User:Jon Awbrey/INQUIRY 2005

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Contents

IDS • AFAR, COSI, EOS, GRAM, OAR

  • AFAR. Approximations Forgivable And Rhetorical
  • COSI. Categories, Objects, Signs, Interpretants
  • EOS. Embodiments Of Signs
  • GRAM. Grammar Reified As Metaphysics
  • OAR. Observation, Action, Reflection

AFAR. Approximations Forgivable And Rhetorical

{Not Found. Thread intended but never started?)

COSI. Categories, Objects, Signs, Interpretants

COSI. Note 1

| A sign is plainly a species of medium of communication
| and medium of communication is a species of medium, and
| a medium is a species of third.
|
| No. 32.  "The Basis of Pragmaticism", MS 283, pp. 125, 129, 131 (1905)
| http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm

COSI. Note 2

| A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
| the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible
| Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic
| relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First
| Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and
| for some possible Interpretant.  A Sign is a representamen of
| which some interpetant is a cognition of a mind.  Signs are
| the only representamens that have been much studied.
|
| No. 22.  "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,
| as far as they are determined", 'Collected Papers', CP 2.242 (1903)
| http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm

COSI. Note 3

| The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign;  and
| it is shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign.  Every
| sign has an object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately
| represented in the sign to be, and as it is in its own firstness.  It
| is equally essential to the function of a sign that it should determine
| an Interpretant, or a second correlate related to the object of the sign
| as the sign is itself related to that object;  and this interpretant may be
| regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness to
| the object, and as it is in its own firstness.
|
| No. 75.  [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness,
| and the Reductibility of Fourthness], MS 914
| http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm

COSI. Note 4

| a.  A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its Object and
|     if anything were to be in a certain relation to the sign called being
|     Interpretant to it, the Sign actively determines the Interpretant to
|     be itself in a relation to the same Object, corresponding to its own.
|
| b.  A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian.  It would generally be Priman in
|     some characters, called its "Material Characters".  But in addition, it is
|     essentially (if only formally) Second to  something termed its "Real Object",
|     which is purely active in the Secundanity, being immediately unmodified by this
|     secundanity;  and these characters of the Real Object which are essential to the
|     identity of the Sign constitute an 'ens rationis' called the "Immediate Object".
|     Moreover, the Sign is conceivably adapted to being Third to its Immediate Object
|     for an 'ens rationis' constituted thereby in the same (generic) relation to that
|     Object in which the Sign itself stands to the same;  and this Third is termed
|     the "Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished] 
|
| c.  A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its determination as
|     Priman are called its Material characters.  But in addition it is
|     Second to what is termed its Real Object, which is altogether active,
|     and immediately unmodified by this Secundanity, and in so far as the
|     Sign is second to it, it is termed the immediate Object.  The Sign is
|     conceivably adapted to being third to its Immediate Object for something
|     in so far termed its Intended Interpretant;  and the Sign only functions
|     as such so far as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it for an Actual
|     Interpretant which thus becomes adapted become a sign of the Immediate
|     [there is a question mark above this word] Object for a further intended
|     Interpretant, and in so far as the Interpretant is such Third it is termed
|     Reflex Interpretant. 
|
| d.  A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its determinations as such are
|     called its "Material characters".  But in addition, it is Second to something
|     termed its "Real Object", which is purely active being immediately unmodified
|     by this Secundanity;  and in so for as the sign is Second to it, it is termed
|     the "Immediate Object" thereof.  The Sign is conceivably adapted bo being Third
|     to its Immediate Object for something which should thereby be brought into the
|     generically same dyadic relation to that Object in which the Sign itself stands
|     to that Object, and this Third is called the "Intended Interpretant";  but the
|     Sign functions as such only in so far as the Intended Interpretant is Second
|     to it and is Third to it for an existent termed the "Actual Interpretant",
|     the modes of ... [unfinished] 
|
| No. 69.  [On Signs], MS 793
| http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm

COSI. Note 5

| A sign is intended to correspond to a real thing, or fact, or to something
| relatively real;  and this object of the sign may be the very sign itself,
| as when a map is precisely superposed upon that which it maps.  [...]
| A sign is also intended to determine, in a mind or elsewhere, a sign
| of the same object;  and this interpretant of the sign may be the
| very sign itself;  but as a general rule it will be different.
|
| No. 24.  "Foundations of Mathematics", MS 9 (1903)
| http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm

COSI. Note 6

| The ideas in which Thirdness is predominant are,
| as might be expected, more complicated, and mostly
| require careful analysis to be clearly apprehended;
| for ordinary, unenergetic thought slurs over this
| element as too difficult.  There is all the more
| need of examining some of these ideas.
|
| The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is
| the idea of a sign, or representation.  A sign stands 'for'
| something 'to' the idea which it produces, or modifies.
| Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something
| from without.  That for which it stands is called its
| 'Object';  that which it conveys, its 'Meaning';  and
| the idea to which it gives rise, its 'Interpretant'.
|
| The object of a representation can be nothing but a representation
| of which the first representation is the interpretant.  But an
| endless series of representations each representing the one
| behind it may be conceived to have an absolute object
| at its limit.
|
| The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation.
| In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as
| stripped of irrelevant clothing.  But this clothing never can be
| completely stripped off;  it is only changed for something more
| diaphanous.  So there is and infinite regression here, too.
|
| Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which
| the torch of truth is handed along;  and as representation, it has its
| interpretant again.  [Lo] another infinite series.
|
| Some of the ideas of prominent Thirdness which require closer study,
| preliminary to philosophy, are Continuity, Diffusion, Growth, and
| Intelligence.
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories", NEM 4, pp. 309-310
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories", MS 717 (n.d.), pp. 307-312 in:
| Carolyn Eisele (ed.), 'The New Elements of Mathematics by
| Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, Mathematical Philosophy',
| Mouton, The Hague, 1976.

COSI. Note 7

| The irreducibility of the idea of Thirdness appears
| to me evidently proved in the Logic of Relations.
| Yet Mr. A.B. Kempe, formerly president of the
| London Mathematical Society, who has made
| an important contribution to a part of the
| Logic of Relations in his "Memoir on the
| Theory of Mathematical Forms" in the
| 'Philosophical Transactions' for 1886,
| plainly does not share my opinion and
| without directly mentioning me calls
| attention to certain phenomena whose
| interest to his mind evidently is
| that he regards them as refuting
| the irreducibility of Thirdness.
| This objection springing, as it
| does, from exact analysis,
| should command my most
| serious consideration.
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", EP 2, pp. 169-170
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", MS 308 (1903), pp. 160-178 in:
|'The Essential Peirce:  Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913)',
| Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1998.

COSI. Note 8

| In order to expound Mr. Kempe's opinion I must define a few technical terms.
| In ordinary logical analysis such as is required in the algebraical or other
| purely formal treatment, it is sufficient to consider Category the Second
| as a two-sided element in the phenomenon, a 'Reaction', involving two
| objects which are differently related to one another, but having no
| general distinctive characters.  In like manner Category the Third
| in the same analysis is regarded as a triadic element of the
| phenomenon without there being any reason for putting one
| of the triad of singulars which may be concerned in it
| as the First, rather than either of the others,
| nor any one as specially Second or Third.
|
| There are other purposes, however, for which it is necessary to
| conceive that in a reaction the first object [is distinguished]
| from the second by a general character common to all 'firsts',
| all 'seconds' having their general character;  and similarly
| in all triadic facts distinctive general characters are to
| be attributed to the First, the Second, and the Third of
| the three objects concerned.
|
| If two singulars A and B react upon one another, the action
| of A upon B and the action of B upon A are absolutely the
| same element of the phenomenon.  Nevertheless, ordinary
| language makes the distinction of 'agent' and 'patient',
| which, indeed, in the languages that are familiar to us
| is given great prominence;  and this is the case with the
| majority of the languages of all families, as well as the
| Procrustean bed imposed by the grammarians allows us to
| make out their real character.
|
| But in all families, languages are found in which little or nothing
| is made of the distinction.  In Gaelic, for example, the usual form
| of expression places what we should call the subject in an oblique
| case, -- the genitive, in that language, but in some languages it
| is rather an ablative or an instrumental case.
|
| This distinction of agent and patient is sometimes useful even in philosophy.
| That is, a formal distinction is drawn between the action of A on B and the
| action of B on A although they are really the same fact.  In the action of
| A on B, the patient B is conceived to be affected by A while the agent A
| is unaffected by B.  A is modified in the action so far as to be in an
| active state;  but this is conceived to be a certain Quality that the
| agent takes on during the action in which Quality the patient in no
| way participates, while the patient, on the other hand, takes on
| a relative character which can neither exist nor be conceived
| to exist except as correlative to an agent.  That is the
| distinction of agent and patient.
| 
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", EP 2, p. 170
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", MS 308 (1903), pp. 160-178 in:
|'The Essential Peirce:  Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913)',
| Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1998.

COSI. Note 9

| So in a triadic fact, say, the example
|
|    A gives B to C
|
| we make no distinction in the ordinary logic of relations between the
| 'subject nominative', the 'direct object', and the 'indirect object'.
| We say that the proposition has three 'logical subjects'.  We regard
| it as a mere affair of English grammar that there are six ways of
| expressing this:
|
|    A gives B to C                     A benefits C with B
|    B enriches C at expense of A       C receives B from A
|    C thanks A for B                   B leaves A for C
|
| These six sentences express one and the same indivisible phenomenon.
| 
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", EP 2, pp. 170-171
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", MS 308 (1903), pp. 160-178 in:
|'The Essential Peirce:  Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913)',
| Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1998.

