türkiye'nin İktisadi* ve İctimai* Tarihi is also useful. Begs benefited from such activity in terms of both revenue and booty, of course; their success must have depended, to some extent, on finding the right mixture. For a general look at the sources of wealth for the principalities, see E. Zachariadou, "S'enrichir en Asie Mineure au XIVe siècle," Hommes et richesses dans l'empire byzantin, vol. 2: VIIe-XVe siècle, ed. V. Kravari et al. (Paris, 1991), 215-24. Important information on revenues in Anatolia in the first half of the fourteenth century was discovered in sources concerning Ilkhanid finances by A. Zeki Velidi [Togan], "Mogollar Devrinde Anadolu'nun İktisadi* Vaziyeti," Türk Hukuk ve İktisat* Tarihi Mecmuası 1(1931):1-42.

32. Apz, ed. Giese, 19. One of the manuscripts used by Atsiz adds that people of other regions came to Osman's domains upon hearing of the "comfort of the infidels here [in Osman's realm]" (102).

33. See Bayburt Kanunnâmesi, ed. Leyla Karahan (Ankara, 1990), 16.


35. See, for instance, the interpretation of a dream attributed to Muhammad* al-Qa'im*, the founder of the Sa'dian dynasty of Morocco, who competed with the Ottomans in the midsixteenth century, in Dahiru Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1981), 5.

37. One could see this within a larger context as part of the role that dervishes continued to play for several centuries, certainly throughout Ottoman history, in Islamic political culture, which is said to be devoid of mechanisms of intermediation between the governing elites and the governed. To the extent that legitimacy of power depended on the acceptance and fulfillment of some reciprocal expectations, it involved the intermediacy ("notarization") of figures who were recognized by the public for reasons that were, ordinarily, not state-induced.

38. The decline of interest is only relative of course and even then not valid for the whole period. In her Constantinople and the Latins, Laiou shows that Andronicus II (r. 1282-1328) was quite concerned with Asia Minor in the first twenty-two years of his reign. On pseudo-Lachanes, see Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, 7-8.

39. C. Foss, "Byzantine Malagina and the Lower Sangarius," Anatolian Studies 40(1990):161-83 and plates; see esp. 173-75. For Andronicus II in Bithynia, see Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 79. Note also the expedition of Catalan troops, dispatched to Asia Minor by the Byzantine empire in 1304, as recorded in Muntaner, Crónica (Barcelona, 1951).

40. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 247. This impression may be due simply to a gap (mentioned in ibid., 144) in Byzantine narrative sources for a while after 1307, namely, when Pachymeres ended his account.


42. Al-'Umari's * Bericht über Anatolien, 22; Ibn Battuta * , 2:324.

43. Barkan and Meriçli, eds., Hüdavendigâr, passim.

44. Inalcik * , "Siege of Nicaea."

45. This does not imply that the appanage system was limited to the Turco-Mongol traditions. The (Persian) Buyids * and (Kurdish) Ayyubids * followed similar practices, as did the Merovingians of medieval Gaul. For references to the most important works on the appanage system in the Islamic world, see S. Humphreys, Islamic History (Princeton, 1991), 166. For a detailed delineation of its workings in one polity over a considerable stretch of time, also see R. McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889 (Princeton, 1991), passim.

46. Pazarlu Beg is mentioned once by the Byzantine historian Kantakouzenos. Land surveys of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries refer to some endowments by Pazarlu and 'Ala'eddin * in the Sogut-Yarhisar * area. It has escaped all attention that the YF-Apz narrative (Atsiz, 102) refers to a son of Osman's as the one who was in charge of the seasonal migration of the tribe; he remains unnamed but is dearly neither Orhan * nor 'Ala'eddin * .

47. Based on the fact that the endowment deed of March 1324 is issued in the name of Orhan * , Uzuncarsili * , has suggested ("Gazi Orhan Bey Vakfiyesi," 282-83) that Osman must have died before that date. But this is not conclusive evidence since there is no reference to Osman as deceased in the document as it now exists, that is, torn, particularly in that part where Osman's name was written, which could have been followed by a formula like "el-merhum * ."

50. Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "La vita de Seyyid `Ali * Sultan * et la conquête de la Thrace par les Turcs"; idem, "La conquête d'Andrinople par les Turcs"; and idem, Le règne de Selim * Ier."
51. This argument was first made by Uzuncarsili * on the basis of a document he discovered and published in "Osmanli Tarihine Ait Yeni Bir Vesikanin Ehemmiyeti ve Bu Münasebetle Osmanlılarda İl*k * Vezirlere Dair Mütalea," Belleten 3(1939):99-106. For an exhaustive analysis of this document, which Wittek argued was a forgery, and for references to the considerable body of scholarly literature on it, see Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Recherches, 106-10.
53. On the office of the kadi`asker * under the Seljuks, see Turan, Vesikalar, 46-47. Note that Ottoman kaza * (juridical system) seems to have evolved in more of a synthesis with the administration of `urfi * (sultanic/customary) law than Seljuk kaza *, where ser'î * (religious) and `urfi * spheres remained more dearly differentiated.
54. Oruç Beg * Tarihi, ed. Atsiz, 41.
55. Byzantium, Europe, and the Ottoman Sultans, 1373-1513: An Anonymous Greek Chronicle of the Seventeenth Century (Codex Barberinus Graecus 111), trans. M. Philippides (New Rochelle, N.Y., 1990), 21. Elizabeth Zachariadou has shown that this source is based primarily on the second edition (Venice, 1573) of Francesco Sansovino's history of the Ottomans; see her The Chronicle about the Turkish Sultans (of Codex Barberinus Graecus 111) and Its Italian Prototype (Thessaloniki, 1960) (in Greek). I thank the author for bringing this to my attention and for orally summarizing its contents.
56. Orhan Saik * Gökyay, "Seyh * Bedreddin'in Babasi Kadi Mi Ildi?" Tarih ve Toplum 2(February 1984):96-98. On the popular confusion between kadi and gazi, see Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, 710.
57. Inalcik *, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest": "The state did not as a rule seek their conversion to Islam as a necessary prerequisite to enrollment in the Ottoman askeri class" (116). Also, being a tribal leader (in the inclusive sense) does not exclude being a gazi; ibid., 119 n. 3. As late as the seventeenth century, there were non-Muslims among the prebendal cavalry, but as isolated cases; see Bistra Cvetkova, Les institutions ottomanes en Europe (Wiesbaden, 1978), 5.
58. Inalcik *, Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar. In the rest of this paragraph, I basically follow this masterpiece of Ottoman political history.
59. Nesri *, ed. Taeschner, 32; ed. Unat and Köymen, 108-9. Apz (ed. Giese, 13-14) relates the practice of standing up and its meaning but not its abolition. In fact, he writes that Ottoman dynasts stood up "until today," implying that this passage (which does not appear in the anonymous chronicles or Uruç) was written before Mehmed * II changed the code; it may again be from the work of Yahsi * Fakih *.
62. Machiel Kiel has undertaken some pioneering studies with many relevant
examples; see his collected articles in Studies on the Ottoman Architecture of the Balkans (Hampshire, Great Britain, 1990). Also note that it was the Sons of Mihal * who built up the complex of the Seyyid Gazi shrine and some other "heterodox" sites in that area. Hayreti *, an `Alevi * poet of the early sixteenth century from Gianitsa, spent most of his life with his patrons among frontier lords, inducting the Sons of Mihal * and Yahya *; see M. Cavusoglu * and A. Tanyeri, intro. to Hayreti, Divan (Istanbul, 1981), xi-xv.

63. According to Ebu'l-hayr *, the compiler, Cem would rather listen to the stories of Sari * Saltuk * than those of the Hamzaname * cycle. While this implies at one level a preference of "Turkish" over "Arab" heroes, it should also be read as an affinity felt for a more familiar geography and "history" since the Saltukname * focuses on the spiritual and military conquest of the Balkans, which was of course the legacy and continued concern of the Ottomans in the fifteenth century. To the extent that it is a "Turkish-Arab" dichotomy, one should recognize that this is not necessarily a question of ethnic stock as such identities are understood in our time. Sari * Saltuk * is identified in the beginning as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad * through the line of the earliest Muslim warriors that were engaged in Byzantine Anatolia.

64. Saltukname *, ed. Akalin, 2:241-44.

65. Also see Köprülü, "Anadolu Selçukluları Tarihinin Yerli Kaynakları," 437 (translated in The Seljuks of Anatolia, 47-48).

