User:Jon Awbrey/Pragmatic Cosmos

From InterSciWiki
Jump to: navigation, search

Blog Posts

Current Version

The Pragmatic Cosmos

This Section outlines the general idea of a priorism of normative sciences (PONS) and it presents the particular PONS that I will refer to as the pragmatic cosmos. This is the precedence ordering for the normative sciences that best accords with the pragmatic approach to inquiry, incidentally framing and introducing the order of normative sciences that I plan to deploy throughout the rest of this work. From this point on, whenever I mention a PONS without further qualification, it will always be one or another version of a pragmatic PONS that I mean to invoke, all the while taking into consideration the circumstance that its underlying theme still leaves a lot of room for variation in the carrying out of its live interpretation.

Roughly speaking, in regard to the forms of human aspiration that are exercised in normative practices and studied in the normative sciences, the study of states or things that satisfy agents is called aesthetics, the study of actions that lead agents toward these goals or these goods is called ethics, and the study of signs that indicate these actions is called logic. Understood this way, logic involves the enumeration and the analysis of signs with regard to their truth, a property that only makes sense in the light of the actions that are indicated and the objects that are desired. In other words, logic evaluates signs with regard to the trustworthiness of the actions that they indicate, and this means with respect to the utility that these indications exhibit in a mediate relationship to their objects. As an appreciative study, logic prizes the properties of signs that allow them to collect the scattered actions of agents into coherent forms of conduct and that permit them to indicate the general courses of conduct that are most likely to lead agents toward their objects.

From this “pragmatic” point of view, logic is a special case of ethics, one that is concerned with the conduct of signs, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics, one that is interested in the good of actual conduct. Another way to approach this perspective is to start with the good of anything and to work back through the maze of actions and indications that lead to it. An action that leads to the good is a good action, and this puts the questions of ethics among the questions of aesthetics, as the ones that contemplate the goods of actions. A sign that indicates a good action, that shows a good way to act, is a good sign, and this puts the domain of logic squarely within the domain of aesthetics. Moreover, thinking is a sign process that moves from signs to interpretant signs, and this makes thinking a special kind of action. In sum, the questions that logic takes up in its critique of good signs and good thinking are properly seen as special cases of aesthetic and ethical considerations.

The circumstance that the domain of logic is set within the domain of ethics, which is further set within the domain of aesthetics, does not keep each realm from rising to such a height in another dimension that each keeps a watch over all of the domains that it is set within. In sum, the image is that of three cylinders standing on their concentric bases, telescopically extending to a succession of heights, with the narrowest the highest and the broadest the lowest, rising to the contemplation of the point that virtually completes their perspective, just as if wholly sheltered by the envelope of the cone that they jointly support, no matter what its ultimate case may be, whether imaginary or real, rational or transcendental.

Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics, while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics. By way of definition, a monitory function is a duty, a role, or a task that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline, checking the feasibility of its intentions and its proposed operations, evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions, and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity of its acts in accord with its aims. A definite attitude and particular perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role with any hope or measure of success. The necessary station arises from the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once, and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature within a finite creation. Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty needs to help the agency that is involved in the effort or the endeavor it monitors to observe the due limits of its proper arena, the higher considerations, and the inherent constraints that force a fallible and finite agent to choose among the available truths, acts, and aims.

To recapitulate the pragmatic priorism of normative sciences (PONS):

Logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, cannot succeed in any of their aims, whether they turn to contemplating the natures of the true, the just, and the beautiful, respectively, for their own sakes, whether they turn to speculating on the certificates, the semblances, or the more species tokens of these goods, as they might be utilized toward a divergent conception of their values, or whether they convert from the one forum to the other market, and back again, in an endless series of exchanges, that is, unless their prospective agents possess the initial capital that can only be supplied by competencies at the corresponding intellectual virtues, and until they are willing to risk the stakes of adequately generous overhead investments, on orders that are demanded to fund the performance of the associated practical disciplines, namely, those that are appropriate to the good of signs, the good of acts, and the good of aims in themselves. In sum, the domains and the disciplines of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, are placed so aptly in regard to one another that each one waits on the order of its watch and each one maintains its own proper monitory function with respect to all of the ones that follow on after it.

