THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL
IN SOUTH-CENTRAL AFRICA

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The Manchester School: From Tight-knit Group to Loose-knit Network

In the decade after World War II, a major, coordinated project of urban and rural research, perhaps the first of its kind in Africa, was carried out by anthropologists working in what was then British Central Africa, now Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi (63, 69). Led by Max Gluckman, the anthropologists broke new ground, empirically and theoretically. Their fresh data were about the observed social practice of specific, recognizable individuals; events were given in detail, with a characteristic richness. The arguments they advanced gave theoretical force to such concepts as, to cite a few among the many, the social field, situational analysis, perpetual succession, intercalary roles, situational selection, cross-cutting ties, the dominant cleavage, redressive ritual, repetitive and changing social systems, processional form, processual change. Besides numerous papers, they published more than a dozen monographs in the 1950s and 1960s (3, 24–26, 41, 43, 68, 76, 85, 86, 100b, 129, 147b, 150).

The concern with social process and the theme of conflict and conflict resolution came to be considered most characteristic of their studies. As Turner put it, when he introduced Schism and Continuity in an African Society, his outstanding classic within the mainstream of these studies:

Underlying the whole study is the concept, most recently reformulated by Gluckman (67) and Colson (22), that groups have "an inherent tendency to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances... conflicts in one set of relationships are absorbed and redressed in the countervailing relations" (132, pp. xxii-xxiii).

The anthropologists came to be known as the Manchester School, after the university department whose seminar was an intense proving arena for them.
and others. In Mitchell's words, "Seen from outside, the Manchester School was a school. But seen from the inside, it was a seething contradiction. And perhaps the only thing we had in common was that Max [Gluckman] was our teacher, and that meant we wrote ethnography rich in actual cases" (personal communication). This seething contradiction which forged disparate contributions is now emerging as the School's lasting strength. Where Marxists rediscover what they see to be "the latent Marxist strand" (57b, p. 23) in the School, others favor a more interpretive approach and take up a phenomenological strand, particularly in Gluckman's own work on the reasonable man (80, p. 6; 47, p. 214). Hence not one strand, but several quite disparate strands now have to be considered, some widely identified with the School, others perhaps more influential beyond it than among its members. The strands I want to discuss are concerned mainly with (a) social problems, (b) processes of articulation, (c) interpersonal interaction, (d) rhetoric and semantics; and I consider them in roughly that order. My aim is to highlight issues of current importance in our field, although my review of the most recent literature must necessarily be brief.

The early members of the Manchester School got much of their initial inspiration outside academia and in the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, now the Institute for Social Research of the University of Zambia (30, 31, 108, 125, 131a, 149, 164). Many were war veterans, and thus older, more experienced than most anthropologists starting fieldwork in their early twenties. In that postwar decade, Oxford structuralists dominated British anthropology. Not surprisingly, it was vis-à-vis Oxford that the Manchester School was first defined. Before coming to Manchester, the early members formed a close-knit working group at Oxford (79). Their élan as a research school survived this academic definition, for at Oxford, and until the mid-1950s at Manchester, they had virtually nothing to do with undergraduate teaching.

Perhaps the earliest outside recognition that a new school had emerged came in a review by Douglas, an Oxford-trained anthropologist familiar with and yet marginal to both the main area and the original working group of the School:

From the many and illuminating references to the researches of other Manchester and Rhodes-Livingstone anthropologists, whether they have worked in Central Africa or other fields, it is evidently time to salute a "school" of anthropology, whose publications are developed through close discussion, and where each worker's work is enhanced by his focus on a common stock of problems (42d, p. 168).

In scope the School was wide, virtually from the start, and included a series of studies in British industrial sociology (48) and Indian village politics and economics (2a, 46c). While acknowledging that wider scope, this review is concentrated on the School's importance for the field of South-Central African studies; and I include certain research in Botswana, which was an extension of the School's studies in Central Africa.
The Manchester School, *qua* school, no longer exists. After that first decade of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, only one of the School’s early members, Colson, continued to do Central African fieldwork with return visits up to the present. Her work along with Scudder has highlighted the need for anthropologists to make repeated and long-term observations rather than one-time studies in order to bring change and innovation into a historical, sociological perspective (27, 29, 32a, 34a, 35, 130). Again, with one important exception, the School’s early members rarely brought students into this field, but directed younger anthropologists’ fieldwork elsewhere. For example, in a considerable Israeli project, Gluckman himself led other anthropologists to carry forward basic ideas from the African research (101, 145, 146). Mitchell was exceptional in that, being based at a university in South-Central Africa until the mid-1960s, he was able to advance the research tradition there with a second generation of fieldworkers, most of whom wrote their PhD theses at Manchester. In a third generation, some students are now writing up the early results of their fieldwork. But the British Central Africa era of the Manchester School is clearly over. Neither at Manchester nor elsewhere in Britain are several Central Africanists together in any anthropology department. The Manchester School survives, of course, in its network, linking highly disparate clusters of widely dispersed scholars; and it may well be revealing about the nature of our own ideas that the School’s members’ interest in networks (106) and “home-boys” (82) bloomed when the School itself ceased to be dominantly a close-knit group.

**The Crisis in the Field**

South-Central African anthropology—and not merely the Manchester School—has come to a crisis. During the 1970s, the great stream of fieldwork and fieldworkers, primarily in Zambia, dried up to a trickle, as did the stream of monographs. In the main, the early Manchester monographs, especially the rural studies, focused on normative inconsistency and contradiction, on situational variation in behavior and processes of social conflict. It is fashionable and all too easy to argue, with rather gross hindsight, that these monographs shared a structural-functional paradigm and that this paradigm was limited to the internal dynamics of small-scale societies. Furthermore, fashionable thinking has it that the paradigm became exhausted in its general theoretical interest (144, 146); it missed too much, was too tied to the status quo, and suffered from being applied too often to the microhistories of village life, mainly the passing moments of micropolitics, such as the petty squabbles of headmen and their rivalrous relatives.