66. That Cem had some political ambitions as early as 1473, when he ordered the compilation of the Saltukname *, also emerges from Angioloello's report of a rather obscure incident. According to the Vicentine page, who was in Ottoman service from 1470 to 1483, there was an attempt to enthrone Cem while his father was on campaign in eastern Anatolia against Akkoyunlu Uzun Hasan *. The exact nature of the incident can be elucidated only after further research, but there can be little doubt that the Conqueror took the matter seriously; he put Cem's advisors to death upon his return. See I. Ursu, ed., Historia Turchescha (1300-1514) (Bucharest, 1909), 48.

67. V.L. Ménage ("Edirne’li Rûhî," 313-14) points out that Ruhi’s * chronicle in fact breaks off at the point where Selim’s * victory looks inevitable. In his La fondation, S. Yerasimos has already underlined the role of Edirne in the resistance to Mehmed’s * imperial project, on the basis of a number of works, including the Saltukname * (207-10).


Epilogue The Creation of an Imperial Political Technology and Ideology


— 194 —

Chronik "Denkwürdigkeiten und Zeitläufe des Hauses `Osman" vom Derwisch Ahmed, genannt `Asik-Pasa-Sohn. Translated (based on the Berlin MS), with notes, by Richard F. Kreutel (Graz, 1959).


[Musa b. ‘Ali ?]. Vilayetname. Facsimile and modern Turkish edition by A. Gölpinarlı (who attributes the work to Firdevsi-i Rumi), in Vilâyet-nâme:


Tursun Beg. The History of Mehmed the Conqueror. Facsimile edition and summary— 196 —


Studies


———. "Gregory Palamas, the Chiones, and the Fall of Gallipoli: Byzantion 22(1952):305-12.
———. "Der Islam in Kleinasien: Neue Wege der Islamforschung." ZDMG 76(1922):126-152.
— 198 —


Cahen, Claude. "Le problème du Shi'isme dans l'Asie Mineure turque

De Vries-Van der Welden, Eva. L'elite byzantine devant l'avance turque à l'époque de la guerre civile de 1341 à 1354. Amsterdam, 1989.
Dickson, Martin. "Shah Tahmasb and the Uzbeks (The Duel for Khurasan with

—200—
———. "Das Problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches." Zeitschrift für

—— 201 —

Inalcik, Halil. "Comments on 'Sultanism': Max Weber's Typification of the
——. 'Osman Ghazi's Siege of Nicaea and the Battle of Bapheus." OE, pp. 77-100.
——. "The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329-1451." In A History of the
Crusades, edited by K. M. Setton. Vol. 6, The Impact of the Crusades on Europe,
——. "The Policy of Mehmed II towards the Greek Population of Istanbul and the
——. "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State." International Journal
of Turkish Studies 2(1980):71-79.
——. "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography." In Historians of the Middle East,
——. "The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium,
——. "The Yürük: Their Origins, Expansion, and Economic Role." In Oriental
 Carpets and Textile Studies. Vol. 2, Carpets of the Mediterranean Countries,
Inalcik, Sevkiye. "Ibn Hâcer'de Osmanlilar'a Dair Haberler." Ankara
Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi 6(1948):189-95, 349-58,
517-29.
——. Byzance après Byzance: Continuation de l' "Histoire de la vie byzantine." 
Bucharest, 1935.
111-50.

Johnson, J. T., and John Kelsay, eds. Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The
Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. New York,
1990.
——. Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and
Kafesoglu's Interpretation and the Resulting Controversy. Translated and edited
Káldy-Nagy, Gyula. "The Holy War (jihad ) in the First Centuries of the Ottoman
Karamustafa, Ahmet T. Vahidi's Menakib-i Cihan ve Netice-i Can : Critical
———. Edebiyat Arastirmaları. Ankara, 1966. This is a collection of previously published articles.

— 203 —
Laiou, Angeliki E. Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of
Lindner, Rudi P. Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia. Bloomington, 1983.
———. "L'origine sociale des premiers Ottomans." OE, pp. 135-44.

— 204 —
———. "Turklugun Tetkiki Bakimindan Bizantinolojinin Ehemmiyeti." Ikinci Türk
Mottahedeh, Roy. Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society. Princeton,
1980.
Ocak, Ahmet Yasar. "Babaîler Isyani'nin Tenkidine Dair." Fikir ve Sanatta
Hareket, 7th ser., 24(September 1981):36-44.
———. "Bazı Menâkibnamelere Göre XIII. ve XV. Yüzyıllardaki Ihtidalarda
———. La revolte de Baba Resul, ou la formation de l'hétérodaxie musulmane en
Université de Strasbourg. Abridged Turkish translation published under the title
Babaîler Isyani (İstanbul, 1980).
Oguz, Mevlut. "Taceddin Ogulları." Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve
Okiç, Tayyib. "Bir Tenkidin Tenkidi." Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi
———. "Sarı Saltuk'a Ait Bir Fetva." Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi
Orhonlu, Cengiz. Osmanlı İmparatorlugunda Asiretlerin İskani. 2d enl. ed.
Özdemir, Hasan. Die altosmanischen Chroniken als Quelle zur türkischen
Paret, Rudi. Die legendäre Maghazi-Literatur: Arabische Dichtungen über die
muslimischen Kriegszüge zu Mohammeds Zeit. Tübingen, 1930.
Pertusi, Agostino. "I primi studi in Occidente sull'origine e la potenza dei
Philippides-Braat, Anna. "La captivité de Palamas chez les Turcs: Dossier et


— 206 —


Uluçay, Cagatay . Saruhan Ogullarive Eserlerine Dair Vesikalar. 2 vols.
Istanbul, 1940-46.


Index

— 209 —
A
Abbasids, 63
abdal 176 n94
`Abdul'aziz 183 n150
`Abdul'aziz 132 -33
`Abdul'aziz 177 n96
`Abdulhamid 74, 185 n9
`Abdu'l-vasi 95
Abu'l-Wafa' 172 n44
Abu 63, 65
accommodationism: frontier cultures, 79 -84, 144 ;
Ottoman, II, 146. See also cooperation, Christian-Muslim; inclusivism
Acropolites, 89
administrative apparatus, Ottoman, 16-18, 104, 111-14, 131-53 passim;
Byzantine influences, 24, 39, 41, 140;
Ilkhanid legacy, 40, 45;
Seljuk institutions, 40, 142;
Turco-Muslim origins, 10, 24, 42. See also fiscal policies
abi 7, 34-35, 45, 176 n94, 187 n26;
autonomy lost, 141;
land given to, 181 n136, 187 n26
Ahi 7, 93, 154, 172 n43
Ahmedi 93-94, 102;
and Ertogrul's 107;
gaza 38, 42, 51, 55;
and Kayi genealogy, 122
Ahmed 149
`aka'id64
Akdag 45-46, 160-61
Akkoyunlu, 69, 94, 122, 178 n101. See also Uzun Hasan
akritai, and gazis, 48, 56. See also Digenis Akritas
al-Aksarayi 130
Aksemseddin 87
`Ala'eddin 106, 108, 136-37, 180 n126, 189 n46
`Ala'eddin 147
`Ala'eddin 177 n96
`Ala'eddin 66, 169 n14
Alanya, 6
`Alevi 54, 75, 172 n44
Alexios III Comnenos, Emperor of Trebizond, 69
Algiers, 83
`Ali 63, 75, 176 n94
`Ali 126, 130, 142
alliances: Christian-Muslim, 19;
Ottoman/proto-Ottoman, 15, 71, 74, 104, 122-38, 140. See also cooperation, Christian-Muslim
altérhistoire, 114-17
Anatolia, 14-15, 36-37, 39;
invasions, xiii, 2-4, 5, 23-24;
migrations into, xiii, 2, 3, 5, 23-24, 45;
Ottoman symmetrical expansion, 17;
politically divided, 2-7, 14-15, 48-49. See also frontier; Rum; Seljuks;
Turco-Muslim society; Turkey
Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (Finley), xiii