Why do things have to be this way? Why is it necessary to impose a PONS, much less a pragmatic PONS, on the array of goods and quests? If everyone who reflects on the issue for a sufficient spell of time seems to agree that the Beautiful, the Just, and the True are one and the same in the End, then why is any PONS necessary? Its necessity is apparently relative to a certain contingency affecting the typical agent, namely, the contingency of being a fallible and finite creature. Perhaps from a God's Eye View (GEV), Beauty, Justice, and Truth all amount to a single Good, the only Good there is. But the imperfect creature is not given this view as its realized actuality and cannot contain its vision within the point of view (POV) that is proper to it. Even if it sees the possibility of this unity, it cannot actualize what it sees at once, at best being driven to work toward its realization measure by measure, and that is only if the agent is capable of reason and reflection at all.

The imperfect agent lives in a world of seeming beauty, seeming justice, and seeming truth. Fortunately, the symmetry of this seeming insipidity can break up in relation to itself, and with the loss of the objective world's equipoise and indifference goes all the equanimity and most of the insouciance of the agent in question. It happens like this: Among the number of apparent goods and amid the manifold of good appearances, one soon discovers that not all seeming goods are alike. Seeming beauty is the most seemly and the least deceptive, since it does not vitiate its own intention in merely seeming to achieve it, and does not destroy what it reaches for in merely seeming to grasp it.

Monitory functions, as a rule, tend to shade off in extreme directions, on the one hand becoming a bit too prescriptive before the act, whether the hopeful effects are hortatory or prohibitory, and on the other hand becoming much too reactionary after the fact, whether the tardy effects are exculpatory or recriminatory. In the midst of these extremes, that is, within the scheme of monitory functions at large, it is possible to distinguish subtler variations in the nuances of their action that work toward the accomplishment the same general purpose, but that achieve it with a form of such gentle urging all throughout the continuing process of gaining a good, that affect a promise of such laudatory rewards, and that afford an array of incidental senses of such ongoing satisfaction, even before, while, and after the aimed for good is effected, that this class of moderate measures is aptly known as advisory functions (AFs).

In the process of noticing what is necessary and what is impossible, and in distinguishing itself from the general run of monitory functions, an AF is able to adapt itself to get a better grip on what is possible, to the point that it is eventually able to make constructive suggestions to the agent that it monitors, and thus to give advice that is both apt and applicable, positive and practical, or usable and useful. If this is beginning to sound familiar, then it is not entirely an accident. As I see it, it is from these very grounds that the facility for abductive simile or the faculty of abductive synthesis (AS) first arises, to wit, just on the horizon of monitory observation and just on the advent of advisory contemplation that an agent of inquiry, learning, and reasoning first acquires the quasi ability to regard one thing just as if it were construed to be another and to consider each thing just inasmuch as it haps to be like another.

In the abode of the monitor I thus discover the first clues I can grasp as to how the abductive bearing (AB) of hypothetical reasoning can be bound together from the primitive elements of the most uncertain states that the mind can ever know. To my way of thinking, this derivation of ABs from the general conduct of monitory duties and the specific ethos of advisory roles, all as pursuant to the PONS, seems to strike a chord with the heart of wonder beating at the core of every agent of inquiry, and accordingly to fashion an answer to the central query, in the words of William Shakespeare: “Where is fancy bred?” Beyond the responsibility to continue driving the cycle of inquiry and to keep on circulating the fresh communication of provisional answers, this form of speculation on the origin of the AB points out at least one way whence these faculties of guessing widely but guessing well can lead me from the conditions of amazement, bewilderment, and consternation that the start of an inquiry all but constantly finds me in.

The anchoring or the inauguration of an abductive bearing (AB) within the operations of an advisory function (AF), and the ensconcement or the installation of this positively constructive advisory, in its turn,within the office of an irreducibly negative monitory function, one that watches over the active, aesthetic, and affective aspects of experience with an eye to the circumstance that not all goods can be actualized at once — this array of inferences from the apical structure of the PONS ought to suffice to remind each agent of inquiry of how it all hinges on the affective values that one feels and the effective acts that one does.