COSI. Note 10

| Nevertheless, just as conceiving of two reacting objects we may
| introduce the metaphysical distinction of 'agent' and 'patient',
| so we may metaphysically distinguish the functions of the three
| objects denoted by the 'subject nominative', the 'direct object',
| and the 'indirect object'.  The 'subject nominative' denotes that
| one of the three objects which in the triadic fact merely assumes
| a non-relative character of activity.  The 'direct object' is that
| object which in the triadic fact receives a character relative
| to that agent, being the 'patient' of its action, while the
| 'indirect object' receives a character which can neither
| exist nor be conceived to exist without the cooperation
| of the other two.
|
| When I call Category the Third the Category of Representation in which there is
| a Represented Object, a Representamen, and an Interpretant, I recognize that
| distinction.  This mode of distinction is, indeed, 'germane' to Thirdness,
| while it is 'alien' to Secondness.  That is to say, 'agent' and 'patient'
| as they are by themselves in their duality are not distinguished as agent
| and patient.  The distinction lies in the mode of representing them in
| my mind, which is a Third.  Thus there is an inherent Thirdness in
| this mode of distinction.  But a 'triadic' fact is in all cases
| an intellectual fact.
|
| Take 'giving' for example.  The mere transfer of an object
| which A sets down and C takes up does not constitute giving.
| There must be a transfer of 'ownership' and ownership is a
| matter of Law, an intellectual fact.
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", EP 2, p. 171
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", MS 308 (1903), pp. 160-178 in:
|'The Essential Peirce:  Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913)',
| Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1998.

COSI. Note 11

| You now begin to see how the conception of representation
| is so peculiarly fit to typify the category of Thirdness.
| The object represented is supposed not to be affected by
| the representation.  That is essential to the idea of
| representation.  The Representamen is affected by [the]
| Object but is not otherwise modified in the operation
| of representation.  It is either qualitatively the
| double of the object in the Icon, or it is a patient
| on which the object really acts, in the Index;  or
| it is intellectually linked to the object in such
| a way as to be mentally excited by that object,
| in the Symbol.
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", EP 2, p. 171
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", MS 308 (1903), pp. 160-178 in:
|'The Essential Peirce:  Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913)',
| Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1998.

COSI. Categories, Objects, Signs, Interpretants • Commentary

COSI. Commentary Note 1

Re: COSI 6.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002818.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2813

The indicated passage makes it clear that Peirce intends his theory of categories
to evince a far more general scope than its special application to sign relations,
even if it's true that the problem of understanding signs instigated his labor in
this direction, and that his ensuing work is heavily influenced by the particular
features of this paradigm and prototype case.  All the more reason to distinguish
the concepts and language that are tailored to semiotic ways and means from those
that become necessary in wider fields of categorical inquiry.

COSI. Commentary Note 2

Re: COSI 7-11, at these locations:

00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2813
07.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002821.html
08.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002822.html
09.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002823.html
10.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002826.html
11.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002830.html

In our reading so far of the selections from Harvard Lecture 3 of 1903 --
also published in Turrisi (ed.), 'Pragmatism as a Principle and Method
of Right Thinking', SUNY Press, Albany, 1997, and published in part in
the 'Collected Papers' as CP 5.66-81, 88-92 -- Peirce shows himself to
be thoroughly cognizant, and appropriately sceptical, of what we might
call "grammar reified as metaphysics" (GRAM), for example, the kind of
metaphysics that projects an agent/patient distinction on the scene of
nature, one that may illuminate nature no better than anything else on
the spectrum between a particular dialect's grammatical categories and
the "fundamental attribution error" of social psychology.  Regarded in
the light of such searching critical reflection, it is possible to ask
the question, and ask it afresh in each new case, whether the features
that we attribute to a phenomenon in view are truly its properties, or
nothing more than conventional attachments.

Incidental Musement:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_attribution_error

COSI. Commentary Note 3

Re: COSI 7.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002821.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2813

Let's now go back and take up the individual points in Peirce's review
of the categories, springing from his thesis about the irreducibility
of thirdness, that he sets forth in the 3rd Harvard Lecture of 1903.

CSP: | The irreducibility of the idea of Thirdness appears
     | to me evidently proved in the Logic of Relations.

This statement is crucial.  It tells us that thirdness is a quality
of a relation as a whole, and not a quality of things in a relation.
It is in fact tantamount to the adicity of the relation in question,
so long as we understand this as a real and not a nominal dimension,
in other words, the irreducible minimum dimension that is needed to
preserve the content of information that's embodied in the relation.

COSI. Commentary Note 4

Re: COSI 8.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002822.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2813

CSP: | In ordinary logical analysis such as is required
     | in the algebraical or other purely formal treatment,
     | it is sufficient to consider Category the Second as
     | a two-sided element in the phenomenon, a 'Reaction',
     | involving two objects which are differently related
     | to one another, but having no general distinctive
     | characters.

In other words, a 2-adic relation can exist between two domains of elements
that are not distinguished by any general characters, indeed, the very same
collection of elements may serve as both first and second domains, as occurs
in a 2-adic relation of the form K c X x X.  It has always seemed to me that
one of the reasons Peirce chose the word "reaction" of Newtonian connotations
for the category of secondness was to emphasize the reciprocity of secondness,
the fact that seconds are seconds to each other, at least, in these sorts of
duals, if not according to every rule of engagement in other sorts of duels.

COSI. Commentary Note 5

Re: COSI 8.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002822.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2813

CSP: | In like manner Category the Third in the same analysis is
     | regarded as a triadic element of the phenomenon without
     | there being any reason for putting one of the triad of
     | singulars which may be concerned in it as the First,
     | rather than either of the others, nor any one as
     | specially Second or Third.
     |
     | There are other purposes, however, for which it is necessary to
     | conceive that in a reaction the first object [is distinguished]
     | from the second by a general character common to all 'firsts',
     | all 'seconds' having their general character;  and similarly
     | in all triadic facts distinctive general characters are to
     | be attributed to the First, the Second, and the Third of
     | the three objects concerned.

A priori, then, both sorts of cases are possible.
There are k-adic relations M c X_1 x ... x X_k
in which all of the X_j are the same, others
in which all of the X_j are distinct, with
all possible combinations of the same and
the different in between.  That's all we
can say, speaking a priori.  The choice
among these possibilities can only be
fixed according to the empirical or
theoretical context of the moment.
In the empirical case it has to
do with the particular domain
of phenomena that we hope to
use the relation to model.

So what kind of evidence, in a particular application,
would tend to support fixing a relational domain in a
particular place, as opposed to letting it float free,
rendering all of the relational converses equally fit
for the application in view?

One kind of evidence is the amount of overlap among the domains X_j,
in other words, the extent to which an element in one domain can be
found to reside in any of the others.  Of course, we can always set
about constructing arbitrarily procrustean relations to fit a given
array of prejudices, but the question has to do with relations that
naturally model the phenomenon of interest.

Nobody said this was an easy question.

COSI. Commentary Note 6

Re: COSI 8.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002822.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2813

| If two singulars A and B react upon one another, the action
| of A upon B and the action of B upon A are absolutely the
| same element of the phenomenon.  Nevertheless, ordinary
| language makes the distinction of 'agent' and 'patient',
| which, indeed, in the languages that are familiar to us
| is given great prominence;  and this is the case with the
| majority of the languages of all families, as well as the
| Procrustean bed imposed by the grammarians allows us to
| make out their real character.
|
| But in all families, languages are found in which little or nothing
| is made of the distinction.  In Gaelic, for example, the usual form
| of expression places what we should call the subject in an oblique
| case, -- the genitive, in that language, but in some languages it
| is rather an ablative or an instrumental case.
|
| This distinction of agent and patient is sometimes useful even in philosophy.
| That is, a formal distinction is drawn between the action of A on B and the
| action of B on A although they are really the same fact.  In the action of
| A on B, the patient B is conceived to be affected by A while the agent A
| is unaffected by B.  A is modified in the action so far as to be in an
| active state;  but this is conceived to be a certain Quality that the
| agent takes on during the action in which Quality the patient in no
| way participates, while the patient, on the other hand, takes on
| a relative character which can neither exist nor be conceived
| to exist except as correlative to an agent.  That is the
| distinction of agent and patient.
| 
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", EP 2, p. 170
|
| C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", MS 308 (1903), pp. 160-178 in:
|'The Essential Peirce:  Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913)',
| Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1998.

COSI. Categories, Objects, Signs, Interpretants • Discussion

COSI. Discussion Note 1

GR = Gary Richmond
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: QUIPS-DIS 60.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002769.html
In: QUIPS-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2766

In part:

JA: I used to favor the order <s, o, i>, but more lately find that the kinship
    of signs and interpretant signs makes the order <o, s, i> more convenient.
    But the order of components is really arbitrary, implying nothing of the
    essence, categorical, ontological, or semiotic.  Though there is reason
    to believe that the early Peirce associates the order <s, o, i> with
    the categories <1, 2, 3>, it is clear that he gradually outgrew this
    parallelism, for reasons that we gave already alluded to in another
    connection.  And since the form of determination that concerns us
    here is in irreducibly 3-adic in general, that is, not compounded
    of 2-adic determinations, the order of components has no bearing
    on that issue, either.