— 210 —
Andronicus II, 134, 188 n38
Andronicus III, 186 n15

184
Angiolello, Giovanni Maria, 191 n66
Ankara: Battle of (1402), 18, 94, 96;
Turkish capital, 149
Annales (French historical journal), 39
`Antanne 63
appanage, 136-38, 189 n45
Apz (`Asikpasazade 54, 96-114 passim, 179 n118, 181 n137, 183 n146;
and Ede Bali, 129, 187 nn25,26;
education, 177 n97;
and gaza 86-87, 145, 146, 179-80, 190 n59;
and Kayi genealogy, 122;
and Orhan's 137;
orthodoxy, 144;
on `Osman 126;
on `Osman's 132;
and `Osman's 189 n46;
and sword-document, 60
Arabic: histories in, 63, 93, 96;
names, xiv, 53, 61, 124-25, 167 n62;
transliterations, xiv
Arabs: Anatolian, 2, 45, 62-63, 67-68, 87;
Cem and, 190-91;
historians, 182 n142
architecture: gazi milieu, 147;
House of Aydin, 134
archives, xii, xiii, 42
Ardabil, Sheikh Safi 8
`Arif 176 n95
`Arif 77
Arik, Fahriye, 164 n31
Armenians, 3, 26
armies, 30;
Battle of Bapheus, 129-30;
Christians in Ottoman, 26, 52-53;
Janissary (yeñi çeri), 17, 18, 112, 139, 149;
Karasi warriors in, 116, 138;
kul83-84, 116, 146, 148-49, 182 n142;
Ottoman strategies, 145;
uc begleri, 142-43. See also Ankara: Battle of; gazis; march environment; navy,
Ottoman; political-military events
Arnakis, George G., 42-44, 50, 51, 55
Artuhi 67-68
Artuk 166-67
Artuk, Ibrahim 168 n3
`asabiyya 114, 182 n142
`Asik 74, 93, 101
`Asikpasazade. See Apz
`Askar 63
`askeri 112, 142, 190 n57

185
Aspurça Hatun 168 n1
astrologers, takvim96
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 41 , 91
Aydin, House of, 69 -78 passim, 89 , 130 , 134 , 138 , 139 . See also Umur Beg Aydinoğlu 77
Aydos fortress, in gazi epic, 70 , 103 , 104
'ayyarun56
B
Baba Ilyas 5 , 73 -75, 109 , 172 mm43,44
Baba'i's 74 -75, 144 ;
Ede Bali and, 74 , 124 , 128 -29;
Revolts, 74 -75, 109 , 124 ;
as Shi'is, 171 n40. See also Vefa'i's
babas, 141
Babinger, Franz, 34
bac104
bacis, 176 n94
Baghdad, 2 , 9
Balabancik, 135
Balivet, Michel, 175 n90
Balkans, 17 , 34 , 113 , 145 -47, 160 n23;
battles, 17 , 116 , 145 ;
gazi warlords mostly based in, 18 ;
"metadoxy," 76 ;
and national historiography, 21 ;
Ottoman benefits to, 32 , 165 n46;
political ideologies, 23 ;
Saltuk 64 , 190 n63;
scholarly community, 42 ;
Serbian losses, 17 , 116 , 139 ;
Thracian towns leading to, 117
Bapheus, Battle of, 129 -30
Bari (Italy), 3
Barthold, W. , 55 -56, 167 n71
Bashkiria, 44
Batatzes, 16
Battalname67 -68
Bayatli Mahmudoglu 106 -7
Bayburt: law code, 131 ;
walls, 77
Bayezid 18 , 97 , 114 , 140 , 183 n145;
and chronicles, 100 , 106 ;
and fratricide, 95 , 136 , 137 ;
intra-Muslim conflicts, 88 ;
and Muslim quarter in Constantinople, 40 ;
son-in-law, 115 ;
son's name, 124 ;
and Timur/Timurids, 18 , 85 , 94 -95, 112 , 128 , 185 n5
Bayezid 97
Bazin, Louis, 186 n13
Bedreddin 143, 145, 171 n40, 183-84
beg/beglik, 14-15, 17, 125, 143
Bektasi 7, 30, 97-98, 139;
cultic sites, 184 n152;
radicalization, 144;
Shi'ism and, 75. See also Haci Bektas Veli
Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Irène, 104, 116, 139, 182-83

Belgrade, 147
Bergama, 116
Beyatli, Yahya Kemal, 179 n115
Bilecik, 126;
lord of, 85, 105, 126, 129
Birgi, conquest of, 77, 170 n24
Bithynia, 47, 118, 125, 167 n72, 188 n31;
arheology, 104;
Baba'is 124, 129;
Byzantine, 7, 10, 15-16, 133-34;
Christians, 10, 26, 85, 107, 114, 142;
'Osmans 7, 10, 15-16, 118, 122-36 passim, 142;
Ottoman, 16, 43-44, 53-54, 90, 135-36; Palamas in, 90. See also Bursa;
Süüt
Blake, Robert P., 35
Bodin, Jean, 31
Borges, Jorge Luis, 157 n3
Bosnia, 21
Bryer, Anthony, 169-70, 174 n70
Bulgaria, 17, 21
Burhaneddin 177 n96, 178 n102
Bursa: Emir Sultan 183 n147;
Ottoman conquest, 16, 43, 136;
siege of, 125, 135, 186 n15. See also inscription (1337)
Busbecq, 33
Byzantines, 14, 117, 119, 160-61;
administrative influences, 24, 39, 41, 140;
Anatolian hinterland and, 37;
vs. Arab-Muslim armies (seventh century), 2-3;
Bithynia, 7, 10, 15-16, 133-34;
capital moved to Constantinople, 5-6;
chroniclers, 51, 61, 89, 129-30, 170 n28, 174 n76, 175 n87, 189 nn40,46;
Crusades, 3, 6;
factions, 16, 71, 135, 138;
foreign origins of rulers, 41;
frontier authority, 125;
and gaza 51, 89;
in gazi epics, 67 -71, 81 -82, 84 -85;
inclusive tribalism, 51;
Karasi emirate near, 16;
national historiography and, 24 , 38;
‘Osman's 61;
as Ottoman heritage, 24 , 33 , 34 , 39;
Ottoman power established over, xiii , 46 , 146;
Ottoman warfare with, 134 -35, 146;
Plethon persecution, 90;
and Seljuks, 3 , 4;
tekvur, 14 -15, 68;
Trebizond, 20, 68 -69;
weakness in Anatolia, 15 , 48 , 49 , 133 -34;
weakness internally, 45. See also Constantinople
C
Çaka Beg, 3
Cakü Beg, 128
calendars, annalistic, 96 , 98 , 102
Cam-i 106 -7
Çandarli ʿAli 111 , 112
Çandarli family, 18 , 111 , 140 , 146
Çandarli Halil 97 , 146
Çandarli Kara 16 , 100 , 112 , 129 , 140
Cantemir, Dimitrie, 183 -84
Cantor, Norman, 12
caravanserai, 6
Castro, Américo, 20, 21
Catalan mercenaries, 188 n39
causality, and cultural history, 58
Çavdar Tatars, 128
Cem, Prince: books written for, 71 , 107 , 147 -48, 190 -91;
and brother, 97 , 137;
son's name, 124
census registers, xiii
Charalambos, Saint, 74
charity, wealth and, 87
Charles V, 20
Chingisids, 2 , 9 , 10 , 29 -30, 122 ;
Altunorda, 45 ;
and economic globalization, 6 ;
inheritance practices, 136 ;
Ottoman vassals, 147 ;
and Tatars, 122 , 127 -28;
Timurids and, 137 , 183 n151. See also Ilkhanids
Christians, 19 -20, 122 , 141 ;
Anatolian, 2 -4, 14 -15, 52 -53, 79 -84, 89 , 126 , 160 -61;
Bithynian, 10 , 26 , 85 , 107 , 114 ;
chronicles and, 107 ;
commingling with Muslims, 20 , 56 ;
conversions to Islam, 10-11, 19-45 passim, 51, 67-74 passim, 160 n22, 174 n77; Crusades, 3, 6; dervishes and, 15; gazis, 52-53, 81-82; Göynük, 186 n21; Karakeçili 185 n9; in Ottoman armies, 26, 52-53; Ottoman marriage alliances, 135; vs. Ottomans, 98, 128; punishment for sins of, 30; saint-sharing with Muslims, 74. See also Byzantines; cooperation, Christian-Muslim; gaza chronicles of House of `Osman xii, 13-14, 48, 90-117, 181 n137; anonymous, 96, 102-16 passim, 131, 143, 145, 181 n137, 183 n146; and court history, 98-100, 114; differences among, 99-103; as fiction, 13, 33, 44; Karamani 96, 102, 107; and Karasi, 116, 138; Kemalpasazade 114; and Marmara-basin economy, 45; Nesri 102-3, 105, 107, 108, 109; and Orhan's 136; Sukrullah 96, 102, 107.

