Genealogies of the Global

Mike Featherstone

Abstract

The term global suggests all-inclusiveness and brings to mind connectivity, a notion that gained a boost from Marshall McLuhan’s reference to the mass-mediated ‘global village’. In the past decade it has rapidly become part of the everyday vocabulary not only of academics and business people, but also has circulated widely in the media in various parts of the world. There have also been the beginnings of political movements against globalization and proposals for ‘de-globalization’ and ‘alternative globalizations’, projects to re-define the global. In effect, the terminology has globalized and globalization is varyingly lauded, reviled and debated around the world. The rationale of much previous thinking on humanity in the social sciences has been to assume a linear process of social integration, as more and more people are drawn into a widening circle of interdependencies in the movement to larger units, but the new forms of binding together of social life necessitate the development of new forms of global knowledge which go beyond the old classifications. It is also in this sense that the tightening of the interdependency chains between human beings, and also between human beings and other life forms, suggests we need to think about the relevance of academic knowledge to the emergent global public sphere.

Key words classification, culture, economics, global, globalization, integration, social life, social sciences, technology

The term ‘global’ suggests all-inclusiveness, along with a certain finitude and limit. It brings to mind connectivity, that space has somehow been shrunk, as we find in the popular phrase ‘we are all in each other’s back yard’. This is something which was represented for the first time in the photographs of the Earth from space in the 1960s. Planet Earth, the small blue and green globe set amidst the vastness of space, captured a certain sense of vulnerability – a reversal of thinking about the scale of our world. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the current meaning of the term global emerged in references to global trade in the 1920s and global war in the 1940s and 1950s (long-range American B-36s carrying the atom bomb were described as ‘global bombers’). The term gained a boost from Marshall McLuhan’s (1962) graphic reference to the mass-mediated ‘global village’. In the 1960s, we also have the first use of the term globalization in the context of the economy and business. The earliest sustained academic discussion of the globalization of markets seems to have been a paper by Theodore Levitt published in the Harvard Business Review in 1983 (Dicken, 1998). In sociology, Roland Robertson (1992) was one of the first to use the term in articles published in 1985. By the early 1990s the term globalization was very much on the increase, and it had migrated into mainstream academic usage. In the past decade it has rapidly become part of the everyday vocabulary not only of academics and business people, but has circulated widely in the media in various parts of the world. It is in this decade that we find assertions that we now live in ‘globality’, a new ‘global age’. There have also been the beginnings of political movements against globalization and proposals for ‘de-globalization’ and ‘alternative globalizations’, projects to redefine the global. In effect, the terminology has globalized and globalization is varyingly lauded, reviled and debated around the world.
The global is often counter-posed to the local, to suggest that the potential to influence and communicate with people in other localities has increased exponentially. People become bound together in longer chains of interdependencies and have great potential to communicate with and influence each other, depending upon their resources and capital. In effect, people’s frame of reference becomes larger, as their reference group of regular contacts becomes more extensive. Ultimately there is the technical potential to communicate with every member of humanity and survey life in every corner of the planet. The potential scope of action becomes global. Whether or not this leads to global integration – to a new level of social life in which more and more people interact with others around the world through new communications systems – is a different question. This is dependent upon the power resources and projects of different groups of people. Not least on the shifting power balance between those groups who have the resources to communicate and those who do not, and those who can engage in extensive surveillance, information gathering and storage and those who cannot. If we pose the question in this way, we can see that globalization processes can lead to various types of global integration and de-globalizing reactions, to the extent that we cannot presume a single outcome.

Yet the rationale of much previous thinking about humanity in the social sciences has been to assume a linear process of social integration, as more and more people are drawn into a widening circle of interdependencies in the movement to larger units: from families to bands, to tribes to regions, to nations, to states and eventually to the world or global level of social organization. In this sense the global is conceived as a limit, a final stage in the integration of humanity. Yet it is easy here to fall into a teleological narrative with human social life conceived as moving from tradition to modernity, to globalized modernity or globality. This approach misses the non-linearity of the process of global integration and the potential for it to have unfolded in different ways. It over-emphasizes the uniqueness of the current phase of globalization and misses earlier phases such as the one which occurred in the late 19th century and ended with the First World War in 1914, in which foreign direct investment was high, along with world trade, leading to the movement of a vast array of products around the world (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Briggs and Snowman, 1996; cf. the popularity of World Fairs at this time, Simmel, 1997); information also moved via a telegraph cable network, and the percentage of the world population migrating was larger than in the current phase of globalization (Friedman, 2004). It also misses the location of knowledge and the interests and power potential of those who formulate the global narratives of progress. Here we think of the various proto-globalizing processes which emerged outside the West at various times usually to be discounted, but which now are being subjected to investigation, and wonder why there was the shift in frame of reference.

A shift in the global balance of power away from the West to Asia would potentially involve different accounts of global integration which could challenge Western narratives and provide the economic and symbolic capital to stimulate systematic research to develop alternative versions. We are already seeing the beginnings of this process with critiques of Eurocentric accounts of the emergence of the modern world system such as Wallerstein’s. André GUNDER Frank, for example, asks us to think back much further and consider that the system of world trade goes back not just 500 years but 5000 years, and to acknowledge the centrality of China in this process prior to what he startlingly refers, to as the ‘Western interlude’ (Frank, 1998; see also Pomeranz, 2000). The challenge is for us to think through what has been termed ‘oriental globalization’ (Nederveen Pieterse, Hobson, this issue). This is a view of global history in which Asia and the Middle East are seen as central to the development of a global economy, standing in sharp contrast to Weberian and Marxist accounts of the Western origins of a dynamic capitalism and modernity with their depiction of an ossified static Asia. Global history takes its impetus from this challenge to contest a diffusionist model in which the significant changes were produced in one place (Western Europe), and needs to think historical processes in a relational spatial dynamic. This goes beyond the idea of the history of societies or states, or their inter-societal or international relations, or the idea of history driven by a master process.
such as capitalism or modernization which spreads out from a (Western) centre, in favour of
the focus on a complex assemblage which operates on a number of levels.

If the shifting balance of global power can give rise to an oriental globalization literature
which disputes Western-centric theories and asks for a rewriting of history in a more relational
and less linear way, then there are clear implications for knowledge, not just of the past, but
also of the present phase of globalization. If globalization points to the process of the integra-
tion of the world (often characterized in terms of space–time compression) and the increased
consciousness of this process, then it should also give rise to emergent dimensions of social
life, new social phenomena, which can challenge existing modes of conceptualization in the
social sciences and humanities. It is this aspect which has captured the attention of Ulrich
Beck (2002), who argues that we need a massive shift in our frame of reference to accom-
pany globalization: if our object is no longer the nation-state society but the global, then we
need a new epistemology to accompany this ontological shift.

Some academics are demanding that we globalize our courses, yet if we want to move
beyond a ragbag global studies, the problems of selectivity of content (what do we put in?,
what dare we leave out?) and the generation of new concepts have to be addressed. To consider
globalization in terms of intensified flows of people, goods, money, information, images and
technology (Appadurai, 1990) is a start, but we need to build on this inchoate image of flows
to conceptualize the structures, barriers, and regulatory mechanisms within which things move,
as well. Hence there is currently a good deal of interest in mapping the global economic, social,
cultural, political and military emergent ‘dimensions’. In practice, it is of course difficult to
separate these aspects of social life when we focus on lived practices and the generation of
culture – we also need to be aware of the history of the formation of these allegedly differ-
entiated ‘spheres’ of social life and the practices and disciplines that administer them (Feather-
stone, 1995). Clearly, in the current phase of globalization, the economy has been the dominant
integrative force, but this is not to say that social, cultural and political ‘factors’ follow on
meekly, or that culture and politics are merely defensive de-globalizing reactions. Indeed, it
may well be the case that an active sphere of global public life is in the process of forming,
a space in which many conflictual images of the globe battle with each other over the emergent
consciousness of a new global ontology based around the vulnerable planet Earth, the
binding together of not just humanity, but life in general in a common fate and the
possibility/impossibility of human intervention.

Globalization as a set of economic processes gathered pace with the neo-liberal deregu-
lation of markets in the late 1980s. Indeed, marketization is often seen in the popular imagin-
ation as the defining characteristic of globalization: the ease with which capital investment
can flow around the world to the most profitable (i.e. cheapest) labour markets – what
Bauman (2000) refers to as ‘liquid modernity’. But we should not see this process as signalling
the eclipse of nation-state power, the replacement of the modern nation-state system which
has been dominant since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, by a totally ‘borderless economy’
(Ohmae, 1987). Rather, economic deregulation is also accompanied by re-regulation, by a
raft of institution-building and legislation designed to give greater ‘sovereignty to the markets’
(Hardt and Negri, 2000; Ong, 2000; Sassen, 2000). It also depends on new infrastructures
to sustain the flows of money and goods. Here we think of not just the new information tech-
nologies, the electronic networks such as the Internet and intranets, telephone systems and
video-conference links, which increase the scope and speed of activities to permit 24-hour
trading and the coordination of transnational corporations. Equally crucial are the new
social infrastructures in the network of global cities: not just stock exchanges, corporate
headquarters and INGO (international non-governmental organization) offices, but the work
and leisure spaces for face-to-face encounters involving people who work in these places along
with specialist business and management service professionals, the experts and intermedi-
aries working in communications and culture industries. If there is globalization of the
economy, we need to ask where are its effects most clearly manifest in terms of creating new
forms of social relationships and practices. The various tiers of global cities linked together
in a vast reference group provide not only command and coordination centres (the network nodes), but also the spaces for business and corporation people and specialists in the new middle class to jet in for face-to-face meetings. These cities, as Sassen (2000) and others emphasize, also attract another set of migrants, the mobile lower-class service workers and cleaners (largely women) who develop their own vernacular cosmopolitan networks (Werbner, 2006).

Economic globalization, then, gives rise to new economic and social forms and modes of connectivity which, in the current neo-liberal phase, is transforming social structures and generating new inequalities; the new mobile global elites (or ‘transnational class’ who enjoy ‘Davos culture’) along with their business, professional, knowledge specialist and culture industry, the new middle-class counterparts, are effective global winners. A sharp contrast to the many workers in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors who remain rooted in place, who have seen their incomes and life chances eroded. Yet the plight of such groups of ‘global losers’ is beginning to throw up and net together (often using new information technologies) activists and sympathizers to develop counter-globalization movements. In effect, a complex global dynamic is emerging which produces a new unstable field, which we are struggling to map. This process is generating a new patchwork of inequalities, pushing us beyond the existing terminology, such as ‘the West and the rest’ and ‘the North and the South’.

In the West, the images of mobility in the media (global music, sport and news from around the world), the accessibility of the Internet and the increasing availability of food and consumer goods from all around the world in the supermarkets and shopping centres, create a sense that there is an emerging global culture. Yet this is often the banal cosmopolitanism of consumer culture, as opposed to a distinctive set of worked through value commitments. Indeed, the latter sense of culture, that a global culture should be somehow equivalent to the culture of the nation-state writ large, is a limited figure on a number of counts. It misses the ways in which national cultures were actively formed in the ‘in-group/out-group’ competing nation-state system, something which has little prospect of being paralleled on a global level, save the potential integration and construction/imposition of a particular set of values, in the wake of planetary ecological disaster.

There is the same problem for those who seek to equate the globalization of culture with Americanization. There is of course a good deal of evidence cited for Coca-Cola-ization, Disneyfication and McDonaldization, and these and other consumer culture brands and icons are visible in the consumer mediascapes around the world. We could also cite the increasing use of (American) English and forms of organization in business law and business practices, education, the Internet, etc. Yet, there are many counter-tendencies, such as the emergence of China, with its own diasporic and global communications circuits, such as finance, media and the Internet. Also noticeable is the development of new regional circuits, as we find with the success of Japanese media and culture in East and South-east Asia (pop music, television dramas, anime, Pokémon, etc.). Many of these cultural forms have reworked American popular cultural themes, but within modern Asian contexts (Iwabuchi, 2002). In addition to the enlarged transnational regional audiences, there are also a range of religious and other cultural movements which originated or have been sustained outside the West (Sai Baba, Hare Krishna, Tzu-Chi, Soka Gakkai, Opus Dei et al.) (Berger, 2002).

An emergent global culture, then, can be seen as being far from the culture of the nation-state writ large, despite various globalization projects arising from nation-states, or cultural and religious movements, to provide an all-embracing integrative culture. Rather, it is better to conceive global culture as a field in which many cultural forms are announced, accumulate, and collide. There is more cultural work going on today, which seeks to expand the circle of addressees and rethink the communal, audience or market relevance of cultural goods and media information. If globalization can be seen as a series of interlinked processes which are generating new forms of social life, then the impetus initially came from economic processes. But it has spread into the social and cultural arenas, not least in providing us all with more cultural work in understanding the others with whom we come into contact, along with the
varying levels of construction and sedimentation of new conventions and habitual modes of interaction and communication.