GR remarks:

GR: Jon recently wrote that while "the early Peirce" associates
    sign/object/interpretant with firstness/secondness/thirdness
    that "it is clear that he gradually outgrew this parallelism",
    that Peirce came to see the categories as not reflected in the
    sign elements.  However, in many late writings, such as, for
    example, the Syllabus of 1902 and letters to Lady Welby, he
    continues to relate the sign itself to firstness, the object
    to secondness, the interpretant to thirdness.  On what basis do
    you make the claim that "he gradually outgrew this parallelism"?
    Would you cite some late passages which reflect this change?

I think that this deserves a thorough going over, and though I can hardly
resist such a happy acronym, I can foresee that it might become necessary
to amend its end to "Sign Relational Components" or else "Roles Of Signs"
before we are done, if the customary confusions get too much in the way.

I have already flagged the turn that I think see in Peirce's work
several times in passing, and will proceed to go back and collect
those instances, but perhaps you could start us off with what you
regard as one or two or three clear examples in the other pan of
the balance.  Just by way of clarification, when I say "outgrew"
I don't necessarily mean that he discarded the other eye on the
subject matter, as that way of looking at things always seems
to come back when we return to our purely ephanescent roots,
but only that he grew another eye, outlook, or perspective,
once that might be called the "objective" or "pragmatic"
point of view, and I consider this to be a significant
achievement, without which his whole philosophy could
hardly be said to get off the ground.

COSI. Discussion Note 2

GR = Gary Richmond
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: COSI 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002789.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2789

GR: You wrote:

JA: ... perhaps you could start us off with what you [Gary] regard as
    one or two or three clear examples in the other pan of the balance
    [re: whether Peirce "gradually outgrew [the] parallelism" of sign
    elements and the categories].

GR: In truth, I think the burden of proof is yours and that we ought begin this
    discussion with examples from your side.  I'll patiently await those (just a
    few would do -- no need for a plethora of urls :-) and then I'll send some in
    response, for example, the ones Liszka cites in his book, perhaps a few others
    I've been considering.

I cannot fathom what notions about "burden of proof" (BOP)
you might have in mind here, but I already begin to sense
some sort of a disconnect as to what's at issue.  When it
comes to these brands of developmental questions, I don't
invariably give pride of place to the very last drops and
smudges of indigo or graphite that a writer drew from his
or her instrumental resources, and I'm as tentative about
Peirce's exercises in pedagogy and popularization as I am
about those of Bell, Bohr, Einstein, Gamov, Klein, or Lie.
So I sense that we may have different ways of arriving at
what we respectively consider to be "the main thrust of a
given writer's mature thought".

The developments that I have been poring over for the
past half year or so begin to show themselves, so far
as I can tell, in the years 1865-1870, culminating in
their different ways in the "New List of Categories"
and the first "Logic of Relatives", and after which
time I sense that Peirce has truly "come of age",
if a century (or two or three) ahead of his Age.

But maybe you are focused on other developments?

COSI. Discussion Note 3

GR = Gary Richmond
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: COSI 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002789.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2789

As I suspected it might, the radical novelty of using the
word "element" this way is grinding against the grain of
my set theoretic brain, and so I will just have to try
yet another name for the game.

GR: Just a few additional comments for clarification.  You wrote:

JA: Just by way of clarification, when I say "outgrew"
    I don't necessarily mean that he discarded the other
    eye on the subject matter, as that way of looking at
    things always seems to come back when we return to
    our purely ephanescent roots ...

GR: although I cannot imagine what you mean by
    "our purely ephanescent roots" (it seems
    like nonsense to me on the face of it,
    but do explicate) ...

Please excuse my playful mood, but sumer is icumen in,
at long last, after all, and given what all I've been
through this year I intend to maintain it while I can.

In honor of that great neo-logician we all know and love,
call it a neologism for the "phaneroscopy of evanescence".

GR: ... you in fact wrote earlier that:

JA: it is clear that [Peirce] gradually outgrew this
    parallelism [of categories and sign elements]

GR: How is it "clear"?  This hedging of the meaning of "outgrew" seems
    at least problematic.  Let's see, for example,  "I outgrew my pants"
    but I can still wear them? Seems unlikely.  I outgrew my desire for
    this (say, immature) person as life-mate, but I don't need to discard
    my earlier "eye on the subject matter".

Well, it was clear to at least some of us, but then
at least one of us has been paying attention to the
many notes bearing on the metamorphosis in question
that I have phanely passed through the ephanescence
of this ethereal remembrain.

GR: Continuing, you wrote that what you really meant was:

JA: ... only that [Peirce] grew another eye, outlook, or perspective, one
    that might be called the "objective" or "pragmatic" point of view, and
    I consider this to be a significant achievement, without which his whole
    philosophy could hardly be said to get off the ground.

GR: How strangely different we view this matter.  I see his pragmatism
    centered in and enlivened by the categories, and the categories truly
    represented in the sign elements.  Why should he need some other "eye"
    to "get off the ground"?  Well, first, what is this other "eye, outlook,
    or perspective"?

Yes, I think that the categories are important, too,
and there is no doubt they bear somehow or other on
the constitution of sign relations, but it's always
conceivable that we have distinct understandings of
what these categories and these sign relations are.

We are having rolling e-vanishments,
due, or so Destroit Edison says, to
storm damage from way last week, so
I will have to take this bit by bit.

COSI. Discussion Note 4

GR = Gary Richmond
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: COSI 2.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002791.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2789

GR: The issue seems to me rather straight-forward:  either Peirce
    "outgrew [the] parallelism" of sign elements and the categories,
    or he did not.  I had asked for some support of your view, you
    replied that I might first support my position, I countered with,
    well first support yours since you are making the radical claim
    (thus, "the burden of proof") -- that is all.  I am not at all
    focused on "other developments".

Okay, that helps me some to understand what you mean by "burden of proof".
A "radical" position requires argument.  An "irradical" position does not.
Even if that goes a long way toward explaining, if not exactly justifying,
some puzzling features of political life, at least in the U.S. these days,
I cannot say that I recognize any such principle in logic.  I'll leave it
to you whether philosophy is more akin to politics or more akin to logic.

GR: So, can you support your claim that Peirce
    "outgrew" his connecting sign elements and
    the categories, or not?  That is all.

I already said that I'd be going back through my old notes
to re-re-mark what I regard as the critical turning points.

COSI. Discussion Note 5

Re: QUIPS-DIS 60.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002769.html
In: QUIPS-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2766

In part:

JA: I used to favor the order <s, o, i>, but more lately find that the kinship
    of signs and interpretant signs makes the order <o, s, i> more convenient.
    But the order of components is really arbitrary, implying nothing of the
    essence, categorical, ontological, or semiotic.  Though there is reason
    to believe that the early Peirce associates the order <s, o, i> with
    the categories <1, 2, 3>, it is clear that he gradually outgrew this
    parallelism, for reasons that we gave already alluded to in another
    connection.  And since the form of determination that concerns us
    here is in irreducibly 3-adic in general, that is, not compounded
    of 2-adic determinations, the order of components has no bearing
    on that issue, either.

GR remarks:

GR: Jon recently wrote that while "the early Peirce" associates
    sign/object/interpretant with firstness/secondness/thirdness
    that "it is clear that he gradually outgrew this parallelism",
    that Peirce came to see the categories as not reflected in the
    sign elements.  However, in many late writings, such as, for
    example, the Syllabus of 1902 and letters to Lady Welby, he
    continues to relate the sign itself to firstness, the object
    to secondness, the interpretant to thirdness.  On what basis do
    you make the claim that "he gradually outgrew this parallelism"?
    Would you cite some late passages which reflect this change?

From my perspective the most radical aspect of the claim that I made
above is the part of the statement that asserts that Peirce ever did
treat the sign relational roles, namely, sign, object, interpretant,
in rough parallel with an ordering that is recognizably akin to what
he'd later call his categories.  This is something that surprised me,
something that I'm still unsure of, and so operating on the rule that
radical propositions demand justification more than conservative ones,
I will set about reviewing why I made it, to see if I still believe it.

But first, just to point up the fact that this preliminary claim is indeed
problematic, let's consider some of the conflicting suggestions for various
permutations of the putative one-to-one correspondences.

I adverted to a correspondence between categories 1, 2, 3
and sign relational domains S, O, I of the following form:

   Category : Domain  =  1:S + 2:O + 3:I

And Gary says that Peirce's late writings agree with this.

But is this really so straightforward?

Just for one instance, what are we to make of the following passage:

| A 'Third' is something which brings a First into relation to a Second.
| A sign is a sort of Third.  How shall we characterize it?  Shall we say
| that a Sign brings a Second, its Object, into 'cognitive' relation to a
| Third?  That a Sign brings a Second into the same relation to a first in
| which it stands itself to that First?  If we insist on 'consciousness',
| we must say what we mean by consciousness of an object.  Shall we say
| we mean Feeling?  Shall we say we mean association, or Habit?  These
| are, on the face of them, psychological distinctions, which I am
| particular to avoid.  (CP 8.332 / SW, 389)
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Selected Writings', SW, 389
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Letters to Lady Welby", pp. 380-432 in:
| Philip P. Wiener (ed.), 'Charles S. Peirce:  Selected Writings',
| Dover Publications, New York, NY, 1966.  Originally published as:
|'Values in a Universe of Chance', Doubleday & Co., New York, NY, 1958.

Even if we read the ordinal and/or Ordinal labels as indications of categories,
we must still note that some of the suggested correspondences are asserted and
some them lead up only to question marks.  I don't see anything straighforward
there.  So I think that a much more careful review of the issue is called for.