— 212 — chronicles of House of `Osman (continued) 114, 122; Uruç, 96, 100, 106, 107, 109; and wealth, 86-87, 111-12; Yazicizade, 94, 96, 122. See also Ahmed; Apz class struggle: Werner history and, 46. See also ruling class Cobanoglu 76-77, 130 coins, 168 n3; gazis of Rum 147; Kayi symbol, 184 n4; Orhan's 164 n31, 184 n4; `Osman's 16, 60, 123, 186 n13 colleges (medrese), 16, 77, 177 n97 colonization, Ottoman policy of, 45, 145 Constantinople: Byzantine capital moved to, 5-6; Church of Hagia Sophia, 71; Muslim quarter, 40; new Ottoman capital, 97, 148, 152; Ottoman conquest, xi, 14-20 passim, 96, 100, 146-52 passim; siege (1422), 183 n147
conversions to Islam, 160 n22;
Christian, 10 -11, 19 -45 passim, 51, 67 -74 passim, 160 n22, 174 n77;
in frontier narratives, 65 -68, 71 -75;
Jewish, 74;
kul83 -84;
Mongol, 74;
`Osman 10, 33, 34 -35, 55, 124;
`Osman's 26, 127, 135;
Ottoman lack of pressure for, 45, 51, 145, 190 n57. See also gaza
cooperation, Christian-Muslim, 11, 19, 114, 145, 160 -61;
Bedreddin 143;
in gazi epics, 66, 68 -72, 79 -84
corporate organizations: abi7, 34 -35, 141;
gazi, 56, 167 n71, 176 n92
Cosan 172 n43, 180 n130
Cossacks, Zaporozhian, 186 n13
Crusades: First, 3;
Fourth, 6
cultural history, and causality, 58
culture: fluidity of identities, 19 -28, 81 -82;
frontier, 61, 62, 64, 84, 89, 147;
national historiography and, 20 -28, 159 -60;
Ottoman written, 93;
western Turkish "classic," 7, 94 -95. See also ethnicity; literacy; political
culture; religion; Turco-Muslim society
D
La dame aux camélies, 82
Danismend 3, 63 -71 passim, 78, 116
Danismendids 3 -4, 48, 57, 64, 66
Danismendname 63, 66, 68, 93, 95 -96, 141
danismends (schoolmen), 110 -14
Dede Korkut, 68 -69, 94, 177 -78
Dehhan 93
Deny, Jean, 186 n13
dervishes, 7, 15, 35, 45, 188 n37;
`Ala'eddin 136;
Apz, 54, 60, 86 -87, 101 -2;
changing standing with Ottomans, 120;
chroniclers, 97;
Ede Bali and, 187;
and gazis, 13, 64 -90, 101 -2, 109, 110, 115 -17;
Geyikli Baba, 53 -54;
hagiographies, 62 -93, 115 -17;
land ownership, 97, 181 n136;
Mevlevi 7, 75, 77, 130, 172 n43;
networks, 101 -2;
Ottoman alliances with, 135;
Ottomans alienated from, 143 -44, 150;
radicalization, 144;
Safavids and, 141;
and schoolmen, 110;
Seljuks and, 66;
takvim96;
and wealth, 86-88. See also Baba'is; Bektasi order; Sufis
desire, in frontier narratives, 68
De Vries-Van der Welden, Eva, 175 n89
devshirme 141
Diehl, Charles, 34
Digenis Akritas, 81-82, 84, 85, 174 n72
Dimetoka (Dhidhimoteichon), 184 n152
Disraeli, Benjamin, 179 n115
Douglas, Mary, 82
dream: interpreters, 132-33;
Murad 151;
`Osman's 8-9, 10, 29-30, 33, 104, 128, 132-33
Dumézil, Georges, 29, 161 n1, 181 n134
Dündar 105-9, 123, 180 n124
Durkheimian tradition, 39, 163 n23
Dusturname 65, 69-70, 71, 73
E
Eastern Roman Empire, xi, 1-2, 3, 8
Ebamuslimname63
Ebu'l-hayr-i 71
Ebussu`ud 154
Eco, Umberto, xii-xiii, 157 n3
economy: chronicles and, 111-12;
globalization of Eurasian, 6-7;
Marmarabasin, 45-46. See also administrative apparatus, Ottoman; fiscal
policies; trade; wealth
Ede Bali, Sheikh, 87, 128-29, 187 nn25,26;
and Baba'is 74, 124, 128-29;
cult, 144;
descendants, 187 n26;
dream interpreter, 132-33;
as `Osman's 87, 123, 129;
wealth, 87, 187 n25
Edime, 148-49, 191 n67
Efromiya, 67-68
Elbistan, Battle of, 76
El Cid, 182 n143

— 213 —
Ellisaeus, 90
Elvan 73-74, 75, 101, 128-29
Emecen, Feridun, 166 n56
emir/emirates, 14-15. See also beg/beglik
Emir Sultan 115-16, 183 n147
endowment deeds: by Bayezid 183 n145;
Foss study, 188 n31;
by Orhan 61, 136, 189 n47;
by Orhan's 168 n1;
'Osman's 16
Enveri 69-70
epics, gazi, 62-90
Ertogrul 45, 53, 105, 123-24, 184 n3, 185 n9, 186 n14;
brothers, 106-7;
historicity, 60, 123;
lineage, 96, 122, 181 n134;
and 'Osman's 30;
and Sögüt, 74, 95, 124;
and Tatars, 128
Erzi, Adnan, 186 n13
ethnicity, 4, 10-11, 12;
fluidity of identity and, 19-28, 81-82, 140-41;
national historiography and, 10, 20-42 passim, 159-60. See also Arabs;
Europeans; Jews; nationalism; tribalism; Turks
Europeans: "anti-Turkish" leagues, 18;
Crusades, 3, 6;
Habsburg, 7-8, 20, 33, 150;
historiography, 30-31;
Iberian, 19-21, 89;
jihad and colonialism by, 79;
refugees in Ottoman administration, 90. See also Balkans; France; Greeks
Evrenos family, 151
Evrenos Gazi, 74
exclusiveness: gazas50, 51;
Ottoman state, 121
F
fakihs 110, 135, 181 n136
Ferando, Captain, 83
feudal system, Ottoman, 46
Fevbre, Lucien, 39
fiction, chronicles dismissed as, 13, 33, 44
Finley, Moses, xiii
Firdevsi 180 n130
fiscal policies: Ottoman, 15, 100, 111-14, 131-33, 145. See also monetary
system; taxes
fitra 84
Foss, Clive, 104, 187-88
France: Annales school of, 39;
historiography on, 22, 25
Franks, Crusades, 3
fratricide, 95, 105-9, 136-37
frontier, xiii-xiv, 1-3, 10, 14-18, 39-40;
authority layers, 14-15, 125-26, 142-43;
culture, 61, 62, 64, 84, 89, 147;
hinterland vs., 37;
"historical" narratives, 62-90, 139-40, 177 n96;
"in operation," 65;
"metadox," 76;
mobility and fluidity, 140-41;
Ottoman alienation/conflicts, 94, 113-14, 139-50, 151-52;
political culture/wilderness, 14-15, 125, 141, 173 n59;
Turco-Muslim, 1-3, 13-15, 37-38, 52, 62-90, 125-28;
uc begleri, 142-43;
vogue, 61. See also Bithynia; dervishes; gazis; nomads; Ottoman state
frontier narratives, 62-90, 139-40, 177 n96. See also chronicles of House of
Osman; history
futuwwa, 34-35, 176 n92
G
Garibname93
gaza11-12, 13, 45-59, 91-92, 176 n94;
chronicles and, 101-2, 109-14, 145, 179-80;
definition, xii, 56-57, 80;
exclusiveness, 50, 51;
"historical" narratives, 62-90, 139-40;
vs. jihad, 79-80;
"motive force" confused with "sufficient cause," 57-58;
Ottomans/proto-Ottomans and, 10-11, 47-59, 89-97, 110-24 passim, 140, 144
-46, 179-80;
Safavids and, 53, 93, 145, 176 n94, 181 n135;
schoolmen and, 109-14, 140;
and sedentarization, 54, 113-14, 140, 142, 147, 181 n135;
standing up to salute, 146, 152, 190 n59;
true, 52, 145;
and wealth, 85-88, 111-12. See also Wittek, Paul/gaza thesis
Gazi 78
gazis, 11, 13-14, 45-49, 91-92, 165-66;
Bedreddin 143;
Byzantine authors and title of, 89;
and central government, 16-18, 111-14, 120, 138-53;
chronicles and, 100-103, 110, 111-17;
corporate organizations, 56, 167 n71, 176 n92;
depiction, 55-57, 58-59;
epics, 62-90;
formalization, 176 n92;
heterodoxy, 11, 53, 143-44;
as historiographical creation, 57;
and "hochislamisch" tendencies, 49;
honor, 84-86, 174 n72;
identity, 78;
inclusivism, 38, 68-70, 82-84;
joy, 179 n115;
most illustrious, 135;
Muslimness of, 12, 52, 55, 66-67, 75-90, 167 n67;
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 91;
networks,