In an important review of trends in Zambian rural research, van Binsbergen puts forth this criticism, while making a positive assessment of contributions by the Manchester School: “African village life was essentially depicted as closed
in itself and following a logic of its own” (139, p. 54). “The tribe” was taken as a unit of study; e.g. Colson & Gluckman’s *Seven Tribes of British Central Africa* (34b), and this led to a confusion in analysis in that the folk concept held by colonial administrators and villagers reappeared as the anthropologists’ analytic concept (perhaps as the folk concept of “peasant” reappears today). Hence only in a later Manchester study. Long’s analysis of innovation by Jehovah’s Witnesses in response to socioeconomic change (97), was “the wider world . . . finally allowed to step in” (139, p. 55). Admittedly, Long’s study could be rephrased in a currently fashionable Marxist idiom, without much distortion, as being about peasant differentiation, the penetration of capital into the countryside, and the social reproduction process. But the criticism of the earlier studies does distort the earlier views of a social field. Moreover, the distortion makes things too easy for those of us, like van Binsbergen himself (140, 141), who continue to grapple with the problems of relating microobservations to wider transformations.

Clearly, a part of the present research crisis is dissatisfaction with some of the ways in which these problems were handled in the early Manchester accounts of integrated social systems. The Manchester accounts contributed to “a tendency for the units of study to shrink” (148, p. 146), and that tendency is now being challenged by tendencies for regional analysis and areal comparison (93a, 127, 140, 156, 162b). But if we are to go forward and not backward to a more mechanical, globally deterministic approach, we need to appreciate which connections between micro- and macrochange were recognized and how they were accounted for in the earlier studies. After all, members of the Manchester School themselves debated the question: “The anthropologist may want to study a particular group, or set of relationships, or domain of activities, which is only part of a larger or more complex social field. How far is it possible to isolate these areas of the field for significant study?” (75, p. 15).

Van Velsen voiced the objection, within the Manchester mainstream, “that isolation, for analytical purposes, should not be confused with *de facto* isolation. In tribal studies the tribe has too often been treated as if it were factually isolated from external cultural, economic, and political influences” (148, p. 145).

This is not the place for a complete view of Gluckman’s own early work. But for our purposes, it is revealing to see which part of it was largely not taken up during the School’s early heyday. Gluckman put forward a series of hypotheses about the expression in cultural terms of social movements involving politically opposed groups from different cultures. For example, “. . . where in a changing system the dominant cleavage is into two culture-groups, each of these groups will tend to set increasingly greater value on its endoculture, since this expresses the dominant cleavage” (60, p. 65). This is the neglected part of Gluckman’s work: it was about interethnic relations, culture and, as Franken-
berg points out, ideology (48, p. 11). [Mitchell’s work on the Copperbelt “Kalela Dance,” which did pursue that, is the most important exception (103a).]

The interethnic argument is now seen to be illuminating in our field, partly through being restated elsewhere. In his Israeli and West African studies, Cohen built on it, as he acknowledges, to develop his influential ideas about the exaggeration and revival of “traditional culture” in “retribalization” (20, p. 97). Following Cohen, the argument has been applied by van Binsbergen in his account of the contemporary political invention of the “tribe” in Zambia (140) and by Almagor in his analysis of “repastoralization” in refugee-host relations in Botswana (1). Also, it is clearly relevant to the current rethinking of contemporary ethnicity in the light of the revised folk and analytic views of what ethnicity was in prior stateless societies (95, 111). With increasing attention to the symbolic construction of ethnic identity (46a), it may well be time to reconsider Gluckman’s other early propositions about interethnic change and continuity in culture.

Social Problems in a Total Society: A Main Strand of the Manchester School

This leads me to the first and perhaps dominant strand of the Manchester School. Consider the title in the Journal of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, “Human Problems in British Central Africa.” The emphasis followed the lead of the Institute’s first director, Godfrey Wilson (13, 163); it was upon relevance to the problems of the people themselves, and above all the most important social problems which were seen to be industrialization and labor migration [for a contrary view, see (98)]. Godfrey Wilson’s own approach with the view of “detribalization” was rejected, however. The reason was that Wilson’s approach was too closely tied to Malinowski’s notion of change through culture contact, which Gluckman attacked in a devastating critique (64, 65). “Detribalization” (163) was also rejected because it implied that people had to be either workers or tribesmen, not both. The assumption was that there existed two systems of social relations and values, one based on modern industrial production, the other on traditional subsistence production, and that people had to commit themselves to one at the expense of the other (150, p. 6). Gluckman’s alternative view regarded labor as going in one leap from village to town and back, and selecting behavior to fit each situation of work and play in either place (71, 72). In Gluckman’s famous dictum, “An African miner is a miner, an African townsman is a townsman” (69, p. 17). The revival of interest in Godfrey Wilson’s work had to await a counterreaction, after a couple of decades, when the dominance of some of Gluckman’s ideas was challenged (45, 46a).
Many of these ideas, a main approach, and the germ of the School's distinctive methods were arrived at by Gluckman before his team of research workers joined him at the Institute. The first and most influential statement is in his three essays of the early 1940s, later republished as *Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand* (58–60). In the School's early heyday, the internal consensus was that "these essays . . . outlined an approach to the study of social change . . . which has provided the central set of analytical concepts of the school" (104, p. vii; for the most recent critical evaluations, see 48, pp. 4–12; 93b, pp. 144–49; 101, pp. 23–24).

In itself novel in the contemporary British anthropology, was Gluckman's description of a day's events at the opening of a bridge in Zululand. It was an occasion happening for the first time, not a customary celebration; and Gluckman described it closely with an eye to the different motives and interests of the various actors, both European and Zulu. The method was not yet that of the extended case. Individual actions were regarded as significant primarily as reflections of macroprocesses. No attempt was made to account for a microhistory of events involving the same individuals prior to that day. Nor were the actors' own definitions of the situation taken to be problematic, as in later treatments by Garbett (53) and Kapferer (88a). Nevertheless, the germ of later case methods was evident (see 44, 109, 110a, 144, 147b).

The main approach was a development of pre-war Oxford structuralism, as Gluckman himself acknowledged, or rather insisted upon (58, p. 26; 74, p. 211; 78, p. 27). Yet other prewar Oxford structuralists showed little or no interest in social problems such as apartheid, industrialization, and labor migration (78). Moreover, the structure they conceptualized was a normative order, a set of values, or an arrangement of jural principles. Once the social problems had to be brought into focus, another conceptualization of structure was needed. Gluckman observed that the "economic integration of Zululand into the South African industrial and agricultural system dominates the social structure" (58, pp. 14–15). Hence he tied his own conceptualization of the social structure to technoeconomic factors.