We need to consider the question whether the order in which
Peirce mentions the sign relations, even when using ordered
labels for them, is intended to imply a correspondence with
the categories 1, 2, 3.

For instance, is any sort of constant correspondence implied
by the use of ordered labels like "A", "B", "C"?  What about
ordinals like "first", "second", "third"?  Then again, what
about Capitalized Ordinals like "First", "Second", "Third"?

By way of refreshing our recollections,
some elemental texts on sign relations:

SR.  http://forum.wolframscience.com/showthread.php?threadid=647
SR.  http://forum.wolframscience.com/printthread.php?threadid=647

(NB.  I'm giving the NKS Forum URL's because of the nice printable version.)

The following are especially pertinent:

SR 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002134.html
SR 4.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/002241.html

COSI. Discussion Note 6

At the other end of the candle, as I begin retracing my notes
I find that I had already started to collect some of the more
critical or problematic passages in this connection under the
following heading:

QUIC.  Questions Involving Categories

00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/thread.html#2585
01.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002585.html
02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002586.html
03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002587.html

So, it may save some energy to review these passages,
identifying the more remote backtrack points therein.

The running questions will be:

   1.  To what extent are there necessary correspondences
       between the categories 1, 2, 3 and the sign relational
       domains or roles O, S, I, not of necessity in that order?

   2.  What assertions or assumptions did Peirce operate under
       at various times with respect to the possibility and the
       necessity of such correspondences?

COSI. Discussion Note 7

mi casa, tu casa? ---
on jugera ...

To state my own view of the subject as starkly as possible:
I can see no indication nor even a likelihood of a natural
correspondence between the three irreducible categories of
relations and the three sign relational aspects or roles.

That statement arises from my present understanding
of what categories are and what sign relations are.
It would not of necessity have anything to do with
Peirce's understanding of the matter, unless there
are objective realities, at which both of us are
aimed, that are destined to be found under the
headings of categories, relations, and signs.

But I do believe that there is an objective reality to these things,
and not only that but that we are talking about the roughly same
things under roughly the same names.  So it is merely a matter
of roughing it out a little further to achieve a new level
of clarity.

From my studies of Peirce's work in the last half of the 1860's,
it is reasonably clear to me that he was forced to develop the
logic of relations beyond the level that we find already with
Aristotle, mainly in order to articulate the complexities of
inference, information, and inquiry, as borne by signs.
This is simply not possible in practical terms without
a reasonably adequate theory of relations, and Peirce
was well on his way to having one by 1870, at least.

In consequence, many of my assertions about what Peirce knew
and when he knew it are based on this understanding of what
a person of his wit, equipped with a reasonably adequate
theory of relations, would be expected to know thereby.

So I proceed from this question by way of orientation:

   What kinds of things are clear to us from the
   standpoint of an adequate theory of relations?

COSI. Discussion Note 8

Continuing to backtrack through my archives, the earliest notice
that I've found so far of this "pragmatic" turn in Peirce's work,
as distinguished from his initial "phenomenological" tack, seems
to be when I was excavating what I could discover about his idea
of "ground" and stopped to take a longer look at MS 113 entitled
"Logic of the Sciences" (1865).  Here's the lead off to the LOTS:

LOTS.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/thread.html#2413

I was especially struck by his notion of "marks" in these passages:

LOTS 5.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/002418.html
LOTS 6.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/002419.html
LOTS 9.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/002425.html

I made an initial comment on the importance of this transition here:

LOTS-DIS 7.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/002429.html

I will try to get time tomorrow to comment further on these issues.

COSI. Discussion Note 9

By way of review, it should be clear that there
can be nothing like a one-to-one correspondence
between Peirce's three categories and the roles
within sign relations.  The quickest way to see
this may be as follows.  In every sign relation
it holds true that every interpretant sign is a
sign in its own right.  Conversely, there exist
sign relations in which every sign may be found
to fit also in the role of an interpretant sign.
This should make it sufficiently plain that the
role distinction between signs and interpretant
signs is purely interpretive.  Finally, objects
in sign relations can be anything that's talked
or thought about, even other signs and concepts.
If one wishes to say that everything we talk or
think about has secondness to it, then I cannot
prevent it, but there is no distinctness to any
such secondness, as it applies indiscriminately
to what had firstness or thirdness a second ago.
So I believe that we have to look elsewhere for
the bearing of the categories on sign relations.

COSI. Discussion Note 10

Re: COSI-DIS 9.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002806.html
In: COSI-DIS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2789

JW = Jim Willgoose

JW: There is a connection between categories and sign relations.

The question of the moment is not whether there is some sort of connection
between categories and sign relations.  The question here is whether there
is a specific correspondence between the categories and the domains of any
given sign relation that makes all signs firsts, all objects seconds, and
all interpretants thirds.  The next question would be whether any of the
six possible correspondences could hold.  The fact is that none of them
work, because the categories are constructs that have their application
at a different level of structure than the components or domains of
sign relations, for that matter, the components or domains of any
3-adic relation.  Their application is to types of relations,
taken as wholes, not the individual elements of relations.

JW: Your strongest argument for the absence of one-one
    correspondence lies with the lack of secondness in
    many areas where there are triadic sign relations.
    The fact that any sign is a potential interpretant
    (or conversely) does not serve the argument.

The fact that the very same thing can be in all three roles
of a sign relation is very much to the point.  To identify
these roles with categories, in any given order, is to say
that the same thing can be placed in all three categories.
But if that's the case then every other association of
categories with sign roles would be equally justified,
and the whole idea of a particular permutation being
singled out loses its utility.

JW: On the other hand, an objection might be that 1st, 2nd, 3rd
    are apparent in every sign but are not to be confused with
    firstness, secondness, and thirdness.  More to the point,
    it is possible that a relation obtains where something
    is second to a first without any secondness in the
    phenomenological sense involved.

I don't know what you are saying here.  If you are saying that one
should not confuse the 1st, 2nd, 3rd place slots in a sign relation
with the categories of firstness, secondness, thirdness, then that is
all that I've been saying all along.

The evidence here is overwhelming.  You might try scanning the
collection of 88 "definitions" of a sign to see if you can find
a consistent association of categories with sign relational roles.
The only way to arrive at a uniquely favored correspondence is by
way of a very selective reading.

http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm

COSI. Discussion Note 11

BU = Ben Udell

BU: From the "New List of Categories":

CSP: | §11. The five conceptions thus obtained, for reasons which
     |      will be sufficiently obvious, may be termed categories.
     |      That is,
     |
     | BEING,
     |
     | Quality (Reference to a Ground), [the 'semiotic' Ground is the ground
     | or reason of the sign's being a sign, in a sense an aspect of the sign,
     | and which Jon has at times said must remain distinguished from the sign,
     | but at other times seems to have seen as a way of talking about the sign]
     | 
     | Relation (Reference to a Correlate), [the 'semiotic' Correlate,
     | i.e., a sign's correlate, is its object, the semiotic object,
     | as is made clear elsewhere in the New List]
     |
     | Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),
     | [the Interpretant is always semiotic]
     |
     | SUBSTANCE.
     |
     | C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 2, p. 55

CSP: | The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.
     |
     | C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 1.556

BU: The category of Quality is that of Firstness.
    The category of Relation (later, Reaction/Resistance) is that of Secondness.
    The category of Representation is that of Thirdness.
 
BU: So there's a pretty clear, if not quite perfect (because
    of the issue of sign vs. ground), correlation between the
    categories and the semiotic elements.  One also sees this
    pattern in some of the quotes from Peirce from before the
    New List.  Interpretant, sign, and semiotic object are all
    semiotic, all thirds, but still, among themselves together,
    correlate to the three categories.

Yes, I've already excerpted to the list almost the whole variorum
of comparable and contrasting passages leading up to the New List.
Putting these together with all the things Peirce says later, the
only way one can say that a particular association of categories
to sign relational roles is "pretty clear" is to focus on those
passages that state or imply one's favorite ordering, and to
ignore all the others.  This appears to be the usual method
of arguing for a particular correspondence.  But it only
works so long as one does not try to make any deductions
from the assumption of a fixed correspondence, as this
always leads to the incoherence of concluding that all
things are all types, all in all.  You illustrate the
problem when you say things like this:

BU: | Interpretant, sign, and semiotic object are all semiotic, all thirds,
    | but still, among themselves together, correlate to the three categories.

Now, it is possible to interpret such a statement as an approximate formula
about sign relations, interpreting words like "first", "second", "third" in
some places as referring to types of relations, that is, species of sets of
triples, and in other places as referring to the orders in which domains of
sign relations are introduced, 'in a particular discussion', but doing that
is playing on some order of equivocality that is best with which to do away.

The question is:  Can one form a consistent model for
the preponderance of Peirce's statements on this score?

It is more or less possible to do that, given an adequate theory
of relations in general, something that Peirce begins to give us
evidence of developing by the time of the 1870 Logic of Relatives.
But interpreting Peirce's statements about signs and representation
in the light of a robust theory of relations will demand a thoroughly
relational point of view, one that gives up the essentialist fixations
of his earlier development.

COSI. Discussion Note 12

JW = Jim Willgoose

JW: It seems that the same thing can serve in all three roles.  I guess I
    meant that to argue for an *absence* of correspondence it would be best,
    as you suggest, to either look at the differences between what comes second
    and secondness, or as you also suggest, to see the categories as applicable
    to a different level of structure than that of components of the sign relation.