— 214 —
gazis (continued)
101 -2, 176 n92;
`Osman 38, 51 -52, 70, 77, 84 -85, 150;
Ottoman/proto-Ottoman, 38, 48, 51 -53, 78, 90 -93, 99, 120, 127 -50 passim;
Ottomans alienating/subjugating, 16 -18, 112 -13, 120, 138 -53;
and pençik tax, 112 -13, 114, 142;
Safavid, 93, 176 n94;
and Thrace, 16 -17, 114 -17, 138 -44 passim;
tribal leaders, 190 n57;
"true" 52;
uc begleri, 142 -43, 146;
wars between, 88 -89;
and wealth, 85 -88, 111 -12. See also gaza
Gelibolu, 184 n152;
earthquake, 145;
gazis taxed in, 112 -13;
Ottoman capture of, 16, 113;
Ottoman loss of, 17, 139
gender: gazi epic inclusiveness, 67 -69, 70;
inclusiveness in genealogies, 40
genealogy, Ottoman, 29 -30, 104 -5, 181 n134;
Kayi, 37 -42 passim, 49, 96, 122, 164 nn31, 37, 184 -85;
tribes and, 50 -51
generosity: Ottoman, 131;
wealth and, 87
genetic method, historiographical, 32
geographic location: Karasi, 16;
and Ottoman rise to power, 15 -16, 36, 45, 58, 120, 130 -34;
Söğüt, 130 -31, 187 -88. See also Bithynia; frontier
George, Saint, 74
Germiyan, House of, 76 -77;
Ahmedi 93 -94;
House of Aydin's autonomy and, 139;
vs. Ottomans/proto-Ottomans, 104, 107, 123 -24, 128 -29, 135;
Tatars and, 128, 135
Die Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches (Hammer-Purgstall), 32
Geyikli Baba, 53 -54
Gianitsa (Yenice Vardar): Gazi Baba of, 74;
Hayreti 190 n62
Gibbon, E. F., 161 n3
Gibbons, Herbert A., xi, 9 -10, 32 -35, 42 -43, 44;
Byzantines compared with Osmanlis, 162 n12;
and chronicles, 13, 33, 44, 98;
and 'Osman 10, 33, 34-35, 54, 124;
and 'Osman's 10, 33, 132;
and Wittek critics, 50
Giese, Friedrich, 34, 187 n26
Gökalp Ziya, 163 n23
Gökyay, Orhan, Saik 143
Gölpinarli, Abdülkadir, 75, 171 n40, 180 n130
Göynük, 40, 128, 186 n21
Granada, Spanish conquest, 20
Greeks: conversions to Islam, 33;
Mehmed 9;
and national historiography, 21, 24, 25-26;
vs. Turks, 84. See also Byzantines
Greenblatt, Stephen J., 72, 170-71
Gregoras, Nicetas, 170 n28, 175 n87
Grousset, R., 34
Gulsehri 93
Gündüz, 105, 107-8
H
Habsburgs, 7-8, 20, 33, 150
Haci 94, 97, 107, 108, 141, 172 n43, 177 n95;
dream interpreter, 132-33;
and Kızıl 115;
order, 7, 30, 75, 97-98, 139, 144, 154, 184 n152;
and 'Osman's 124;
and rulership, 30;
as Saint Charalambos, 74. See also Bektasi order
Hagia Sophia, 105
hagiographies, 13-14, 62-92, 102, 114-17, 176-77
Halilname 95
Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von, 32, 132
Hamza 63, 94
Hamzaname 63, 190 n63
Hamzavi 94
al-Harawi 169 n14
Harmankaya, 127
Harun 177 n95
Hatun 40
Hayreddin 83, 84, 170 n30
Hayreti 190 n62
Hellenism, Byzantines and, 90
heterodoxy: gazi, 11, 53, 143-44;
Islamic, 52, 53-54, 71-76;
networks, 176 n92;
Ottoman, 11-12, 51, 53, 54;
Türkmen, 75-76
historical linguistics, xii
historiography, xi-xv, 9-13, 14-, 21-59;
European, 30 -31;
 generational cycles, 11;
genetic method, 32;
 international, 160 n21;
"lid model," 21 -22;
national, 10, 20 -47 passim, 159 -60;
Ottoman onion/garlic, 99, 102, 114;
and political-military events, 10, 32, 36, 38, 39, 174 n70;
trends in, xii -xiii;
Turco-Muslim Anatolian, 93 -95;
Turkish, 10,

— 215 —
23, 41, 42, 44 -46. See also chronicles of House of `Osman
history: cultural, 58;
narrative, 39 -40;
sociological, 39, 46 -47, 163 n23. See also archives; historiography
Hizir 75
honor, gazi code of, 84 -86, 174 n72
Hopwood, Keith, 84, 174 n70
hospitality, wealth and, 87
Houtsma, M. Th., 35, 42
Huart, C., 35
Hudavendigar 108
human sacrifice, 54
Hungarians: "anti-Turkish" leagues, 18;
refugees in Ottoman administration, 90
hunkar143. See also sultanate
huruc63, 118 -19
Husameddin 76
hutbe104, 147, 179 -80
I
Iberia, 19 -21, 89
Ibn `Arabshah 85, 88
Ibn Battuta: and ahi
associations, 187 n26;
at Göynük, 40, 186 n21;
and hospitality in Anatolia, 87;
and Jew in Anatolian court, 77;
on Orhan 135
Ibn Hajar 182 n142
Ibn Kemal 105, 108, 114
Ibn Khaldun 16 -17, 114, 182 n142
Ibn Sina 166 n59
Iconium (Konya), 4
ideals; gaza49 -50;
and wealth and glory, 87. See also ideology
identities, 190-91;
explanatory value, 35;
fluidity of cultural/national, 19-28, 81-82, 140-41;
gazi, 78, 81-82;
as Turks, 95. See also culture; ethnicity; nationalism
ideology: conflicting norms, 81;
in historiography, xiii, 99-105. See also gaza
Ilbegi 114-17, 143, 185-84;
death, 100, 106, 116-117, 139
Ilkhanids, 6, 14, 122, 130;
influences on Ottomans, 40, 44-45;
and "king of Artana," 186 n22;
Oljaitu of, 75
Inalcik 45, 47, 58, 163 n23, 179 n108;
and Apz version, 180 n127;
and Mehmed 104;
and 'Osman-Mihal 145;
and 'Osman's 136;
and uc begleri, 146
inclusivism, xii, 13;
gazi, 38, 68-70, 82-84;
gender, 40, 67-69, 70;
of Ottoman elite, 90;
Ottoman state, 120, 121;
redefined, 120;
tribal, 38, 50-51. See also cooperation, Christian-Muslim; heterodoxy
India, 21, 159 n18
influence, historiography on, 24-25, 59
inscription (1357), Bursa, 61, 77, 109, 120;
produced later, 52, 55;
Wittek thesis and, 38, 42-43, 51, 52, 55
Interregnum (1402-13), 18, 101, 102, 137
Iorga, Nicolae, 52, 34, 145, 162 n7
Islam. See Muslims
Ismailam'il 75-76, 176 n94
Istanbul. See Constantinople
Italy, Bari, 3
Iznik. See Nicaea
'Izzeddin 66
J
Janissaries (yeşi çeri), 17, 18, 112, 139, 149
Jennings, Ronald C., 51-52
Jews: Anatolian, 74, 77;
conversions to Islam, 74;
in Ottoman court, 90
jihad, vs. gaza 79-80
Johnson, Samuel, 30-31, 161 n3
K
kadi'asker 112, 142, 190 n53
kadis, 104, 135
Káldy-Nagy, Gyula, 51-52, 53, 186 n14
Kallipolis. See Gelibolu
Kantakouzenos, John, 16, 89, 175 n87, 189 n46;
alliance with Orhan, 71, 89, 104, 138, 169-70;
and Umur Beg, 70, 170 n28
kapikulu. See kul
Kara 112-13
Karacahisar, 104, 109-10, 126
Karakeçili 123, 185 n9
Karakoyunlu, 122
Karamanids, 94, 178 n102, 185 n5
Karamani 96, 102, 107
Karasi emirate/warriors, 16, 113, 116, 138, 139
Kastamonu, 76-77
Kayi branch, Oguz 184-85;
Köprülli and, 37-42 passim, 49, 122, 164 nn31,37, 184 n3;
Yazicizade 96, 122, 184 n4