There is also a fourth major social process, politics, to be considered. Here we need to think beyond existing international politics and the constraints on many international non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations, to structure global dialogues via people who are exclusively stamped as representatives of nation-states. There is an intensification of global politics from below, some building upon the work of international peace and solidarity movements and other INGOs that seek to construct new forms of human solidarity, global peace, inter-faith religious ecumenism or planetary life solidarity (in addition to the current wave of ‘third culture’ institution building, it should be remembered that there was also a significant increase in this type of activity in the years leading up to the First World War; see Boli and Thomas, 1999).

Yet the current phase differs to the extent that an important dimension of global politics is the development of a global civil society. The anti-globalization protests in Seattle in 1999, and Cancún in 2003, suggest not only a defensive protest against economic globalization with its WTO-inspired punitive regimes of destruction of livelihood through the opening up of agriculture outside the West to the global market, but also a process of formation. The World Social Forum (initially conceived as a reaction to the neo-liberal global elite club, the World Economic Forum) has held various meetings in Porto Alegre from 2001 onwards, and a major congress in Mumbai in 2004, along with a range of regional assemblies. It is an emergent hybrid form which is engaged in discussions and network-building to work out the agenda for an alternative globalization, under the ambitious promise that ‘another world is possible’. The aim is an intervention for the formation of a global civil society, which provides the basis for rethinking global democracy and citizenship. Indeed, something which could well involve syncretisms from different globalizing traditions (the ummah and ahimsa and not just European human rights). This process seeks to establish a new form of sovereignty which counters the sovereignty of the global markets and military force.

Military globalization is rarely talked about in the same context as economic, social, cultural and political globalization processes. Yet there is clearly a binding together and potential governmental disciplining of the people of the world through military force and technologies with their capacity for comprehensive global satellite surveillance and missile and weapon system targeting. This process of military globalization gave rise to the Internet and a host of other technologies which incorporate speed of delivery, scope of action and flexibility of response. As the power potential of economic and military globalization increases, there are those who see this as facilitating the global Empire, a new supranational form of sovereignty from above, which redefines the scope of action of nation-states. In effect, for Hardt and Negri (2000, 2005), we are moving into a new global era in which the US-defined state of emergency has the potential to undermine international law and define all wars as civil wars, or policing operations, under the new supranational umbrella, as war becomes a permanent part of biopower, or social reproduction.

Yet before we concede to the globalitarian bad dream of total surveillance and control, we should refer to Karin Knorr Cetina’s (2005) recent discussion of global terrorism which suggests that the formation of world society may turn out not to be at all as people have envisaged and also casts doubt on the efficacy of social intervention, either for good or ill. Knorr Cetina points to the ways in which the new global terrorism can exemplify complexity by highlighting the major imbalances between cause and effect, unpredictable outcomes, and self-organizing, emergent structures. This contrasts with the earlier dreams of social science producing general explanations and the achievement of expert control. The management of uncertainty, task predictability and orderly performances were much easier to facilitate in the ‘relatively complex’ organizations of modern industrial societies. A global society, on the other hand, entails a different form of complexity: one emanating more from micro-structural arrangements that institute self-organizing principles and patterns. One of her most telling observations is that this new pattern of complexity is found both in the global
markets and global terrorism, and in either case is exceedingly difficult to predict and control.

This point has important implications for global knowledge and the development of a global public sphere. As we seek to grapple with a new level of social life and the emergent global economic, social, cultural, political and military ‘objects’ and process, it is clear that our existing modes of analyses, often formulated with bounded-state societies, or working off simple games models involving one or two parties, are no longer adequate. Barbara Adam (1999) in her discussion of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear explosion argues that it challenges our classical theoretical framework. She argues it could only be understood via a new approach which went beyond the traditional separation of disciplines to take into account the intermeshing of natural and social processes. There is also the need to go beyond the traditional focus upon intra-societal processes, with the need to make sense of a complex network which linked together a nuclear explosion, weather patterns, milk production, radiated babies and the overseas aid ‘gifts’ of the British government. It is in this sense that the new forms of binding together of social life necessitate the development of new forms of global knowledge which go beyond the old classifications. It is also in this sense that the tightening of the interdependency chains between human beings, and also between human beings and other life forms on planet Earth, suggests we need to start to think about the relevance of academic knowledge to the emergent global public sphere.

References


Globalizations

Boaventura de Sousa Santos

Abstract What is generally called globalization is a vast social field in which hegemonic or dominant social groups, states, interests and ideologies collide with counter-hegemonic or subordinate social groups, states, interests and ideologies on a world scale. Even the hegemonic camp is fraught with conflicts, but over and above them, there is a basic consensus among its most influential members (in political terms, the G-7). It is this consensus that confers on globalization its dominant characteristics. The counter-hegemonic or subordinate production of globalization is what is called insurgent cosmopolitanism. It consists of the transnationally organized resistance against the unequal exchanges produced or intensified by globalized localisms and localized globalisms.

Key words counter-hegemony, emancipation, globalization, social movements, utopia, World Social Forum

Introduction

In the past three decades transnational interactions have intensified dramatically, from the production systems and financial transfers to the worldwide dissemination of information and images through the media, or the mass movements of people, whether as tourists or migrant workers or refugees. The extraordinary range and depth of these transnational interactions have led social scientists and politicians to view them as a rupture with previous forms of cross-border interactions, a new phenomena termed ‘globalization’. The term ‘global’ today is used to refer both to the processes and to the results of globalization.

Whether new or old, the processes of globalization are a multifaceted phenomenon with economic, social, political, cultural, religious and legal dimensions, all interlinked in a complex fashion. Strangely enough, globalization seems to combine universality and the elimination of national borders, on the one hand, with rising particularity, local diversity, ethnic identity and a return to communitarian values, on the other. In other words, globalization appears to be the other side of localization, and vice versa. Moreover, it seems to be related to a vast array of transformations across the globe, such as the dramatic rise in inequality between rich and poor countries and between the rich and the poor in each country, environmental disasters, ethnic conflicts, international mass migration, the emergence of new states and the collapse or decline of others, the proliferation of civil wars, ethnic cleansing, globally organized crime, formal democracy as a political condition for international aid, terrorism, and militarism, etc.
The debates on globalization have centered around the following questions: (1) is globalization a new or an old phenomenon?; (2) is globalization monolithic or does it have different political meanings and both positive and negative aspects?; (3) is it as important in the social, political and cultural domains as it is in the economic domain?; and (4) assuming that globalization is intensifying, where is it leading, what is the future of national societies, economies, polities and cultures? These debates have been showing that what is generally called globalization is a vast social field in which hegemonic or dominant social groups, states, interests and ideologies collide with counter-hegemonic or subordinate social groups, states, interests and ideologies on a world scale (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003; Sen et al., 2004). Even the hegemonic camp is fraught with conflicts, but over and above them there is a basic consensus among its most influential members (in political terms, the G-7). It is this consensus that confers on globalization its dominant characteristics. Just as with the concepts that preceded it, such as modernization and development, the concept of globalization contains both a descriptive and a prescriptive component. The prescription is, in a vast set of prescriptions, all anchored in the hegemonic consensus. This consensus is known as the ‘neoliberal consensus’ or the ‘Washington consensus’, since it was in Washington in the mid-1980s that the core capitalist states in the world system subscribed to it, and it covers a vast set of domains (world economy, social policies, state–civil society relations, international relations). This consensus has weakened in recent years by virtue of both the rising conflicts within the hegemonic camp and resistance from social movements and progressive NGOs around the world (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003). However, it is this agreement that has brought us to where we are today and for that reason deserves to be analysed. The Washington consensus encompasses four major issues: (1) the consensus of the liberal (or rather, neoliberal) economy; (2) the consensus of the weak state; (3) the consensus of liberal democracy; and (4) the consensus of the primacy of the rule of law and the judicial system.

The consensus of the neoliberal economy states that national economies must open themselves up to the world market, and domestic prices must be accommodated to international prices; priority must be given to the export sector; monetary and fiscal policies must be guided towards a reduction in inflation; the rights of private property must be effectively and internationally protected; the entrepreneurial sector of the state must be privatized; there must be free mobility of resources (except labor), investments and profits; state regulation of the economy must be minimal; social policies must be a low priority in the state budget, no longer universally applied but rather implemented as compensatory measures for means-tested, vulnerable social strata.

The consensus of the weak state is based on the idea that the state, rather than being the mirror of civil society, is its opposite and potentially its enemy. The state inherently oppresses and limits civil society, and only by reducing its size is it possible to reduce its harmful effects and thus strengthen civil society. Hence, the weak state tends also to be a minimal state.

According to the consensus of liberal democracy, civic and political rights have an absolute priority over social and economic rights. Free elections and free markets are two sides of the same coin: the common good achieved through the actions of utilitarian individuals involved in competitive exchanges with the minimum of state interference.

Finally, the consensus of the primacy of the rule of law and the judicial system establishes the need for a new legal framework suited to the regulatory needs of the new economic and social model based on privatization, liberalization, and market relations. Property rights and contractual obligations must be guaranteed by the law and the judicial system, conceived of as independent and universal mechanisms that create standard expectations for businesses and consumers and resolve litigation through legal frameworks which are presumed to be accepted by everyone.

The different consensuses share a core idea that constitutes a kind of meta-consensus. This central idea is that we are entering a period in which deep political rifts are disappearing. The imperialist rivalries between the hegemonic countries, which in the 20th century had provoked two world wars, have disappeared, giving rise to interdependence between the great powers,
cooperation and regional integration. Nowadays only small wars exist, many of which are of low intensity and almost always on the periphery of the world system. In any case, the core countries, through various mechanisms (selective military intervention, manipulation of international aid, control of multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), have the means to keep these focuses for instability under control (Patomäki and Teivainen, 2005). Moreover, conflicts between capital and labor are being relatively de-institutionalized without causing any instability, since labor has, in the meantime, become a global resource and no institutionalized global labor market still exists or ever will exist. The idea that rifts between the different models of social transformation are disappearing also forms part of this meta-consensus. The first three-quarters of the 20th century were dominated by rivalries between two antagonistic models: revolution and reformism. If, on the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall meant the end of the revolutionary paradigm, the crisis of the welfare state in the developed countries and of the developmentalist state in the developing countries means that the reformist paradigm is equally condemned. In the face of this, social transformation is, from now on, no longer a political question but a technical question. The idea of the end of history is the extreme manifestation of this meta-consensus.

Moving from the descriptive/prescriptive level to the analytical level, it becomes evident that the dominant characteristics of globalization are the characteristics of the dominant or hegemonic globalization. Therefore, a crucial distinction must be made between hegemonic globalization and counter-hegemonic globalization.

The Nature of Globalizations

The idea of globalization, as a linear, homogenizing and irreversible phenomenon, although false, is prevalent nowadays, and tends to be all the more so as we move from scientific discourse into political discourse and everyday talk. Apparently transparent and without complexity, the idea of globalization masks more than it reveals of what is happening in the world. And what it masks or hides is, when viewed from a different perspective, so important that the transparency and simplicity of the idea of globalization, far from being innocent, must be considered an ideological and political move. Two motives for such a move should be stressed. The first is what we could call the determinist fallacy. It consists of inculcating the idea that globalization is a spontaneous, automatic, unavoidable and irreversible process which intensifies and advances according to an inner logic and dynamism strong enough to impose themselves on any external interferences. The fallacy consists in transforming the causes of globalization into its effects, obscuring the fact that globalization results from a set of political decisions which are identifiable in time and space, as mentioned above. The second political motive is the fallacy of the disappearance of the South. Whether at a financial level, or at the level of production or even of consumption, the world has become integrated into a global economy in which, faced with multiple interdependencies, it no longer makes sense to distinguish between North and South or between the core, periphery and semi-periphery of the world system. In the terms of this fallacy, even the idea of the ‘Third World’ is becoming obsolete. Since, contrary to this discourse, the inequalities between the North and the South have dramatically increased in the past three decades, this fallacy seems to have no other objective than to trivialize the negative, exclusionary consequences of neoliberal globalization by denying them analytical centrality. Thus, the ‘end of the South’, and the ‘disappearance of the Third World’ are, above all, a product of ideological changes which must, themselves, become an object of scrutiny (Santos, 2005; Sen et al., 2004).

Both the determinist fallacy and the fallacy of the disappearance of the South have lost credibility in recent years. On the one hand, if, for some, globalization is still considered a great triumph of rationality, innovation and liberty, capable of producing infinite progress and unlimited abundance, for others, it is increasingly an anathema, as it brings misery, loss of food sovereignty, social exclusion for ever vaster populations of the world, and ecological destruction, etc. On the other, a contradiction has been growing between those who see in
globalization the finally indisputable and unconquerable energy of capitalism and those who
discover in some of its features, such as the revolution in information and communication tech-
nologies, new opportunities to broaden the scale and the nature of transnational solidarity and
anti-capitalist struggle (Buey, 2005).