In principle, therefore, logic assumes a purely ancillary role in regard to the ethics of active conduct and the aesthetics of affective values. On balance, however, logic can achieve heights of abstraction, points of perspective, and summits of reflection that are otherwise unavailable to a mind embroiled in the tangle of its continuing actions and immersed in the flow of its current passions. By rising above this plain immersion in the dementias swept out by action and passion, logic can acquire the status of a handle, something an agent can use in its situation to avoid being swept along with the tide of affairs, something that keeps it from being swept up with all that the times press on it to sweep out of mind. By means of this instrument, logic affords the mind an ability to survey the passing scene in ways that it cannot hope to imagine while engaged in the engrossing business of keeping its gnosis to the grindstone, and so it becomes apt to adopt the attitude that it needs in order to become capable of reflecting on its very own actions, affects, and axioms.

File Date • 2005 Oct 06

IOS. Note 1


3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos

This Section describes an arrangement for organizing the
normative sciences, namely, aesthetics, ethics, and logic,
that I call the "pragmatically ordered normative sciences".
It presents a scheme of dependence, precedence, and oversight
orderings that I will also refer to as the "pragmatic cosmos".

This is the organization of the normative sciences that best
accords with the pragmatic approach to inquiry, incidentally
framing and introducing the order of the normative sciences
that I intend to use throughout the remainder of this work.

From this point on, whenever I speak of "the cosmology" or "the order" of
the normative sciences without further qualification, it will always be
some version of the pragmatic cosmos that I mean, all the while taking
into consideration the circumstance that the theme still leaves a lot
of room for variation in the carrying out of its live interpretation.

IOS. Note 2


3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos (cont.)

By way of making a first approach to examining the relationships
that exist among the forms of human aspiration that we exercise
in our normative practices and study in the normative sciences,
let me suggest that the study of states or things that satisfy
agents in some way is what we know most broadly as Aesthetics,
that the study of actions that lead agents toward these goals
or these goods is what we know most generally as Ethics, and
that the study of signs that indicate these actions, whether
positively or negatively, is just Logic.

Understood this way, logic involves the enumeration and the analysis of signs
with regard to their "truth", a property that makes the sense that it can only
in the light of the actions that are indicated and the objects that are desired.
In other words, logic evaluates signs with respect to the trustworthiness of the
actions that they indicate, and this means with respect to the utility that these
indications exhibit in a mediating relation to their objects.  As an appreciative
study, then, logic prizes the properties of signs that allow them to collect the
scattered actions of agents into coherent forms of conduct and that permit them
to indicate the general courses of conduct that are most likely to lead these
agents toward their established objects.

From this "pragmatic" point of view, logic is a special case of ethics,
one that is concerned with the conduct of signs, and ethics is a special
case of aesthetics, one that is interested in the good of actual conduct.

Another way to approach this perspective is to start at the "end", that is,
with the "good" of anything, and to work back through the maze of actions
and indications that lead up to it.  An action that leads to the good is
a good action, and this puts the questions of ethics among the questions
of aesthetics, as the questions that contemplate the goods of actions.
A sign that indicates a good action, that shows a good way to act, is
a good sign, and this puts the domain of logic squarely within the
domain of aesthetics.  Moreover, thinking is a sign process that
moves from signs to interpretant signs, and this makes thinking
a special kind of action.  In sum, the questions that logic
takes up in its critique of good signs and good thinking
are properly seen as special cases of aesthetic and
ethical considerations.

IOS. Note 3


3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos (cont.)

The circumstance that the domain of logic is set within the domain of ethics,
that is further set within the domain of aesthetics, does not keep the outlook
of each dominion from rising to such a height along an independent dimension or
an orthogonal direction that each keeps a watch over all of the domains that it
is set within.  In sum, then, the image is that of three cylinders that stand on
concentric bases, telescopically extending through a succession of heights, with
the narrowest mounting to the highest, and the broadest developing the most basic,
all of them rising to the contemplation of a summit that virtually completes their
perspective, as if wholly sheltered by the envelope of the cone that they jointly
support, no matter what its ultimate case may turn out to be, whether imaginary
or real, rational or transcendental.

Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics,
while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics.
By way of definition, a "monitory function" is a duty, a role, or a task
that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline,
checking the feasibility of its intentions and its indicated operations,
evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions,
and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity
of its acts in accord with its aims.  A definite attitude and particular
perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role
with any hope or measure of success.  The necessary station rises from
the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once,
and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature
within a finite creation.  Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty
needs to help the agency that is involved in the endeavor or the effort
it monitors to observe three things:  The due limits of its proper arena,
the higher considerations of its action, and the inherent constraints that
force a fallible and a finite agent to choose among the variety of available
truths, and acts, and aims.

IOS. Note 4


3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos (cont.)

Before advancing to more detailed considerations,
let us recapitulate in short order the schematism
of the "pragmatically ordered normative sciences".

Logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, cannot succeed in any
of their aims, whether they turn to contemplating the natures of the
true, the just, and the beautiful, respectively, for their own sakes,
whether they turn to speculating on the certificates, the semblances,
or the more species tokens of these goods, as they might be utilized
toward a divergent conception of their values, or whether they turn,
converting all from the one forum to the next market, and back again,
in an endless series of exchanges, not unless their prospective agents
possess the initial capital that can be supplied solely by competencies
in the corresponding intellectual virtues, and until they are willing to
risk the stakes of adequately generous overhead investments on the tender
of orders that are demanded of the bearer to fund the performance of the
associated practical disciplines, namely, those that are appropriate to
the good of signs, the good of acts, and the good of aims in themselves.

In summary, then, the domains and the disciplines of logic, ethics, and
aesthetics, in that order, are placed so aptly in regard to one another
that each one waits on the order of its own assigned watch and each one
maintains its own due monitory function with respect to all of the ones
that follow on after it.

IOS. Note 5


3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos (cont.)

Why do things have to be this way?  Why should it be necessary
to suppose an ordering, much less a pragmatic ordering, on the
commonly understood array of goods and quests?  If everyone who
reflects on the question for a sufficient spell of time tends to
agree that the Beautiful, the Just, and the True are one and the
same in the End, then why is it necessary to postulate a meantime
cosmos, and why should the pragmatic cosmos have a special appeal?

The practical necessity of some order or other and the potential of
a pragmatic order are apparently relative to a certain contingency
that affects the typical agent that we have in mind, namely, the
contingency of being a fallible and a finite creature.  Perhaps
from a "God's Eye View" (GEV), Beauty, Justice, and Truth all
amount to a single Good, the only Good that there is.  Still,
the imperfect creature is not given this outlook on the good
as its realized actuality and it cannot contain its vision
within the point of view that is proper to it.  And even
if it sees the possibility of this unity, it has no way
to actualize what it sees at once, at best being driven
to work toward its realization measure by measure, and
that is only if our limited agent is capable of reason
and reflection at all.

The imperfect agent lives in a world of seeming beauty, seeming justice,
and seeming truth.  Fortunately, the symmetry of this seeming insipidity
can break up in relation to itself, and with the loss of the objective
world's equipoise and indifference goes all of the equanimity and most
of the insouciance of the agent in question.  It happens like this:

Among the number of apparent goods and amid the manifold of good appearances,
one soon discovers that not all seeming goods are alike.  Seeming beauty is
the most seemly and the least deceptive, since it does not vitiate its own
intention in merely seeming to achieve it, and does not destroy what it
reaches for in merely seeming to grasp it.

IOS. Note 6


3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos (cont.)

Monitory functions, as a rule, tend to shade off in extreme directions,
on the one hand becoming a bit too prescriptive before the act, whether
the hopeful effects are hortatory or prohibitory, and on the other hand
becoming much too reactionary after the fact, whether the tardy effects
are exculpatory or recriminatory.  In the midst of these extremes, that
is, within the scheme of monitory functions at large, it is possible to
distinguish subtler variations in the nuances of their action that work
toward the accomplishment the same general purpose, but that achieve it
with a form of such gentle urging all throughout the continuing process
of gaining a good, that affect a promise of such laudatory rewards, and
that afford an array of incidental senses of such ongoing satisfaction,
even before, while, and after the aimed for good is effected, that this
class of moderate measures is aptly known as "advisory functions" (AF's).