Okay.

JW: In any case, what is so damning about describing
    an equivalence relation on the components of
    a sign relation?

Nothing at all -- once we establish what a sign relation is,
then it becomes possible to discuss many pertinent sorts of
equivalence relations that may be defined on selected pairs
of domains.  These do not follow necessarily from the bare
definition of a sign relation, but may arise in many cases
that naturally concern us.  But I don't see what this has
to do with the collapsing of categories into sign roles?

JW: You seem to suggest that "the singling out of a particular
    permutation loses its utility".  I do not understand why.

I mean that we are no longer saying anything significant about
either sign roles or categories if every possible permutation
is equally justified.

COSI. Discussion Note 13

JW = Jim Willgoose

JW: If you exhaust the reordering of the components of the sign relation,
    it does not seem to follow that "nothing significant" can be said
    about the categories.  Each category preserves its distinctness
    through any ordering (whatever is first is first etc.)  I didn't
    say anything about "collapsing" categories into sign roles.
    On the contrary, whatever sort of semiosis appears *confirms*
    the categories.  The question is how.

I can't tell what you are saying here, so I'll just track back
to what I thought was a point of agreement, that the categories
1, 2, 3 are different sorts of things from the places 1, 2, 3 in
a particular way of presenting the "columns" of a sign relation.
That's the important thing.

Another way to look at this whole business of ordering is like this.
There are two sorts of orderings that we often consider:  There are
"conventional" orderings that we adopt as matters of convenience in
particular discussions.  The order in these cases has no particular
significance and serves its purpose so long as we keep it fixed for
the duration of the discussion at hand.  Then we have "substantial"
orderings, where the order of the classified items is intended to
reflect something of significance about them, something that we
would expect them to preserve from discussion to discussion.

I think it's clear that a given ordering of sign relational domains is
offered as a variable convenience while the ordering of the categories
is meant to reflect a matter of invariant substance.

Now, it's true that a particular type of discussion,
for instance, one type of phenomenological discussion
or one type of psychological discussion, may find that
a particular ordering of sign domains is such a constant
convenience throughout that type of discussion, that it
begins to be taken for a matter of substance, but that
is just the typical artifact of binding discussion
and thought to a single paradigm.

COSI. Discussion Note 14

GR = Gary Richmond

Re: COSI 5.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002817.html
In: COSI.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2813

GR: Jon quoted Peirce to the effect that the

    | interpretant of the sign may be the very sign itself;
    | but as a general rule it will be different.

GR: Certainly in this age of the internet one need not demand even that
    "sop to Cerberus" that would require a person at the "receiving" end
    of some semiotic event, so that one can easily imagine, for example,
    a sign transmitted electronically so that its interpretant would
    be "the very sign itself".  And certainly in ones own meditations,
    the sign I think about ("so I says to myself") may be "the very
    sign itself."

GR: But Peirce says in several places, as he does in the quotation under 
    consideration, that "as a general rule it will be different", that
    while it may be "an equivalent sign" that it is characteristically
    "a more developed sign".  I think that a categorial distinction
    between sign and interpretant sign remains necessary in semiosis
    in consideration of at least its temporal dimension even when
    the interpretant is "an equivalent sign".

In this passage Peirce trebles himself to make explicit what
is at any rate evident from his more general definitions of
sign relations, namely, that a sign relation L c O x S x I
may contain triples o:s:i of the forms x:x:i, o:x:x, and
even x:x:x.  Of course, the roles of components remain
as distinct as they ever were, no matter what fills
them, but -- and it's a really big but -- roles are
not categories.

The only way to make sense of a Peircean category, and it's easy
to find passages where he makes this more clear, is to regard it
as a "category of relations" (COR).  In other words, k^thness is
just the property that all (irreducibly) k-adic relations share.
The thesis that three categories are necessary and sufficient
is then provable by means of the logic of relations.

Properly regarded, then, a "category of relations" (COR) is
a very different thing from a "role of components" (ROC),
and in these acronyms, at least, the order is critical.

COSI. Discussion Note 15

BM = Bernard Morand

Re: COSI-DIS 14.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002819.html
In: COSI-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2789

JA: Properly regarded, then, a "category of relations" (COR) is
    a very different thing from a "role of components" (ROC),
    and in these acronyms, at least, the order is critical.

BM: Very nice Jon, I enjoy your caution "at least":
    For the order to be critical, the components
    (the alphabetical letters O, C, R) require
    continuity regardless of the ordering.

BM: So we get:
    O = Of = Of
    C = Category = Component
    R = Relation = Role

BM: Is the Sphynx defeated?

The Sphynx, as usual, ain't talking ...
I can only guess what's on her mind ---

I think she'd say:

   Of = Of, at least, in some declensions.

   Category =/= Component, at least, not here.

   Relation =/= Role, at least, not in this paradigm.

In sum I reckon that no one numbed
in the chilegon carnival of Oedipi
would dare to count this as d'feet.

COSI. Discussion Note 15

ES = Elise Springer
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: COSI-COM 2.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002831.html
In: COSI-COM.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2820

JA: it is possible to ask the question, and ask it afresh in
    each new case, whether the features that we attribute
    to a phenomenon in view are truly its properties,
    or nothing more than conventional attachments.

ES: I suspect the question "whether the features ... are truly its properties,
    or nothing more than conventional attachments" invites a false dilemma.
    Perhaps there are very few "true properties" and yet very many real
    *relations*, some of which involve organisms.

ES: I have in mind, for example, the sorts of phenomena described by Gibsonians
    as "affordances":  to say that the "edibility" of something is "truly a
    property of it" is awkward;  yet to say that it is "nothing more than
    conventional attachment" would be a mistake.  It truly *is* edible
    *by* certain organisms, in virtue of certain possible interactions
    (ingestability, digestability, non-toxicity, nutrition).  No?

ES: Nevertheless, the first bit -- to suspect that things are
    less often "true properties" than so-called common sense
    suggests -- is the crucial and refreshing bit ...

Yes, for the sake of magnifying effects I staked out the penultimate extremes
in the spectrum of possibilities, but I expect no absolute answers, nothing
better than the bit of critical reflection that is capable of unfreezing
time-worn habits and making practical judgments in a realistic setting.
It may be an empirical matter whether nature recognizes our splitting
of agent from patient, participant from observer, wave from particle,
object from sign from interpretant, and so on, or it may be a force
of logic that determines the answer, if at all.  But this is an
arena where reflex contests with reflection, so it's typically
necessary to inhibit the one in order to facilitate the other.

COSI. Discussion Note 17

Re: COSI-DIS 16.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002832.html
In: COSI-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2789

JP = Jim Piat

JP: I've enjoyed your comments below.  I think there are
    two dimensions being considered in your exchange.

JP: First is the property of an entity vs the property of a relation
    between two or more entities.   Second is the issue of whether
    either sort of property is real (independent of what folks
    imagine or stipulate) or whether the property (be it of
    an entity or a relation) is conventional or stipulated
    for some purpose.

JP: For example edibility is a real property of the relationship
    between some entities;  whereas, (again for example) the monetary
    value of say a five dollar bill is a conventional property of the
    bill itself (in turn distinct from the real relational purchasing
    power of five dollars).

JP: Perhaps  -- 

JP: To speak unambiguously, honestly, truly, really, etc about  the world
    of which we are a part may not only be awkward  -- it may be impossible.
    Perhaps the best we, as participant observors of the world, can ever achieve
    is some degree of speaking the same language  in the sense of having a shared
    interest or common point of view.

JP: Oh -- here's another slant.  Perhaps a useful way to think about properties is
    in terms of whether they are monadic, dyadic, or triadic.  A monadic property is
    felt and intrinsic.  A  dyadic property which is both felt sensed is reactive and
    relational in the sense of being extrinsic.  And finally a triadic property which
    is felt sensed and thought is necessarily interpreted or conventional but also
    either real or imaginary.

JP: In any case I've enjoyed your exchange of comments.

I sense a boundless discussion lurking around the edges here,
so I'll revert to a principle of Southern chivalry and stay
with the question that I came to the dance with.  This has
to do with the question of whether sign relational domains
and roles are intrinsically pairable with the categories.
I don't think they are, and don't think that Peirce did
either, as you can find him playing musical chairs with
the possible off-pairings according to the aims in view,
whether ontological, phenomenological, or psychological.

The text from the 3rd Harvard Lecture that I'm currently citing
is one of the clearest discussions of this issue that I've seen:

COSI 07.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002821.html
COSI 08.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002822.html
COSI 09.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002823.html
COSI 10.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002826.html
COSI 11.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002830.html

I plan to get back to this, but my time on list
will be very intermittent the rest of the month.

Wishing everybody a good summer/winter,
to each hemisphere, relatively wishing.

EOS. Embodiments Of Signs • Discussion

EOS. Discussion Note 1

| In 1923 I gave up the attempt to write a logic of transitive verbs
| and began to see what I could do with the logic of propositions.
| My object, as a psychologist, was to invent a kind of least
| psychic event, or "psychon", that would have the following
| properties:  First, it was to be so simple an event that
| it either happened or else it did not happen.  Second,
| it was to happen only if its bound cause had happened --
| shades of Duns Scotus! -- that is, it was to imply its
| temporal antecedent.  Third, it was to propose this to
| subsequent psychons.  Fourth, these were to be compounded
| to produce the equivalents of more complicated propositions
| concerning their antecedents.
|
| In 1929 it dawned on me that these events might be regarded as the
| all-or-none impulses of neurons, combined by convergence upon the
| next neuron to yield complexes of propositional events.
|
| Warren S. McCulloch, WIANTAMMKIAAMTHMKAN?, EOM, pp. 8-9
|
| Warren S. McCulloch, "What Is a Number, that a Man May Know It,
| and a Man, that He May Know a Number?", Ninth Alfred Korzybski
| Memorial Lecture, 'General Semantics Bulletin', Nos. 26 & 27,
| Institute of General Semantics, Lakeville, CT, 1961, pp. 7-18.
|
| Reprinted in 'Embodiments of Mind', MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965.