Gluckman's solution introduced an historical perspective with an emphasis upon process and a distinction between structures or systems according to their relative stability. At its starkest, the distinction obscured gradual and limited change in favor of an extreme contrast between repetitive and changing systems. In the former, changes follow an established pattern; in the latter, they do not, with the possibility of catastrophes and radical breaks from the pattern. The difference depends on how or whether conflicts, which are always present in any system, can be and are resolved (for my criticism of Gluckman's repetitive systems model of civil war see 154, and on his equilibrium model for Barotse see 115, pp. 130–32). Thus in a version of Fortes's and Evans-Pritchard's binary model of fission and fusion, each structure or system was a
synthesis of alternative aspects, conflict, and the overcoming of conflict, antagonism, and cooperation: Gluckman’s was a dialectical view.

**The Initial Plan and the “Sample Area” Method**

A natural step from these essays was Gluckman’s Seven Year Research Plan of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (63). The Seven Year Plan was addressed, above all, to the question of how to study British Central Africa as a changing total society. Gluckman’s answer was to break it down to its typically representative parts, and to treat each as a “sample area” which a sociologist (the word “anthropologist” was not used) could manage to study through fieldwork.

In the Plan towns and rural areas were distinguished, but different types of towns were not spelled out. Among rural areas were six different types according to presence or absence of cash crops, import or export of labor, and proximity to the rail line. The comparative research in accord with that typology was to account for “the differential effects of labor migration and urbanization on the family and kinship organization, the economic life, the political values, the religious and magical beliefs” (63, p. 9, my emphasis). It is worth noting, given recent Marxist criticism of the early work (14, 18), that the Plan explicitly took class differentiation into account, for example, “a class of peasant farmers emerging among Tonga, with their cash crops” (63, p. 9). The method of intensive “sample areas” which foreshadowed the Institute’s considerable use of census techniques was intended to test hypotheses about a limited number of factors, not to provide an account of cultures or whole societies with the same “tribal” name (23). The my people vs your people syndrome or the quest for missing “tribes” had, at least at first, nothing to do with the Manchester School, with the Seven Year Plan or its implementation.

What a sample area method brings into a comparative perspective is diversity in response to general forces of change, and this has recently been the basis for renewed interest in the method. (Does its revival provide an actual instance of Gluckman’s repetitive system?) Once again, in parts of South-Central Africa there is a food crisis, with an apparent deterioration of home production (114b, 114c). This has reopened debate about alternative responses to economic change which Gluckman focused on in a foreword to Watson’s *Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy* (70, pp. v-xvi). In giving that monograph’s key points of growth, as was his custom with Manchester School monographs, Gluckman distilled three sets of factors which went into producing the variable responses in different Central African societies. The argument has its drawbacks [for a critique of Watson’s account of the Mambwe, see (114b)]. But for historians (39a, 115, 118) as well as anthropologists (36, 96) the method of comparison represents a needed antidote to a gross view, in global terms of “peasantization” or “proletarianization,” of agrarian catastrophes within colonial and neocolonial states (32b).
On the gross view of dependency on capitalist penetration from without, a swing prevails (112). After a period of economic stimulation with the introduction of cash crops or labor migration comes the period of strangulation with the collapse of demand for labor or an adverse market for cash crops and a sharp increase in the costs of producing them. Against that view Ranger writes of the need,

to know which societies retained the capacity to respond once again in a healthy manner when colonial industry decided that it wanted food-stuffs from those districts, or when the colonial state decided that it wanted to boost food production everywhere, or when the independent nation state sought to encourage agriculture, and which did not (39a, p. 117).

In *Land Reform in the Making* we take up the underlying challenge to provide accounts which do bring into focus the specific, internal dynamics of different societies and yet sharpen the comparative appreciation of structural transformations within a wider field (161).

The Seven Year Plan, like Gluckman’s earlier essays, is essential reading for any appreciation of the social problems strand in the Manchester School and, indeed, for its overall impact. One reason is that, unlike most such plans, this one was in good measure carried out, as Gluckman was able to show in his own assessment of the project’s strengths and weaknesses ten years later (69). A second is that it contained a view of the big picture, British Central Africa seen as a part of the industrializing empire, which was never replaced by a new synthesis for the wider changing social field. The need has been to locate again all the pieces of microresearch and to put forward new hypotheses on a systematic, comparative basis. A third is that the emphasis was on the effects of economic factors; the study of economies was largely neglected. The neglect is all the more striking in the light of the advance that Richards made. Her early work was the first major anthropological study in Africa of reciprocal food sharing and underproduction in a redistributive economy undergoing rapid change as a result largely of sharply increased labor migration from the countryside to towns (124). Between that study and Lancaster’s fine-grained account of economic change and sex roles (96) there has been almost a break in primarily economic research, or at least in reporting and analysis, and there is a recognized need in our field for further such studies (see also 16, 17, 39b, 113, 114b, 152). Finally, a fourth reason for the Plan’s importance is that carrying out its pieces of microresearch created a tension with the Plan’s basic orientation and forced some of the fieldworkers to redirect their main attention to other issues besides those of labor migration and industrialization.

**The Management of Systems or Spheres in Articulation**

Given the dominant concern with social problems, and partly in the attempt to get a theoretical perspective on them, members of the Manchester School came
to pay special attention to the fit or contradiction between disparate systems or spheres of social relations. This second strand amounted to what would now be considered a theoretical interest in processes of articulation, but it was an interest in something problematic for the people themselves, requiring management, adjustment, or adaptation. The structural models of fit or contradiction focused on social processes in three critical conjunctions: first, relations between village or peasant organization and the organization of the state; second, connections between town and country or industrial and tribal spheres; third, the interconnection between worker organization and the wider system of urban and industrial relations. To a lesser extent, attention was also paid to worker-state relations.

In the following sections, I consider these conjunctions in turn. I begin with a structural model and the processes to which it was applied, and then I review the literature’s recent trends and current debate. Midway, I take up arguments which cut across the separation of peasant/state and town/country relations.

**Village Organization, Bureaucracy, and the State**

Gluckman introduced a structural model (66. 77a) in which articulation within a total political hierarchy was seen in terms of intercalary and interhierarchical roles. At the bottom level was the intercalary role in which the political and domestic or kinship systems met. In this role a village headman was subject not merely to conflicting pressures from his fellow villagers and from his political superiors, but he was also pulled by disparate values and interests as kinsman and as political office-holder. One suggestion was that the increasing intervention of the state in agriculture and village affairs exacerbated the tensions endemic in the role (for a contrast see 91a).