— 216 —
Keyka‘us 66
Khorasan, gazis of, 55-56, 115
Kilia-Akkirman victory (1484), 96
Kilij Arslan II, 77
Kipchak influences, 164 n37
kızılbas 92-93
Kızıl 114-17, 139, 183, 184 n152;
cult, 115, 117
Knolles, Richard, 30-31, 161-62
Konya, 4
Köprühisar village, 108
Köprüli, Mehmet Fuat, xi, 10, 35-44, 54, 171 n40;
and Haci 172 n43;
Inalcik 163 n23;
and Kayi genealogy, 37-42 passim, 49, 122, 164 nn31,37, 184 n3;
and philology, xii;
political career, 165 n48;
on religious syncretism, 75;
on Sufis, 171 n41;
Werner and, 46-47;
and Wittek, 10-11, 35-44, 50, 55, 163 n26, 164 n31
Kosedag 5
Kramers, J. H., 35
kül 83-84, 116, 146, 148-49, 182 n142
Kurds, 2, 172 n44
Kütahya, 77
L
Laiou, Angeliki E., 188 n38
Lamprecht, Karl, 32
Langer, William L., 35
language: of endowment deeds, 61, 136;
of historical writing, 93. See also Arabic; Turkish language; writing
Lascaris, 48, 127, 133
latitudinarianism, xii, 13, 66, 72. See also cooperation, Christian-Muslim
law codes, Ottoman, 131-32, 190 n53
leaders, 14-15, 125-26, 142-43;
eg, 14-15, 17, 125, 142-43;
emir, 14-15;
hetman, 186 n13;
tekvur, 14-15, 68. See also sultanates
Lefort, Jacques, 104
De la legislation (Bodin), 31
Leunclavius, 109
Lewis, G., 178 n101
"lid model," historiographical, 21-22
Lindner, Rudi Paul: and Byzantine Bithynia, 133;
and chronicles, 89, 98-99, 102, 103-4;
and gaza50-57, 109, 110;
and 'Osman's 132, 133
literacy: and orality, 64;
Ottoman, 16, 93, 177 n97. See also colleges; writing
Lutfi 184 n1
M
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 31
magazi63
Maghrib, 188 n35
Mahdi, Muhsin, 166 n59
Mahmud 149
Mahmud 69
Malatya, 4, 64, 87
Malkoçoğlu family, 151
Mamluks, 53, 76, 125
Mantzikert, 3, 4
march environment, 48, 122;
heterodoxy, 53, 72;
oral lore, 65;
and Ottoman state building, xi, 12, 14, 37, 131. See also Anatolian
frontier; gazis; nomads
"Marmara-basin economy," 45-46
Marquart, J., 35
marriages, as possible political strategy, 15, 71, 129-30, 135, 169-70
Marxism-Leninism, 46, 165 n46
Massignon, Louis, 35, 176 n92
medrese, 16, 77, 177 n97
Mehmed 18, 95, 101, 137, 178 n105
Mehmed 37, 104, 146-47, 148, 152;
and Cem's enthronement attempt, 191 n66;
expropriation drive, 115;
and factions, 18-19, 96-97, 146;
fiscal policies, 100;
and fratricide, 108, 136, 137;
and gaza, 146, 152, 190 n59;
imperial project, 96-97;
navy, 69;
son, 115;
Sufi mentor, 87;
at Troy, 9
Mehmed 77
Mehmed 137
Ménage, V. L., 99, 179 n108;
and gazi resentments, 114;
and 'Osman's, 104;
and Ruh'i's, 191 n67;
and Yahsi, 99, 181 n137
menakib See hagiographies; Yahsi Fakih
Menakibu'l-kudsiye, 73-75, 93, 109
Mengli Giray, 147
Mentese, 36, 38, 48, 78, 134
Mes'ud 4
"metadoxy," 76-78
Mevlana, 7, 77, 93
Mevlevi, 7, 75, 77, 130, 172 n43
migrations, 160 n22;
into Anatolia, xiii, 2, 3, 5, 23-24, 45
Mihal, 127, 151
Mihal, 26, 40, 101, 127, 145
Mihaloglu, 150