In the light of these disjunctions and confrontations, it becomes clear that what we term
globalization is, in fact, a set of different processes of globalization and, in the last instance,
of different and sometimes contradictory globalizations. What we generally call globalization
is, in fact, different sets of social relationships which give rise to different phenomena of
globalization. In these terms there is not, strictly speaking, one sole entity called globalization,
instead there are globalizations; to be precise, this term should only be used in the plural. As
they are sets of social relationships, globalizations involve conflicts and, therefore, winners and
losers. The dominant discourse on globalization is the history of the winners, told by the
winners.

At an abstract level, only a process-based definition of globalization is possible. Here is my
definition: it is a set of unequal exchanges in which a certain artefact, condition, entity or local
identity extends its influence beyond its local or national borders and, in so doing, develops
an ability to designate as local another rival artefact, condition, entity or identity.

The most important implications of this concept are as follows. First, there is no originally
global condition; what we call globalization is always the successful globalization of a particu-
lar localism. In other words, there are no global conditions for which we cannot find local
roots. The second implication is that globalization presupposes localization. The process that
creates the global as the dominant position in unequal exchanges is the same one that produces
the local as the dominated, and therefore hierarchically inferior, position. In fact, we live as
much in a world of globalizations as we live in a world of localizations. Therefore, in analyti-
cal terms, it would be equally correct if our current situation and our research topics were
defined in terms of localization instead of globalization. The reason why the latter term is
preferred is basically because hegemonic scientific discourse tends to favor the history of the
world as told by the winners.

There are many examples of how globalization produces localization. The English language
as a lingua franca is one. Its propagation as a global language implies the localization of other
languages, even of languages which not long ago saw themselves as potentially global languages,
as is the case of the French language. Analogously, the French or Italian actors of the 1960s –
from Brigitte Bardot to Alain Delon, or from Marcello Mastroianni to Sophia Loren – who at
the time symbolized the universal style of acting, seem, when we watch their films again
nowadays, provincially European, if not curiously ethnic. The difference in view lies in the
way in which, since then, the Hollywood style of acting has managed to globalize itself. That
is to say, once a certain process of globalization has been identified, its integral meaning and
explanation cannot be obtained without taking into account the adjacent processes of reloca-
tization occurring simultaneously or in sequence to it.

One of the transformations most frequently associated with the processes of globalization
is the compression of time and space, or, rather, the social process by which phenomena accel-
erate and are spread throughout the world. Although apparently monolithic, this process
combines highly differentiated situations and conditions and, because of this, cannot be
analysed independently of the power relations that respond to the different forms of temporal
and spatial mobility. On the one hand, there is the global capitalist class, which in reality
controls the space–time compression and is capable of transforming it in its favor. On the
other, there are the classes and subordinate groups, such as migrant workers and refugees, who
in recent decades have represented much cross-border traffic, but who do not, in any way,
control the space–time compression. Between the executives of the multinational companies
and the emigrants and refugees, tourists represent a third mode of production of the compres-
sion of space and time.

There are also those who contribute greatly to globalization but remain, nevertheless, pris-
oners in their own local time–space. By cultivating the coca, the peasants of Bolivia, Peru and
Colombia, contribute decisively to the world drug culture, but remain ‘localized’ in their villages and mountains, as they always have been. So do the Rio slum-dwellers, who are prisoners of their marginal urban lifestyle, while their songs and dances, particularly the samba, are nowadays part of a globalized music culture. The production of globalization therefore entails the production of localization.

I distinguish two main modes of production of globalization. The first one consists of a twin process of globalized localisms/localized globalisms. Globalized localism is the process by which a particular phenomenon is successfully globalized, whether it is the worldwide activities of the multinational, the transformation of the English language into a lingua franca, the globalization of American fast food or popular music or the worldwide adoption of the same laws of intellectual ownership, patents or telecommunications aggressively promoted by the USA. In this mode of production of globalization, what is globalized is the winner of a struggle for the appropriation or valorization of resources or for the hegemonic recognition of a given cultural, racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, or regional difference. This victory translates into the capacity to dictate the terms of integration, competition and inclusion.

The second process of globalization is the localized globalism. It consists of the specific impact on local conditions produced by transnational practices and imperatives that arise from globalized localisms. To respond to these transnational imperatives, local conditions are disintegrated, oppressed, excluded, de-structured, and, eventually, restructured as subordinate inclusion. Such localized globalisms include: the elimination of traditional commerce and subsistence agriculture; the creation of free trade enclaves or zones; the deforestation and massive destruction of natural resources in order to pay off external debt; the use of historic treasures, religious ceremonies or places, craftsmanship and wildlife for the benefit of the global tourism industry; ecological dumping (the ‘purchase’ by Third World countries of toxic waste produced in the core capitalist countries in order to pay for foreign debt); the conversion of subsistence agriculture into agriculture for export as part of ‘structural adjustment’; and the ethnicization of the workplace (devaluing of salaries because the workers belong to an ethnic group considered ‘inferior’).

These two processes operate in conjunction and constitute the hegemonic type of globalization, also called neoliberal, top-down globalization or globalization from above. The processes should be dealt with separately, since the factors, agents and conflicts which intervene in one or the other are partially distinct. The sustained production of globalized localisms and localized globalisms is increasingly determining or conditioning the different hierarchies that constitute the global capitalist world. The international division of the production of globalization tends to assume the following pattern: core countries specialize in globalized localisms, while peripheral countries only have the choice of localized globalisms.

**Insurgent Cosmopolitanism**

There is, however, a second mode of production of globalization. I call it insurgent cosmopolitanism. It consists of the transnationally organized resistance against the unequal exchanges produced or intensified by globalized localisms and localized globalisms. This resistance is organized through local/global linkages between social organizations and movements representing those classes and social groups victimized by hegemonic globalization and united in concrete struggles against exclusion, subordinate inclusion, destruction of livelihoods and ecological destruction, political oppression, or cultural suppression, etc. They take advantage of the possibilities of transnational interaction created by the world system in transition, including those resulting from the revolution in information technology and communications and from the reduction of travel costs. Insurgent cosmopolitan activities include, among many others: egalitarian transnational North–South and South–South networks of solidarity among social movements and progressive NGOs; the new working-class internationalism (dialogues between workers’ organizations in different regional blocs); transnational coalitions among workers of the same multinational corporation operating in different countries; coalitions of workers and citizenship groups in the struggle against sweatshops, discriminatory labor practices and slave
labor; international networks of alternative legal aid; transnational human rights organizations; worldwide networks of feminist, indigenous, ecological or alternative development movements and associations; and literary, artistic and scientific movements on the periphery of the world system in search of alternative non-imperialist, counter-hegemonic cultural values, involved in studies using post-colonial or minority perspectives. The confrontations surrounding the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle on 30 November 1999 was the first eloquent demonstration of insurgent cosmopolitanism (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003; Sen et al., 2004). The World Social Forum is today its most accomplished manifestation. The use of the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ to describe the global resistance against the unequal exchanges produced by hegemonic globalization may seem inadequate in the face of its modernist or Western ascendancy. The idea of cosmopolitanism, like universalism, world citizenship and the rejection of political and territorial borders, has indeed a long tradition in Western culture, from the cosmic law of Pythagoras and the philallelia of Democritus to the ‘Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto’ of Terence, from the medieval res publica christiana to the Renaissance humanists, and from Voltaire, for whom ‘to be a good patriot, it is necessary to become an enemy of the rest of the world’, to working-class internationalism. This ideological tradition has often been put to the service of European expansionism, colonialism and imperialism, the same historical processes that today generate globalized localisms and localized globalisms. Insurgent cosmopolitanism, on the contrary, refers to the aspiration by oppressed groups to organize their resistance on the same scale and through the same type of coalitions used by the oppressors to victimize them, that is, the global scale and local/global coalitions. Insurgent cosmopolitanism is also different from that invoked by Marx as meaning the universality of those who, under capitalism, have nothing to lose but their chains – the working class. In addition to the working class described by Marx, the oppressed classes in the world today cannot be encompassed by the class-which-has-only-its-chains-to-lose category. Insurgent cosmopolitanism includes vast populations in the world that are not sufficiently useful or skilled enough to ‘have chains’, that is, to be directly exploited by capital. It aims at uniting social groups on a non-class basis, the victims of exploitation as well as the victims of social exclusion, of sexual, ethnic, racist and religious discrimination. For this reason, contrary to the Marxist concept, insurgent cosmopolitanism does not imply uniformity, a general theory of social emancipation and the collapse of differences, autonomies and local identities. Giving equal weight to the principle of equality and to the principle of recognition of difference, insurgent cosmopolitanism is no more than a global emergence resulting from the fusion of local, progressive struggles with the aim of maximizing their emancipatory potential in loco (however defined) through translocal/local linkages.

This character is both the strength and the weakness of insurgent cosmopolitanism. The progressive or counter-hegemonic character of the cosmopolitan coalitions cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, it is intrinsically unstable and problematic. It demands constant self-reflection by those who share its objectives. Cosmopolitan initiatives conceived of and created by a counter-hegemonic character can later come to assume hegemonic characteristics, even running the risk of becoming converted into globalized localisms. It is enough to think of the local initiatives in participatory democracy, which had to fight for years against authoritarian populism, the ‘absolutism’ of representative democracy and the mistrust of the conservative political elites, and which nowadays are beginning to be recognized and even adopted by the World Bank, seduced by the efficiency and lack of corruption they have applied to managing funds and development loans. Self-reflexive vigilance is essential in order to distinguish between the technocratic concept of participatory democracy sanctioned by the World Bank and the democratic and progressive concept of participatory democracy, as an embryo of counter-hegemonic globalization (Bello, 2002).

The instability of the progressive or counter-hegemonic character is also derived from another factor: the different concepts of emancipatory resistance held by cosmopolitan initiatives in different regions of the world system. For example, the struggle for minimum standards in working conditions (the so-called labor standards) – a struggle led by trade unions
and human rights organizations in the more developed countries, to prevent from circulating freely in the world market products produced by labor that does not reach these required minimum standards – is certainly seen by the organizations that promote it as counter-hegemonic and emancipatory, since it aims to improve the conditions of the workers’ lives. However, it can be seen by similar organizations in peripheral countries as one more hegemonic strategy of the North, to create one more form of protectionism which favors the rich countries and harms the poor ones. In spite of all these difficulties, insurgent cosmpolitanism has succeeded in credibly demonstrating that there is an alternative to hegemonic, neoliberal, top-down globalization, and that is counter-hegemonic solidarity, bottom-up globalization. From now on, what we call global and globalization cannot but be conceived of as the provisory, partial and reversible result of a permanent struggle between two modes of production of globalization, indeed, between two globalizations.

References

Boaventura de Sousa Santos is Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, Coimbra University, and distinguished legal scholar at the Law School, University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of many books published in Portuguese, English, Spanish and French. His most recent books in English include Toward a New Legal Common Sense (Butterworths, 2002), Democratizing Democracy (Verso, 2006), The World Social Forum: A User’s Manual (Zed Books, forthcoming) and, as editor with César Rodríguez-Garavito, Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Global Assemblages

Stephen Collier

Key words anthropology, global assemblages, rationalization, techno-science

Max Weber began his 1920 ‘Prefatory Remarks’ to the Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion with a famous and provocative claim:

The child of modern European civilization will inevitably and justifiably approach problems of universal history from the following standpoint: What chain of circumstances led to the appearance in the West, and only in the West, of cultural phenomena which – or so at least we like to think – came to have universal significance and validity. (2002: xxviii)

A series of illustrations follows: developments in history, music, science, architecture, bureaucracy, and, finally, ‘the most fateful force in our modern life’, capitalism.

Contemporary sensibilities balk. Few today would agree that the development in the West of an orchestra with a string quartet as its nucleus, or
the East’s lack of a solution to the problem of the
dome, give either civilization a claim to phenomena with universal validity, even if one could find
a serious scholar still willing to talk about ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ (or, for that matter, about ‘civilization’). But the most crucial items on
Weber’s list – science, bureaucracy, and economic rationalism, to which Weber’s work returned again
and again – are harder to dismiss. Whatever misdi-
rections resulted from discussions around globalization in recent decades, it is certain that at the beginning of the 21st century the ever-more pervasive spread of capitalism and the rationaliza-
tion of what Weber called the ‘life worlds’ are central topics for a global knowledge. Indeed, the
most relevant question today is not whether the significance of such forms is universal but whether they can be meaningfully associated with ‘the West’. Twentieth-century developments in
Japanese and Chinese capitalism, or in Russian, Indian, and Pakistani techno-science – to take a
few among innumerable examples – should convince us that, whatever claims one might make
about their patrimony, these forms no longer require the support of their conditions of origin.
What remains, then, is to ask how we might move beyond platitudinous proclamations to assess their
significance for contemporary life.