In *The Yao Village* (103b), Mitchell developed the model by examining the dilemmas headmen faced, in villages of differing complexity, because they had to represent and symbolize the whole community to its parts and certain of its parts to the whole. A reputation for impartiality was essential for a headman’s authority. Yet it was that very reputation which was constantly at risk with the exercise of authority. The headman had to settle quarrels between kin which were often linked to festering and ultimately irresolvable tensions of a structural kind. In political competition with other headmen, he faced a related dilemma. His goal was to attract more followers, build up the strength of his village, and thus win greater proof of the chief’s favor, which was expressed in graded emblems of prestige. But with success came not only more people but also more possibilities of splits and increasingly more bitter factional disputes.

Mitchell’s monograph, with its unusually fine microhistories, made the management of political and personal reputation a subject for analysis over time in a way that went well beyond Gluckman’s initial structural framework. But the argument kept to the thesis that major political activity centered around
office, and following Mitchell, an emphasis on office-holding and succession dominated the Manchester School's village studies until van Velsen regarded more informal leadership in the absence of corporate lineages among Lakeside Tonga (147b). Van Velsen's departure opened the way for what has become a stream of research on men of influence and political impasse in a small village (91b, 92), new elites and policy making in a small town (7), entrepreneurs and power strategies in a large village (99), political cliques and class formation on leased farms (37, 38).

Here a question must be asked although it leads somewhat aside from my main discussion of articulation and political hierarchy. A mainstream in British social anthropology during the 1950s, and for some time afterward, was preoccupied, perhaps excessively, with lineages, descent, and the developmental cycle of domestic groups. But did Manchester studies such as Mitchell's (103b) and Marwick's (100b) remain within that mainstream? And if so, at what cost?

Strongly influenced by Fortes, Mitchell used a developmental cycle framework for The Yao Village (103b). The wider process of village politics was seen to have a cycle like that of matrilineage power struggles, the latter crucially constituting the former. Similarly, Marwick gave most weight to lineage segmentation when examining Cewa sorcery accusations as catalysts in structurally endemic splits (100b).

It is worth noting how in a Yao village sets of living siblings and their offspring located themselves genealogically. They did so, with reference to the current headman, through ascending pairs of ancestresses or an ancestor, a past village headman, if the set was patrilaterally linked. In the total village genealogy which the ethnographer was able to piece together as a whole, for even a quite large village, a simple representation of "us" vs "them" was given repeatedly. Yet Mitchell did not recognize that the Yao regularly simplified the demographic variation of the past for present purposes by using an elementary binary scheme; descent was a construction after the fact.

The point illustrates a more general difficulty with both Marwick's and Mitchell's village studies. Their approach blocked out phenomenological questions of selective perception and the present reconstruction of the past. Mitchell changed his approach in his later phenomenological statement of urban ethnicity (107). Barnes and Cunnison, writing on history and the invention of tradition (2b, 40), had already raised such questions, which have now been taken up in a series of recent studies, including my own (38, 94, 120, 155a, 159; see also 3, 41).

Interhierarchical Roles and Bureaucracy

That said, I want to complete the discussion of political articulation by considering interhierarchical roles. Here the concern was with chiefs and district
commissioners, although the latter were not described in depth, with one exception (86). The interhierarchal roles of chiefs and district commissioners, like the intercalary roles of headmen, were considered to be characterized by dilemmas and conflicting pressures. This was due to the fact that they were at the meeting points within the total political hierarchy between subhierarchies with disparate interests and values.

Holleman's account was outstanding, although it has been somewhat neglected. With privileged or rather state-sanctioned access to information on district commissioner and chief alike, Holleman, who headed a Southern Rhodesia government commission of inquiry, showed how each official was pulled into a confrontation. This was toward the end of alien rule in Zimbabwe with the emergence of nationalism and a reorganization of government (86; see also 151). Holteman's description of the colonial administration in action was also unusually comprehensive. However, it conveyed connections between the developing bureaucracy and a changing power situation without raising the statement of these connections to a theoretical plane. Nevertheless, some of the weakness of the structuralist model became apparent, such as that it assumed a fixity about the levels in the hierarchy and that it made the actor virtually a prisoner at the level of his role, i.e. at the bottom as headman or in the middle as chief or district commissioner. What Holleman showed was how an actor as a politically conscious being may decide he must operate at different levels of the hierarchy and, even more, mobilize support from outside it. A further development of the argument is emerging on the basis of observations in the postcolonial state (6, 15, 29, 55, 94, 159) where the complexity and number of the levels is more unstable, with the changing distribution of power in center-periphery relations and with the multiplication of bureaucratic and quasi-bureaucratic agencies (162a).

It must be said, however, that the study of bureaucracy has not gone beyond its infancy in our field. Gluckman argued that Weberian models of bureaucracy, influential in studies elsewhere in Africa during the 1960s, distracted attention from the full realities of power in an altering economy (74, p. 47). In his own later work on courts, he did not pursue his early perception that under colonial rule, "The Lozi government is tending to become a bureaucracy, separated from and not representing the people" (59, p. 120: 62). Presently, there is a major need for research on the expansion of bureaucracy and the state, but unless it is research on the world views of clients and officials, on their invention of culture and "tradition" as well as on their power strategies or "class" alliances (143), it will continue to leave a gap in our understanding of peasant-state relations and the current catchword, "grass-roots development" (28). A further need stems from our growing awareness of development personnel as forming an international community with a culture of its own and with a major goal of self-preservation (33). Unless our local studies of
bureaucracy can take into account how members of that international community maintain it and their places within it, we are likely to make rather limited sense of the apparent absurdities of development planning and practice.

**Dual Spheres: Town and Country**

Gluckman's *Economy of the Central Barotse Plain* (59) and his *Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property* (61) gave leads for a dual-spheres model of a total social field. In later studies (147a, b, 150), the dual-spheres model was used to show how under colonialism, industrialization with labor migration reinforced tribal political and kinship systems rather than breaking them down. Within the total social field there were two spheres, one urban and industrial, the other rural or tribal, and a functionally complementary relation held between them (73). The urban sphere got the labor it needed without having to pay the full social costs of reproducing that labor. Migrants “raided” the towns for wages and then returned home to the countryside where their families maintained themselves by producing on the land (56). The land was kept from becoming a commodity, and thus opening the way for the burden of landless poor, by the colonial order which fixed the control of land under tribal authorities. To be a tribesman was to have rights to land and thus security against the vagaries of urban employment. Such rights could not be divorced from kinship bonds and obligations. Hence clinging to the land meant clinging to a tribal political and kinship system.

Watson went further in arguing for the positive fit between spheres in the Mambwe case.