JA = Jon Awbrey
VA = Victoria N. Alexander

Re: http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2005-May/002707.html
In: http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2005-May/thread.html#2690

Copied here:

JA: Here are some scenarios that I used to think about in this connection.

JA: Imagine a primitive cell, some kind of proto-neuron, but just complex enough
    to have an input process (proto-dendrite) and output process (proto-axon).

    --->[]--->

JA: When that cell divides -- yes, I know, I did say primitive --
    what does it, on its way to becoming they, do about its i-o?

JA: The most generic thing that can happen may be drawn like this:

          o-[]-o
         /  \ / \
    --->o    \   o--->
         \  / \ /
          o-[]-o

JA: This is supposed to suggest that each cell has its
    independent input and output, but that each also
    gets input as to the what the other is outputting.

JA: If this doesn't come out too good in the mail,
    try the archived version at the Arisbe list,
    which will appear under the thread head
    that I gave above.  If you can read it
    under a fixed-width character format,
    that would work the best.

VA replies:

VA: I've made some progress in my writing about non-sentient nature 
    interacting interpretively.  I am interested to hear more about
    your proto neuron.  (Can an axon's behavior as an index of the
    state of the neuron?)

VA: I've checked the archived version of the thread on the Arisbe list,
    and the diagram is clearer, but I didn't find any further posts on
    the subject beyond the first.

I had intended to get back to this, but apparently anything that I omit
to log in my archive du jour slips out of sight, out of mind, so I will
copy the remainder of this discussion there and see if that helps.  But
the acronyms for "Semiotics Applied To Nature" and "Semiotics In Nature"
sounded a bit too ominous for my comfort, so I devised this alternative.
The title "Embodiments Of Signs" (EOS) will also serve to remind me of
the instigmatic frame for these thoughts, which was for me the reading
that I did so long ago and so often since in Arbib, Ashby, McCulloch,
and Pitts.  That will tell you that the proto-neuron is really just
a filiation of McCulloch's "psychons" and later "formal neurons".

With that retro-amble, I will try to remember
what this was about and get back to it later.

EOS. Discussion Note 2

JA = Jon Awbrey
SZ = Steven Ericsson Zenith

Re: EOS 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002783.html
In: EOS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2783

Cf: WIANTAMMKIAAMTHMKAN?
    http://www.infoloom.com/pipermail/topicmapmail/2001q3/002833.html

JA: The most generic thing that can happen may be drawn like this:

           o-[]-o
          /  \ / \
     --->o    \   o--->
          \  / \ /
           o-[]-o

JA: This is supposed to suggest that each cell has its
    independent input and output, but that each also
    gets input as to the what the other is outputting.

SZ: I am surprised to find this connectionist view.  I would point out
    that this many-to-many architecture has practical scaling limits
    and thus requires localization -- Which is, in fact, demonstrated
    in observations of the brain.  It requires a higher level model
    (one might call it a "systems model") for the semeiotics to
    work across this localization.

The little grey cells associated with this topic are very grey indeed,
and it'll take me a while to warm them up to firing temperament again.
Actually, I don't have a problem with connected thinking, so long as
the connectivity is at least degree 3, but of course all the garden
varieties of which you're most likely thinking are at most degree 2.
Please note that all of the vertices in my picture are of degree 3.
Now, if subsequent generations of connectionists had paid a bit
more attention to the 3-adic phenomena that McCulloch & Pitts
revealed, then the whole history of connectionism might have
been radically less a farce than it actually happened to be.

SZ: Evenso, the archicture hits the hard problem pretty quickly.
    I've never seen Peirce as an epiphenomenalist -- I'd be
    surprised to discover that you are one Jon.

For my part, I'm not even trying to explane consciousness.
I am only noting explanatory relations among its contents.

JA: the acronyms for "Semiotics Applied To Nature" and "Semiotics In Nature"
    sounded a bit too ominous for my comfort, so I devised this alternative.
    The title "Embodiments Of Signs" (EOS) will also serve to remind me of
    the instigmatic frame for these thoughts ...

SZ. I would think the acronyms were simply asking for trouble.
    Do you think that Peirce ever viewed semeiotics as not being
    an intrinsic of nature?  Certainly I have always considered that
    he did and that Locke considered it so.  Your alternative was the
    right direction in my view.

Well, I suspected that 'some' of the acronyms might be spelling for trouble,
which is why I opted for another, but what brand of trouble comes with dawn?

Sufficient Unto The Day ...

GRAM. Grammar Reified As Metaphysics • Discussion

GRAM. Discussion Note 1

BB: Bill Bailey

Re: COSI-DIS 16.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002832.html
In: COSI-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2789

Cf: COSI 07-11.   http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2821
In: COSI.         http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2813

I will spin off the present tangent of discussion under a heading
that highlights the brand of artificiality or conventionality that
Peirce brought up in his 3rd Harvard Lecture of 1903.

BB: The questions the posts raise in my mind is whether "real"
    must imply unmediated information -- a "thing as it is" as
    opposed to a thing as represented in some form of media.

You are describing what Kant called the noumenon, according to his more
theoretical half, the unknowable thing in itself.  But we know that Peirce
rubricized both of their more practical ways of thinking as Kantianism without
the unknowability of the thing in itself, preferring to say instead that we have
what information or knowledge that we can indeed have of objects precisely in the
form and medium of our representations.

BB: Conversely, when we speak of the unreal, are we not merely
    speaking of a lack of representation is some media.  How can
    there be unmediated information?  And if information must be
    mediated, what does "real" mean?  I've always imagined Peirce
    must somewhere say "real" in human terms means our information
    checks out both repeatedly and cross-modally -- we see what we
    touch, we hear it when it hits the floor, it registers on our
    instruments, so on.

A predicate of reality -- both in general, that there is a real world
of some kind that explains what persistently appears in our experience,
and in particular, that a real portion of the real world explains this
or that particular but still systematic experience -- enters thought by
way of hypothesis, a hypothesis that remains on eternal probation, even
if we come to trust some hypotheses to a very large degree.

BB: None of that insures we access the thing as it is, but apparently it
    is there, and there over time and throughout various operations with
    attributes that stably produce the same effects upon us as well as
    our instruments.  Is (can) there be any other meaning of "real"?

I can't see any in evidence.

The part of this that bears on our previous topic is this:
Merely to describe how a predicate of reality rises to the
level of making any sense at all, we have to be operating
within a framework of at least a certain arity, complexity,
dimensionality, or richness, and everything points to the
circumstance that the minimal sort of framework for this
purpose is a sign relation or something tantamount to it.

GRAM. Discussion Note 2

BB = Bill Bailey
JP = Jim Piat

Re: GRAM-DIS 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002838.html
In: GRAM-DIS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/thread.html#2838

BB, quoting JP:

JP: Whether Peirce would or does argue that all that is real must at
    least in principle be subject to reliable, public, cross modal
    verification I do not know, though I think he at least comes
    close in his essays on how to make our ideas clear and the
    fixation of beliefs.

BB: Yes, those are the essays that led me to think (hope) he was 
    more explicit elsewhere.  It helps a Nimrod like me to know 
    others are also seeing fish.

BB, addressing JA:

BB: I especially liked your last paragraph.  I think some writers
    in the field, especially popularists, feel no need for a very
    consciously constructed "framework of at least a certain arity,
    complexity, dimensionality, or richness".  And so off they go
    a-hunting for the Snark, that minimal  sign relation which
    they imagine they can easily keep in their sights.

The fact that an idea can only make sense in contexts that are "up to it",
in other words, that achieve a certain level of complexity, is analogous
to the fact that some forms of life can only arise and remain viable in
environments that maintain a certain level of richness in the resources
that avail the form of life in question.

Concepts, as intellectual constructs, whether constructed over the course of
our common biological evolution, our indiosyncratic personal development, or
a congeries of both, are tools whose usability and utility are contingent on
and relative to their intellectual niche.

With a bit of luck, we may find that an idea ranges more widely
in its applications than the paradigm cases which gave it birth,
but this is a chance that has to be tested, not taken for grant.

Finally, it should be noted that the recognition
of an "objective property", a property that can
be predicated of an object from the data that
are proper to a sufficiently diverse set of
representations, may depend on a framework
that can be constructed on the basis of
those representations, not merely the
simple agreement or coincidence of
what already appears in those
fashions of representation.
Then again, some objects
that we formerly took
for "objective" tend
to disappear in the
new construction.

GRAM. Discussion Note 3

AS = Arnold Shepperson
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: GRAM-DIS 2.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002843.html
In: GRAM-DIS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/thread.html#2838

Only have time for random reflections the next few days,
but will try to get back to this more coherently later on
in the summer, as I think that it's a very important topic.

AS: Had a chance to get some reading of mail,
    and it just turns out this was the first
    mail I checked.