In the process of noticing what is necessary and what is impossible,
and in distinguishing itself from the general run of monitory functions,
an AF is able to adapt itself to get a better grip on what is possible,
to the point that it is eventually able to make constructive suggestions
to the agent that it monitors, and thus to give advice that is both apt
and applicable, positive and practical, or usable and useful.  If this
is beginning to sound familiar, then it is not entirely an accident.
As I see it, it is from these very grounds that the facility for
"abductive simile" or the faculty of "abductive synthesis" (AS)
first arises, to wit, just on the horizon of monitory observation
and just on the advent of advisory contemplation that an agent of
inquiry, learning, and reasoning first acquires the "quasi" ability
to regard one thing just as if it were construed to be another and
to consider each thing just inasmuch as it haps to be like another.

In the abode of the monitor I thus discover the first clues I can grasp
as to how the "abductive bearing" (AB) of hypothetical reasoning can be
bound together from the primitive elements of the most uncertain states
that the mind can ever know.  To my way of thinking, this derivation of
AB's from the general conduct of monitory duties and the specific ethos
of advisory roles, all as pursuant to the PONS, seems to strike a chord
with the heart of wonder beating at the core of every agent of inquiry,
and accordingly to fashion an answer to the central query, in the words
of Wm. Shakespeare:  "Where is fancy bred?"  Beyond the responsibility
to continue driving the cycle of inquiry and to keep on circulating the
fresh communication of provisional answers, this form of speculation on
the origin of the AB points out at least one way whence these faculties
of guessing widely but guessing well can lead me from the conditions of
amazement, bewilderment, and consternation that the start of an inquiry
all but constantly finds me in.

The anchoring or the inauguration of an "abductive bearing" (AB) within
the operations of an "advisory function" (AF), and the enscouncement or
the installation of this positively constructive advisory, in its turn,
within the office of an irreducibly negative monitory function, one that
watches over the active, aesthetic, and affective aspects of experience
with an eye to the circumstance that not all goods can be actualized at
once -- this array of inferences from the apical structure of the PONS
ought to suffice to remind each agent of inquiry of how it all hinges
on the affective values that one feels and the effective acts that
one does.

IOS. Note 7


3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos (cont.)

In principle, therefore, logic assumes a purely ancillary role in regard
to the ethics of active conduct and the aesthetics of affective values.
On balance, however, logic can achieve heights of abstraction, points of
perspective, and summits of reflection that are otherwise unavailable to
a mind embroiled in the tangle of its continuing actions and immersed in
the flow of its current passions.  By rising above this plain immersion
in the dementias swept out by action and passion, logic can acquire the
status of a handle, something an agent can use in its situation to avoid
being swept along with the tide of affairs, something that keeps it from
being swept up with all that the times press on it to sweep out of mind.
By means of this instrument, logic affords the mind an ability to survey
the passing scene in ways that it cannot hope to imagine while engaged in
the engrossing business of keeping its gnosis to the grindstone, and so it
becomes apt to adopt the attitude that it needs in order to become capable
of reflecting on its very own actions, affects, and axioms.

IOS. Note 8


3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos (concl.)

o-------------------------------------------------o
|                                                 |
|                        o                        |
|                       / \                       |
|                      /   \                      |
|                     /     \                     |
|                    o-------o                    |
|                   /| Logic |\                   |
|                  / |       | \                  |
|                 /  |       |  \                 |
|                o---------------o                |
|               /|   | Ethic |   |\               |
|              / |   |       |   | \              |
|             /  |   |       |   |  \             |
|            o-----------------------o            |
|           /|   |   Aesthetic   |   |\           |
|          / |   |   |       |   |   | \          |
|         /  |   |   |       |   |   |  \         |
|        o---o---o---o-------o---o---o---o        |
|                                                 |
o-------------------------------------------------o
Figure 1.  The Pragmatic Cosmos

Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the Pragmatic Cosmos,
or the pragmatically ordered normative sciences:  Aesthetics, Ethics, and
Logic.  The arrangement is best viewed as a planar projection of a solid
geometric configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases,
all subtending an overarching cone.  This way of viewing the situation
brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal order relations
that exist among the normative sciences.  In regard to their bases,
logic is a special case of ethics and aesthetics, and ethics is
a special case of aesthetics, understanding these concepts in
their broadest senses.  In respect of their altitudes, logic
exercises a critical perspective on ethics and aesthetics,
and ethics takes up a critical perspective on aesthetics.