The Mambwe are conditioned by their indigenous productive system to work regularly, to co-operate in production, to appreciate residential stability, and to value present investment for future benefits. These values are not dissimilar to those current among Europeans in the industrial sector of the economy, and may help the Mambwe wage-earner to benefit from the industrial labor markets in a way quite different from other shifting cultivators on the plateau (150, p. 35).

It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the use of a dual-spheres model brought about a blindness to political opposition and antagonism to colonial rule. On the contrary, Watson used the model to account for rural support for the African Congress and the mobilization of a chief, along with the symbolic capital of chiefship, against both a proposed Central African Federation and increased state intervention in agriculture (150, pp. 215–21).

The break from the dual-spheres model has stemmed mainly from three considerations. The model has proved inadequate to cover extremes of stratification associated with economic boom or bust; i.e. in the Luapula area, increasingly sharp economic and social differentiation with the expansion of commercial fishing and trading (113, 114a) and, among Mambwe themselves, widespread impoverishment due to collapse of the demand for labor (114b,
114c). Secondly, as Mayer pointed out, “The extra-town ties can indeed be simultaneously involved in those very actions which represent participation in an urban system. An ‘urban’ role and a ‘tribal’ role can be discharged pari passu” (102, p. 576). A corollary is that rural adaptations are made to sustain such simultaneous involvement and cannot be explained merely by reference to a rural system.

Thirdly, whether the rural-urban dichotomy is analytically useful or empirically valid in the postcolonial state has increasingly come to be doubted. Colson and Scudder compared two quite nearby villages of resettled Gwembe Tonga in order to highlight the rural diversification that has become so marked in Zambia and more widely in Africa (35). For members of one village, “... there is no rural-urban continuum, nor do sample members behave differently when living in town as opposed to when living in the village. Rather town and country are part of a single habitat in which the same mechanisms for coping are used” (35, p. 202).

Such a village sustains a constant flow of people to and from the major towns of Kafue and Lusaka for such purposes as work, marketing of crops, shopping, and casual sociability. By contrast, in the second village people are trapped in subsistence agriculture and rely heavily on rural wage earning and construction work in a nearby small town. They have adopted town standards of dress and diet; they expect to have amenities like those of town dwellers, but they shun the major towns. Thus in neither village would the dual-spheres model apply.

Pottier’s restudy of the Mambwe highlights a related point because it brings into focus the regional importance that a small town and its squatter settlement may have when the mainstay becomes petty trading and commerce in contraband. The point is that the model’s rural-urban dichotomy made it hard to conceptualize developments in relations within the countryside between the small town and its hinterland. Here it is worth noting that despite a few recent studies by Bond (6), Keller (89, 90), and Weinrich (153), small towns continue to be grossly understudied in our field. It is as if the established view of labor moving in one leap from country to town and back has depended on ignoring the steps in between.

So far we have seen the argument primarily from the rural side of urban-rural relations. It can also be seen from the urban side, i.e. where people now perform in towns rituals once performed only in the countryside (34a; 141, pp. 236–56). But how are we to account for such continuities in behavior? Can we construct a model that is more adequate for the interaction between town and country?

It has been suggested (57a, 142) that the best way forward from the dual-spheres model is a Marxist approach: the penetration of capitalism is to be understood by analyzing the articulation of modes of production. I am doubtful, however, whether such an approach can overcome a built-in bias. This is
the tendency to resort to a version of functionalist or teleological reasoning. In it capitalism is the dominant mode of production and increasingly on the march: hence what survives does so simply because it suits capitalism and not primarily because of any resilience in other social relations or any adaptive strength in cultural dispositions. I am aware that this is a moot issue among Marxists themselves (57a, pp. 30–31), but I believe that in our field of study no Marxist approach has overcome the limitation.

**Beyond the Parameters: Religion in History**

So far it has been useful to discuss separately peasant-state and urban-rural relations. But the crisis in our field has taken us beyond such a separation and thus beyond the parameters of the Manchester studies of the 1950s and 1960s. The analytic cutting across of that separation has been most evident in recent arguments which explore historical change in the organization, ideology, and experience of religion. Hence, before completing my discussion of the structuralist models, I would like to leave their framework and pursue some of this more recent exploration of religious change. My discussion will further highlight the impact that different approaches—neo-Marxist, phenomenological, poststructuralist—are having on studies in our field.

Within our field, the impetus for this exploration has come from two main sources. Somewhat apart from the mainstream of Manchester village studies, Colson’s essays on Tonga neighborhoods and cross-cutting ties (26) raised the question of how a diffuse community ritually associated with the land generated or constituted political community and political authority. The foci in her analysis were shrines as central places around which were organized the rudiments of public peace as well as various flows of ritual goods and services going even beyond the community. For a population that was gradually shifting between ephemeral communities, each shrine with its heroic founder at most a few generations back was a sea anchor “which slows the drift and does not stop it” (21, pp. 100).

A further stimulus came from the work of historians, notably T. O. Ranger (116, 117, 119–124). The key questions Ranger has posed have been about the nature of religious protest and the differential responses by cults and churches during major crises of a political or economic kind. His answers, if much debated (5, 19, 158), have opened a major area of research (8, 49, 50, 52, 94, 126, 127, 158) by anthropologists challenged to move toward a truly historical perspective on religious change.

On that basis, the contributors to *Guardians of the Land* (127) have analyzed trends in what Schoffeleers calls “territorial cults” and “ecological ritual.” These are cults in which the rituals’ ostensible aim is to protect the community as a moral whole. The rituals are to secure the goodness of the land and, indeed, all the values, including the health and fertility of individuals, which in
religious belief depend on the communal integrity. The book's thesis is that political change is the prime cause, even an exemplary model or blueprint, for religious change. It is because of invasion and conquest, the confrontation of states and stateless societies, the formation and re-formation of states that the cults are considered to have altered the parochial or universal identity of their spirits, their local or interlocal extension, their formal organization in terms of centralization and hierarchy, indeed their very conception of a ritualized attachment to the land.

Schoffeleers's typology for a major areal comparison of cult trends hinges on the view that the cults vary according to the principles which people use to define their communities. The principles seem to be: 1. residential nearness, 2. wider political association, 3. ethnicity in the sense of shared identity on the basis of likeness in culture, language and history. For each there is a corresponding type of territorial cult: 1. local, 2. state, 3. tribal. A fourth type, the federative, emerges with the kind of community that cuts across the other principles. So rare does this cross-cutting type seem to be that Schoffeleers finds only two instances in Central Africa. Both are High God cults, and both were centred, in their early heydays, in great states involved in long-distance trade: i.e. the Chisumphi cult of the Maravi states west of Lake Malawi and the Mwali cult of the states surrounding the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe.