An emerging body of scholarship has grappled with this question by examining what might be
called global assemblages (Collier and Ong, 2005).
Global assemblages are the actual configurations
through which global forms of techno-science, economic rationalism, and other expert systems gain significance. The global assemblage is also a
tool for the production of global knowledge, taken
in the double sense of knowledge about global forms and knowledge that strives to replace space,
culture, and society-bound categories that have dominated the social sciences throughout their
history.

The term global refers to forms such as science, expert systems, or techniques of rational calcula-
tion whose validity, as Anthony Giddens has argued, rests on ‘impersonal principles, which can be
set out and developed without regard to context’ (1994: 85). The implication is not that
global forms are everywhere but that they have a
distinctive capacity for decontextualization and recontextualization, abstractability and move-
ment, across diverse social and cultural situations. It may be helpful to take a few contemporary
examples. Developments in extraction, donor
matching, and immunosuppressant drugs have made human organs an increasingly global form
(Cohen, 2005). Certain organs can be abstracted
from one context, a human body, and functionally embedded in virtually any other. A similar point
could be made about the objects of standards regimes, from illness identified through diagnostic
standards in psychiatry to agricultural products
produced according to the strictures of production
and quality standards (Dunn, 2005; Lakoff, 2005).

Through standards, such objects gain a legibility and functionality in heterogeneous domains.
Global forms do not, of course, hold a monopoly on mobility. Consider McDonald’s or Coke. But
the validity of the latter depends on meaning, belief, or desire, specific functions of subjectivity.
Global forms, by contrast, are ‘valid’ in relation to the
improper and self-referential terms of tech-
nical systems.

In many respects, global forms are akin to the
‘boundary objects’ and ‘immutable mobiles’ examined by scholars of science and technology
(Latour, 1987; Bowker and Star, 2000). But if
one’s concern is not with the workings of global forms themselves but, rather, with their anthropo-
logical significance, a further conceptual turn is
required, to the space of assemblage. A global assemblage is the actual and specific articulation of
a global form. Thus, for example, the anthropolo-
gists Lawrence Cohen and Nancy Scheper-Hughes
have analyzed assemblages comprising ‘global’ organs, networks of brokers and dealers, donors
and recipients, sellers and buyers, who interact in
various moral and money economies, and through
various forms of technical and political regulation
(Cohen, 2005; Scheper-Hughes, 2005). From this
element it should be clear that the global assem-
bable is an alternative to the categories of local and
global, which serve to cast the global as abstrac-
tion, and the local in terms of specificity. In the
space of assemblage, a global form is simply one
among a range of concrete elements.

The relationship among the elements in an
assemblage is not stable; nor is their configuration reducible to a single logic. Rather, an assemblage is structured through critical reflection, debate, and
test. Thus, as Scheper-Hughes and Cohen have argued, communities, families, government
officials, non-state organizations, and scholars
debate organ transplants, proclaim their immorality in the name of the sanctity of the body, or promote their legalizability in the name of better regulation,
health, and allocative efficiency. As Andrew Lakoff
(2005) has shown, doctors with different forms of
psychiatric expertise dispute the ability of standards
to yield adequate diagnoses, or, for that matter, the
very possibility of establishing generalizable diagnos-
tic standards for mental illness. And as Elizabeth
Dunn (2005) has argued, agricultural standards may
simultaneously unify some markets but also
provocatively parcellizing economic exchange.
In pointing to instabilities and conflicts, the global assemblage serves as a tool for a critical global knowledge, though one that diverges from the standard fare of relativizing cultural analyses, sociological reductions to structures of power, or political economic analyses of hegemony that have dominated discussions of globalization. Investigations into global assemblages assume that Weber’s provocative claim is still with us: the abstractability, mobility, and power of global forms make them ‘fateful’ for human life. And the secular trend of their expansion is a central problem with which critical purveyors of global knowledge must grapple. But such investigation cannot tell us whether the ‘rationalization of the life-worlds’ – biological life, the life of labor, or the life of the psyche – is, in general, a good or bad thing. Rather, it seeks to clarify moral or ethical positions, resistances, and possibilities that emerge around such processes, without knowing ‘what lies at the end of this tremendous development’ (Weber, 2002: 124).

References

Mundialization/Globalization

Renato Ortiz

How can one understand the specifics of globalization from a cultural perspective? One possible answer would be to go back to the world system paradigm, for its critique of the nation-state as a unit of analysis opens a way to envision the world dynamics in other bases. This perspective, however, opens up other problems that, if ignored, will lead us into a dead end. There is, first, a strong economic inclination of the analyses, for the world system’s history is conceived as the evolution of capitalism (Wallerstein, 1991). As the economic basis is the privileged unit of analysis, political and cultural manifestations appear as its immediate reflections. In fact, this way of understanding social phenomena transposes to a wiser territoriality a well-known reasoning: society is formed by an economic infrastructure and an ideological superstructure. The material ‘floor’ would comprehend and determine the upper part of such architecture. Another dimension posited by the analysis is its...
systemic character. A world system is an articulated set within which all elements are functionally integrated into the whole. An example is to be found in Luhmann's work, that, conceiving society as a system, can extend the concept to reach a planetary scope; in this sense, the world would be a sole communicative system, where the parts, in their differences, would be linked to the same set. There would even be a hierarchy among social systems, from simple to complex, i.e., from less to more differentiated. The difference, however, has a simply functional role, the part functions for the integrity and coherence of the whole.

This theoretical conception allows us to answer an array of questions related to the role of economic and political forces in the ‘world system’. It includes, however, a series of contradictions that unveil its weaknesses. There is, first, a lack of social actors; a system-society does not need individuals and political actors: it consummates itself independently of their existence. The systemic approach encompasses the limitations of the sociological objectivism characteristic of Durkheimian or structuralist theories. By understanding society as a ‘thing’ or ‘structure’, one transcends the existence of ‘the men who make history’, i.e., the individuals and institutions that act and interact with each other. It would be difficult to conceive of social action within this theoretical framework, for the social actor would have a passive role in the social interaction process (at best, he or she would perform a function). In a word, the fate of all would be determined (not only comprehended) in the planetary structure that encompasses us. Another aspect has to do with the degree of interaction required by analytical thinking. In order to function, a system requires an articulation such that the movement of each one of its parts would be solely coordinated by the whole. Internal cohesion has to be high, and without this systemic unity would be compromised. Within this perspective, as Wallerstein (1991) emphasizes, culture is ‘a structure through which the world system operates’. In fact, it would simply have the function of a ‘geo-culture’, guaranteeing the maintenance of an order imposed by itself, independent of the culture.

The above criticisms allow us to take up the cultural question at another level. There is, in the idea of globalization, the suggestion of a certain unity. When we speak about a global economy, we have in mind one single structure, underlying economic exchange in any place on the planet. Economists can even measure the dynamics of this globalized order through various indicators: exchanges and international investments. The same can be said of the technological sphere: it is marked by the unity of techniques – computer, satellites, electric or nuclear energy. But, would it make sense understanding the cultural theme in the same way? Could we speak of ‘one’ global culture or ‘one’ global identity in the same manner we consider the economic and technological levels? Surely not, and language offers a good example. For historical reasons – British colonialism, North American imperialism, capitalist economic expansion, the development of science in the USA after Second World War, and the like – English became the language of world modernity; it would not make sense, however, to imagine the disappearance of other languages in the face of its dominance. The existence of a hypothetical ‘universal’ language, shared by all the planet’s individuals, would require that all human experiences converged towards one and the same source of meaning. But such a linguistic speculation is not reasonable. The emergence of English as a world language gives a new definition to the world market of linguistic goods at a planetary scale, shows an unmistakable power situation but does not imply a single way of speaking. And that is the reason why it is useful to establish a difference between the terms globalization and mundialization. The first may well be applied to the economic and technological spheres; the second adapts itself better to the cultural universe. The ‘mundi’ (world) category is then articulated to both dimensions. It is bound first to the movement of globalization of societies, to the economic and technological transformations that involve them. Without this material dimension we could hardly discuss the existence of a process of mundialization of the cultural sphere. But it also corresponds to a ‘world (mundi) vision’, a specific symbolic universe of today’s civilization, that coexists with other world visions, establishing hierarchies, conflicts and accommodations with them. Its transversality reveals modern life’s globalization, its mundiarity expresses the cultural diversity that is inherent to the process.

Using an idea by Marcel Mauss (Mauss, 1974), I would say, mundialization is a total social phenomenon, which pervades all cultural manifestations. The whole goes to the core of its parts, redefining them in their specificities. In this sense it would not be proper to speak of a world-culture whose hierarchical level would be situated outside and above local, regional or national cultural practices. Thinking in this manner would amount to establishing dichotomous relations between various platforms (local vs. national, national vs. global, local vs. global), promoting the dualist reason in a planetary scale. In order to exist, a culture has to have roots, to be situated in men’s everyday practices, without which it would be an abstract expression of social relations. With the emergence
of globalization/mundialization, the cultural whole recasts the ‘situation’ where multiple particularities are located, without the need to think in systemic terms. Thinking mundialization as a totality allows us to approximate it to the notion of civilization, an extra-national set of specific social phenomena, common to many societies. But it is necessary to emphasize a particularity of our times. Historically, a civilization extended beyond a people’s frontiers, but limited itself to a determined geographical area. A mundialized culture corresponds to a civilization whose territoriality is globalized. This is not, however, synonymous with uniformity. I emphasize this aspect for the cultural debate sometimes identifies both dimensions, and this is inadequate. For a long time, the discussion of culture, especially when it refers to the so-called mass culture, has debated the dilemma of consciousness homogeneity. In fact, the conception of mass itself is associated with the idea of crowd (a popular notion in the 19th century), where the individuals tended to dissolve into the whole. The theme is posed anew in the context of the planetary diffusion of technologies. For a good many authors, the global village would consecrate the homogeny of habits and thinking. Communication technologies, getting people closer to each other, would make the world smaller and identical. An example: Theodore Levitt’s (1983) diagnosis of markets’ globalization. We would be living a reality that had suffered a standardization of products consumed at a global scale, leveling cultural practices to a sole common denominator. It would be naïve to non-critically oppose this globalization perspective. Science, technology, consumption, all are important vectors of the globalization process. There is in fact a patterning of modern life’s different domains. This is due to some extent to industrialism that invades the cultural sphere itself. The industrial making of movies, television series, books, video games, clothes, is doubtless bound to product patterning. And for this they understand the models, the norms that structure social relations. Individual behavior is bound to this ‘ground’ shared by all. A society is a set of subgroups whose particular ways are distinguished within a common framework. But no one ever refers to culture ‘standardization’ when dealing with indigenous societies (as it would make no sense to describe Trobriand aborigines’ life in terms of ‘patterning’).

It is, however, important to distinguish pattern and standards. Anthropologists teach us that there is no society without a determined cultural pattern. And for this they understand the models, the norms that structure social relations. Individual behavior is bound to this ‘ground’ shared by all. A society is a set of subgroups whose particular ways are distinguished within a common framework. But no one ever refers to culture ‘standardization’ when dealing with indigenous societies (as it would make no sense to describe Trobriand aborigines’ life in terms of ‘patterning’).

It is only in the discussion of industrial societies that pattern and standard are identified to the idea of homogeneity. Such an association became ‘natural’ due to the high degree of rationalization of modern life and to the extension of industrial procedures to the cultural domain. The modern world’s rationality distinguishes different areas of society, in one of which, consumption, the patterning process is deeply established. The serial production of cultural artifacts even allows for an analogy with industrial rationality. This fundamental trait of contemporaneous societies, however, should not lead us to be confused. When Weber writes on the rationalization about Western music, he has in mind the casting of a cultural pattern in the sense anthropologists give to the notion. We could hardly assimilate such a pattern to the idea of standardization. In other words, the pattern is not to be confused with the standard. The point is to understand how the patterning process takes on hegemonic character, although not univocal, in the globalized context. Taking on again the concept of civilization restores the discussion to another level. There is no conceptual opposition between the common and the diverse; a mundialized culture promotes a cultural pattern without imposing the uniformity of all; it disseminates a pattern bound to the development of world modernity itself. Its width certainly involves other cultural manifestations, but it is important to emphasize that it is specific, founding a new way of ‘being-in-the-world’ and establishing new values and legitimizations. And that is the reason why there is not and there will be not a single global culture, identical in all places. A globalized world implies a plurality of world-views. What we do have is the consolidation of a civilization matrix, world modernity, that is actualized and diversified in every country, region, place, as a function of its particular history. And this means that globalization/mundialization is one and diverse at the same time. We should not conceive of such a diversity as equivalent to the idea of pluralism. In the global situation, parts are different and unequal, fill hierarchically diverse positions, and are permeated by the power relations and force lines that constitute the reality of the game of world’s interests.