2012 • The Pragmatic Cosmos • Discussion

2012 • Discussion Note 1


I found the figure that I used to draw by way of explaining
what I called the “pragmatic ordering of normative sciences”.

Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos
At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html

o-------------------------------------------------o
|                                                 |
|                        o                        |
|                       / \                       |
|                      /   \                      |
|                     /     \                     |
|                    o-------o                    |
|                   /| Logic |\                   |
|                  / |       | \                  |
|                 /  |       |  \                 |
|                o---------------o                |
|               /|   | Ethic |   |\               |
|              / |   |       |   | \              |
|             /  |   |       |   |  \             |
|            o-----------------------o            |
|           /|   |   Aesthetic   |   |\           |
|          / |   |   |       |   |   | \          |
|         /  |   |   |       |   |   |  \         |
|        o---o---o---o-------o---o---o---o        |
|                                                 |
o-------------------------------------------------o
Figure 1.  The Pragmatic Cosmos

Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the Pragmatic Cosmos,
or the pragmatically ordered normative sciences:  Aesthetics, Ethics, and
Logic.  The arrangement is best viewed as a planar projection of a solid
geometric configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases,
all subtending an overarching cone.  This way of viewing the situation
brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal order relations
that exist among the normative sciences.  In regard to their bases,
logic is a special case of ethics and aesthetics, and ethics is
a special case of aesthetics, understanding these concepts in
their broadest senses.  In respect of their altitudes, logic
exercises a critical perspective on ethics and aesthetics,
and ethics exercises a critical perspective on aesthetics.

Yet another attack of synchronicity -- I just now happened to be working on the markup of
some old work and I ran across this bit where I was trying to puzzle out a sensible picture
of how the normative sciences fit together within a pragmatic perspective on their objects.

| Questions about the good of something, and what must be done to get it,
| and what shows the way to do it, belong to the normative sciences of
| aesthetics, ethics, and logic, respectively.
|
} Aesthetic knowledge is a creature's most basic sense
| of what is good or bad for it, as signaled by the
| experiential features of pleasure or pain,
| respectively.
|
| Ethical knowledge deals with the courses of action
| and patterns of conduct that lead to these ends.
|
| Logical knowledge begins from the remoter signs
| of what actions are true and false to their ends,
| and derives the necessary consequences indicated by
| combinations of signs.
|
| In pragmatic thought, the normative disciplines can be imagined as three
| concentric cylinders resting on their bases, increasing in height as they
| narrow, from aesthetics to ethics to logic, in that order.  Considered with
| regard to the plane of their experiential bases, logic is subsumed by ethics,
| which is subsumed by aesthetics.  And yet, in another sense, logic affords
| a perspective on ethics, while ethics affords a perspective on aesthetics.
|
| http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_6#6.2._A_Candid_Point_of_View

2012 • Discussion Note 2


Re: Frances Kelly
At: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8051

I hadn't been expecting to untangle their complex inter-relationships and
mutual dependencies in a single fixed hierarchy -- something more like the
Vortices of Yeats comes to mind even at a first glance, except it would take
a trio of tornadoes in this case -- and things that are ordered one way under
one light may be ordered another way under another light.  The problem that
Peirce gives us is how to understand the way in which logic might be seen
as a special case of ethics and ethics might be seen as a special case of
aesthetics, all without denying the obvious applications of each form of
inquiry to all the others.

Here's another bunch of bits I emitted on this subject:

• http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_5#5.2.10._The_Pragmatic_Cosmos

I apologize for the style of writing in that material --
those are things I wrote 1 or 2 decades ago and it will
take 2 or 3 passes before I can extract the substance in
any tolerable form.

2012 • Discussion Note 3


Peircers,

Here's another prospectus on normative inquiry that I wrote up in September 1992.

Prospects For Inquiry Driven Systems

1.3.1. Logic, Ethics, Esthetics

The philosophy I find myself converging to more often lately is the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. According to this account, logic, ethics, and esthetics form a concentric series of normative sciences, each a subdiscipline of the next. Logic tells how one ought to conduct one's reasoning in order to achieve the stated goals of reasoning in general. Thus logic is a special application of ethics. Ethics tells how one ought to conduct one's activities in general in order to achieve the good appropriate to each enterprise. What makes the difference between a normative science and a prescriptive dogma is whether this "telling" is based on actual inquiry into the relationship of conduct to result, or not.