I do not find the typology convincing, as a whole. Among other things, the typology is inadequate for the conceptualization of cross-cutting relations. Their absence, apart from the two federative or intertribal High God cults, is an artifact of the typology, rather than history, in my view. For example, consider the cult centered at Monze in the once stateless society of Tonga. Discussed as a local cult by Schoffeleers, it has been on Colson's evidence (32a, p. 125), both interethnic and interlocal in its region [for an attempt to view the cult in ethnic or supertribal terms see (111)]. The point is not a matter of an error in labeling, which, if corrected, would leave the typology unchallenged. In terms of the typology, this cult is so significantly unlike the two federative cults that lumping them all together would virtually collapse many of the conclusions linked to the typology as a whole.

Schoffeleers concludes, "... the modern period . . . sounded the death knell for territorial cults" (127, p. 43). It may be too much to expect Schoffeleers to have anticipated, as I discuss shortly, that some of the cults were once again to be a force in making history at the barrel of a gun. But it marks a fundamental misreading that his view does not and cannot take into account the fact that certain cults continue, through the colonial and postcolonial periods, to be at the forefront of resistance to the state and prominent in symbolic protest against the inroads of a cash economy.

Lan's *Making History, Spirit Mediums and the Guerilla War in the Dande area of Zimbabwe* (94) is the first major attempt in our field to build on
Lévi-Strauss's analysis of myth and, on that basis, to produce a post structuralist approach to religious innovation under conditions of rapid change, with the attack on colonialism's ancien régime. Substantial studies of the Korekore mediums before the war by Garbett (50–52, 54) and Bourdillon (8–12) made Lan's advance possible. Lan shows that by expanding the reference of the cult's political symbolism, spirit mediums, and perhaps most importantly among them one associated with the power of war, were able to absorb guerrilla warfare within their cosmology. In one part of Zimbabwe at least, the cult incorporated guerrillas, requiring them to conform to its logic, rather than the other way round. Lan's study gives a systematic account of the politics of tradition in resistance to the state through to the postwar period; and it enables us to understand how and why it was that the cult was so resilient in the face of a violent and severe crisis. Above all, there is the lesson that anthropology of a classic kind has something important to say about what matters to people even when they are swept up in apparent revolution.

Around sacred central places, such as those of spirit mediums, are focused and refocused the flows which take people, goods, services, and ideas across communities. The observation is not novel, yet too often it has been neglected in analysis. Too often, the "sociopolitical system" or the bounded community has so been given priority that it regularly appears to have religion as somehow reflecting or corresponding to it. To overcome the neglect, a concept has been needed that would crystallize our theoretical interest in sacred places and the changing flows around them and across communities.

I introduced the concept of the regional cult to meet that need in an A.S.A. monograph with a fairly representative coverage for South-Central Africa (32a, 126, 138b, 158). Part of the impetus for this has been indicated above. It came from earlier South-Central African studies as well as from my long-term observation of the High God cult of Mwali. After the A.S.A. essays were written, I should note also, I developed the concept further by constructing an analytic framework for the range of regional cults (157). At that stage, I responded primarily to the recent contributions by Smith and others on "nodal forms of organization" (131b, p. 9) and by Turner on pilgrimages as social processes (136a).

Much of the framework had to be addressed to internal dynamics. It had to be established, first, that regional cults have competing organizational and ideological tendencies, perhaps most importantly tendencies toward inclusiveness and exclusiveness; and second, that propositions about these tendencies can be put with regard to the location of the sacred centers, their definition, their pattern with regard to other centers, their significance for cult elites and hierarchies. Beyond this, my framework of regional analysis represented an attempt not only to interpret but also to account contextually for the cults' waxing and waning. I rejected what I considered to be a simplistic "correspond-
ence theory,” but I did contextualize cult change in a dialectical relation with a wider social field having its own changing values and its own changing distribution of power and resources. Indeed, such contextualization was the essential basis for my specific account (158) of a two-way process of politics in which the High God cult has continued in different historical periods to rally moral sentiment against exploitation and the abuse of power.

To quote from a development of my argument,

With its concentration on point-to-point relations rather than boundedness, [the framework of regional analysis] gives full weight to the ways that activities are focused and oriented within zones and wider fields whose circumference may be ambiguous and even indeterminate, rather than a known, essential prerequisite for analysis. Similarly, in its approach to culture, it presumes no box, no single or unitary code within which all the flow of discourse must be contained. Instead, it recognizes the translation of culture by the people themselves, and takes as problematic their switching from code to code (160, p. 681).

To pursue the argument even further, the much wider and growing body of literature on large-scale and polyethnic religious movements in South-Central Africa has to be taken up. There are very fine studies, particularly by Daneel (42a, 42b), Dillon-Malone (42c), Jules-Rosette (87a, 87b), and Murphree (110b), which describe the specifics of religious innovation in different polyethnic churches. On this basis we are able to raise a series of questions. What are the images of space and the person which the religious imagination invents at different periods within the same wider social field? What is the inner and transformational logic of such imagery? How does it relate to perceived predicaments and contradictions in experience? Exploring these questions within a framework of regional analysis leads me, in recent work (162b), to a better appreciation of the Mwali cult in relation to polyethnic churches within the same wider social field. The result is more sensitive to semantic and phenomenological issues, and it gives a comparative perspective on the cumulative development of religious pluralism in a wide area extending even beyond South-Central Africa.

The project, if not always the method and major theoretical sources, is similar to the one van Binsbergen has pursued, primarily with nineteenth and twentieth century data from Zambia on cults of affliction, territorial cults, and prophetic churches. His collected essays (141) put forward a series of alternative models of the relations between religion, economy, and society. The early models remind one of arguments of Fustel de Coulanges in their view of an evolutionary trajectory. But van Binsbergen makes a radical critique of Horton’s intellectualist view of the reconstruction of symbolic order; he exposes its neglect of the organizational dimension of religious innovation as well as its overemphasis on one-way rather than dialectical change. The movement in van Binsbergen’s own thinking is toward a Marxist approach. In his introductory programmatic statement, such an approach is focused around the conflicts of
interest between the weak and the powerful which make for the dynamics of a mode of production and related processes of articulation between modes of production. In this statement also, the rapprochement is more with Godelier and Augé, rather than with other French Marxists (Meillasoux, Rey, Terray) who hardly attempt to do “full justice to the relative autonomy of the symbolic order. . . . or to present] an explicit analysis of the relations and transformations forward and backward between the symbolic and material order” (141, p. 69).