References
Culture and Global Systems

Jonathan Friedman

Culture is often treated as a code, a paradigm and more recently as a substance that can spread throughout the world. The position I suggest here is much simpler. Culture in the most general sense, as generic culture, is simply that which is specific to human societies based on the notion of alternative ways of doing similar things. The capacity for culture is the capacity within the same species to constitute different ways of getting organized. It has usually been contrasted with the rest of the biological world, of which we are, of course, a part, by the fact that other species have far less leeway in the organization of their lives, their production of ways of going about the world. This relative fixity has been called instinct in the past although the relative fixity of the behavior of non-humans is clearly more complex. This notion of culture as that which makes us human is not the usual usage of the term of course, except for those who deal with the relations between species. Rather, human culture is a differential concept, based on the notion of difference itself, different ways to skin a cat, different ways to relate to the world, different ways of organizing social reproduction, etc.

That culture can be understood in terms of specific structures, even codes, is based on a false dichotomy between culture as specific social practice and culture as the organizing principle of such practice. Culture is difference, of course, but the difference does not precede the practice. Culture is a set of properties of practice, that which is the specificity of the latter. It is not a scheme for the organization of social life that has a prior existence to that life. Nor does the fact of cultural difference convey anything concerning the origins of such difference. The embeddedness of culture within the social is the starting point for examining the way it is constituted as a social and historical process. In sum, to say that social life is culturally constituted is to say that social life is constituted of culture but not by culture. It is of course true that there are aspects of culture that are not embedded in actual social relations but exist as relatively autonomous symbolic schemes to be used to socialize members of a particular social world and/or to interpret the nature of social existence (as in myth). The internal order of the cultural is related to the construction of worlds of intentionality that constitute the immediate, i.e., non-reflexive meaning of action. Understanding such worlds should not be conflated with the external observation of meaning as a set of texts, objects or substance, as is the case in most globalization approaches to culture. The attempt to understand what people are doing in their lives can never be replaced by an external interpretation of the products of their activities. The examples of this confusion are often quite shocking, as when it is assumed that culture A is a melange of cultures B and C, without any analysis of the way the so-called possessors of such culture create their worlds. Thus, spaghetti becomes part-Chinese, and New Guinea masks depicting advertising for South Pacific Beer are assumed to be hybrid works. Hybrid-for-us perhaps, and it is often stated that such hybridity is an objective phenomenon even if local subjects are unaware of it. But hybridity-for-us is not objective since it is only ‘for us’, in fact, our own subjective interpretation of our objectification of other people’s lives. I have suggested that discourses of hybridity are identity discourses rather than attempts to understand what the people we are supposed to be studying are up to. This perspective is symptomatic of global elites, of transnationally identified artists, intellectuals, media people, and global politicians. In cultural terms, it is generated by a gathering of cosmopolitans in the West. This elite congregation is the source of much of the discourse of globalization as well.

The issue of globalization as related to culture is a product of the kind of conflation referred to above. The objectification of culture is one of its instrumental aspects, the reduction of the practice...
of difference, of meaning, to a product, a text, a substance which liquified can thence flow across all conceivable borders. This process is associated with visions of a new world that we are entering, a millennium of globalization that for some is the announcement of a world of diasporic hybridity, and for others, a world of increasing disorder and inequality.

Global Process and Culture

The global field is one within which globalization, in the sense of movement can either occur or not occur. Globalization itself does not define the global. The Fordist period of nation-states was just as global as the contemporary world of supposedly disintegrating national sovereignty, even if states are as strong as ever. A systemic approach allows us to ask the very question: why suddenly did culture become a central figure of discourse and why has cultural globalization followed suit (Friedman, 2004b)?

The emergence of culturalist discourse occurred in tandem with the rise of cultural politics, with the decline of modernist structures of identity and the fragmentation of the modernist world into cultural specificities, the search for roots, the demands for culturally based rights as opposed to class rights. This was a major historical transformation in the West and its dependencies stimulating a series of cultural re-identifications: indigenous, regional ethnicity, immigrant ethnicity and the transformation of national identity from the issue of citizenship to one of cultural belonging. This is what I have referred to as horizontal fragmentation of the national order.

At the same time there has been a rapid vertical polarization separating upwardly mobile sectors of national populations and downwardly mobile sectors, the increase in the rate of stratification in which the lower half indigenizes while the upper sector cosmopolitanizes. While the bottom becomes increasingly xenophobic and indigenizing in its search for a secure identity, the top identifies as the wards of the multicultural world that has been produced by globalization. Here we find the tendency to self-identification as hybrids as in ‘my life world is an assemblage of objects from world’s cultures’, or ‘I am a citizen of the world.’ At the bottom, those identified and sometimes self-identified as the global rednecks become increasingly angry opponents of what they identify as global elites: Washington, Rome, the Jews and all other representatives of the cosmopolitan agenda. It is interesting that here as well there are alliances across ethnic lines, the ‘black’ Washitaw Indians who are allied with the Republic of Texas, the KKK in St Petersburg that trains with local black power groups. Sometimes this is made explicit, as when it is stated that all the trash, white, black, red and brown should have it out and then get the real culprits ‘the gold card-carrying academics’ (Goad, 1997) who have always succeeded in separating themselves from the multicultural bottom that they so celebrate.

The above polarities are not alone, of course. There is an interesting tendency for the emergence of geo-political polarizations that have been suggested by authors such as Huntington (1996). Others (Buruma and Margalit, 2004) have suggested that a more general hatred of Western modernity is a deeper structure of Western civilization, from the Romantics, to more recent cultural anti-Westerners. This discourse has been exported, they claim, to Japan in World War II, to Russia beginning in the 19th century, as well as to Muslim ‘fundamentalism’. While it is true that such discourses have been used by anti-Western and anti-modernist movements in order to purify their geographical regions from the disease of modernity, there is plenty of local discourse that can be summoned for the same geo-political goals. Fractures at lower geographical levels in the global arena are thus supplemented by these larger world regional configurations (Friedman, 2004c).

While this is occurring in the Western-dominated sector of the world, in East Asia, primarily China, but also in parts of South-east Asia, the cosmo- politan is in a weak position with respect to nationalist and regionalist discourses, the establishment of larger geographical units, an intensive focus on development and a new Asian modernism, the extinction or integration, by assimilation, segmentation, rather than autonomization of indigenous minorities.

The combination of horizontal and vertical polarization establishes the field of forces that in their specificity are, by definition, cultural (Friedman, 2004a). If particular signifying constructions are produced in such processes, discourses of hybridity and multiculturalism, discourses of indigenization, nationalism, tradition-alism and Kastom, these are the cultural content or properties of the changing configuration of the global arena itself. Is there global diffusion in all of this? Of course, commodities, brands, technologies, the media, etc. have established themselves across much of the globe and there has even been a certain superficial identification with these sets of objects among rising elites and, to some extent, middle classes. One might wish to call this homogenization, although it is disproved by the fragmented production of new identities and cultural forms. From the outside there might indeed be examples of what one could call hybridity, but these are usually observer-dependent phenomena.
Hybridity only exists, and it does, of course, where those who are so defined identify as such. All of this of course has occurred in the past, not least in the form of religious expansion related most often to economic and political colonization: the Hinduization and then Islamization of Southeast Asia (and East Africa), the spread of all kinds of technologies, products, texts, all common phenomena in world history. We note, however, that diffusion is not a process in itself but a result. How things move and the way they are integrated into people’s lives must be approached in great detail and with emphasis on the actors involved. For the spread of religion, at least, the conflicts between local elites in vying for control over trade and other forms of external wealth have been a crucial aspect of such ‘diffusion’ in Asia, Africa, the Pacific and even in Europe. The articulation between different logics and strategies originating in different parts of the world forms the site of a true understanding of such phenomena.

References

Global History
Bruce Mazlish

Key words Eurocentrism, global history, globalization, knowledge, new global history, world history

Global history compels us to ask what it is we know about our world, and how we know it. In its simplest terms, globalization, the subject of study in global history, takes us beyond Eurocentrism, nationalism, and their parochial ways of thinking, into a world of both difference and differences being transcended in the name of a common humanity. In doing so, however, it raises many questions about the disciplines by which we try to discern the shape of what it is we are seeking to understand.

These are lofty-sounding statements. We need to come down to earth as well. Global history is, to begin with, a sub-field of history (Mazlish, 1993; Hughes-Warrington, 2005). It is often used as a synonym for world history. This obfuscates our knowledge in an important way. While world history is also an effort to go beyond Eurocentrism, it does not focus on globalization. The latter is a theme, contained within world history, that can be traced from earliest times – hunter-gatherers spreading across the globe – up to the present. It encompasses interconnection and interdependence of people, trends that appear to be increasing over time. Yet, teleology and determinism must be rejected as we seek to understand globalization’s development. The story of the latter is made up of unintended consequences and human agency, with the result being powerful currents that move in a global direction.

We ‘know’ this since some time after the end of the Second World War, when the factors making globalization achieved a level of expansion and synchronicity and synergy that, like water boiling, has brought us to a new state. The very term ‘globalization’ only appeared around the 1960s. To reflect our new awareness we would do well to adopt a new periodization: the global epoch.
Previously, we spoke of ancient, medieval and modern periods or epochs. Now we must transcend the latter term in this sequence, modern (and its offspring postmodern), for it has lost its potency in orienting us in a ‘world’ (a word derived from Middle English meaning ‘earth’) that has become a globe (a word derived from Latin for spheroid, and pointing us outward) (Mazlish, 1998). Our consciousness of space and time has changed to match our changed life experiences. This is knowledge, a knowledge that requires us to re-examine all our social sciences disciplines, which were derived from an earlier transformation, that of the Industrial and French Revolutions.

Many, if not most, scholars will refuse to take this jump. Their disciplinary traditions, their fights over turf, do not allow them to embrace the interdisciplinary approach and the global history perspective that is required. This is even more true in regard to what is emerging as New Global History, an initiative that focuses on present-day globalization, seen as coming into being after 1945 (for further details, see the website, www.newglobalhistory.org). Knowledge moves by fits and starts – one thinks of Galileo’s opponents who refused to look through his telescope or, if they did, declared the stars seen through it to be mere dust on the glass. Such an intelligent man, but stuck in his own limited perspective, as Immanuel Wallerstein declares ‘so-called “globalization”’ to be a fad (Wallerstein, 2000, xviii–xix). Many follow him in this view.

Often they are blinded by their political desires. Particular ethnic, religious, and national groupings prize particularism rather than universalism, which they link to globalization and see as threatening their ways and local power. Thus, universalizing sciences, such as mathematics and physics, are viewed as mere social constructs, with no need to accept them as true knowledge. This in spite of the fact that they are the same for Asians and Americans and produce similar results everywhere. The same can be said for parts of technology: computers work the same everywhere. How they are used, of course, is a different matter.

Needless to say, outside the natural sciences, the situation is more complicated. Do we know about human rights in the same way we know about gravity? The answer is obviously no. Yet, emerging out of human historical experience as a moral imperative with universalistic claims, human rights, or so its proponents claim, override local, particularistic behaviors in the name of the greater community of humanity. Foreshadowed in the idea of cosmopolitanism (see the entry in this encyclopedia by Pheng Cheah), which is being rethought in the light of globalizing experiences, human rights are based on the reality of developments in the information revolution and the interconnections made possible by that revolution. In the shape of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), operating in connection with the UN and nation-states, the rights of each individual and of oppressed minorities are vindicated.

The perspective of (new) global history requires us to see the world anew in these terms. NGOs and multinational corporations (MNCs) are the new actors, alongside the state, in our emerging global society. Our growing knowledge of this fact – for example, of the 100 largest economies, 29 of these are MNCs; as a result, the value added by, say, Exxon Mobil, is larger than the GDP of countries such as Pakistan, New Zealand, Hungary, and Vietnam – needs to be matched by our visualization of this world (Chandler and Mazlish, 2005). If we open an atlas, we do not see this fact. To remedy this distortion, an historical atlas of the MNCs, Global Inc., has been published (New Press, 2003). A project is now under way to match it with a similar atlas depicting the extent and power of the NGOs.

This is knowledge for the eye as well as in the mind. Global history requires us to rethink and review all our other pieces of knowledge. Thus, the notions of sovereignty, internationalism, migrations, and so forth call out for re-conceptualization in the context of globalization, viewed from an historical perspective (in which history, of course, is interdisciplinary). In spite of certain fantasists of globalization, nation-states will not disappear in the world shaping itself around us. Yet national histories will certainly have to be written anew from the global history perspective. One can see this beginning to happen even in such extremely nationalistic and parochial settings as the teaching of American history.

In short, global history puts all our preconceptions and presumed knowledge at risk. As we have been told since antiquity, with this truism recently emphasized by many postmodernists, knowledge is power. It can be power over nature, or power over humans. And power produces knowledge, whether aiding in domination or undermining existing dominations. The question at issue is whether knowledge is merely local power or can transcend its origin and become part of the heritage of humanity. The answer is, of course, contested, but now must be contested in the terms presented to us by globalization.