— 217 —
Mihaloglu, 101-2
Mizrab, 63
Momen, Moojan, 171 n40
monetary system: Ottoman, 16, 100, 111, 114. See also coins
Mongols, 6, 14, 30, 45;
conversions, 74;
frontier authority, 125;
vs. Seljuks, 5, 48;
"Tatars," 127-28
Moravcsik, Gyula, 89
Mordtmann, J. H., 35
Morocco, 188 n35
Mottahedeh, Roy, 132
Mubarizeddin, 77
Mugiseddin 77
Muhammad 63, 94, 115, 190 n63
muluk19-20
Muneccimbasi 109
Murad 17, 111, 137;
dream, 151;
fiscal policies, 111, 112, 113;
fratricide, 95, 137;
and Ilbegi's 116, 139;
institutionalization of central power, 141-43;
mother, 40;
sultanic attitude, 143
Murad 18, 101, 137, 146, 184 n4
music, martial, 146, 152
Muslims, xi, 1-4, 141, 166 n59, 170 n30;
Baghdad caliphate, 9;
cooperation and commingling with Christians, 11, 19, 20, 56;
epics, 63;
European history and, 31;
futuwwa organizations, 34-35;
gazi, 12, 52, 55, 66-67, 75-90, 167 n67;
heterodox, 52, 53-54, 71-76;
Islamic political culture, 61, 140, 188 n37;
jihad vs. gaza79-80;
metadoxy, 76-78;
military skills, 30;
muluk19-20;
names, 53, 61, 124, 167 n62, 186 n14;
'Osman 10, 33, 34-35, 54-55;
Ottomans not "fanatic," 11-12, 44, 45, 51-54, 89-90, 145, 165 n38, 190 n57;
Ottoman wars with other, 8, 51, 73;
Saltuk's 7;
saint-sharing with Christians, 74;
Shi'i, 73, 75-76, 141, 171-72;
"true," 52;
umma, 52. See also conversions to Islam; cooperation, Christian-Muslim;
dervishes; gaza; orthodoxy; Sunni; Turco-Muslim society
Mustafa 101, 146
Mustafa 149
Muzaffereddin 76-77
Myriocephalon, 4
N
Naci 185 n9
Name of the Rase (Eco), xii-xiii
names: Arabic, 53, 61, 124-25, 167 n62;
Byzantine, 124;
Digenis, 82;
and fluidity of identity, 141;
in hagiographies, 75
Muslim, 53, 61, 124, 167 n62, 186 n14
‘Osman’s 61, 124-25, 158 n1, 185-86
Turkic, 51, 53, 147, 167 n62, 186 n13
Turkish, 124, 186 n14
narrative history, 39-40
narratives, xiii
Anatolian frontier, 62-90, 139-40, 177 n96
oral, 62, 65, 71, 98
theme, 65-66. See also chronicles of House of ‘Osman; historiography
nasiru’l-guzat 77
Nasreddin Hoca (Nasreddin 7
nationalism, 10
and frontier inclusivism, 84
historiography, 10, 20-47 passim, 159-60
Turkish, 10, 26, 32, 46, 75-76, 164 n31
navy, Ottoman, 69, 170 n22
Nesri 102-3, 105, 107, 108, 109
Nicaea (Iznik): Byzantine capital in, 6, 133
 crusaders recapturing, 3
Ottoman conquest and first medrese built in, 16
Nicopolis (Nigbolu 94
Nihali 150
Nogay, Prince, 45
nomads: ‘Osman 2, 10, 16, 33, 78, 123, 126
and Ottoman alienation/sedentarization, 140, 147, 150
Safavids and, 181 n135
and sectarianism, 76
sedentary dispositions, 54
vs. sedentary farmer, 174 n70
symbiosis with farmers/townsmen, 126. See also frontier; march environment
Normans, 3, 25
Noyan, Bedri, 180 n130
O
Oguz 124, 147
Oguz 96
Oguz 37, 45, 94, 96, 184-85
Dede Korkut tales, 68-69, 94, 177-78
dialect, 2. See also Kayi branch
orality: and literacy, 64
narratives, 62, 65, 71, 98
Orhan 52, 61, 90, 135, 142
and booty, 15, 86
and brother, 106, 108, 136-37, 180 n126, 189 n46
Bursa and Iznik conquests, 16
and Byzantine factions, 138
and chronicles, 96, 99-100
coins, 164 n31, 184 n4
endowment deed
Orhan (continued)
(1324), 61, 136, 189 n47;
epithet, 61;
and gaza109 -10, 113;
imam's son, 96, 99, 101, 124, 131;
inheritance, 136 -37, 180 n126, 189 nn46, 47;
Kantakouzenos alliance, 71, 104, 138, 169 -70;
and Karasi, 16, 116;
marriages, 15, 71, 129, 168 n1, 169 -70;
name, 186 n14;
son, 17, 139
Les origines de l'empire ottomane (Köprülű), 36, 47
orthodoxy, 54, 72 -76;
gazis and, 66 -67;
Ottoman, II, 90, 92, 99, 109 -14 passim, 144 -45. See also Muslims
Oruç Re'is 170 n30
`Osman xi , 1, 7 -9, 15 -16, 122 -38;
and ahis34 -35, 187 n26;
ancestors, 2, 5, 37, 122;
coins, 16, 60, 123, 186 n13;
conversion to Islam, 10, 33, 34 -35, 55, 124;
death, 16, 180 n126, 189 n47;
dream, 8 -9, 10, 29 -30, 33, 104, 128, 132 -33;
entourage, 10, 127;
epithet, 61;
father, 60, 123;
frontier narratives and, 77 -78, 84 -85;
and gaza65 , 179 -80;
as gazi, 38, 51 -52, 70, 77, 84 -85, 150;
location of beglik, 15, 36, 45, 58, 120, 130 -34;
marriage, 128 -29;
names, 61, 124 -25, 158 n1, 185 -86;
political acumen, 15, 34, 126;
religion, 10, 33, 34 -35, 53, 54 -55;
rise to power, 15, 103 -5, 118, 128 -38, 184 n1;
as "self-made man," 34;
Söğüt base of power, 65, 130 -31;
sons, 11, 15, 16, 52, 61, 136, 189 n46;
and uncle, 105 -9, 123, 180 n124. See also genealogy, Ottoman; `Osman , House of
`Osman xi , 4, 7 -9, 10, 15 -17, 36, 117;
absolute power of, 151 -52;
and Aydinoglu 69;
and Baba'is 74, 129;
and chronicle authors, 95 -96, 110 -14;
diverse elements, 33 -34;
entering competition, 119, 129 -30;
frontier narratives and, 77 -78, 84 -85, 139 -40;
heterodoxy of, 11 -12, 51, 53, 54;
and House of Mihal 127;
inclusive tribalism, 51;
kul 83 -84, 146, 148 -49, 182 n142;
loss of purity, 110 -14;
and "Marmara-basin economy," 45 -46;
nomads, 2, 10, 16, 33, 78, 123, 126;
Safavids vs., 93;
Timur's land divisions, 94;
tribal factor, 10 -11, 37 -42 passim, 50 -51, 99, 104, 164 nn31,37, 167 n72;
Turkic names, 53;
yeñi çri, 112, 139. See also chronicles of House of 'Osman; genealogy; Ottoman state
'Osmancik 35
`Osmancik 35
Ottoman state, xi-xv, 3-19, 21-59, 118-53;
alliances, 15, 71, 74, 104, 122-38, 140;
Byzantine heritage, 24, 33, 34, 39;
capitals, 97, 148-49, 152;
centralizing, 16-19, 97, 111-14, 120-21, 137-53;
centrifugal vs. centripetal tendencies, 14, 121, 139;
classical Ottoman system, 96-97;
"corrupt" phase, 10;
devshirme in, 141;
factions, 18-19, 92-98 passim, 143-44, 146;
fragmentation, 117;
and gaza, 10-11, 47-59, 89-97, 110-24 passim, 140, 144-46, 179-80;
gazis of, 38, 48, 51-53, 78, 90-93, 99, 120, 127-46 passim;
gazis alienated/subjugated, 16-18, 112-13, 120, 138-53;
generosity and justice, 131;
geographic location and, 15-16, 36, 45, 58, 120, 130-34;
Ibn Khaldunian 16-17, 114, 182 n142;
Interregnum (1402-13), 18, 101, 102, 137;
legitimation, 95, 96;
length of, xi;
lid model and, 21-22;
and Maghrib, 188 n35;
"Romanesque" quality, 1;
ruling class, 4, 142, 190 n57;
ruling traditions (higher Islamic/Persianate), 61, 140, 188 n37;
succession, 120, 136-38. See also administrative apparatus, Ottoman; archives;
religion; sedentarization
204
Pachymeres, 61, 129-30, 174 n76, 175 n87, 189 n40
Palaeologus, Michael, 134
Palamas, Gregory, 90, 175 n89
Paphlagonia, 35, 130, 134
Pazarlu Beg, 189 n46
"peace party," Ottoman faction, 18-19, 146
pençik, 100, 112-13, 114, 142
Persians: documents in language of, 61, 136; histories, 93, 96, 130, 177 n96, 178 n102; ruling traditions, 61, 140
Petropoulos, Elias, 25-26
Philadelphia, siege of, 126-27
Philanthropenos, Alexios, 126-27
philology, xii, 39
Pir 92-93, 184 n152
Plethon, 90

— 219 —
poetry, 118, 176 n94;
Beyath, 179 n115;
Dehhani 93;
Yunus 5, 7
Polish refugees, in Ottoman administration, 90
political culture: Anatolia, 2-7, 14-15, 48-49, 125, 173 n59; Bithynia, 125;
frontier, 14-15, 141, 173 n59;
Islamic/Persianate ruling traditions, 61, 140, 188 n37;
Seljuk Anatolia, 121. See also administrative apparatus, Ottoman; alliances; Ottoman state; political-military events political-military events, 4, 173 n60; historiography and, 10, 32, 36, 38, 39, 174 n70; in Ottoman rise to power, 138-50 passim. See also armies; gazis; march environment; navy, Ottoman; revolts; specific events politics: international, 7-8, 138;
tripartite taxonomy, 144; writers of comparative, 31. See also political culture; political-military events Polo, Marco, 6 positivism, 13, 29, 72 power: in frontier narratives, 68; House of `Osman 151-52;
legitimacy of, 188 n37. See also politics pseudo-Lachanes, 133 Q al-Qa'im 188 n35 R racialism, 10; in historiography, 30, 160 n22. See also ethnicity Rahamm 70 Rashid 130
religion: babas, 141; and gazi legitimization, 56; "metadoxy," 76; 'Osman 10, 33, 34-35, 53, 54-55; pagan Hellenism, 90; pagan Tatar, 128; pre-Islamic, 10, 53-54, 71, 72, 75; "shamanistic," 53-54, 75, 99; syncretistic, 15, 53, 72, 74-75, 89-90, 143; Zoroastrians, 45. See also Christians; dervishes; heterodoxy; Muslims; Sufis republic, Turkish, 10, 149 revolts: Baba'i, 74-75, 109, 124; Bedreddin 143, 145; kul 146 Romans, I, 181 n134; Eastern Roman Empire, xi, 1-2, 3, 8 Romulus, 1, 8 Rudolf of Habsburg, 7-8 Ruhi 148, 191 n67 ruling class: frontier sociopolitical order and, 141; Ottoman, 4, 142, 190 n57. See also 'Osman, House of ruling traditions: higher Islamic/Persianate, 61, 140, 188 n37. See also political culture Rumi 1-2, 4; gazis of, 112-13, 147-48, 149; Seljuks of, 3-5, 66, 115. See also frontier; Rumi Turks Rumi 1-2, 4, 28. See also Turco-Muslim society Rüstem, Kara 112-13 sacredness, ambiguity and impurity, 82 Sa'dian dynasty, 188 n35 Safavids, 8, 94, 141; and gaza, 53, 93, 145, 176 n94, 181 n135; and Ottoman factions, 144, 145; Shi'i, 73, 75 Safi 8 Sahin 86 Sahlins, Marshall, 8, 181 n134 saint-sharing, Muslim-Christian, 74 Salah 127, 186 n18 Saljan, Princess, 68-69 Saltuk 7, 94, 115, 149, 177 n95; and Balkans, 64, 190 n63. See also Saltukname Saltukname 53, 65, 71-72, 147-49, 190-91 Samsa 123 Sasa Beg, 70, 77 schoolmen, Ottoman, 18, 90, 110-14, 129, 140 sectarianism: Turkish, 75-76. See also Shi'i; Sunni sedentarization, 140;
and dream legend, 133;
and gaza54, 113 -14, 140, 142, 147, 181 n135. See also administrative apparatus, Ottoman
Selim 75 -76, 148, 191 n67
Seljuks, 2 -9 passim, 14, 66, 122, 184 n1;
administrative apparatus, 4, 40, 142;
and Baba'is 129;
descendants, 116, 183 -84;
frontier authority, 125;
and gazis, 48;
Germiyan tribe and, 124;
histories in medieval times, 94, 96;
inheritance practices, 136;
Iorga on significance of, 32;
juridical system, 190 n53;
Köprülü on, 39, 40;
`Osman 147;
Persian chronicles of, 178 n102;