It is worth noting that on the confrontation between the Lumpa church, the dominant nationalist party, and the state, related views are put forward by van Binsbergen (138a) and Bond (7), albeit without reference to each other. (Bond is influenced by British Marxist historians, Hobsbawm and Thompson.) Both focus on rural community’s incorporation in capitalism and the state as well as on the ideological expression of an incipient class struggle between rich and poor peasants and/or proletarians. However, somewhat more than Bond, van Binsbergen clarifies the phases in which the Lenshina movement developed its own organization as a society within and opposed to the society around it, but also with its own internal conflicts between leaders and followers.

It might be thought, from the review so far, that cults and churches monopolize religious innovation in South-Central Africa. Against that, Harries-Jones (83) makes an important point about political religion in his illuminating study of Zambia’s dominant nationalist party (U.N.I.P.) and its development from a preindependence phase of mobilization and antielitism to later phases of bureaucratic administration and elitism. Harries-Jones relates the party’s success in mobilizing political support to its success in religious innovation. By creating new urban funeral committees and thus taking over the urban arrangements to honor the dead, the party invested itself, in town, with the roles of the closest kin along with the sentiments and legitimacy in close kinship. The urban funeral was for “all people of Zambia”; vast crowds came. But rather than overthrowing accepted tradition, care was taken to be seen to respect it. The party was thus able “to incorporate tradition into its political organization, and to remain free from the accusation that it was promoting any particular tribal interest” (84, p. 112).

The Urban System: Part-Systems and Partial Integration

These processes of articulation and religious innovation lead me to another of the Manchester School’s structuralist models. It is the last which space permits me to discuss here. In his introduction to the only book on urbanization in the School’s early heyday, apart from Mitchell’s “Kalela Dance” (103a), Epstein gave the gist of it:

The urban social system is made up of many different sets of social relations or spheres of social interactions. The factors making for social change and development operate over the
whole of this field, and are present in every sphere; but they do not impinge upon these spheres with the same weight, or at the same time. Thus the developing urban social system appears to be marked by internal inconsistency. In the discussion of "tribalism" in towns I have tried to show how such inconsistency may be resolved through the operation of the principle of situational selection (43, p. xviii).

The basic perception was that while racial cleavages were paramount throughout, in many areas of urban life tribal values continued to operate alongside industrial values in other areas.

If the dual-spheres model of town and country, at least in Watson's version, was a model of fit and reinforcement, this model of the urban social system was a model of partial integration and inconsistency. Moreover, only for the duration of a limited period could that inconsistency be temporarily resolved through situational selection. The model envisioned a temporary avoidance of conflict by actors selecting, in Azande-like fashion, one belief in one situation and a perhaps contradictory one in another, according to the actor's role. From period to period, however, the inconsistency and disharmony was a source of change in a crisis, i.e. the model harked back to Gluckman's view of a changing social system (see above, p. 162). As Epstein put it, "It is only in situations of crisis... that the inherent conflicts emerge, and the radical opposition between these different principles of social organization is brought into the open" (43, p. 46).

In their use of the partial integration model, Mitchell and Epstein complemented each other. Mitchell's account of Copperbelt leisure activities gave the lead; Epstein's analysis followed, first on mine and municipal township politics (43) and most recently on domestic life (46b). Their studies thus took a radically different direction from those in East and West Africa which started with the ethnic group and its lineage or network organization in opposition with others. A distinctive hallmark of the early and later Manchester School studies in urban South-Central Africa (83, 88a, 105, 106), I should stress, was the focus on various situations, movements, associations, or networks in which interethnic relations could be observed but which were defined in other terms than ethnicity.

Current debate suggests that the earlier studies had too little to say about the changing roles of women, but an adequate remedy for the neglect is still needed. In my view, Schuster's account of the Zambian capital's "new women" (128) is too one-sided an ethnography of sexual politics, with vivid anecdotes but without the depth of case analysis we have come to know we need. Elite and subelite women appear either to be victimized by men or to have to toughen themselves to be the manipulators. It all rests on Schuster presuming to be able to make the clinical judgment that Zambia is a "sick society" and that the social malaise corrupts and oppresses women as wives and lovers. Keller (89) and Hansen (81a, 81b) provide alternative evidence; they are right to reject
Schuster's contention and to begin analyzing the variation in women's roles of dependence or independence in relation to a wider structure of opportunity.

**The Interactionist Strand: Transaction or Symbolic Interaction**

At many points in this review, I have been aware that one book could be regarded as a centerpiece for understanding the Manchester School's principal currents of ideas, orientations, and empirical concerns. It is, of course, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society* (132), and its main argument is now too well known to need to be rehearsed here. On a personal note, I have to say that the sad news of Victor Turner's death has reached me while I have been writing this review. He was my friend and teacher. He blazed trails, with the *chinjikijulu* of the Ndembu (134, p. 29) and so many others, far beyond the scope of this review; and I must devote a separate essay to my appreciation.

But, to put it briefly, *Schism and Continuity* was at once the crest of one wave, on conflict resolution, and a force for movement in the alternative directions of transactionalism and more interpretive approaches such as symbolic interaction. If unmistakably a part of the theoretical development from the Oxford structuralists, *Schism and Continuity* was a high-water mark in that Manchester mainstream which derived from Malinowski's *Crime and Custom* (100a) and his notions of endemic conflict and the social or life situation. In *Crime and Custom*, the endemic conflict of principles was primarily between Mother-right and Father-love or paternal interest. In *Schism and Continuity* it was between matrilineality and virilocality. In both, the major conflict involved the choice between conflicting loyalties, the tension between selfish and social drives, and the antagonism between individuals or cliques seeking power or wealth.