AS: Jon made the following comment:

JA: The fact that an idea can only make sense in contexts that are "up to it",
    in other words, that achieve a certain level of complexity, is analogous
    to the fact that some forms of life can only arise and remain viable in
    environments that maintain a certain level of richness in the resources
    that avail the form of life in question.

JA: Concepts, as intellectual constructs, whether constructed over the course
    of our common biological evolution, our indiosyncratic personal development,
    or a congeries of both, are tools whose usability and utility are contingent
    on and relative to their intellectual niche.

AS: Just yesterday I was reading something by John Deely that I previously
    downloaded from Mats Bergman's Commens site, in which Deely discusses
    precisely this issue in terms of how Jakob von Uexkill's conception
    of an Umwelt is applicable to this.  Deely moves from there to
    Thomas Sebeok's Biosemiotics thesis, before getting to his point
    that Peirce's broader semeiotic is a starting point for moving
    from the nominalism of modern philosophy to a new sort of
    'post-modern' philosophy.

Some of us that passed through mathematical, gestalt, and cognitive psychology,
not necessarily in that order, got our first dose of similar ideas from Kurt Lewin,
especially his notion of "life space" and his use of topological ideas in psychology.

AS: I'm not altogether sure Deely's got this tiger suitably tightly by the tail,
    but I nevertheless think that the issue of how that which is real is known,
    has much to do with how the relation between knower and object permits the
    object to MAKE ITSELF KNOWN.  Where I think Deely has a point, is that the
    evolved human mind can make logical connections through its 'reasoning faculty'
    that merely instinctive evolved minds cannot.  We can assume a point of view,
    that is, that lets us know that even if we don't hear the tree falling over
    in the forest, we can connect the reality of that event with other marks
    and traces, indexes, that other participants of the relation 'is foresting'
    have in fact perceived and responded to the event in their situationally
    evolved ways.  There really is something quite non-Berkelyan about Peirce,
    and reading his review of Frazer's Berkely again just confirms how far one
    has to go against the mainstream grain to grasp what Peirce makes possible.

AS: People sometimes complain that Peirce's notion of the sign entails
    some rather large and unexamined degree of 'causality' that does
    little more than leave him as a sort of naive 'positivist' (the
    term being one of derision, and having nothing to do with any
    actually occurring historical positivism).  But if we take
    seriously his doctrine that phenomena are such because they
    do a considerable of the appearing involved, then any sign
    must have its property as a sign in virtue of its capacity,
    propensity, power, potentiality, and what have you, to
    'add value' by its being a sign, to that which the
    Object shows of itself.

We've been through the causality bit too many times to repeat.
I'll just repeat that causal determination is a special case
of the sort of determination involved in sign relations, and
by no means exhaustive of it.

AS: Jon does this better than I do, but I'll essay
    a diagram of what this might mean.  Peirce's
    Sign relation is represented as:

AS: O ---> S ---> I

AS: Where O = Object
          S = Sign
          I = Interpretant

Well, diagrams like that convey a false impression that all sign relations
are decomposable into 2-adic relations of determination, and that there is
always a temporal ordering object, sign, interpretant.  This can happen in
particular cases, but they are very special, degenerate cases.

AS: The Appearing of the object is like the tree falling:
    it's going to do what it's going to do irrespective
    of whether some nosy naturalist or semiotician is
    just sitting there waiting for something to happen.
    If the falling arouses some response in waiting
    semio-scientist, any response at all (and that
    has to include 'Well, ho hum'), then what
    determines that response AS AN INTERPRETANT
    is whatever SIGN it was that the falling
    activated (for want of a better word,
    because nominalists just HATE it when
    Peirce students start waffling on
    about 'determination, don't they?).

AS: Perhaps another way to see an object (that dratted tree keeps falling over),
    is to view it as an antececdent element of a sequence.  O stands R to S, and
    S stands R to I; by the property of transitivity, then, O stands R to I.
    If we look at a fairly accessible little text of Peirce (CP 3.562), and
    apply the precepts of sequential relations he outlines there, then we
    can't logically show the following version of the sign relation
    without changing the subject:

AS: I ---> S ---> O

Transitivity is a property of 2-adic relations,
and invoking it depends on a decomposition of
the phenomenon into 2-adic relations.  Again,
this can happen, but is not the generic case
for sign relations.

AS: The sign's specific relation of sequence is non-commutative.
    Signs logically just can't determine Objects.

I would disagree with that, but save it for another season.

AS: In brief, to get back to Jon's point after a long detour,
    there is something about the evolved relations between
    Objects and possible interpreters, that makes the
    Interpretant as the terminus of an element in an
    open-ended sequence of relations, essentially
    'determined'.  Peirce had some interesting
    things to say about 'determination' in both
    the "Reply to the Necessitarians", and the
    "What Pragmaticism Is" articles.  My reading
    leads me to think that despite the formal
    simplicity of the concept of sequence,
    our evolution as semioting (!) beings
    is in a very foundational sense an
    Interpretent of the evolution of
    sequential relations.

"Semioting" I like.

AS: Whoops!  He's getting metaphysical again,
    which means time to let the topic stand
    until he's cooled off.

Triple Ditto ...

GRAM. Discussion Note 4

AS = Arnold Shepperson
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: GRAM-DIS 3.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002849.html
In: GRAM-DIS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/thread.html#2838

In part:

AS: The sign's specific relation of sequence is non-commutative.
    Signs logically just can't determine Objects.

JA: I would disagree with that, but save it for another season.

Just a hint, still a bit out of season, as to what I mean here.
Intentional objects -- logical objects like aims, designs, ends,
goals, set-points, targets, objectives, and so on -- are perfectly
respectable and even you might say quintessentially pragmatic objects.
For instance, the date and time that my endontologist scribbles on his
appointment card form a complex sign that denotes the appointed point in
the future, with reference to the place that is pre-engraved on the card,
and my acceptance of the card from him signifies my contract to visit his
office once again at the aforesaid point in spacetime.  Logically speaking,
it is perfectly sensible to say that this sign denotes an event that is not
yet realized, and even if our sun going nova in the meantime spares me the
risk of a root canal, the sign denotes that never-to-be-realized event all
the same.  Not only that, but the exchange of this token is an effective
component of realizing the objective event, when and if it does occur.
Finally, since all of these signs form but a portion of reality, none
of this diminishes the objective nature of reality, what Einstein
called the "out yonder" (OY).

GRAM. Discussion Note 5

AS = Arnold Shepperson
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: GRAM-DIS 4.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002850.html
In: GRAM-DIS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/thread.html#2838

Repeated here:

AS: The sign's specific relation of sequence is non-commutative.
    Signs logically just can't determine Objects.

JA: I would disagree with that, but save it for another season.

JA: Just a hint, still a bit out of season, as to what I mean here.
    Intentional objects -- logical objects like aims, designs, ends,
    goals, set-points, targets, objectives, and so on -- are perfectly
    respectable and even you might say quintessentially pragmatic objects.
    For instance, the date and time that my endontologist scribbles on his
    appointment card form a complex sign that denotes the appointed point in
    the future, with reference to the place that is pre-engraved on the card,
    and my acceptance of the card from him signifies my contract to visit his
    office once again at the aforesaid point in spacetime.  Logically speaking,
    it is perfectly sensible to say that this sign denotes an event that is not
    yet realized, and even if our sun going nova in the meantime spares me the
    risk of a root canal, the sign denotes that never-to-be-realized event all
    the same.  Not only that, but the exchange of this token is an effective
    component of realizing the objective event, when and if it does occur.
    Finally, since all of these signs form but a portion of reality, none
    of this diminishes the objective nature of reality, what Einstein
    called the "out yonder" (OY).

AS replied:

AS: I can get all this, and you're more or less spot on.
    But the issue here is not so much the dynamic object,
    but the relation between an interpretant, a sign,
    and an immediate object.  An appointment scribbled
    in a dentist's desk diary does, as sign, determine
    a future event that might not take place but which
    (all things being equal) should if I don't chicken
    out at the thought of somebody rooting around in my
    root canals.  I guess the appointment partakes more
    of the nature of a dynamic object (a would-be) that
    is intended to realise the possibility that I could
    continue to chew Macadamias and beef jerky IF I keep
    this appointment (and, naturally, continue to keep
    appointments so my dentist can afford his malpractice
    insurance).  But as an Immediate object, aren't we
    perhaps speaking of the AGREEMENT to meet, and not
    the meeting as such?  I may well chicken out and skip
    the root-canal treatment;  but at the time that sign
    gets scribbled in the diary, its immediate object is
    this here agreement to meet at that there time, and
    in the writing the sign doesn't constitute the object,
    but record its mutual recognition by me and my dentist.
    I guess the matter could be chewed over further (Damn!
    Now it's mastication and dentition, and not trees falling
    over), perhaps taking some account of the semiotic nature
    of coordination.

I think that we need to recognize that the logico-semiotic account of things
takes place at a level of analysis that is prior to all of the various sorts
of causal (efficient, final, formal, material, or what have you), cybernetic,
or dynamic accounts that we might choose, or not, to flesh out the narrative.
At the logical or semiotic level of analysis, the question is simply whether
it makes any kind of sense at all to talk about a time not present, as I did
a couple of weeks ago when I stated that I would pick it up here in a couple
of weeks.  This is nothing more intricate than the question of whether signs
of that sort have the sorts of objects that uncoached interpreters give them.
As a question of logic or semiotics, I can see no objection to letting signs
refer to objects neither past nor present, indeed, that never come to pass.