At a minimum, global history requires us to take up the epistemological and dialectical dimensions of old questions about knowledge in a new light. Without doubt, it forces us to transcend the received Eurocentric perspective and to engage in the preliminary step of going beyond Orientalism to a close examination of Occidentalism (Coronil,
The next step is to explore the geography of globalism per se, an adventure on which we are only now beginning to embark in a serious way. This is a piece of knowledge that is no longer refutable.

References

Bruce Mazlish is Professor of History Emeritus at MIT. Among his most recent publications are *The Global History Reader*, ed. Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye (Routledge, 2005) and *Civilization and Its Contents* (Stanford University Press, 2004). He has also published numerous articles on globalization in various periodicals.

East and West in Global History

*John Hobson*

If the title of this entry appears to be unproblematic, if not anodyne, it turns out to be contradictory and loaded with Eurocentric bias. It is contradictory because within conventional historiography there is no East and West in ‘global history’. ‘Global history’ is neither global, because it is a provincial story of Western universalism, nor historical because it is ‘historical-Eurocentrism’ written backwards. For in conventional historiography, the East is prejudicially relegated to a residual category that has no autonomous place in global history – it is merely a stagnant backwater in the mainstream Western story. In short, conventional global history turns out to be an ahistorical-Eurocentric ‘Western provincialism writ large’.

David Landes dismisses this view as but politically correct ‘good think’ which avoids the ‘twin facts’ that the West has consistently led the East and pioneered modern global capitalism (Landes, 1998). Similarly, John Roberts argues for the veracity of Eurocentrism on the grounds that:

([it] means ‘putting Europe at the centre of things’, and its usual implication is that to do so is wrong. But, of course, if we are merely talking about facts, about what happened, and not about the value that we place on them, then it is quite correct to put Europe at the centre of the story in modern times. (1985: 201)

But it is precisely the naivety or impossibility of the fact-value distinction wherein the source of the problem lies. For what eludes Roberts and Landes is that Europe only appears to occupy centre-stage of progressive global history because Eurocentric values have led them to select Europe as, or place it at, the centre of the story in the first place. And the East only appears to be absent because it has been selected out, having been consigned to the dark ghetto of the marginalized periphery.

The idea of Western history as universal (global) history emerged in the 19th century when racist-Eurocentrism or Orientalism had been constructed by the Europeans (Said, 1978). This discourse suddenly pronounced the superiority of Europe over the ‘inferior Eastern other’. It entailed two critical assumptions: first, that what had previously been thought of as interlinked, if not symbiotic, regions were suddenly relocated along either side of a constructed ‘civilizational line of apartheid’. And, second, Europe was constructed as qualitatively superior to the East because it supposedly had exceptional, progressive characteristics or virtues. By contrast, the East was inscribed with only regressive properties. Having

Key words agency, capitalism, civilizations, East/West, Eurocentrism/Orientalism, imperialism
constructed Europe as superior and exceptional, Eurocentric thinkers then extrapolated this conception back in time to Ancient Greece, thereby painting an ahistorical picture of Europe as permanently superior (Amin, 1989; Bernal, 1991). Simultaneously Europe was inscribed with a unique ‘logic of immanence’ wherein the seeds of progress were contained within its socio-political structure. Accordingly, from Ancient Greece on, European development and global history are (re)presented as a purely endogenous Western story that unfolds in a linear sequence. In the process, the Western people were elevated to the permanent ‘subject’ of global history standing at the centre of all things progressive. Conversely, the Eastern peoples were relegated to the peripheral status of global history’s passive ‘object’, languishing on the Other side of an imaginary civilizational frontier, stripped of history and dignity.

Crucially this Orientalist discourse was endogenized within the major theories of the rise of capitalist global modernity – especially liberalism, Marxism and Weberianism (Blaut, 1993; Turner, 1993; Frank, 1998: Chapter 1; Hobson, 2004: Chapter 1). Accordingly they explain Europe’s rise by excavating causal variables that allegedly exist only within Europe. Moreover, fabricating the story of the rise of the West entailed retrospectively tracing Europe’s superiority back to Ancient Greece and then forwards through an immanent journey of the Western (Oriental) Express. On the way the Western train passes through an imaginary linear series of purely European way-stations. These comprise feudalism, the Italian commercial-financial revolution and the Renaissance, commercial capitalism and the Iberian Voyages of Discovery, and then on through British industrialization before arriving (for liberalism) at the terminus of history - the Pax Americana. Marx, of course, shared in this view though he saw capitalism as the penultimate way-station before socialism, which stood at the gateway of the communist terminus of history. Conversely, such a progressive linearity was absent on the Other side of the ‘civilizational frontier’, where Oriental despotic/patrimonial states and collectivist mentalities and production systems choked civil society, thereby resulting in permanent stagnation. Accordingly, the Easterners could only passively await the arrival of the Oriental (imperial) Express which, fuelled by Occidental Messianism, steamed across to pick them up in order to graciously deliver them to the emancipatory terminus of history.

But the problem with this Eurocentric story is that it obscures the considerable role that Eastern agents have played both in progressive global history and in the rise of Europe, which in turn implies a promiscuous and globally interdependent relationship between East and West. Recently, a number of scholars have undertaken their own ‘voyages of rediscovery’ resulting in various non-Eurocentric explorations of the global-historical rise of the West (Abu-Lughod, 1989; Blaut, 1993; Frank, 1998; Goldstone, 2000; Pomeranz, 2000; Hobson, 2004). Despite all manner of differences, one of the common themes of the alternative post-1997 departure is the inversion of the standard Eurocentric temporal-narrative. Now the mainstream of global history up to the 19th century appears as Eastern – especially East Asian – and, after a short Western interlude, seems to be returning back to China. Moreover, without the considerable help provided by the East, there might never have been a Western interlude (Hobson, 2004). The assumption that global history began with the Europeans after 1492 obscures the point that the West emerged within a pre-existing Eastern-led global economy that was forged in the post-500 era. And between then and about 1800 Europe resided on the backward periphery of the global economy, constituting a promontory of Afro-Asia or the ‘Cape of Asia’ (Vályi, cited in Nederveen Pieterse, 1990: 105).

Important to the emergence of the global economy after 500 was the rise of various interlinked regions. These extended across from Tang China to the Islamic Ummayyad/Abbasid empire in West Asia and the Fatimids in North Africa via the kingdom of Srivijaya in Sumatra, ultimately linking to Europe via Ummayad Spain and Italy. They promoted an extensively pacified space that enabled both considerable trade and the transmission of advanced Eastern ‘resource portfolios’ (ideas, institutions and technologies) to Europe. In turn, the Afro-Eurasian economy was woven together by three major trade routes (Abu-Lughod, 1989), which were initially promoted by Islamic capitalists after about 650, though Jews, Africans, Javanese, Indians and Chinese were also important.

Islam led the way in terms of two major indicators – extensive and intensive global power. Extensive power refers to the ability of a state or region to spread its economic tentacles outwards, whereas intensive power refers to a leading economy that provides high supply and demand for global trade. Islamic West Asia led the way in both after about 650. Around 1100 the baton of global intensive power was passed not to Italy but to China (during the Sung industrial miracle), where it remained down to the early 19th century. And around 1450 the leading edge of global extensive power passed not to the Iberians but to the Chinese. Nevertheless the distribution of global economic power was polycentric for Islamic West
Asia and North Africa as well as India and later Japan maintained high levels of intensive and extensive global power.

Paradoxically, the official 1434 Chinese ban on foreign trade came just before Chinese external trade escalated (Hobson, 2004: Chapter 3). China’s voracious demand for silver, owing to her hugely productive economy and large trade surplus with the rest of the world, ultimately sucked Europe directly into the Afro-Asian-led global economy. For China’s demand for silver provided the main outlet for the plundered Spanish-American bullion, thereby enabling the Europeans to finance both their trade deficit with China (and other Asian countries) as well as their, albeit modest, presence within the Indian Ocean trading system (Hobson, 2004: Chapter 7). And it enabled the Europeans to directly insert themselves into the global gold–silver arbitrage system that was centred upon China (Flynn and Giraldez, 1994; Frank, 1998).

Eurocentrism assumes that the Europeans single-handedly made their own developmental history (and subsequently that of the world’s). But this obscures the role of Oriental globalization wherein advanced Eastern ‘resource portfolios’ diffused along the sinews of the global economy to be eventually assimilated by the Europeans, thereby fuelling the rise of the West throughout the 500–1800 period. So while the Italians led the way in Europe after about 1000, the financial institutions upon which they relied were borrowed from West Asia. Moreover, without the many Islamic ideas that diffused across there might never have been a ‘European’ Renaissance (Goody, 2004; Hobson, 2004: Chapters 6 and 8). In Eurocentrism the Voyages of Discovery signify the emergence of early globalization at the hands of the Europeans. But they might better be labelled the Voyages of Rediscovery, given that the regions the Portuguese ‘discovered’ had long been in contact with each other and indirectly with Europe through Oriental globalization. Moreover, without the diffusion of Eastern resource portfolios, there might never have been any Voyages of Rediscovery. The critical features of the European ships that enabled oceanic sailing – the square hull and stern-post rudder, lateen sail and triple-mast system – were derived from Islamic and Chinese shipping. The critical navigational techniques and technologies – the astrolabe, solar and lunar calendars, astronomy, trigonometry and geometry – were derived mainly from Islamic West Asia. And when we note that the weapons deployed by the Iberians – gunpowder, gun and cannon – had been invented in China in 850, 1275 and 1288 respectively, then there is very little left for the Portuguese or Spanish to have sincerely claimed for their own. Last, but not least, British industrialization was significantly fuelled by the imperial appropriation of Eastern resources – land, labour, bullion, raw materials and markets – and the assimilation of Chinese ideas and technologies (Hobson, 2004: Chapters 9–11).

So what does this tell us about ‘East and West in global history’? It should be clear by now why ‘bringing the East back in’ creates a genuinely global history. But this begs the question: does the deconstruction of the white Eurocentric myth of the West-as-pioneering-subject of global history merely lead to an inverted-Orientalist, or Occidentalist, metanarrative? This retort misses the central point. For deconstructing the civilizational-apartheid perspective of Eurocentrism necessarily reveals the peoples of the world as symbiotic, hybrid partners rather than opposing and separate entities. It points up the modalities of inter-human commonality, communication and connection rather than difference, deafness and disassociation. And in so doing it reveals the affiliations and immanent solidarity of civilizations and of the world’s peoples. Ultimately, in recognizing this we take an initial step, if not one giant leap, towards a global dream that exorcises the global nightmare of cycles of war and civilizing missions imposed upon a manufactured Eastern Other. A dream wherein the peoples of the Earth can finally sit down at the table of global humanity and communicate as equal partners after the dark interlude of Western colonialism and neocolonialism.

References

John Hobson is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His major research interest is in the area of ‘inter-civilizational relations’, past, present and future.

**Oriental Globalization**

*Jan Nederveen Pieterse*

The critique of Eurocentrism has gone through several rounds. The first round was primarily a critique of Orientalism. Edward Said and Martin Bernal, among others, focused on cultural bias and racism in Eurocentric history. Others addressed Eurocentric biases in development thinking (Samir Amin, Paul Bairoch, Stavrianos) and historiography (Eric Wolf, James Blaut, Jack Goody).

Subaltern Studies made further contributions revisioning history from the point of view of the global South. A further strand, global history, generated critical historical studies that document the significance of, in particular, Asia and the Middle East in the making of the global economy. Janet Abu-Lughod focused on the Middle East, Marshall Hodgson on the world of Islam, K. N. Chauhuri on South Asia, André Gunder Frank on East and South Asia, Kenneth Pomeranz, Robert Temple and Bin Wong on China, Eric Jones on Japan, and Anthony Reid on South-east Asia, along with many other studies. This body of work not merely critiques but overturns the conventional perspectives and implies a profound rethinking of world history that holds major implications for social science and development studies.

Arguably this body of literature converges on a major thesis: the Orient came first and the Occident was a latecomer. Frank’s *ReOrient* settles on 1400–1800 as the time of ‘Asian hegemony’ (1998: 166). The two major regions that were most ‘central’ to the world economy were India and China. This centrality was based on ‘greater absolute and relative productivity in industry, agriculture, (water) transport, and trade’ and was reflected in their favorable balance of trade, particularly of China (1998: 127). Pomeranz’s *The Great Divergence* offers meticulous comparisons of developments in China and Britain and Geoffrey Gunn (2003) draws attention to South-east Asia as a ‘first globalizer’.