In this view, logic and ethics do not set goals, they merely serve them. Of course, logic may examine the consistency of an arbitrary selection of goals in the light of what science tells about the likely repercussions in nature of trying to actualize them all. Logic and ethics may serve the criticism of certain goals by pointing out the deductive implications and probable effects of striving toward them, but it has to be some other science which finds and tells whether these effects are preferred and encouraged or detested and discouraged relative to a particular form of being.

The science which examines individual goods, species goods, and generic goods from an outside perspective must be an esthetic science. The capacity for inquiry into a subject must depend on the capacity for uncertainty about that subject. Esthetics is capable of inquiry into the nature of the good precisely because it is able to be in question about what is good. Whether conceived as empirical science or as experimental art, it is the job of esthetics to determine what might be good for us. Through the exploration of artistic media we find out what satisfies our own form of being. Through the expeditions of science we discover and further the goals of own species' evolution.

Outriggers to these excursions are given by the comparative study of biological species and the computational study of abstractly specified systems. These provide extra ways to find out what is the sensible goal of an individual system and what is the perceived good for a particular species of creature. It is especially interesting to learn about the relationships that can be represented internally to a system's development between the good of a system and the system's perception, knowledge, intuition, feeling, or whatever sense it may have of its goal. This amounts to asking the questions: What good can a system be able to sense for itself? How can a system discover its own best interests? How can a system achieve, from the evidence of experience, a cognizance, evidenced in behavior, of its own best interests?

• http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Essays/Prospects_For_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#1.3.1._Logic.2C_Ethics.2C_Esthetics

2017 • Pragmatic Cosmos • Discussion

2017 • Discussion Note 1


Here's a recent recitation of one of my oldest meditations
that I just ran across and thought it fit nicely into the
discussion of JAS's Logic of Ingenuity.

Pragmatic Cosmos • 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/06/09/pragmatic-cosmos-%e2%80%a2-1/

Re: Michael Harris • Not About Fibonacci
https://mathematicswithoutapologies.wordpress.com/about-the-author/
https://mathematicswithoutapologies.wordpress.com/2016/06/09/not-about-fibonacci/

I have often reflected on the interminglings of the main three
normative sciences.  In one of my earliest meditations I saw
Beauty, Goodness, and Truth as the intersecting circles of
a Venn diagram, with the summum bonum the central cell.

As far as our ability to approach our object from our origin
without, perfect knowledge of the Good would require us to
know all the consequences of our contemplated actions while
perfect knowledge of the True would require us to know all
the axiom sets that never beget a contradiction.  As far as
I could tell, and as far as I could see deciding with the
empirical tests and theorem provers I could morally and
mathematically envision devising, these two tasks exceed
the talents of mortal humans and all their technological
extensions.

But when it comes to Beauty, our form of being appears to have
an inborn sense to guide us on our quest to the highest good.
That way through beauty to our ultimate goal I called the
human-hearted path.

Document History

2003 • Inquiry List • Inquiry Oriented Systems

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20141229181203/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000870.html
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20141229181400/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000882.html

2003 • Inquiry List • The Pragmatic Cosmos

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20141229181204/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000871.html
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010145/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000873.html
  3. http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010251/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000875.html
  4. http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010047/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000876.html
  5. http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010237/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000877.html
  6. http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010211/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000878.html

2003 • Inquiry List • The Pragmatic Cosmos • Expository Notes

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20141230055000/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html

2003 • Inquiry List • The Pragmatic Cosmos • Precursory Notes

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20141230055001/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000881.html

2003 • Inquiry List • The Pragmatic Cosmos • Revisatory Notes

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20141229181401/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000883.html
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010234/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000885.html
  3. http://web.archive.org/web/20070317163617/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000887.html
  4. http://web.archive.org/web/20070313091137/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000888.html
  5. http://web.archive.org/web/20070308085804/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000889.html