OAR. Observation, Action, Reflection

OAR. Note 1

| Reflection is turning a topic over in various aspects and in various lights
| so that nothing significant about it shall be overlooked -- almost as one might
| turn a stone over to see what its hidden side is like or what is covered by it.
|
| John Dewey, 'How We Think', p. 57,
| Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, 1991.
| Originally published by D.C. Heath,
| Lexington, MA, 1910.

In our discussion of the possible bearings that Peirce's categories
might have on sign relations, I spoke of a turn in Peirce's thought
from the more purely phenomenological to the more properly pragmatic,
and I tried -- somewhat clumsily, by way of my stereoscopic metaphor --
to make the point that this is a turning that keeps on turning, and
that one of its most important traits is the capacity to turn back
and forth between the two different perspectives, but that fixing
on either angle by itself would leave our vision insipidly flat.

By way of disentangling it from many bedeviled questions
that might tend to weigh it down unnecessarily, I'd like
to tease out that theme for an independent development.

OAR. Note 2

                    o Metaphysics
                    |\
                    | \
                    |  \
                    |   o Normative Science 
                    |  / \
                    | /   \
                    |/     \
      Phenomenology o       o Mathematics

| Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics;
| Metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 1.186 (1903)

To vary the metaphor, we might pass from stereoscopic vision to bipedal
locomotion, the two feet in question being phenomenology and mathematics.
Phenomenology is restricted to what appears -- some would say what appears
unbidden, others would admit what appears by the invitation of experimental
protocols -- but mathematics frees us to speculate what might be possible in
any number of imaginary circumstances.  In this way we can see its connection
to logical reflection:

| By 'logical' reflexion, I mean the observation of thoughts
| in their expressions.  Aquinas remarked that this sort of
| reflexion is requisite to furnish us with those ideas
| which, from lack of contrast, ordinary external
| experience fails to bring into prominence.
| He called such ideas 'second intentions'.
|
| It is by means of 'relatives of second intention'
| that the general method of logical representation
| is to find completion.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.488-490,
|"The Logic of Relatives", 'The Monist', vol. 7,
| pp. 161-217, 1897.

OAR. Note 3

| And I will tell thee a sign right manifest,
| which will not escape thee.  When another
| wayfarer, on meeting thee, shall say that
| thou hast a winnowing-fan on thy stout
| shoulder, then do thou fix in the earth
| thy shapely oar and make goodly offerings ...
|
| Homer, 'Odyssey', 11.126-130
| http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Hom.+Od.+11.97

On further reflection, I can see that there's room
between observation and reflection to complete the
triad in one more variation on Peirce's categories.

Just as a creature that grows its k^th eye or its k^th leg may be said
to outgrow its former stages of development that relied exclusively on
the lesser numbers of eyes or legs, that is to say, so long as the new
organs of opervision and logomotion are properly coordinated with what
came before, and, moreover, are not mere redundancies in the resources
that they add, in just such a way and with just such qualifications we
may view the completion of the categories as an outgrowth of old ideas.

OAR. Note 4

Let us go back to the rough matrix of ideas out of which industrial
gems like the pragmatic maxim and the sign definition are both mined.
We discover there the concepts of practical bearings, considerations,
or effects, which are notions to the effect that if we perform certain
actions in certain sets of circumstances then we are more or less bound
to undergo certain experiences as a result.  There also we find the idea
that the meaning of a concept or symbol can be clarified to its ultimate
degree by articulating it in terms of these axes of practical bearings.

At first sight, the conditions of action, circumstance, and experience
appear to constellate a heterogeneous lot, and so our first attempts
to organize our practical bearings may be carried out in terms of
3-adic transactions or "pragmatic conduct relations" that relate
suitable domains of action, circumstance, and experience in one
convenient order or another.

Taking another look, we may notice that what we know of a given circumstance
is always in terms of its experienced characters, properties, or predicates,
and so we may consider action to be a transformation of experience, passing
from one complex of empirical properties or narrated predicates to another.

Ultimately, I think it is possible to contrive even greater generalizations,
defining a concept of "pragmatic relations" among three domains of "pragma",
that is to say, domains of elements that are regarded abstractly as objects,
at this level of generality including the above brands of conduct relations
along with sign relations as special cases.

But let us put off that ultimate generalization for now, and explore
the idea of action -- deliberate, intentional, pragmatic action --
as a transformation of experience and its associated predicates.

OAR. Observation, Action, Reflection • Discussion

OAR. Discussion Note 1

SL = Søren Lund

Re: OAR 2.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002804.html
In: OAR.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2803

SL: Jon, you provide a quote, a very interesting quote, that has puzzled me
    for some time now.  (I remember Ransdell using it in his dissertation
    from 1966, but there he didn't explain it;  it functioned, I believe,
    as a sort of back up for the general thesis he wanted to make at
    that time.)  Peirce says:
 
    | By 'logical' reflexion, I mean the observation of thoughts in their expressions.
    | Aquinas remarked that this sort of reflexion is requisite to furnish us with
    | those ideas which, from lack of contrast, ordinary external experience fails
    | to bring into prominence.  He called such ideas 'second intentions'.
    | It is by means of 'relatives of second intention' that the general
    | method of logical representation is to find completion.
    |
    | C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.488-490,
    |"The Logic of Relatives", 'The Monist', vol. 7,
    | pp. 161-217, 1897.
 
SL: What could Peirce possibly mean here?  Why is it "requisite"?
    And what sort of "ideas"?  Do you have an explanation of that?

I had meant to get back to this.  Peirce is here taking the
general notions of logical reflection and second intentions
and making a particular use of them in the framework of his
logical graphs.  The technical task at hand in this context
is how to introduce a logical constant for "falsity" in the
most natural, least artificial, least 'ad hoc' way possible.
The problem can be described as follows:  If we start from
a frame of reference in the logic of relations where every
term is relative, how can we reconstruct things that will
serve for logical invariants, like a constant truth or
a constant falsehood?

As it happens, one can draw on the materials at hand, namely,
the expressions in a given formal language, like a particular
calculus of relative terms, to build up constructs or models
that will satisfy any consistent specification of properties.

But I think that the best way to see what Peirce had in mind
by way of logical reflection and second intentions is to look
at a few examples of some significance where he applied these
concepts to some effect.

I had previously gathered a series of examples at these locations:

ROSI.  Relatives Of Second Intention

00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/thread.html#2503
01.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002503.html
02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002511.html
03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002520.html
04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002521.html
05.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002522.html
06.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002523.html
07.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002524.html
08.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002525.html
09.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002526.html
10.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002527.html
11.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002529.html
12.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002530.html
13.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002533.html
14.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002534.html
15.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002535.html
16.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002536.html
17.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002538.html
18.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002539.html
19.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002540.html

In other action:

  Pistons 95
  Spurs   86

OAR. Discussion Note 2

Re: OAR-DIS 1.   http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002824.html
In: OAR-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/thread.html#2824

Cf: ROSI-DIS 5.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002537.html
In: ROSI-DIS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/thread.html#2504

A comment that I made on the ROSI-DIS thread may also be pertinent here:

| We can get a sense of what Peirce intended by "logical reflexion"
| if we observe what he actually did, according to his accounts of
| the matter, in noticing and naming the various terms of second
| intention to which he took the time to call general attention.
|
| Apparently, "observation of thoughts in their expressions", with
| regard to the panoply of 2-adic relative terms, is not limited
| to their expressions in rhematic forms such as "child of __",
| "cousin of __", "husband of __", "spouse of __", and so on,
| but includes, for Peirce, observation of their expressions
| in extensional forms such as those that form up over the
| the relevant basis of elementary 2-adic relatives like
| A:A, A:B, A:C, ..., B:A, B:B, B:C, ..., and so on.
|
| Moreover, the output of these reflections is a classification
| of relative terms according to abstract commonalities of form,
| for instance, the "diagonal form" A:A + B:B + C:C + ... of an
| identity relation.  Given a fruitful classification, one then
| inquires into the laws that affect these forms in combination.

Document History

AFAR. Approximations Forgivable And Rhetorical

  • (Not Found. Thread intended but never started?)

COSI. Categories, Objects, Signs, Interpretants

  1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002813.html
  2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002814.html
  3. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002815.html
  4. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002816.html
  5. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002817.html
  6. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002818.html
  7. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002821.html
  8. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002822.html
  9. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002823.html
  10. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002826.html
  11. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002830.html

COSI. Categories, Objects, Signs, Interpretants • Commentary

  1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002820.html
  2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002831.html
  3. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002833.html
  4. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002844.html
  5. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002845.html

COSI. Categories, Objects, Signs, Interpretants • Discussion

  1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002789.html
  2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002791.html
  3. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002792.html
  4. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002793.html
  5. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002794.html
  6. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002795.html
  7. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002796.html
  8. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002797.html
  9. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002806.html
  10. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002807.html
  11. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002808.html
  12. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002809.html
  13. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002810.html
  14. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002819.html
  15. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002827.html
  16. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002832.html
  17. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002837.html

EOS. Embodiments Of Signs • Discussion

  1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002783.html
  2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002786.html

GRAM. Grammar Reified As Metaphysics • Discussion

  1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002838.html
  2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002843.html
  3. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002849.html
  4. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002850.html
  5. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-July/002855.html

OAR. Observation, Action, Reflection

  1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002803.html
  2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002804.html
  3. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002805.html
  4. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-August/002902.html

OAR. Observation, Action, Reflection • Discussion

  1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002824.html
  2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002825.html