— 220 —
Seljuks (continued)
political culture, 121;
power disintegrating, 30, 38;
Türkmen tribes vs., 5, 73 -74;
Yazicizade 94, 96, 178 n101
Serbia, 17, 116, 139
Seyyid `Ali Sultan. See Kizil Deli
Seyyid Battal 63 -68, 78, 94;
shrine, 92 -93, 154
Shahruh 137
shamanism, 53 -54, 75, 99
Sh'i, 73, 75 -76, 141, 171 -72
Sihabeddin 76
Sikari 177 n96
Sinan 26
Sinop, 6, 78
Sisiya, 66 -67
slaves, 135, 139;
kul83 -84, 146, 148 -49, 182 n142;
tax on, 112, 142
Sofia, 170 n24
Söğüt, 108, 187 -88;
Ertogril 74, 95, 124;
Mehmed 95, 178 n105;
`Osman 65, 130 -31;
and `Osman-Ede 129
Soviet Union, 21, 44
Spain, 20-21
Stone, Lawrence, 11
subasi104
succession, Ottoman, 120, 136-38
Sufis, 92, 171 n41;
Aksemseddin 87;
and dream interpretation, 133;
futuwwa organizations and, 34-35;
Ottoman preferences, 141;
Sheikh Safi 8. See also Baba'is; Bektasi order; dervishes; Mevlevi order;
Vefa'is
Sukrullah 96, 102, 107, 114, 122
Suleyman 94
Suleyman 115
Suleyman 20, 33, 83, 90, 150, 154
sultanates, 186 n22;
Mamluk, 125;
Ottoman, 17-18, 137, 139, 143, 148-49;
Seljuk, 2, 9, 125
sun-language theory, 41, 163-64
Sunni, 144-45, 171-72;
and heterodoxy, 54, 75-76;
Ottoman defender of, 73, 92
sword-document, 60
syncretism: religious, 15, 53, 72, 74-75, 89-90, 143. See also cooperation, Christian-Muslim; heterodoxy; latitudinarianism
T
Taceddin-i 86, 129
Taeschner, Franz, 168 n1, 176 n92
takvim96, 98, 102
Tarsius (Tersiye/Terzi Yeri), 134
Taskoprizade 54, 86
Tatars, 85, 122, 127-28, 135
taxes, 16, 131-32, 145;
bac104;
pençik, 100, 112-13, 114, 142
Tekin, Sinasi 166 n56
tekvur, 14-15, 68
Tevarih-i149. See also chronicles of House of 'Osman
Thrace, 16-17, 71, 114-17, 138-44 passim;
Belciceanu-Steinherr on, 104, 116, 139, 182-83
Timur (Tamerlane)/Timurids, 9, 18, 88, 93-96 passim;
and Bayezid 18, 85, 94-95, 112, 128, 185 n5;
Bursa departure, 183 n147;
Chingisid relation, 183 n151;
son, 137;
and Tatars, 85, 128
Todorov, Nikolai, 160-61
Togan, A. Zeki Velidi, 44-45, 123, 164-65
Toktagu Khan 45
trade, 126;
routes, 6-7, 17, 45-46, 188 n31
transliteration, xiv
treasury, Ottoman, 100, 111, 112 
Trebizond, 20, 68-69
tribalism, 12, 16-17, 130, 132, 167 n72

gaza120, 165-66;
Ibn Khaldunian 16-17, 114, 182 n142;
inclusive, 38, 50-51;
`Osman 10-11, 37-42 passim, 50-51, 99, 104, 164 nn31,37, 167 n72. See also ethnicity; Türkmen tribes
Trojans, Turks as, 9, 159 n11
Troy, Mehmed 9
Turahanoglu 151
Turali, Kan, 68-69, 178 n101
Turan, Osman, 160 n22
Turco-Muslim society, 10-11, 35-44 passim, 117, 151-52, 165-66;
and administrative apparatus, 10, 24, 42;
authority layers, 125;
in Balkans, 145;
and centrifugal vs. centripetal tendencies, 121;
classics of, 7, 94-95;
and gaza62-90, 91, 165-66;
heterodox, 52, 73;

historiography, 93-95;

House of `Osman 119;
Knolles history and, 31;
leaders, 14-15, 125-26;
nonsectarian, 76;
proto-Ottoman identity with, 78;

Turkish historiography's tendencies with, 46;
and unigeniture, 120. See also Anatolia; gazis; Ottoman state
Turkestan (Barthold), 55-56
Turkey: Akdag 45-46;
Atatürk inscriptions, 41;
and chronicles, 98;
identity, 23;
Köprülü's political career, 165 n48;
as locally recognized entity, 4;
republic, 10, 149;
scholarly community, 42;
Togan, 44. See also Anatolia; Turkish nationalism
Turkic names, 51, 53, 147, 167 n62, 186 n13

— 221 —
Turkish historiography, 10, 23, 41, 42, 44-46
Turkish language, 4, 5;
histories in, 63, 93;
names, 124, 186 n14;
Oğuz 2;
as Ur-language, 163-64. See also Turkic names
Turkish nationalism, 10, 26, 32, 46, 75-76, 164 n31
Türkmen tribes, 3, 5, 73-76, 93-94, 160 n24. See also Turks
Turks, 12, 122, 160-61;
`Alevi 54, 75;
Battle of Bapheus, 129-30;
Cem identification with, 147, 190-91;
historiography on, 10, 23-46 passim;
inclusive tribalism, 51;
maturing identification of, 95;
and Philanthropenos, 126-27;
racialism toward, 30;
"real," 23, 95;
Rumi 1-2, 4, 28;
Sunni, 54;
"Tatars," 127-28. See also Oğuz Turks; Ottoman state; Seljuks; Turco-Muslim society; Türkmen tribes
U
uc begleri, 142-43, 146
ulema, 110-14
Ulu Cami (built by Aydinoğlu 77, 134
al-`Umari 124, 128, 134, 135
Umayyads, 63
umma, Muslim, 52
Umur Beg, Aydinoğlu 65-71 passim, 94, 135, 170;
and Kantakouzenos, 70, 170 n28;
ship "Gazi 78;
tax abolished by, 132
unigeniture, 120, 136-38
Uruç bin `Adil 96, 100, 106, 107, 109
Uzuncarsili 164 n31, 171 n40, 189 n47
Uzun Hasan 94, 131, 178 n101
V
vassalage, 146-47
Vefâ'is 74, 128-29, 144. See also Baba'is
Veled, Sultan 93
Vietnam War, 50
Voltaire, F. M. A. de, 29
Vryonis, Speros, 46, 54
W
waqf deeds. See endowment deeds
"war party," Ottoman faction, 18-19, 146
warriors. See armies; gazis
wealth: Ede Bali, 87, 187 n25;
Ottoman ventures bringing, 15, 16, 86. See also taxes
Werner, Ernst, 46, 165 n46
Wittek, Paul/gazaxi -xii, xiii, 10 -11, 13, 35 -59, 164 n31;
and chronicles, 103, 104, 109 -14, 180 n127;
and cooperative undertakings, 82 -83;
critics, 13, 49 -59, 91, 163 n26, 164 n31;
and formalization of gazis, 176 n92;
and Köprülü, 10 -11, 35 -44, 50, 55, 163 n26, 164 n31;
and tribalism, 10 -11, 37, 38, 50 -51, 164 n31, 167 n72
women, in gazi epics, 67 -69, 70
World War I, 32, 36
writing, 60, 64;
blooming of historical, 93 -95;
of oral narrative, 63. See also language
X
xiómiai, 90, 175 n90
Y
Yahsi 96 -106 passim, 110, 124, 131, 183 n146;
and gaza179 -80;
and gaza190 n59;
and Kayi genealogy, 122;
and Orhan's 137;
on 'Osman 126;
and 'Osman's 189 n46
Yarcani 177 n96
Yarhisar, 129
Yazicioglu 171 n40
Yazicizade 122, 184 n4;
Seljuk history, 94, 96, 178 n101;
and tribal electoral process, 180 n124
Yerasimos, Stéphane, 104 -5, 178 n107, 191 n67
Yinanç, Mükrîm Halil, 160 n22, 185 -86
Yunus Emre, 5, 7, 93
Z
Zachariadou, Elizabeth A., 104, 174 n77
Zaporozhian Cossacks, 186 n13
Zoroastrians, 45

http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft467nb2qj/