In general outline, the Orient-first thesis runs as follows. Global connections may go back to 3500 BCE or earlier still, but 500 CE may rank as the start of oriental globalization and 600 as the beginning of the big expansion of global trade. This timing is based on the revival of camel transport between 300 and 500. At the time the global economy was centred on the Middle East with Mecca as a global trade hub. In 875 Baghdad ranked as a ‘water-front to the world’ linked to China (Hobson, 2004: 40). The Middle East remained the ‘Bridge of the World’ through the second millennium, but by 1100 (or later by some accounts) the leading edge shifted to China where it remained until the 19th century. In China’s ‘first industrial miracle’ ‘many of the characteristics that we associate with the eighteenth-century British industrial revolution had emerged by 1100’ (Hobson, 2004: 50) with major advances in iron and steel production, agriculture, shipping and military capabilities. From Japan to the Middle East, the East was the early developer – far ahead of Europe in agriculture, industry, urbanization, trade networks, credit institutions and state institutions. Several historians note that ‘none of the major players in the world economy at any point before 1800 was European’ (Hobson, 2004: 74). The East was also expansive: the Afro-Asian age of discovery preceded Columbus and Vasco da Gama by about a millennium (Hobson, 2004: 139).

Europe was a late developer. Eastern ideas and technologies enabled European feudalism, the
financial revolution in medieval Italy and the Renaissance: ‘oriental globalisation was the midwife, if not the mother, of the medieval and modern West’ (Hobson, 2004: 36). In Hodgson’s words, the Occident was ‘the unconscious heir of the industrial revolution of Sung China’ (in Hobson, 2004: 192). Hobson dates China’s central role earlier and extends it later than Frank does. According to Hobson, in shares of world manufacturing output, China outstripped Britain until 1860 and ‘the Indian share was higher than the whole of Europe’s in 1750 and was 85 percent higher than Britain’s as late as 1830’ (2004: 77, 76). In terms of GNP, the West only caught up with the East by 1870; in terms of per capita income, a less representative measure, the West caught up by 1800.

I will discuss three specific critiques of Eurocentrism that this literature contributes and then give an assessment of this literature. One of the cornerstones of Eurocentrism is the idea that China turned away from maritime trade and that this caused its gradual decline and opened the way for the expansion of European trade in Asia. The revisionist literature argues that the closure of China (and Japan) is a myth and the diagnosis of decline is likewise mistaken. It is true that China did not choose the path of maritime empire, but Western historians have mistaken the official Chinese imperial legitimation policy of upholding the Confucian ideal and condemning foreign trade with the actual trade relations which continued and flourished. That China remained the world’s leading trading power shows in the ‘global silver recycling process’ in which ‘most of the world’s silver was sucked into China’ (Hobson, 2004: 66; Frank, 1998: 117).

Another cornerstone of Eurocentrism is Oriental despotism (and variations such as Weber’s patrimonialism). In contrast, the revisionist literature argues that states such as China and Japan had at an early stage achieved ‘rational’ institutions including a ‘rational-legal’ centralized bureaucracy, minimalist or laissez-faire policies in relation to the economy and democratic propensities, while the European states during the 1500–1900 ‘breakthrough period’ were far less rational, more interventionist and protectionist, and less democratic: ‘eighteenth century China (and perhaps Japan as well) actually came closer to resembling the neoclassical ideal of a market economy than did Europe’ (Pomeranz, 2000: 70). Light taxation and laissez-faire attitudes to enterprise were common in the East long before the West and trade tariffs were consistently far higher in the West than in the East throughout the period of comparison, which shows that the Oriental despotism thesis is faulty.

The centrepiece of Eurocentrism is the judgement that other cultures lacked the European commitment to enterprise and accumulation. Weber highlighted the Protestant ethic and described Islam and Confucianism as obstacles to modern development. But many observers have noted the penchant for commerce in the Islamic world. Viewing Confucianism as an obstacle to development involves historical ironies too: what ranked as an obstacle in the early 20th century was recast as the Confucian ethic hypothesis to account for the rise of the Asian Tigers in the late 20th century. An additional irony is the influence of Confucianism on European thinking. That behind Adam Smith stood François Quesnay and the Physiocrats is a familiar tale, but the Physiocrats’ critique of mercantilism was inspired by Chinese policies and the philosophy of wu-wei or non-intervention, which goes back to well before the Common Era (Hobson, 2004: 196). Thus, Confucius emerges as a patron saint of the European Enlightenment.

What are the significance and status of oriental globalization literature at this stage? There are echoes of dependency theory in this body of work for if it wasn’t European genius or other endogenous factors that turned the tide, the role played by colonialism and imperialism in changing the global equation must be greater than is acknowledged in Eurocentric perspectives. One thinks of Eric Williams’s work on slavery, Walter Rodney on Africa and other studies. But dependency theory was structuralist while the recent revisionist history rejects a global structural approach (such as world-system theory) and reckons with contingency and devotes attention to agency and identity formation: ‘material power in general and great power in particular, are channeled in different directions depending on the specific identity of the agent’ (Hobson, 2004: 309). Dependency thinking came out of the era of decolonization while the allegiance of revisionist history lies to global history rather than to history viewed through the lens of a particular region and time period. It looks past Fernand Braudel and his ‘Mediterranean world’ and past world-system theory and its preoccupation with the Low Countries and the Baltic, to wider horizons in the tradition of William McNeill’s global history.

At times there is a rhetorical surcharge to this literature which reflects its character as a polemical position. This comes across in a recurrent problem: though the portée of its findings is that the East–West divergence is a fiction and is really a continuum, the oriental globalization literature reverses the current of Eurocentrism by marginalizing the West and centering the East, thus it replays

The oriental globalization literature is uneven in that it represents a kind of retroactive Sinocentrism and Indocentrism; for various reasons China, India and the Middle East have been more extensively studied and are more salient than other areas. There is frequent mention of the ‘Afro-Asian global economy’ but the African part remains sketchier than the Asian side. Also South-east Asia, Central Asia and the Mongol Empire often fall between the cracks of the world’s major zones. The oriental globalization thesis needs to integrate finer-grained regional histories and studies such as Hoerder’s (2002) work on world migrations during the second millennium. Janet Abu-Lughod also suggests triangulation with local histories but notes, ‘We can never stand at some Archimedean point outside our cultures and outside our locations in space and time. No matter how outre we attempt to be, our vision is also distorted’ (2000: 113).

While the oriental globalization literature has grown rapidly and is increasingly substantial, it is by no means dominant. Mainstream thinking continues to view the West as the early developer and the East and the global South as laggards or upstarts. At the turn of the millennium – following the Soviet demise and the Asian crisis and neoconservative belligerence in Washington – Western triumphalism, though increasingly hollow, sets the tone as part of an entrenched ‘intellectual apartheid regime’. The Washington consensus is as steeped in Orientalist stereotypes and historical myopia as the neoconservative mission to bring freedom and democracy to the world. Eurocentric economic history à la David Landes (The Wealth and Poverty of Nations) and Roberts (Triumph of the West) rhymes with Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations, Bernard Lewis’s account of Islam (What Went Wrong?), Fukuyama’s ideological history (The End of History) and Mandelbaum (The Ideas that Conquered the World). This general mindset informs the IMF and the World Bank policies (economics without history or anthropology) as well as American aspirations in the Middle East (politics without memory), as if development and democracy are virtues that the West chanced upon first and only.

Besides plain ignorance and arrogance, there is something deceptive about Eurocentrism-as-policy, a trait that Ha-Joon Chang summed up as Kicking Away the Ladder (2002). In the 19th century free trade was used as a means to deindustrialize colonial economies and now WTO statutes and free trade agreements that uphold the intellectual property rights of multinational corporations short-circuit industrialization in the global South. Institutionalized amnesia and intellectual apartheid are instruments of power.

As the oriental globalization literature over-takes the self-indulgent west-centric view of globalization, perhaps the global realignments that are now gradually taking shape will catch up with the material side of American supremacy. This diagnosis of the ‘global confluence’ arrives on the scene at the time that China, India and East Asia are re-emerging as major forces in the global economy; historiography catches up with the present just when the present is coming full circle with past trends in the world economy. A synthesis that is yet to take shape is that of the historical oriental globalization thesis with the cutting edge of contemporary globalization in the making.

References
Globalization with a European Face

Hermann Schwengel

Mediating Emerging Powers

Should globalization have a face as civilizations and cultures, states and societies, economic and social orders historically had or have? We may think of friendly or ugly faces of power – our cultural memory includes colonial and racist faces of power – one generation in 1968 had the dream of socialism with a human face, and another of capitalism with a human face in the good times of the new economy at the end of the last century. The cultural memory of historical representations of power matters when new emerging powers are beginning to shape the global order. The European cultural memory may enable Europeans to mediate emerging powers beyond the world of traditional empires and their global economies, beyond the worlds of nation-states and their international economies, and beyond the world of liberal empires and their global economy, since they know something about the reflexivity of power. The double character of power, being at once asymmetrical, as Max Weber characterized it, as well as creative, i.e. the ability to do something with somebody else, as Hannah Arendt stressed, has to be turned into a tool for mediation. The emerging powers are structurally diverse: there are nation-states and societies as extended as continents and civilizations like India and China, associations of regional states as in Europe, South-east Asia, and South America, and all the varieties of reflexive territorialism between them. There are networks of global firms and technology hubs, the nodes of capital markets and knowledge systems, and the new economic archaeology of power. There are these widespread media-, techno-, ideo-, religious, and cultural scapes that Arjun Appadurai talks about, and the old and new ecumenical spheres, diasporic locations and islands of meaning with their flows of images, text, sound, and artefact. Last but not least, there are global cities no longer defined only by financial headquarters, historical functions and home for the creative classes, but by their position in the permanent struggle for centrality in the global urban landscape of power, as Saskia Sassen (1995) has taught us. Their emerging powers work from above and from below, within global societies and within their interdependency: people see, hear, taste, feel, and smell this emergence. Discourses on globalization are an essential part of globalization everywhere and are mirrored and reflected by multiple audiences. One may argue that these emerging powers do not allow, do not need or should not ask for mediation, because the flows and stocks of the global complexities, as John Urry (2003) has characterized them, will find their own way. But the realities of globalization demand a rethink of the old European ideas of mediation and Aufhebung. At the same time it is true that European thought is not just the naturally born candidate for the position of mediating emerging powers. European reflexive modernity is less universal and more particular than Europeans often like to believe. It is true that it would be better to speak of 5000 years of globalization rather than of 500 years, as André Gunder Frank (1998) has suggested; that the project of globality is different from the project of modernity, and the global universe after modernism will not be defined by the postmodernism we know. Modern individualism and individual choice in all spheres of life, the interaction of markets as a social research process and the driving force for mobilization and differentiation, popular democracy and individual conflict management, the dominance of rational cultures forcing secularists as well as believers to come up with their reasons and intensities, all these modern achievements are confronted with emerging powers and the empty place of globality. Before suggesting a European reflexive empire, as Ulrich Beck does (Beck and Grande, 2004), Europeans

Jan Nederveen Pieterse is at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, specializing in transnational sociology and is the author of several books.

Key words emerging powers, Europe, European globalization, Westphalian order of societies, world systems

Jan Nederveen Pieterse is at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, specializing in transnational sociology and is the author of several books.
have to break with their idiosyncratic identification of globalization and modernization, reflect on their position in the rise of the modern world system and reshape their illusions after recovering from their own two world wars.

World Systems

The real challenge of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory is to speak of a singular world system. Archaeologists as well as historians would prefer to speak about world systems, they suggest, as Gil Stein (1999) does, alternative frameworks such as trade-diaspora and distance-parity models of interaction, they have empires and their world economies, as Fernand Braudel has documented, and last but not least the world of nation-states and their global economy. The singular modern world system marks the special place in-between historical-archaeological empires and exchange systems, on the one hand, and modern capitalism, democratic republic and open culture, on the other. In this modern world system, however, some basic questions remain: whether the dynamic towards universal nations or the balance of strategically acting powers, and the commercial and credit institutions of economic power or the professional and industrial commodification of labour are shaping economic life, and whether the institutionalized coexistence of beliefs, traditions, and cultures, or the mediation of different human experiences in a single universe of science, ethics, and aesthetics makes the world go round. It is that singularity that now is reappearing on the global political, cultural, and economic stage, but this time in terms of a true global world system. Europeans do not own the reflection on the singular world system at all, they have to accept their histories of rising, rivalling and declining power in a collective psychoanalysis in order to contribute to and mediate the antagonisms of a true global world system. After their centuries of religious civil war and reason, revolution and development, life and difference – Helmuth Plessner has suggested the sequence of reason, development and life for the European centuries – American modernization emerged in the first half of the 20th century as the only mediator between universalism and the balance of powers, industry and commerce, pluralism and belief. As the challenge of socialism disappeared in the second half of that century, and the aspirations of the Third World remained limited because the constitution of many independent states was not embedded in an institutionalized global economic order, for a moment it seemed that the American unification of modernity and globality would be the end of history and that globalization would get an American face. But after only a few years the basic questions of the one-world system are back and more open than ever before. If Europeans are entering the contemporary struggle and competition for the mediation of the emerging powers of globalization, they not only have to understand the shift of economic, political, and cultural power to the American project of global modernization during the last century, but maybe even more the global limits of their own post-war European project which proves to be much more inward-looking, historicist and passive than most of them believe.