2004 • Inquiry List • Inquiry Oriented Systems • The Pragmatic Cosmos

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20150202173621/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-February/001112.html
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20141230051016/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-February/001113.html
  3. http://web.archive.org/web/20061013234723/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-February/001114.html
  4. http://web.archive.org/web/20061013234819/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-February/001115.html
  5. http://web.archive.org/web/20061013235305/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-February/001116.html
  6. http://web.archive.org/web/20061013235337/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-February/001117.html
  7. http://web.archive.org/web/20061013234744/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-February/001118.html
  8. http://web.archive.org/web/20141230052020/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-February/001119.html

2004 • Ontology List • Inquiry Oriented Systems • The Pragmatic Cosmos

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302154925/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05337.html
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302154935/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05338.html
  3. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302154945/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05339.html
  4. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302154955/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05340.html
  5. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302155005/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05341.html
  6. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302155015/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05342.html
  7. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302155025/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05343.html
  8. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302155036/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05344.html

2012 • Inquiry List • The Pragmatic Cosmos • Discussion

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20141230161000/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2012-March/003829.html
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20141230161001/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2012-March/003830.html
  3. http://web.archive.org/web/20141230171001/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2012-March/003831.html

2012 • Peirce List • The Pragmatic Cosmos • Discussion

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20141230160000/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8048
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190033/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8049
  3. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190105/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8051
  4. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190124/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8052
  5. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190142/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8053
  6. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190202/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8054
  7. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190219/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8055
  8. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190357/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8059
  9. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190443/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8061
  10. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190458/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8062
  11. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190517/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8063
  12. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190536/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8064
  13. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190556/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8065
  14. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190613/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8066
  15. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190629/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8067
  16. http://web.archive.org/web/20131214190655/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8068

2014 • Peirce List • Pragmatic Cosmos • Discussion

⌑⌑⌑ http://web.archive.org/web/20150302154431/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15211
⌑⌑⌑ http://web.archive.org/web/20160109040001/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15235
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20150302154400/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15211
JBD http://web.archive.org/web/20141222173112/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15230
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141222232041/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15235
SJ http://web.archive.org/web/20141223043244/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15236
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141223043401/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15237
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141223043439/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15238
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141223170003/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15239
HR http://web.archive.org/web/20141223231016/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15240
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141223230804/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15241
HR http://web.archive.org/web/20141226175017/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15243
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141226173402/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15244
HR http://web.archive.org/web/20141227032005/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15246
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141227043001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15252
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410110000/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15256
ET http://web.archive.org/web/20170410123000/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15257
HR http://web.archive.org/web/20141230170007/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15260
HR http://web.archive.org/web/20141230165851/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15261
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410111600/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15263
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410112000/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15264
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410112200/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15265
ET http://web.archive.org/web/20170410121801/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15266
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410122000/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15267
SJ http://web.archive.org/web/20141229051219/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15268
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410112400/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15269
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410113000/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15270
ET http://web.archive.org/web/20170410115500/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15271
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410120030/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15272
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20170410114000/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15273
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20150102004828/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15276
SJ http://web.archive.org/web/20141229185001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15278
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141230043005/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15279
GM http://web.archive.org/web/20141230153616/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15282
ET http://web.archive.org/web/20141230153648/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15283
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141230180002/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15285
HR http://web.archive.org/web/20150101164006/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15290
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20141231210002/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15291
EFB http://web.archive.org/web/20150101161059/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15292
JA http://web.archive.org/web/20150102184802/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15293

2015 • Inquiry List • Pragmatic Cosmos • Discussion

  1. http://web.archive.org/web/20150201150201/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004311.html
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20150201150203/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004312.html
  3. http://web.archive.org/web/20150106044536/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004313.html
  4. http://web.archive.org/web/20150114194405/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004314.html
  5. http://web.archive.org/web/20150114194000/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004315.html
  6. http://web.archive.org/web/20150114194435/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004316.html
  7. http://web.archive.org/web/20150114194500/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004317.html
  8. http://web.archive.org/web/20150114194517/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004318.html
  9. http://web.archive.org/web/20150114170226/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004319.html
  10. http://web.archive.org/web/20150114200002/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004320.html
  11. http://web.archive.org/web/20150114193058/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004321.html
  12. http://web.archive.org/web/20150201150248/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2015-January/004322.html

2017 • Peirce List • Pragmatic Cosmos • Discussion

JA https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00062.html
JFS https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00064.html