Malinowski can be read, of course, as if he meant to value practical action over cultural norm, but that was not the received view in the early Manchester tradition. Malinowski's lesson which *Schism and Continuity* took up was this. The full force of cultural reality is felt in *crises*; then are governing norms restated and upheld, not bent or manipulated to suit private interests. The point from *Crime and Custom* was, further, that compromises and readjustments are made beneath the surface of social life until a crisis makes them public, when for the sake of redress people may bring "ritual power" and its "binding force" (100a, p. 104) to bear. In *Schism and Continuity* the radical advance was a highly systematic framework of processual analysis, built around the concept of the social drama with its pre- and post-crisis phases, and substantiated in the rich microhistories of humanly rounded individuals. Sandombu confronted us, like a hero in a Greek drama, and it was as if we were witnessing "the helplessness of the human individual before the Fates: but in this case the Fates [were] the necessities of the social process" (132, p. 94).
But what were these necessities? The microhistories in *Schism and Continuity* resound with Turner's perceptions of human creativity and individual consciousness, his insights into the negotiation of cultural and social order and his analysis of the power-seeking manipulations of self-interested individuals. In itself the interaction was generative on the microscale. Here the microhistorian seemed to be saying something more and other than the sociologist of the whole social system. Or rather, the insights implicitly called for a move away from the current structuralist paradigm of conflict resolution in order to conceptualize the nuances, even the ephemera, of microsituations.

At this parting of ways, opposed directions for the study of interaction were indicated. In one direction loomed *homo economicus* and approaches with universal, culturally nonspecific assumptions about the quest for benefit through tactics and strategies. This was the direction of transactionalism, and following it led, perhaps most distinctively in the Manchester tradition, to the accounts of choice and decision making in social networks which Mitchell fostered. In an opposite direction was the concern with the force of symbols, the culturally specific management of meaning, the construction of images of the self and the person. Here Turner's later work also challenged us and has had an impact on studies which have tended toward a symbolic interactionist or phenomenological approach.

By applying propositions from Blau about exchange and power, Kapferer took the transactional direction about as far as it could go. The result was his tour de force on interaction between African workers and Indian management in a small Indian-owned factory in a Zambian mining town. Like Turner, Kapferer concentrated his analysis on events around a crisis: but in his case the three phases climaxed in a strike. No previous worker in our field had reached Kapferer's standard in the meticulous documentation of the transfer of goods and services between workers. This enabled Kapferer to trace quite rigorously the highly specific variations in social credit and credibility which affect a person's ability to control others in interaction.

At points in the analysis, however, Kapferer did move in a direction away from Blau by pursuing Boulding's ideas of the self image and Strauss's approach to negotiated order. In Kapferer's view, how a situation was defined was problematic, empirically as well as analytically. Under conditions of normative uncertainty, he argued, defining the situation is an achievement that has to be made by the actors themselves. The definition of the situation has to emerge from the interaction itself, in his view, and cannot be given merely by the structure of a wider arena. A major strength of his approach is that it enables us to understand changes in consciousness and perception as workers and management explore the strength and nature of their
support beyond the factory floor, learning the new realities of union and government power in the recently independent state.

Perhaps the best and most thoroughgoing critique of transactionalism is the one that Kapferer has himself given in the book he edited on *Transaction and Meaning* (88b). And the question which he raises remains: Is transactionalism an exhausted paradigm or can a suitably modified model be developed?

**Toward Semantics and Rhetoric**

The label “Semantic Anthropology” was not invented by members of the Manchester School. Yet it fits our continuing concern with the study of language that moves people to action and persuades them of the conduct that fits their social situation. The suggestion may seem somewhat surprising, given some of the conventional wisdom about the distinctive interests of the Manchester School. The time has come, however, to see Turner’s major work on the performance of ritual, on the evocative ambiguities in symbols and metaphors (134–136), as a force within an established mainstream of research in South-Central Africa. This is the study by members of the Manchester School and others of rhetoric and ambiguity in the context of social situations. We have begun to explore the language of healing in divination (137, 155b) and other ritual (87a, 87b, 155c) and to account for its power to move and motivate actors.

Much of the rhetoric studied by members of the School has been in disputes and court arguments (38, 43, 68, 69, 159, 162a). Moreover, much of the ambiguity has been in the vocabulary of ownership (76, pp. 140–69), the norms of office (155a) or marriage (38), the terms and categories of land-holding (76, pp. 75–111, 155d), or legal concepts in general (68, 77b). All of this has tended to put the analyses somewhat beyond the pale of “Semantic Anthropology.” For it is a widespread bias, at least among social anthropologists, that whereas something called kinship or perhaps politics is at “the core of the subject,” something else called law is in a compartment (the legal hag, in the words of a colleague) by itself, at the periphery where peculiar hobbyhorses belong.

To put aside that curious compartmentalization, I want to conclude by drawing attention to an exploration that takes us to one frontier of our subject. Gluckman’s classic on the judicial process (68) started our exploration of the nexus between concepts of the person, the language of rules, and the logic of situations. It is beside the question here to make the much rehearsed legalistic points about his use or abuse of “the reasonable man.” The nub of the matter is that Gluckman opened up the problems of how culturally shared concepts of the person are used by judges and inform their rhetoric and their manipulation of ambiguity in the rules. In the argument from cross-examination to judgment, rather than operating with any single rule or stated norm, the judges had to bring to bear a whole gestalt of legal and nonlegal elements, many of them implicit
categories, Gluckman showed. He put forward a framework for analyzing distinct forms of ambiguity within a hierarchy of concepts (68, pp. 293–305). Moreover, he applied the framework in order to account for the ways in which judges are able to be persuasive and carry the conviction of judging according to the law and public standards despite the apparent uniqueness or novelty in any specific case.

With data from Tswana disputes, Comaroff and Roberts (38), writing in that rare partnership of an anthropologist and a lawyer, shift the analysis from the judges’ to the litigants’ perspective. While they pursue the theoretical interest in normative gestalts and the construction of authoritative discourse, they introduce more of an emphasis on power. Who controls the dispute process from phase to phase and how, they ask. They base their answers in a theoretically sophisticated account of the discourse in which behavior is labeled and categorized. One result is a challenging model of the debating tactics and strategies in different kinds of cases between various types of adversaries.

It must be seen also that the exploration goes beyond indigenous forums and modes of argument employing culturally shared premises and commonly understood categories. There is a growing interest in introduced forums and argument in which there is a misrecognition of culture along with innovation that is inadvertent, covert, or disguised as tradition. Following that interest, I have dealt with the argument in disputes before commissions of inquiry, quasi-judicial tribunals, and other introduced forums; I show how highly ambiguous rules and categories are variously invented and turned into received tradition by bureaucrats, politicians, and villagers under colonial rule (155a) and in a new, postcolonial state (159, 162a). The immediate challenge is to carry this exploration forward in a way that interprets fine sequences of action and accounts for the imaginative, even idiosyncratic use of rhetoric, but at the same time gives full weight to processes of change in wider social fields.

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