European Illusions

After the post-war-recovery, with the crisis of the 1970s, Europeans became conscious of their reflexive capacities and developed sublime feelings of superiority regarding the liberal project of modernization. At the end of the century most of these feelings proved to be illusions, software without hardware. Nevertheless, this amalgam of reflexive social capacities and sublime illusions is an obstacle to any global mediating role giving globalization a European face. Europe seemed to have some civilizational advantages resulting from a longer and more intensive period of industrialization creating the appropriate institutions and the appropriate behaviour of mass society, sophisticated organization and democracy. More than this, European urban experience seemed to preserve an idea of public life, depth of collective experience and vital senses for the division of meaning between urban and rural landscapes. Some people even thought that the European experience of family, marriage and intensive bonds between individuals had the better historical chances to be cultivated and extended. When, three decades ago, the first waves of our contemporary globalization arrived, many Europeans, due to their mature historical institutions, the complexities of their urban life and their differentiated family life believed themselves to be better adjusted to the uncertainties of modernity. Indeed, the American way of life having been Europeanized by war, welfare-statism and communication had moved into the global crisis of the 1970s, seemingly unable to work with this decline. By turning this decline upside down hegemonic American liberals – and their British followers – first of all learned from their Japanese and German competitors and then used the new opportunities of globalization, information industry and global mediascapes to make their project of modernization reflexive, raising productivity, including vital parts of European and Asian societies. The seemingly civilizing European
advantages were doubted. The long and extensive experience of industrialization could also be a disadvantage in flexible high-tech production or high quality service structured by global expansion of the tertiary sector. The European urban experience with its historical-cultural core might not be open enough for the productive effects of migration, transnational media experience and anthropological reflexivity. Even the often quoted stability of personal bonds, reciprocity and public life expressed in public places, theatres and museums could be doubted as too slow, too homogeneous and too inflexible for a vital post-colonial world of intensive differences. The European face seemed to be looking old, not only against the new America but against the new Second World of emerging powers from India and China to South African and South American states and societies. But neither the old nor the new Europe, neither the old nor the new America, neither the old Third World nor the new Second World, match the questions of our time. In 1973 economic globalization began to recover from the de-globalization of the world wars, in 1989, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the question of political globalization returned, and after 2005, with the end of the post-war constitution for Europe, the German question is over, but the European question of that time is now embedded in the real interaction of global emerging powers.

Global Expectations

At the beginning of the 21st century expectations for Europe come more from the periphery than from the centre. The East and South European societies of the EU are re-inventing themselves to get into the markets, networks, and institutions, although these efforts are embedded in the nervous intertwining of local and global desire. Emerging powers like China and India as well as associations of growing economies are interested in a better balance of power and are looking for attractive, cooperation cultures in a competitive world. Beyond nation-building, beyond the historical interaction of civilizations and beyond the Westphalian Order of states, global complexities are framed in a different manner. But instead of developing global governance software without the hardware of global government, a new Westphalian order of societies may be the future. The treaty for this contract is not yet signed, but overlapping societies, migration from above and from below, permanent comparison and exchange of ideas and values are demanding new arenas for conflict and consensus in and between societies linking the power structure of one society much closer to the power structure of the others. As high-technology enterprises, media and cultural industries are providing the interaction of markets, opportunities, desires, and life chances, Europeans could offer a model for an order of open societies attractive for a globalized world. However, the European economic unity in diversity is not established, the difference between a Scandinavian and British welfare regime is unbalanced, and the creative cores of development are partly chic nodes in the global enterprise network. From the glorious times of European modernity there might remain a distinguished sense of global complexities, the fluidity of objects and subjects between words, histories, and experiences, as well as some sense of the dignity of places, persons, and artefacts, but as in history Europeans have to re-invent themselves to mediate the emerging powers. The long shadows of the European 19th century, nation and class, have to be reflected when Europeans are mediating work and service within and between societies, and have to mediate taxation and representation within and between societies while leaving the shadows behind in contributing to a truly globalized world. European intellectual traditions are characterized by the same ambivalence. The intellectual history of critical social theory, structuralism and cultural theory, modernization and systems theory is somehow exhausted from the great post-war recovery, the post-colonial fragmentation and the post-totalitarian difference, but at the same time offering tools of reflexivity for the management of emerging powers. As often in history Europeans prove to be the most universal and the most particular human beings at the same time. They are born to invent the idea of Weltpragmatismus, but could get lost between their history and the compression of time and space.

References

Problematizing Global Knowledge – Genealogies of the Global/Globalizations

Hermann Schwengel is Head of the Department for Sociology at the Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg and Dean of the Faculty for Philosophy. He works in the field of interdisciplinary cultural studies and historical and political sociology including his Globalisierung mit europäischem Gesicht: Der Kampf um die politische Form der Zukunft (Berlin, 1999).

America

Djelal Kadir

Key words: exceptionism, godliness, hegemony, hypertrophy, immunity, impunity, providentialism, supplement, terrorism

To take America as an encyclopedic object, and as a ‘supplement’, at that, is to court damnable incoherence, if not outright action-able impertinence where America’s global order of the day at the beginning of the 21st century is concerned. Hegemonic world order is prone to guard its privileged epistemic and onto-theological status with fanatical zeal. America as self-reifying centrality has militated for its indisputable ontological status since its inception as Puritan theocracy. Harold Bloom, not without typical American self-conviction, has diagnosed America as endemically self-sanctifying and providentially elect, closer to God than any other chosen people has dared deem itself so chosen. Bloom’s The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation, published in the not insignificant year of 1992, is as acute as Bloom could ever be. It is also symptomatic of America’s perennial self-perception as history’s exception. A ‘Post-Christian Nation’, as Blooms subtitle avers, is a post-historical nation, inasmuch as history where America is concerned has always been teleological and messianic, which is to say apocalyptic. Its ‘post-Christianess’ would clearly make it as post-apocalyptic and extra-historical. Symptomatically, Bloom’s diagnosis coincides with Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1993), yet another instance of American triumphalist exceptionalism that deems itself beyond human history. And while Bloom saw America as ‘post-Christian’ in 1992, by the beginning of the 21st century the ‘postness’ he and Fukuyama diagnosed would prove encyclically circular.

In a vehement return of the repressed, in Freud’s terms, that would betray a pre-Christian zeal verging on self-idolatry and divinely conferred self-justification, by 2005 commentarists such as Canada’s (formerly of the USA) Henry A. Giroux refer to the reigning paradigm of America’s public sphere as ‘Rapture Politics’, and to the pitiful characterization of America by its former Attorney General John Ashcroft as

Unique among nations, America recognized the source of our character as being godly and eternal, not being civic and temporal. And because we have understood that our source is eternal, America has been different. We have no king but Jesus. (Giroux, 2005)

At the beginning of the 21st century, then, as we cycle back into encyclopedic knowledge management, America stands apart as uncontested and incontestable hegemon in a cyclical return to a ‘heroic’ age, where ‘heroic’ can only be understood in Hobbian and apocalyptic terms, rather than in terms of the recursive spirals of Giambattista Vico. Such recursivity is not only a reaction formation responding to the baleful contingencies of realpolitik and its terrors, itself a complex set of reactions, in turn. Rather, America’s self-perceived godliness and infallibility are yet another occasion of a compensatory gesture seen as perennially indispensable because, in good measure, of America’s genesis as nominal and philological gambit on the part of pundits such as Thomas More, himself no less theologically convinced, a strength of conviction that would end with his decapitation in the court of his sovereign, and on the part of ironic wits such as Martin Waldseemüller. In his Cosmographia Introductio (Introduction to Cosmography) (1507), Waldseemüller would forge the baptismal nomination of ‘America’ as lexical play on the name of Amerigo Vespucci. By taking the Greek stem meros (‘place’) and prefixing the privative ‘a’ to it, and by locating this ‘no-place’ on earth (ge), with Amerigo Waldseemüller left the trope of ‘utopia’ as legacy for the ill-starred Thomas More (Kadir, 1992). This is the nominal ontology for which America has been compensating ever since with desperate and sanctimonious righteousness. It has not sufficed to displace nominalism as foundation by substituting realism’s or religion’s bedrock ontology. America has
perennially labored to convert that compensatory realism into an onto-teleology, an overcompensation that would have America be ‘real’ not only of/in this world, but also of/in the next. Thus, the providentialist exceptionalism has echoed unremittingly since Columbus equated the newly encountered oceanic land mass with the eschatological New World, since the Puritans founded their theocracy in New England as New Canaan, since continental conquest and colonization found its divine sanction in Manifest Destiny, and since God himself certified the enterprise of global hegemony through His latest providential agent, the current president of the USA, George W. Bush, who is convinced of his divine appointment and godly agency (Mr. Bush would confess on a July 16, 2004, visit to an Amish community in Smoketown, PA, ‘God speaks through me.’ See http://www.irregulartimes.com/godspeaksthroughme.html.) How, then, to consign such providentially sanctioned centrality to epistemic supplement in an encyclopedic archive, when the destiny of America is already writ large in God’s own book for the ages? Perennial attempts to reframe America as hemispheric synecdoche, as ‘the other America’, or as ‘our America’, have proved no more than disingenuous reaffirmations of America as Whitanesque grandeur and bipolar multiplicity, or as involuntary and inexorable self-subalternizations on the part of Latinate voices in the rest of the American Hemisphere. Symptomatic, in this regard, is Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s ‘Nuestra America: Reinventing a Subaltern Paradigm of Recognition and Redistribution’ (2001), where a ‘reinvention’ ends by being a re-inscription and replication of what it would interrogate.

If, then, as the subtitle of this encyclopedic project avers, the global goal is to render ‘global knowledge’ problematic, we are faced with no larger problem than the suppleness this project would impute to the status of what deems itself not only global in this planet Earth, but central in the cosmic order of extra-planetary space (now duly militarized) and transcendental metaphysics (now evangelized with the zeal of born-again self-conviction). This, of course, is not only a transcendence into metatheoretical space and post-apocalyptic time, it is a bulking metaphysic, a hypertrophy that distends the global and overflows any site of knowledge production – no matter whether encyclopedic, archival, digitalized, or hypertexted. No cognitive mapping can contain America, as supplement or as metanarrative, and no network – the World Wide Web or any other cosmic formation of knowledge management – proves equal to the task of epistemic or discursive containment. America has proved from its inception what this author has termed elsewhere ‘an incontinent continent’ (Kadir, 1986). At the beginning of this new millennium, America labors to sustain this indomitable impetus with greater vigor than ever. This is no mere deluge or fluidity that overflows the sites and epistemic rules of knowledge production. America has always viewed itself as post-diluvian and post-apocalyptic, where, as the already cited Bloom demonstrates, by example as much as by assertion, ‘post-’ and ‘pre-’ converge in a cycle of ‘preposterous’ self-conviction. As such, if indeed it is to be consigned taxonomically to the status of supplement, America’s supplementarity must be cosmic and extend well beyond the circumscriptions of the circular paideia we commonly call an ‘encyclo-pedia’. As global hegemon, America situates itself beyond any globalizing process. No archive, squared or in the round, can subsume, much less subject to its disciplinarity the America that militantly deems itself exempt from and exceptional to any consignments of knowledge or constellations of realpolitik. An orthogenesis of its own exertions, America does not brook definition as instance of any discursive formation or as epistemic object of any dialogical assemblage. In its self-perceived and oft-declared exceptionalism, it would persist as incomparable monad that does not allow for diagnostic scrutiny or prognostic speculation outside its own self-engendered criteria. It aggressively projects its own unilateral speculation outside its own self-engendered criteria. It aggressively projects its own unilateral speculation outside its own self-engendered criteria.

References

de Sousa Santos, Boaventura (2001) ‘Nuestra
America: Reinventing a Subaltern Paradigm of
Recognition and Redistribution’, Theory,
Fukuyama, Francis (1993) The End of History
Toronto Star July 24, http://www.thestar.com/
NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/
Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=112
2070220572&call_pageid=1105528093962&
col=1105528093790&DPL=IvsNDS%2f7Ch
AX&taclidlogin=yes
Kadir, Djelal (1986) Questing Fictions: Latin
America’s Family Romance. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Kadir, Djelal (1992) Columbus and the Ends of
the Earth: Europe’s Prophetic Rhetoric as
Conquering Ideology. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.

Djelal Kadir is the Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of
Comparative Literature at the Pennsylvania State
University and the Founding President of the
International American Studies Association. He is
the author or editor of more than ten books, the
latest being How Far Is America from Here?
Selected Proceedings of the First World Congress of
the International American Studies Association
22–24 May 2003. (Amsterdam and New York,
2005), and the Comparative History of Latin
American Literary Cultures, 3 vols (Oxford and